



A comparative historical study of religious, legal and political transformations during the contemporary Iranian social movements

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Abstract

No governing body is able to exercise glorious domination over a region or victorious control of a nation through lawlessness, arbitrary power and injustice. A ruling regime may get ahead in such circumstances, only when dominated social groups and classes refrain from working together to advance their shared ideas, therefore cease resistance and relinquish their legitimate rights to change via social movements. Contemporary Iranian society has gone through various forms of social movements in order not to surrender, but to improve the situation of freedom and social justice. This restricted regional research, via using comparative historical perspective, questions in what ways the social forces participating in three major modern-day social movements could bring about religious, legal and political changes, taking into consideration the Shi'i Shari'a-based ideological interpretations and transformations. A brief overview of these efforts demonstrates how each of them was initially relatively successful in bringing about a major shift in domestic politics to attract a greater popular political participation, but could not maintain its gains under religiously politically prevailing tyranny, among other internal and external variables. This appraisal based on a theoretical review on the comparable analytical literature of the Nazi movement and system depicts, how the Islamic Republic, despite of its essential differences, as the constitutional heir to the Shari'a-based Constitutional Supplement of the 1900s constitutional movement, the direct outcome of the 1970s revolutionary movement, as well as the repressive force against the 2009 Green reformative movement has an anti-totalitarian organizational system, not a totalitarian executive entity. Accordingly, by recognizing the process of decentralization of power (Neumann and Hilberg), the organizational progressive self-radicalization of the repressive forces (Mommsen) and the fact that the religious leaders to implement their oppressive policies recruit predominately from normal people not necessarily from ideological ones (Browning and Kühl), an analytical focus on the both lower and higher levels, an intentionalist-functionalist amalgamation approach is suggested. Methodologically, to examine these social collaborations, the sequence of events has been scrutinized, through small-n design. Accordingly, three different strategies of causal assessment are practiced, narrative (process tracking), as well as nominal (Mill's System of Logic and Boolean algebra) and ordinal comparisons (Fuzzy logic) to tackle the problem of large numbers of explanatory variables and increase testability of the causal claims. This work lastly has a different look at the solutions facing the Iranian current society and crises, neither a revolutionary to overthrow nor a reformative to consolidate, but a constitutional quest, as an alternative solution.

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Abbreviations

CENTO	Central Treaty Organization (a treaty during the Cold War)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
EU	European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product or (Income)
IRGC	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
IRIB	Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting
MOIS	Ministry of Intelligence and Security
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
SA	Sturmabteilung (paramilitary wing of the German Nazi Party)
SAVAK	Sazeman-e Ettela'at va Amniat-e Keshvar (Intelligence and Security Organization of Iran, during Pahlavi dynasty)
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nations
US	United States (of America)

Chapter I. Introduction and theoretical framework

Introducing the subject matter, the importance and aspiration within literature review

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6. Method

1. Introduction

Sociologically, a research topic statement, concerning a particular area, can either arise from theory or practical sphere of social facts.¹ Whereas, the functionality of a theory can be discovery, description and explanation of a single phenomenon,² the mission of a comparative historical explanatory study can be recognition of causal factors, supervising a single phenomenon among two or more focused cases.³

Recognition, comprehension and representation of the complexities and broad diverse dimensions of the social phenomena such as social movements require comprehensive and extensive explanations, which in practical research constitute difficulties, sound roughly problematic and are nearly impossible. Thus, in fact, a limited efficient comparative historical explanation of religious, legal, and political changes would facilitate the study and simultaneously would scrutinize and complete knowing over the complications of social movements and revolutions. In this regard, merely some selected facts will be represented objectively related to the concerned cases.

Hereupon, the objective of this study is to comparatively historically research the religious, legal and political transformations during three Iranian social movements, since 1900, considering the ideological evolution and revolution of Shi'ite and the very notion of Shari'a⁴ or Islamic laws. Consequently, to achieve a causal analysis via evaluating those conjunctions of unique events inside the Iranian historical context which were effective on the religious, legal and political transformations during three contemporary social movements, I will present a narrative analysis model of the circumstances in the Persian Constitutional Revolution in 1905, a narrative analysis model of the conditions for the state collapse in Iranian Revolution 1979, and finally a same analytical model for the turn of events in the Green Movement in 2009.

Afterwards, to tackle the problem of large numbers of explanatory variables in the narrative sets, increase the trialability of the causal claims and assumptions and their relationships, I will

¹ See Alan Bryman. "The Research Question in Social Research: What is its Role?". *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*. 10: 1. Pp. 5-20. 2007.

² Paul Diesing. *Patterns of Discovery in the Social Sciences*. New York: Routledge. 1971. Pp. 108-109.

³ James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (eds.). *Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 2015. Pp. 5-7. Matthew Lange. *Comparative-Historical Methods*. London: SAGE. 2013. p. 4.

⁴ Shari'a literally means the path of watering place, hence the major road so as to be guided. Actually, this canonical law is based on the teachings of the Quran and the traditions of the prophet Muhammad, Hadith or his quoted saying regarding the sources of Islam and Sunnah or the living example of him. Coeli Fitzpatrick and Adam Hani Walker (eds.). *Muhammad in History, Thought, and Culture: An Encyclopedia of the Prophet of God*. California: ABC-CLIO. 2014. p. 557.

design and set forward a table of Nominal Comparison, specifically, by the methods of agreement and difference, a table of Ordinal Comparison, namely the ranking of the necessary and sufficient circumstances or the role of the different social influences, causes and factors as well as their consequences in terms of the legal, religious and political changes in each case. This comparative historical research, through examining the gathered set of recent historical data hopes to propose comparative representations and causal reproductions that are able to serve to the studies focusing on the past and present vigorous and determined attempts by large groups of people on large scales to do or undo social changes with similarities and differences (particularly the Middle Eastern cases). These possible comparisons would have capability to represent a method of study for social movements and cases that are observed to exist or happen, while their causes and explanations are in question. Such social attempts can be from both the bottom (within social groups and classes) and the above (within ruling, legislative and constitutional levels), and to a certain degree search for empowering disadvantaged groups of societies to fully realize their potentials and to be utilized by the best that they deservedly suppose.

2. The Green Movement, the facts of the Islamic governance versus the historical cases and the theoretical discussions

Contemporary Iran is identified as a developing Middle Eastern country, that at least symbolically has socially started the process of so-called modernization. In this type, instead of an endogenous realization of modernization, we are able to trace a drastic tragic clash between the traditional and religious components versus the modern elements.

Iran's particular state was fertilized by the 1970s social movement, which ended in the ultimate authority of the mullahs with a different interpretational conception of Islam and its central text book of Quran, the believedly direct revelation from Allah. Therefore, its social legislation, norms, values and conventions were regulated on Shi'a religious beliefs, convections and the Shari'a laws.

As a matter of fact, after the independence movements ended in the short-lived Islamic Republic of East Turkistan (1933-1934), Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1956-) and Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1960-),⁵ which were all to secure the nation claims and rights within the processes and frameworks of the weak polities, and explored independent state building in the Sunni Muslim World, the Iranian Islamic Republic sovereign system, as a result of a revolution, was obviously an evolution at least in the Islamic Shi'ite movements and political thought by an organized guided ideology and leadership. By such characteristics, this type of Republic strengthened the possibility of revolution within the framework of strong nation states and forming a government after the Caliphate⁶ for the radicalized Islamic groups and organizations such as Daesh or the very ISIL,⁷ Al Qaeda, among others.

The Iranian Islamic revolution was basically truly confusing to the observers who were already impressed by the structuralistic theory of Theda Skocpol (1947-)⁸ in terms of the social

⁵ Mordecai Dzikansky, Gil Kleiman and Robert Slater. *Terrorist Suicide Bombings: Attack Interdiction, Mitigation, and Response*. Boca Raton: CRC Press. 2012. p. 289.

⁶ Caliphate, the political-religious state encompassing the Islamic ummah (community) and their territories in the centuries following the death of the prophet Muhammad (632 AD). The head of such state was known as Caliph (successor) with a sort of spiritual authority. The Islamic Caliphate grew rapidly during its first two centuries towards Southwest Asia, North Africa, and Southwest Europe. Dynastic struggles Mongols' invasions brought about the Caliphate's weakening and destruction particularly in 1258. The Caliphate was completely abolished in 1924 by the fragmentation of Ottoman Empire. Asma Afsaruddin. "Caliphate". *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Online edition. March 30, 2018. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Caliphate>.

⁷ Islamic State of Iraq and Levant. Levant is a historical geographical term referring to a large area in the eastern Mediterranean.

⁸ Steffen Kailitz (ed.). *Schlüsselwerke der Politikwissenschaft*. Wiesbaden: Springer-Verlag. 2007. p. 446.

movements and revolutions.⁹ This confusion, inevitably led to the question of the role of religious factors in explanation of revolution and made this issue unclear, whether really religion has the potential to become a vehicle for evolution, in which the life and the possibility of its change can be justified and explained, even in political and constitutional¹⁰ dimensions.

2.1. The Islamic revolutionary activities and regional security

Internationally, this revolutionary regime is instrumentally benefiting the conflicts inside the Middle Eastern countries, however, it has been potently able to control, indeed repress any form of struggle and objection inside its borders. Its theocratic rulers posed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps¹¹ special force of Quds¹² in 1980 as a primary mechanism for developing and supporting extraterritorial operations. It began with supplying weapons and ammunition for Palestinian militant groups (e.g., Hamas and Islamic Jihad), and thereafter endeavored to promote the Iranian experience of the Islamic revolution to the Shi'ites of the region.¹³ The members of this group are described as talented skilled elite individuals, as well as autonomous who are themselves decision makers for overseas missions.¹⁴ They have been actively involved in many proxy wars, regional military interventions, terrorist and sabotage operations and traffickings.¹⁵ They have organized military troops in many cases such as Afghanistan (since 1980-), Lebanon (since 1982-), Bosnia (1992-1995), Syria (since 2011-), among others. In the

⁹ See Theda Skocpol. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 1979.

¹⁰ A constitution, which is expected to be a system of fundamental laws and basic principles for governance. Oxford Learners Dictionaries. Online edition.

<http://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/constitution?q=constitution> .

¹¹ In 1979, this armed force was founded by Khomeini to achieve his revolutionary intentions.

¹² Quds is the Arabic name of Jerusalem. The founders of the IRGC selected the name of Quds for this force, since the liberation of this city for the benefit of the Muslims was one of their fundamental aspirations.

¹³ Peter L. Hahn. *Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations*. London: Rowman & Littlefield. 2016. p. 241.

¹⁴ Mahan Abedin (an interview). "Iran: Expert Discusses Iran's Quds Force And U.S. Charges Concerning Iraq". Radio Farda. Online edition. February 16, 2007.

https://web.archive.org/web/20080416114504/http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=02&y=2007&id=36B123CE-693B-448E-BF7D-A541E2A7BD12 .

¹⁵ The information from the U.S. State Department. Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview Share, Country Reports on Terrorism 2013. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224826.htm> . Steven O'Hern. *Iran's Revolutionary Guard: The Threat That Grows While America Sleeps*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books. 2012. Pp. 72-73. Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer (eds.). *Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press. 2013. p. 71.

Syrian case, they played under a religious cover of “Shrine Defenders”¹⁶ to fight the opposition of Bashar al-Assad (1965-)¹⁷. Since late 2014 they have structured Afghan and Pakistani militant Shi’ites, in the names of “Fatemiyoun division”¹⁸ and “Zainebiyoun Brigade” towards Syria. Altogether, almost 15 groups of Quds-backed militant Shi’ites are active in Syria and Iraq.¹⁹ The members of these groups are recruited by different incentives. e.g., in Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyoun cases, monthly 500 dollars together with an Iranian citizenship.²⁰ So far, a significant number of these forces are killed in the region, their burial ceremonies have visibly been held in several Iranian cities. In this regard, in March 2017, the head of the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs officially announced, 2100 so-called shrine defenders had been killed. He also said that the leader urged him to pursue their Iranian citizenship so as to support their families.²¹

2.2. A civil resistance in the shape of a reformative movement

Predominately, the Iranian middle-class and the increasing unemployed educated young population with democratic aspirations have been annoyed and critic of such religious radical policies and their implicit consequences, in particular an international isolation for the country. By the Green Movement (13th June 2009-12th June 2011),²² they desperately searched political changes and wanted their socio-economic circumstances to be improved.

This movement was sparked in the events of an electoral process. On May 20th, 2009, the Guardian Council endorsed the Islamic eligibility of four subdued candidates, the president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (1956-), Mir-Hosseini Mousavi (1942-), Mehdi Karroubi (1937-) and

¹⁶ The shrine of prophet Muhammad’s granddaughter, Zeinab (626-681AD), which is one of the major Shi’ite shrines, located in Damascus.

¹⁷ Spencer C. Tucker and Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. (eds.). U.S. Conflicts in the 21st Century: Afghanistan War, Iraq War, and the War on Terror. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO. 2016. p. 125.

¹⁸ The henchmen of Fatimah daughter of Muhammad.

¹⁹ Babak Dehghanpisheh. “Iran recruits Pakistani Shi’ites for combat in Syria”. Reuters. Online edition. December 10, 2015. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-pakistan-iran/iran-recruits-pakistani-shiites-for-combat-in-syria-idUSKBN0TT22S20151210> . American Foreign Policy Council. The World Almanac of Islamism 2017. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 2017. Pp. 339-340.

²⁰ Farnaz Fassihi. “Iran Pays Afghans to Fight for Assad”. The Wall Street Journal. Online edition. May 22, 2014. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-recruiting-afghan-refugees-to-fight-for-regime-in-syria-1400197482> .

²¹ The Editors of The Times of Israel. “2,100 Iranian fighters said killed in Iraq, Syria”. The Times of Israel. Online edition. 7 March 2017. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/2100-iran-fighters-said-killed-in-iraq-syria/> .

²² See Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (eds.). The People Reloaded: The Green Movement and the Struggle for Iran’s Future. New York: Melville House. 2011.

Mohsen Rezaee (1954-)²³. They all had already important official positions in the regime's history. Each of the candidates was far from any suspicion, as they all already were vital contributors to the Shi'a ideology and governance. The most prominent of them was Mousavi, the prime minister from 1981 to 1989.²⁴

In order to give a decent face to the electoral process, promote its popularity, in particular among the younger generations, the theocratic state made two major decisions, holding a series of televised debates and a decrease in the social control to run electoral street carnivals. During the arranged debates, the candidates unexpectedly challenged each other, which attracted much attention, and for the first time in the history of the regime polarized the society. In spite of the high inflation and high unemployment rates, the president, Ahmadinejad pretended an improvement in the situation of the society. He presented a perfect example of a fully-fledged populist, and his gesture to contempt his rivals raised many doubts over his own background. The simulative relative freedom of expression, television debates, and the illusion of freedom of choice strengthened a sort of confidence among a large section of the society, that this time unprecedentedly would be a without harm election. This fantasy was fueled by the freedom to hold streets campaign, meeting, carnival and human chain in favor of the candidates. During this period, many young people in the big cities stayed in the streets until the early hours of morning, exchanged ideas and highly invested on the election. The official results of the election caused a deep shock among the movement's supporters. Contrary to all the predictions, Mousavi received less than 34 percent, Karroubi and Rezaee very few, together less than three percent.²⁵ On the other side, the election process as always had a lot of room for fraud and manipulation. For example, the inadequacy of voter centers, especially in the areas that were exclusively monitored by the government members, governmental donations to the rural areas so as to attract their support for the president Ahmadinejad, among others.

The reelection of the president was immediately asserted by the supreme leader, to leave no doubt to the authenticity of result. In the first weeks after the announcement of the official result of the vote, Tehran and other large cities witnessed massive protests. More and less people

²³ He is a senior military general in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, whose elder son, Ahmad was refugee to the US, where he took a hard stance against the officials of the Islamic regime, consequently, he was murdered by IRGC radicals in November 2011 at a hotel in Dubai. See Haggai Carmon. "The Mysterious Death of Ahmad Rezaee: Whodunit?". SOTT.net. 17 November 2011.

<https://www.sott.net/article/237875-The-Mysterious-Death-of-Ahmad-Rezaee-Whodunit> .

²⁴ Mehrzad Boroujerdi and Kourosh Rahimkhani. "Iran Primer: Iran's Political Elite". Frontline. Online edition. 1 November 2010. <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/11/iran-primer-irans-political-elite.html> .

²⁵ Tareq Y. Ismael, Jacqueline S. Ismael and Glenn Perry. Government and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East: Continuity and change. New York: Routledge. 2016. p. 193.

from different social groups and classes participated in the rallies. The reaction of the regime was instant drastic crackdown. Despite of such severe repression, the demonstrations were held almost every day and the movement lasted up until two years after the incident. Mousavi and Karroubi were house arrested and their ties to outside were cut off. Afterwards, gradually, the social movement subsided, but it led to a sort of delegitimization of the regime among the movement's proponents. The slogan of the final days was simply "death to dictator", which directly questioned the supreme head of the regime.²⁶

2.3. A dilemma between the indigenous Shari'a-based laws and the Universal Human Rights

Right after the repression of the Green Movement, the intersection of freedom of opinion and expression became extremely narrowed. Inasmuch as, according to the World Press Freedom Index in 2010, Iran ranked 175 out of 178 countries in the world.²⁷ Additionally, Reporters without Borders' annual report over Iran reflects the victimization of Arts. 18 and 19²⁸ more than other fundamental Human Rights based on the Universal Declaration.²⁹

These reports might not be truly surprising, when we pay enough attention to the speeches of the representative of the regime almost less than four decades ago, in 1982, at the United Nations, in which he declared the Declaration as a secular comprehension of the Judeo-Christian tradition which could not be implemented in the Muslim societies without conflicting with the Shari'a laws. In his 7th December 1984 statement to the UN General Assembly's 3rd Committee, again put on record the regime's position on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). In his delegation's view, the concept of human rights was not limited to the

²⁶ See Hashemi. *The People Reloaded: The Green Movement and the Struggle for Iran's Future*.

²⁷ World Press Freedom Index. 2010. <https://rsf.org/en/world-press-freedom-index-2010> .

²⁸ Art. 18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. Art. 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression including freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. United Nations. "Universal Declaration of Human Rights". <https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/> .

²⁹ The Editors of Reporters without Borders for Freedom of Information. "Press freedom violations recounted in real time (January -December 2018)". Reporters without Borders for Freedom of Information. Online edition. December 28, 2018. <https://rsf.org/en/news/press-freedom-violations-recounted-real-time-january-december-2018> . Shirin Ebadi, Monireh Baradarn, Iraj Mesdaghi and Reza Moini. "Forty years of state lies: RSF unveils leaked Iranian justice file". Reporters without Borders for Freedom of Information. Online edition. February 7, 2019. <https://rsf.org/en/news/forty-years-state-lies-rsf-unveils-leaked-iranian-justice-file> .

UDHR, “Man is of divine origin and human dignity could not be reduced to a series of secular norms and certain concepts contained in the UDHR that needed to be revised.”³⁰ Accordingly, this regime recognized no authority or power but that of almighty God, and no legal tradition apart from the Islamic law Shari’a. Furthermore, as his delegation had already emphasized at the 36th session of the General Assembly, the conventions, declarations and decisions of the international organizations, which are contrary to Islam, have no validity for this regime. Thus, it would not hesitate to violate these provisions, since it has to choose between violating the divine Shari’a-based constitutional law of the country and violating the secular conventions.³¹ For instance, when facing a contradiction between the Convention of the Rights of Children and Islamic law, the latter will take precedence. This has been publicly asserted at the United Nations and repeated by the regime’s authorities in front of various committees in charge of the enforcement and respect for the instruments of human rights. Consequently, this regime has often been denounced by the international organizations for its lack of respect for international obligations, in particular human rights obligations.

As a matter of fact, in the face of a legal state, the Islamic Republic has signed all five main international human rights treaties, the Human Rights Declaration,³² the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,³³ the Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,³⁴ the Convention on the Rights of the Child,³⁵ and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.³⁶ The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Children on their participation in armed conflict has also been signed, however they have explicitly refused to sign some other covenants, e.g., two major human rights conventions, the 1984 Convention against Torture and the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discriminations against Women for what is contrary to the Islamic Shari’a. Some groups wanted in any case these two conventions to be ratified. The female activists encouraged the parliament to present a bill to ratify them. When the bill was presented to the Council of Guardian which is a body in charge of checking the Islamicity and constitutionality of laws, simply was rejected for non-conformity with the constitution’s article that set the respect of the

³⁰ David G. Littman. “Universal Human Rights and Human Rights in Islam”. New York: Midstream. Pp. 2-7. February-March 1999.

https://web.archive.org/web/20021113111506/http://www.dhimmitude.org/archive/universal_islam.html .

³¹ Ibid.,

https://web.archive.org/web/20021113111506/http://www.dhimmitude.org/archive/universal_islam.html .

³² United Nations. Concluding observations (2011), CCPR/C/IRN/CO/3.

³³ Ibid., (2010), CERD/C/IRN/CO/18-19.

³⁴ Ibid., (2013), E/C.12/IRN/CO/2.

³⁵ Ibid., (2016), CRC/C/IRN/CO/3-4.

³⁶ Ibid., (2017), CRPD/C/IRN/CO/1.

principles of the Shari'a as a constitutional test of compatibility. The outcome was that the Islamic authorities made sure that there is almost not much opportunity for change and reform the women's rights. On the other side, it strengthened the supposition that the conciliation between the supreme and ultimate sovereign of the mullahs' conception of the Shari'a laws and the Universal Human Rights standards sounds almost unrealizable, therefore, to sign or not to sign the international conventions plays more or less a small role in the human rights violations. Comparatively, before the Islamic revolution, the autocratic monarch Shah of Iran had a great enthusiasm about political relationship, particularly with the Western democratic and pro-Human Rights countries. Although, this type of international relation could constructively provide support for his rule, in the climax phase of the revolutionary uprisings (1978-1979) circumscribed the scope and extent of his policies and measures, based on the Human Rights' principles. According to this analysis, the Shah's regime was trapped in what Daniel P. Ritter, scholar of revolutions, in his comparative work (2015)³⁷ in terms of the civil movements and revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa researched and conceptualized as "the iron cage of liberalism".³⁸ Apparently, the Islamic Republic so as not to be trapped in such enclosure, from the very beginning cut its ties with the US, reduced relationship with the EU and refused to fully behold to such an international deal as UDHR, therefore through accusing its opposition forces as "pawns of the West" has been capable to repress any form of civil non-violent or violent disobedience, demonstration and movement.³⁹

2.4. *The Quranic text and its interpretability issues*

Predominately, the Islamic Republic legitimizes its ideological procedures by means of the Quranic text. For example, it refers to the literally meaning of the surah Ali'Imran (family of Imran) 19th verse, "Indeed, the religion in the sight of God is Islam, and those who were given the scripture did not differ except after knowledge had come to them, ..., thus whoever disbelieves in the verses, indeed, God is swift to take revenge".⁴⁰ By this way of referencing and interpreting, the monopolized socio-legal process of legitimizing and producing standards in such system will be simply distorted. This distortion is led to an unnegotiability in the Quranic articles and this of course has disarranged the freedom of speech in this society. However, in

³⁷ See Daniel P. Ritter. *Iron Cage of Liberalism: International Politics and Unarmed Revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. 2015.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 31-32.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 180-181, 207.

⁴⁰ Quran. <https://quran.com/> .

practice, in the view of other readers, the revealed Quranic articles or so-called “Wahy” are definitely interpretable, similar to every other text, in that there is an art of scripture interpretation, post-linguistic understanding, and the general rules and procedures for determining a different sense of written texts as “hermeneutics”.⁴¹

The idea that a sheer word cannot transfer the ultimate hidden message, connotation and feeling that invokes something in addition to literal or primary meaning sparked a new phase for searching rules of textual interpretation via emphasizing on the historical contextual aspect. The knowledge of modern tradition of hermeneutics is the legacy of the renaissance as well as Kantian views, and is associated with a spectrum from Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834),⁴² Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911)⁴³ to Martin Heidegger (1889-1976),⁴⁴ Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002),⁴⁵ Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005),⁴⁶ and Ernst Fuchs (1903-1983)⁴⁷ so as to unpack the contemporary meaningfulness and possible truth of the literary, Biblical and other ancient texts. Then, the methodology of the recent history hermeneutics and literary theory that particularly grew out of the research on the Bible was adapted by some modern Islamic theologians such as Mohammed Arkoun (1928-2010)⁴⁸ and Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im (1946-)⁴⁹ who made serious doubts about the objectivity of the Quranic text versus global current affairs, changes and phenomena such as human rights, women rights, among others. Meanwhile, the modern fundamentalism and religious radicalized fanaticism created the requirement to more deeply question the traditional Islam and challenged more Muslim intellectuals to begin rethinking and critically reviewing the Islamic central text of Quran towards an alternative method and a modern interpretation. Some efforts were also done to hopefully increase the critical awareness and the applied sense of interpretation of the God’s message concerning the depth and

⁴¹ Fundamentally, the etymology of hermeneutics is derived from the name of a messenger in the Greek mythology as Hermes, who used to interpret the words of the gods for people. Hermeneuein, in the Greek language means to express, explain, translate and interpret. Laurence W. Wood. *Theology as History and Hermeneutics: A Post-critical Conversation with Contemporary Theology*. Lexington: Emeth Press. 2005. p. 105.

⁴² Werner G. Jeanrond. *Theological Hermeneutics: Development and Significance*. London: Springer. 1991. Pp. 44-45.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 51.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 64.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 70.

⁴⁷ Wood. *Theology as History and Hermeneutics: A Post-critical Conversation with Contemporary Theology*. 116.

⁴⁸ Roy Jackson. *Nietzsche and Islam*. New York: Routledge. 2007. p. 70.

⁴⁹ Gregory Claeys (ed.). *Encyclopedia of Modern Political Thought*. Vol. 1. Los Angeles: CQ Press. 2013. p. 444. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im. “Toward an Islamic Hermeneutics for Human Rights”. in *Human Rights and Religious Values: An Uneasy Relationship?*. edited by Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, Jerald D. Gort, Henry Jansen, Hendrik M. Vroom. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B. V. 1995. Pp. 229-242.

significance of the hermeneutics and therefor representing a common theological framework among the Muslim communities. This framework recommends intertextually reading the Quranic and quotational texts so as to deconstruct the conventional interpretations.

As the literary texts are absolutely societal and historical artifacts in specific contexts,⁵⁰ the Quranic text also could be studied within an epistemological and chronological exploration, beginning with an examination of the earliest revelations which would provide an accurate perception of the early Islamic events and might distinguish the Quranic moral ideals. As in actual fact, there is a significant gap between the preached religious ideals and the real world.⁵¹ In this connection, the intertextual relations in understanding the verses require various types of circular hermeneutics correlations among letters versus verses, verses versus surahs, verses versus the whole of Quran, Quranic intentions, quotations and other religious sources vis-à-vis the textual context and historical circumstances.⁵² Also, we are able to pay attention to the fact that, historically, diverse human generations from different societies comprehend the reality in diverse ways,⁵³ this, of course bound to the historicity would therefore defy the one-dimensional interpretations.

Similar to Biblical interpretation that has the same age as the Bible,⁵⁴ the Quranic and quotational commentaries back to the beginning of Islam. Among roughly thousand Quranic quotational exegeses and interpretations in Sunni and Shi'i Islamic history, the works of Badr Ad-Din Az-Zarkashi (1344-1392)⁵⁵ and Jalal al-Din al-Khudayri al-Suyuti (1445-1505)⁵⁶ can be considered as hermeneutics, because they are more concerned with how someone interprets rather than a pure interpretation or exegesis.⁵⁷ Nonetheless, there is not a vividly organized

⁵⁰ Julie Thompson Klein. *Humanities, Culture, and Interdisciplinarity: The Changing American Academy*. New York: SUNY Press. 2005. p. 91.

⁵¹ William Grassie. *The New Sciences of Religion Exploring Spirituality from the Outside In and Bottom Up*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2010. p. 137.

⁵² Hendrik M. Vroom and Jerald D. Gort (eds.). *Holy Scriptures in Judaism, Christianity and Islam: Hermeneutics, Values and Society*. Amsterdam: Rodopi. 1997. p. 104. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Nazif Muhtaroglu and Detlev Quintern (eds.). *Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in Dialogue: The Logos of Life and Cultural Interlacing*. Dordrecht: Springer. 2014. Pp.165-166. Wilna A.J. Meijer. *Tradition and Future of Islamic Education*. Muenster: Waxmann Verlag. 2009. Pp. 152-153.

⁵³ John Storey. *From Popular Culture to Everyday Life*. Oxon: Routledge. 2014. p. 54.

⁵⁴ Richard N. Soulen and R. Kendall Soulen. *Handbook of Biblical Criticism*. Cambridge: James Clarke & Co., Ltd. 2001. p. 73.

⁵⁵ See Badr Ad-Din Az-Zarkashi. *Al-burhan fi ulum al-Quran (Arabic) (Reasoning to the Sciences of the Quran)*. Muhammad Abu Al-Fadl Ibrahim (ed.). 4 Vols. Cairo: Al-Habibi. 1972.

⁵⁶ See Imam Jalal-Al-Din Al-Suyuti. *The Perfect Guide to the Sciences of the Quran: Al-itqan fi ulum al-Quran*. Trans. by Hamid Algar. Reading: Garnet Publishing. 2011.

⁵⁷ B. Todd Lawson. "Hermeneutics". Originally published: 2003. *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/hermeneutics> .

formulated applied method so as to interpret the Quran by Shi'i grand mullah interpreters to connect a possible interpretation to the concerned principles.

The interpretations on the Quran in Persian language began during the second half of the 10th century. Their primary objective was to present the exegesis of the Quran for those Persian readers who did not have Arabic knowledge. Many Usuli Shi'i mullahs' commentaries on the Quran that have been written during the 20th century⁵⁸ have simply marginalized the historical context. As a matter of fact, such mere literal interpretations⁵⁹ not a critical Quranic exegesis and explanation simply led to the current inexcusable Islamic Shi'i radicalism.

Inside the Quranic text, originally, there is the word of interpretation, as "Ta'wil". Literally, Ta'wil is in quest of realizing and interpreting the hidden origin or returning to the foreground or the first form of a single word and can be utilized at the service of the recognition of the external meaning in contrast to the discovery of a historical hidden inner meaning and the realization of the process of discerning of the truth. Accordingly, only the esoteric meanings not exoteric meanings are intended. Such recognition and therefore interpretation is possible merely through a small number of people with specialized knowledge, based on the Quranic text, "He is the one who has sent the book to you, in it there are some fundamental verses, that are the foundation of the book, others are allegorical. Those who have perversity in their hearts, follow the allegorical part, seeking discord and searching for the interpretation of the hidden meanings, but no one can interpret their hidden meanings except God and those who are firmly grounded in knowledge and say, we believe in the book, the whole of it is from our lord, and except the owners of the intellect do not understand their truth."⁶⁰ Additionally, there is another verse to explicitly postulate that the Quran left the door of interpretation open, at least granted to a handful of elitistically conceived individuals, "And these are the parables we illustrate for people, but only are understandable for those who have knowledge."⁶¹

⁵⁸ Annabel Keeler. "Exegesis iii. In Persian". Originally published: 1999. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/exegesis-iii> .

⁵⁹ For instance, the external apparent meaning of the verse 5th surah Ta-Ha "Allah, the most gracious is firmly established on the sky throne of authority". Naser Makarem Shirazi. Tafsir Nemooneh. 27 Vols. Tehran: Dar-alkotob al-Islamiyya. 1973.

<https://zeker.tebyan.net/#SourehID=20&Aye=5&pi=0&PageID=312&TabIndex=0&T=fa.makarem.en.yusufali> . or "The Most Merciful who is above the Throne established". Quran. <https://quran.com/> . by itself suggests that, God is sitting on his throne on the sky, which requires intercontextually and historically to be interpreted.

⁶⁰ Surah Ali'Imran (family of Imran) verse 7th. Makarem Shirazi. Tafsir Nemooneh.

<https://zeker.tebyan.net/#SourehID=3&Aye=7&pi=0&PageID=50&TabIndex=0&T=fa.makarem.en.yusufali> .

⁶¹ Surah al-Ankabut (The Spider) verse 43rd. Ibid.,

<https://zeker.tebyan.net/#SourehID=29&Aye=43&pi=0&PageID=401&TabIndex=0&T=fa.makarem.en.yusufali> .

The interpretations of two recent Shi'i grand mullahs in Tafsir al-Mizan (1982)⁶² and Tafsir Nemooneh (1973)⁶³ depicted a more tonal of this text versus the modern world phenomena. Hereupon, for instance, in terms of the already mentioned 19th verse of surah Ali'Imran, actually the Ta'wil (the original meaning) of the word "Islam" is "submission". Therefore, the meaning of the verse can be interpreted that "the conception of the true religion in the sight of God is to surrender to his command, and in fact the spirit and principles of the celestial religions everywhere and in any age are the same."⁶⁴ Moreover, intertextually, based on a quotation from Ali⁶⁵ in Nahj al-Balagha,⁶⁶ "Islam is the very submission to the truth".⁶⁷ This is a possible clear interpretation that can be expressed.

In spite of these commentaries, the ruling mullah policy and decision makers, who took the initiative of the supposedly enlightened movement of 1979, fundamentalistically revived the extremist Shi'a and adjusted a set of ideological religious beliefs accompanied with the particular interpretation of the Shari'a legal principles.

⁶² Tafsir al-Mizan (The balance in interpretation of the Quran) is an exegesis on the Quran written by Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i (1904-1981) consists of 27 volumes, originally in Arabic. Trans. by Tawus Raja. Qum: The World Organization for Islamic Studies. 1982. <http://www.almizan.org/index.php> .

⁶³ Tafsir Nemooneh (The ideal commentary of the Quran) is an exegesis on the Quran written by a number of mullahs under the supervision of Naser Makarem Shirazi (1927-) consists of 27 volumes, originally in Persian. <https://zeker.tebyan.net/#SourehID=1&Aye=1&pi=0&PageID=1&TablIndex=0&T=fa.makarem.en.yusufali> . http://islamicblessings.com/books_author/Find_Books_list.asp?psearch=tafseer-e-namoona&Submit=Search&psearchtype= . It is worth noting that Makarem Shirazi, after the 1979, was given the control of Iran's sugar and became a billionaire known as the "Sugar Sultan" or monopolist, thus one of the most influential conservative mullahs. Joshua Keating. "The List: Iran's Worst Clerics". Foreign Policy. Online edition. June 18, 2009. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/06/18/the-list-irans-worst-clerics/> .

⁶⁴ Tafsir Nemooneh. <https://zeker.tebyan.net/#SourehID=3&Aye=19&pi=0&PageID=52&TablIndex=0&T=fa.makarem.en.yusufali> . Tabataba'i. Tafsir al-Mizan. <http://www.almizan.org/index.php> . 174-175.

⁶⁵ Ali ibn Abi Taleb (600-661 AD) was the cousin and son-in-law of prophet Muhammad, ruling over the Islamic caliphate from 656 to 661, as well as the first figure after Muhammad in Shi'a. I. K. Poonawala and E. Kohlberg. "Ali b. Abitaleb I. Life". Originally published: 1985. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/ali-b-abi-taleb> . Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Asma Afsaruddin. "Ali". Encyclopædia Britannica. Online edition. March 8, 2018. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ali-Muslim-caliph> .

⁶⁶ A collection of sermons and quotations ascribed to Ali, Muhammad's cousin, son-in-law and successor based on the Shi'ite. Ian Richard Netton (ed.). Encyclopaedia of Islamic Civilisation and religion. New York: Routledge. 2008. p. 477.

⁶⁷ Ali. Nahj al-Balagha. Sermon 125. Online edition. <https://www.al-islam.org/discovering-islam-moustafa-al-qazwini/introduction> .

2.5. The arbitrary power versus the constitutional law

In this Shi'i renaissance, the freedom of speech is one of the greatest ignored legal human rights to seriously reconsider. Despite the truth that, the right of freedom of opinion, freedom of expression, no fear of having a specific opinion, freedom to receive and impart information through any form of media among some other universal human rights are explicitly confirmed and declared by the constitutional law of the 1979 revolution,⁶⁸ the freedom after expressing opinion is not legally guaranteed at all. It means that the Islamic Republic constitutionally provides the protections, benefits and freedom of expression only for some groups which have state influence and affiliation. In this case, Tyranny, unrestrained by law,⁶⁹ (with usurped legitimate sovereignty) includes some groups that are excessively entitled to deny freedom to others, through what Karl Loewenstein (1891-1973)⁷⁰ ontologically typified as semantic constitution⁷¹ or Giovanni Sartori (1924-2017)⁷² classified as facade constitution.

Table 1. A classification of regimes' constitutions, based on Loewenstein (1957) and Sartori (1962) works⁷³

Types of Regime	Types of Constitution
Democratic	Guaranteed
Transitional (towards Autocracy or Democracy)	Nominal
Authoritarian	Fake
Hybrid dual structured (such as Islamic Republic)	Fake

This apparently healthy, but genuinely fake constitution, which practically has not been fully well-fitted to the Iranian social context, in the implementation phase occasionally has either been ignored or manipulated. Furthermore, in effect, with all its formal hierarchical outfits, it is

⁶⁸ Art. 23, The Inquisition is forbidden, and no one may be molested or reprimanded simply for holding a belief. Art. 24, Publications and the press are enjoyed by the freedom of expression except when it is detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public. Details of which are specified by law. Iran Constitution 1979. <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000.html> .

⁶⁹ Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Online edition. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tyrant> .

⁷⁰ Michael Kilian, Heinrich Amadeus Wolff and Peter Häberle. Staatsrechtslehrer des 20. Jahrhunderts: Deutschland - Österreich - Schweiz. Berlin: De Gruyter. 2018. p. 489.

⁷¹ His ontological classification of constitutions includes normative living real applicable constitutions, nominal or not fully implemented and effective, and finally the semantic ones or the dead letters. Karl Loewenstein. Political power and the Governmental Process. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. 1957. Pp. 147-150.

⁷² Norbert Campagna and Stefano Saracino (eds.). Staatsverständnisse in Italien: Von Dante bis ins 21. Jahrhundert. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 2018. p. 328.

⁷³ Christoph Antons (ed.). Routledge Handbook of Asian Law. Oxon: Routledge. 2017. p. 78.

not capable to confine the arbitrary application of authoritarian sources of power. This trait was intensely illustrated in the 1980s extrajudicial terror.⁷⁴

Although, the 1979 constitutional document on paper exhibits respect for human rights, the regime under fear and threat would not hesitate to totally ignore it by unwritten sanctions. Thus, basically, in our case we are not confronted with other constitutional possibilities such as a proper ensured or even nominal one.⁷⁵ This constitution, which is a type relatively without constitutionalism,⁷⁶ as a matter of fact asserts an amalgamation of ideological theocratic tendencies with several sources of authority, authoritarily coexisting through supporting orderly ballot boxes, in which, in practice, its reformist elements are adequately disappointed. In any rate, such a seemingly absurd and self-contradictory system, by such constitutional, international and practical playact, whether named and described theocratic, sort of republic, fascistic, tyrannical, totalitarian, constitutional, amalgamation, among others has sacrificed one of the most important achievements of the world community in the last century, the very fundamental universal set of human rights, highlighted in the oppression to the recent Iranian social movement.

2.6. *The case of National Socialist state and Dual State theory*

In order to investigate the structure of power of such a system, as the product of the Iranian 1979 social movement and the repressive force of the Green 2009 social movement, this research is aimed to address the analytical works on the Nazi state system that sounds comparable, despite of its essential differences.

In the first place the 1941 work⁷⁷ of Ernst Fraenkel (1898-1975),⁷⁸ a pioneer of German political theory in the post-World War II era is noteworthy. Fraenkel endeavored to present his work throughout his outstanding research on the German National Socialist party, state, legislation system and judicial administration. Fraenkel's theory specifies how the Nazi party ideology

⁷⁴ The Mullahs' regime after 1979 revolution initiated a massacre in the 1980s, which reached a peak in 1988 by religiously authorizing the extrajudicially death squads for the prisoners who were already sentenced and served part of their terms. Reza Afshari. *Human Rights in Iran: The Abuse of Cultural Relativism*. Pennsylvania: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press. 2011. p. 38.

⁷⁵ Giovanni Sartori. "Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion." *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 56, No. 4, Pp. 853-864. December 1962. p. 861.

⁷⁶ Albert H. Y. Chen. *Constitutionalism in Asia in the Early Twenty-First Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 2014. p. 1.

⁷⁷ Ernst Fraenkel. *The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1941; Trans. E.A. Shils, newly Published by The Law Book Exchange, Ltd. 2006.

⁷⁸ Wilhelm Bleek and Hans J. Lietzmann (eds.). *Klassiker der Politikwissenschaft: von Aristoteles bis David Easton*. München: C. H. Beck. 2005. p. 151.

divided the German system of governance into two coexisting side by side spheres as a dual state. Firstly, the Normative State, which protected the legal order, as expressed in written law passed by the legislative body, decisions of courts and the measures of administrative deputations. Secondly, the Prerogative State, which was controlled by the very Nazi party, and exercised unlimited violence permissively by any legal or illegal guarantees. Taking this narrow split into consideration, he theoretically evaluates the development of the Third Reich legal principles and realities as a dual state, and then depicts this system under the supreme jurisdiction of the Führer or Adolf Hitler (1889-1945).⁷⁹ Fraenkel's work also contains a brief history of administrative law and the development of the dual state in Prussia and later in Germany, from the Great Elector,⁸⁰ who established an absolute monarchy in Brandenburg by subjecting the Estates to his control, Frederick the Great⁸¹ who introduced the principle of the rule of law as far back as 1747 to the periods of growing liberalism and the Bismarck era. He considers the manifestation of the independent administrative power in the prerogative of the crown to declare the martial law, based on the complete control of army and foreign affairs by a plan under Bruening.⁸² For Fraenkel the Nazi state was unique not only for its prerogative or arbitrary powers, but in addition for the way it amalgamated the arbitrary powers with a capitalistic economic organization.⁸³ As a result of such sectorial coexistence and synergical association of capitalism and National Socialism, the government via its normative section secured the continuation of capitalistic society for those Germans who were not threatened by the Nazism. On the other side, the prerogative part used legal sanction as well as brutal violence against those people who were considered as enemies. Accordingly, the normative

⁷⁹ Fraenkel. *The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship*. xiii. Robert S. Wistrich. *Who's who in Nazi Germany*. New York: Routledge. 2002. p. 116.

⁸⁰ Frederick William (1620-1688) was Elector of Brandenburg and Duke of Prussia, and thus ruler of Brandenburg-Prussia from 1640 until his death, he was popularly known as "the Great Elector" (a person who has the right to vote in elections) because of his military and political achievements. Stephan Skalweit. "Frederick William". *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Online edition. February 14, 2018. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Frederick-William-elector-of-Brandenburg> .

⁸¹ Frederick II or Frederick the Great (1712-1786) was the third and the last King in Prussia from 1740 until 1786. Matthew Smith Anderson. "Frederick II". *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Online edition. December 28, 2017. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Frederick-II-king-of-Prussia> .

⁸² In fact, Art. 48 of the constitution of the Weimar Republic of Germany (1919-1933) allowed presidents, under certain circumstances, to take emergency measures without the prior consent of the Reichstag. This potency included the issuance of unexpected and emergency official orders. It was applied by the president Paul von Hindenburg, under the Chancellorship of Heinrich Bruening in 1930 to deal with the economic crisis. Nonetheless, this wide-ranging financial bill so as to reform government finances through both higher taxes and decreases in government spending (a Stagflationary policy) was rejected by the Reichstag. Hans Mommsen. *The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy*. Originally published in 1989. Trans. by Elborg Forster and Larry Eugene Jones. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press. 1996. Pp. 57-58. Fraenkel. *The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship*. 157-167.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, xiv.

state was by no means a rule of law but “a necessary complement to the Prerogative State” and the both states “constituted an interdependent whole”,⁸⁴ essential to the Nazi pattern of governance. He then describes the severe consequences of the decree of February 28th, 1933, in the gradual retreat of the judges, who at the beginning refused to comply, but later associated with political pressure and finally denied the judicial review of all acts of the Gestapo, namely, the tough instrument of the prerogative apparatus (despite of some resistances, e.g., the Prussian supreme administrative court climbed down as late as 1936).⁸⁵ This trend with undetermined limits of the political sphere gave to all judicial decisions an uncertainty which upset the conventional notion of rule of law. Aside from these restrictions most of the legal institutions essential for capitalism, such as freedom of enterprise, private property, right of employer, regulation of unfair competition, and patent rights were either established or revived and remained enforceable in the courts, except where the Jews were involved. Furthermore, the decree unambiguously named the Communists as enemies of the state, but it did not take long time up to the propagandas began against the Churches, the socialists, the liberals, even the conservatives, and as a matter of course the Jews. As long as the Jews had a limited sphere in the economic system, were given some legal protection. With the 1937 resignation of Hjalmar Schacht (1877-1970)⁸⁶ as minister of economics, their elimination from economic sphere was determined, and they became rejected by the society, despite the fact that the Reich Supreme Court had declared them legally dead as early as 1936.⁸⁷

The Nazis’ regime justified its measures via creating the “myth of a permanent emergency” and announcing the threat and danger of enemies. As a matter of fact, the personification of the potential enemies were the Jews for the regime that assumed, “If there are no enemies, they have to be created”.⁸⁸ In this relation, the normative state merely protected constructive forces against the Gestapo, naturally, non-Aryans could not be considered as constructive elements.⁸⁹ In any case, the National Socialist actions were placed above the laws. In the struggle between political aims and legal orders, the former was victorious, thus, “the view that every single act against Jews must be ordered by the government individually is not correct. If this were the case, it would not be permissible to interpret the law to the disadvantage of the Jew and the Jew

⁸⁴ Ibid., 71.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 24-27.

⁸⁶ Wolfgang Waldner. Warum die Geldpolitik 1929-33 die Weltwirtschaftskrise verursacht hat. Norderstedt: Books on Demand. 2009. p. 65.


⁸⁷ Fraenkel. The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship. 96.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 200.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 62.

would enjoy the protection of the law.”⁹⁰ These legal and judicial circumstances alongside with other positional administrative policies therefore resulted in a type of devolution, the transfer of the Nazi power to the lower levels (from the central to the regional administration), a decentralization of arbitrary autonomous organizational power inside the Nazi system of dual governance, which was not explicitly elaborated by Fraenkel.

Model 1. A model of the Fraenkel's analysis of the Nazis' political system



2.7. A theoretical factual comparison of the Dual State pattern

Despite of the lack of a complete compatibility with the Fraenkel's case, similarly, emergency circumstances, enemy, conspiracy and sedition are the popular repetitive words of the supreme leader of the Islamic republic. He on 19th October 2016 justified that repeating the word “enemy” by him, is the same as repeating the word “devil” by God in the Quran.⁹¹ Furthermore, in a similar manner, Islamic Republic has a kind of particular mixed capitalistic formation features (albeit absolutely unlike to the Western capitalism) into the elements of the planned economy. It has almost ever manipulated and controlled every aspect of the Iranian social and economic life, for instance, under the control of the supreme leader, Khamenei there are some

⁹⁰ Ibid., 94. See Heinz Guradze. Review of “The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship,” By Ernst Fraenkel. in Washington Univ. Law Review. Vol. 27, Issue 4. Pp. 603-607. January 1942.

⁹¹ The Editors of Radio Zamaneh. “Khamenei's defense of repeating the word of enemy”. Radio Zamaneh. Online edition. 19 October 2016. <https://www.radiozamaneh.com/304011> .

foundations⁹² that operate hundreds of companies in diverse economic sectors. Apparently, a sizable portion of the budget and capital of the country are under their tight rein. They were established by the decrees of Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989)⁹³ after the 1979 revolution to confiscate the assets and properties of the royal family, their affiliates and rich proponents.⁹⁴ Fundamentally, Khomeini did not adhere to his popular promises after the victory of the revolution. He in his speeches, confidently and forcefully specified his prerogative views to governance. He referred several times to Ali (the 1st Shi'i Imam) versus Banu Qurayza tribe,⁹⁵ "if he (Ali) was supposed to be a merciful ruler, he had not killed 700 people (by his Zulfiqar)⁹⁶ within only one day". He concluded that they are not able to correct the Islamic governing by holding courts and jailing, they should search for the rulers who cut and lash in similar way of prophet Muhammad.⁹⁷ In this way, from the very beginning, the first leader of the Islamic Republic sought to weaken the normative institutions under the Islamic sovereignty. On the whole there has been no written or official announcement, but it was quite obvious inside the negotiations over the Islamic Republic nuclear program that there is a dual core of decision making in Iran or in other words, there are two competing states running the country. The major

⁹² e.g., Foundation of the Oppressed and Disabled or MFJ, Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs, Execution of Imam Khomeini's Order, Astan Quds Razavi, among others are tax-exempt and out of normative state system. The editors of the International Monetary Fund. Staff Country Reports, Islamic Republic of Iran: Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes Fiscal Transparency Module. Washington, D.C. International Monetary Fund. 2002. p. 8.

⁹³ The first supreme leader of Islamic Republic. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam. A Critical Introduction to Khomeini. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. 2014. p. xxi.

⁹⁴ The Editors of Frontline. "The structure of power in Iran: An overview of the Iranian government and political system". Frontline. Online edition.

<https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/inside/govt.html> .

⁹⁵ Banu Qurayza tribe was a Jewish tribe which lived in the oasis of Yathrib (now known as Medina), until the 7th century, when their conflict with Muhammad led to their demise. See William Montgomery Watt. The Cambridge history of Islam. Vol. 1A. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 2008. Pp. 39-41. Also, Surah 33rd of Quran, Al-Ahzab (The Clans), verses 26 and 27 refer to Banu Qurayza tribe, "And He brought down those who supported them among the People of the Scripture from their fortresses and cast terror into their hearts so that a party you killed, and you took captive another. (26)" "And He caused you to inherit their land and their homes and their properties and a land which you have not trodden. And ever is Allah, over all things, competent. (27)". Quran. <https://quran.com/> .

⁹⁶ Zulfiqar (a split-bladed or double pointed design sword), is the name of the fatal legendary sword of Ali, which is said to have been given to him by Muhammad in the Battle of Uhud (March 23rd, 625 AD) and was brought by Gabriel Lord of Angels as an order from God. The deadliness of this sword was due to its specific form, one side was allocated to make wound and the other side led air inside. Madonna Gauding. The Signs and Symbols Bible: The Definitive Guide to Mysterious Markings. New York: Sterling Publishing Company. 2009. p. 105.

⁹⁷ Ruhollah Khomeini. Speech for the Supreme Judicial Council. 20 July 1980. in Sahifeh-ye Khomeini, Vol. 13, including Khomeini's speeches, messages, interviews, decrees, religious permissions, and letters. <http://emam.com/posts/view/2400> . Khomeini. Speech for the president, members of the Experts Assembly and Friday Prayer Leaders. 3 February 1985. in Sahifeh-ye Khomeini, Vol. 19. <http://emam.com/posts/view/17191/Permission#english-translation> .

state is a theocratic prerogative effective, regardless by right or not. It really exists although not legally stated and headed by the so-called absolute guardianship or leadership of the Ummah,⁹⁸ Ali Khamenei (1939-) acting behind a facade that is the de jure rightful state. The second one is the legal one because of the law, including the presidency and the Majlis (parliament) which their authority and responsibility are defined based on the constitution, although is often violated by the ipso facto state. By the so-called Geneva agreement in 2013,⁹⁹ the de facto state implicitly recognized the authority of the republican lawful facade on a range of the issues. Many years extension of the negotiations confirms this duality. Moreover, the regime's delegations mostly were not led by the cabinet ministers of the recognized state, at least apparently representing the national sovereignty, but by appointed officials whose tasks were to listen to the views of the international community and inform them of the leader's views but not to effectively and efficiently conduct the negotiations. Furthermore, under the presidencies of Khatami (1943-) and Ahmadinejad, Islamic Republic's position was that the Western countries' imposed sanctions were both illegal and unjust. The Islamic Republic demanded their entire lifting as a precondition for negotiating, in particular on the nuclear issue. Under the presidency of Rouhani (1948-), the so-called moderate,¹⁰⁰ those sanctions were still regarded as unjust, but no longer as illegal. It was surely with the consent of the Islamic prerogative state.¹⁰¹ On February 25th, 2019, the Syrian president al-Assad met the theocratic leader Khamenei, apparently officially, for the first time since the beginning of the Syrian war. Although, at this official meeting Mohammad Javad Zarif (1960-)¹⁰² as the official foreign minister of the obviously elected state was not invited, his position was filled by the commander of the Quds

⁹⁸ Ummah is an Arabic term for community, and is commonly used to mean the collective community of Muslim people. Marilyn R. Waldman and Malika Zeghal. "Islamic world". Encyclopædia Britannica. Online edition. October 17, 2017. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Islamic-world#ref317071> .

⁹⁹ The Geneva interim agreement on Iranian nuclear program officially titled as Joint Plan of Action, Geneva. 24 November 2013.

¹⁰⁰ Since he took office in 2013, Iran has embarked on what Amnesty International calls "a staggering execution spree", giving it the highest per capita state-killing rate in the world. The targets for murder and imprisonment include journalists, Christians and anyone who can be viewed as a political or religious dissident in obedience, as Rouhani said in 2014, to "God's commandments". Christopher Booker. "Iran's moderate leader is nothing of the kind". The Telegraph. Online edition. 23 January 2016.

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/12116458/Irans-moderate-leader-is-nothing-of-the-kind.html> .

¹⁰¹ Amir Taheri. "Opinion: Iran is a nation with two governments". Asharq Al-Awsat. Online edition. 28 November 2014.

<https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/amir-taheri/opinion/opinion-iran-is-a-nation-with-two-governments> .

¹⁰² Susan M. Shaw, Nancy Staton Barbour, Patti Duncan, Kryn Freehling-Burton and Jane Nichols (eds.). Women's Lives around the World: A Global Encyclopedia, Vol. 1. California: ABC-CLIO. 2018. p. 103.

force (the overseas arm of the IRGC) Qasem Soleimani (1957-2020),¹⁰³ the secretary of international affairs of the leader or the very unofficial foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati (1945-),¹⁰⁴ a notorious long serving judicial official known as “the judge of death” Ebrahim Raisi (1960-),¹⁰⁵ among other Khamenei’s entourage. In the meanwhile, Zarif resigned, in that he believed after publishing the photos of this meeting, he as a foreign minister would have no credibility around the world. Two days later Zarif returned to the ministry of foreign affairs, as his resignation was denied by Rouhani¹⁰⁶ under the Khamenei’s pressure.¹⁰⁷ This event clearly depicted the elected president and his cabinet are merely the frontline staff in a country which is run by a theocratic clerical establishment with an ultimate authority.¹⁰⁸

To illustrate the other violations of the theocratic sector, an old ratified convention in Iran can be exemplified. The Iranian regime, before 1979 revolution, ratified the Biological Weapons Convention, on 23rd August 1973. The Islamic normative state after the revolution confirmed such conventions, but, its prerogative part hiddenly has advanced biologic and genetic engineering research programs supporting an industry that produces standardized vaccines by a duality of usage to easily produce biological warfare agents. The regime’s activities indicate a maturing offensive program with a rapidly evolving capability that might soon include the ability to deliver the weapons by various means. In June 2004, the American intelligence community

¹⁰³ After the USA invasion of Iraq, he was the major figure of the so-called mullah’s support to the Middle Eastern Shi’i and especially pro-Asad militant groups. Brian L. Steed. *ISIS: An Introduction and Guide to the Islamic State*. California: ABC-CLIO. 2016. p. 138.

¹⁰⁴ He was one of the German court defendants in the bloody assassination case of the Mykonos a Greek restaurant in Berlin on 17th September 1992. In this incident several opposed politicians were injured and murdered. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (ed.). *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, Vol. 21. Colorado: Westview. 2000. p. 49.

¹⁰⁵ Ervand Abrahamian. The Islamic Republic’s “Greatest Crime” (An Interview). Center for Human Rights in Iran. Online edition. May 4, 2017. <https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2017/05/an-interview-with-scholar-and-historian-ervand-abrahamian-on-the-islamic-republics-greatest-crime/>. He is the 8th and current President of Islamic Republic (2021-), was the chief Justice (2019-2021), and also between 2016 and 2019 the trustee of Astan Quds Razavi, a religious multi-millionaire (in dollar) foundation in charge of the donations to the holiest Iranian Shi’ite shrine in Mashhad. Bozorgmehr Sharafedin. “Hardline cleric Raisi to take on Rouhani in Iran’s presidential election”. Reuters. Online edition. April 9, 2017. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-elections-raisi-idUSKBN17B0DZ>. Farzin Mansouri. “Ebrahim Raisi; from Judgment to Trusteeship”. BBC News. Online edition. 7 March 2016. http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2016/03/160307_brahim_raissi_astan_qods_profile.

¹⁰⁶ Benjamin Mueller. “Two Days After Resigning, Iran’s Foreign Minister Returns to Post”. The New York Times. Online edition. February 27, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/27/world/middleeast/iran-zarif-rouhani-foreign-minister.html>.

¹⁰⁷ The Editors of Radio Farda. “Khamenei Has Reportedly Told Zarif Not To Resign”. Radio Farda. Online edition. February 26, 2019. <https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iran-khamenei-has-told-zarif-not-to-resign/29792362.html>.

¹⁰⁸ The Editors of The Times of Israel. “US dismisses surprise resignation of Iran’s Zarif”. The Times of Israel. Online edition. February 26, 2019. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-dismisses-surprise-resignation-of-irans-zarif/>.

confirmed in a 721-page report to the Congress that Islamic Republic maintains an offensive biological warfare program. Also, according to a 2005 report published by the American State Department, the regime began his work on the offensive biological weapons during the Iran-Iraq war.¹⁰⁹

As another evidence, there was a popular election in 1997, president Khatami came to power on a wave of hope. Additionally, there was a popular parliament, which was dominated by pro-Khatami so-called reformists. Nevertheless, in their time, the main part of the Chain Murders, a series of mysterious murders and disappearances of the Iranian dissident intellectual critics was operated and completed under allegedly some rogue agents of the legal Ministry of Intelligence¹¹⁰ and depicted the Islamic Republic as the only regime that its valid normative state has not much influence on its armed and security forces. Even though, constitutionally, the presidency has the second highest official fixed reign after the leadership¹¹¹ and obviously is responsible for the country's administration, his authority has been always violated by the almighty leader or the most powerful person in the country, who enjoins all sequence of domestic and external arenas throughout his prerogative parallel outfit. The dominion of his prerogative collateral power is developed and lengthened from the urban to the most demoted rural areas through his mullah representatives or Imams of Friday Prayer and their Basenji guardians.¹¹² These mullahs are more influential than all regional administrative divisions of the republic state in the country.¹¹³ In other words, similar to the measures of the Nazi which were placed above the laws, the orders and the occasional autonomous decisions of these prerogative elements are prior to the legal hierarchical formalities of the normative state.

¹⁰⁹ Ephraim Kahana and Muhammad Suwaed. *The A to Z of Middle Eastern Intelligence*. Lanham: Scarecrow Press. 2009. Pp. 120-121.

¹¹⁰ Muhammad Sahimi. "The Chain Murders: Killing Dissidents and Intellectuals, 1988-1998". *Frontline*. Online edition. 5 January 2011. <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/01/the-chain-murders-killing-dissidents-and-intellectuals-1988-1998.html> . See also Elaine Sciolino. *Persian Mirrors: The Elusive Face of Iran*. New York: Free Press. 2000. Pp. 233-239.

¹¹¹ Iranian Constitution 1979, Chapter 9th The Executive Power, Section 1 The Presidency, Arts. 113, 114. http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html .

¹¹² The Basij militia, which is a subsidiary of the Revolutionary Guard, was basically created in 1979 by the founder of the Islamic Republic, Khomeini, as a volunteer force to back up the Iranian army in the Iran-Iraq war. (Ali Alfoneh. "The Basij Resistance Force". U.S. Institute of Peace. Online edition. 2015. <http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force/iranian>) With a network now of exaggeratedly as many as 23,800,000 passive and active members (On 22nd November 2015, Mohammad Reza Naqdi, the commander of the Basij paramilitary force of Iran, announced in a TV interview) is tasked to maintain order and scare potentially dissidents mostly in times of crisis. In today's Iran, they benefit financial and social merits such as loans, university positions and top-ranked state occupations and opportunities.

¹¹³ The Editors of *Frontline*. "The structure of power in Iran: An overview of the Iranian government and political system". <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/inside/govt.html> .

Although, this fact has facilitated the active supervision of the representatives of the theocratic state over both the approved state and the whole society, simultaneously it has created a sort of decentralized arbitrary autonomous power inside the Islamic Republic system. This trend of chaotic rogue autonomy went even further beyond the borders of the country towards the international domain.

In any case, the constitution ambiguously provides the supreme leader with authority over all matters of the de jure state. Khamenei that was even to his own surprise appointed after the death of Khomeini in 1989, conducts the command of the armed forces, the national monopolized media and the judiciary system. Indeed, the watchdog body of the Council of Guardian under the authority of him vets candidates for every so-called election, e.g., parliament, presidency, Assembly of Experts of the Leadership, thus the system's democratic and autocratic practices are under his influence as he is at the top of the power structure. Accordingly, the leader should further proctor the total domestic and foreign policies so as to determine their firmness and orientation.¹¹⁴

On the normative side, there is also a legislative body as Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament) with 290 representatives who are apparently publicly elected, but practically confirmed by the leader's influence and consent, every four years. It legislates laws, entitles state's bills, confirms the international treaties, approves country's budget and ministers of a substantive cabinet. The parliamentary legislations are vetted by the 12 mullah and semi mullah watchdogs of the Council of Guardian¹¹⁵ to distinguish their suitability with the Shari'a, without problem and conflict. The members of the Council of Guardian have the exclusive right to interpret and expound the constitution.¹¹⁶ According to Art. 107 of the constitution, there is also an Assembly of Experts of the Leadership responsible for detecting, discovering and supervising the leader (howbeit, it expresses merely warm approval and praise for the leader), consists of 86 virtuous and learned mullahs meeting yearly.¹¹⁷ Its members are elected through a public ballot similar to any other Islamic elections, as its candidates should be vetted by the

¹¹⁴ Ibid., <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/inside/govt.html> . Iranian Constitution 1979, Chapter 8th, The Leadership, Art. 110. http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html .

¹¹⁵ The leader appoints six mullahs of the 12 members of the Council of Guardian. The head of the judiciary, who is also appointed by the leader, recommends the remaining six semi mullahs to the parliament to be appointed.

¹¹⁶ Iranian Constitution 1979, Chapter 6th The Legislative Powers, Section 2 Powers and Authority of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, Art. 91. http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html .

¹¹⁷ Iranian Constitution 1979, Chapter 8th The Leadership, Art. 107.

http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html . The Editors of Frontline. "The structure of power in Iran: An overview of the Iranian government and political system". <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/inside/govt.html> .

Council of Guardian and the leader himself, so that it demonstrates a vicious circle or a sequence of reciprocal cause and effect in which these elements intensify and aggravate each other, leading inexorably to a worsening of the situation in the recent history of Iran.

Khomeini on 6th February 1988, two years before his death ordered the establishment of the Expediency Discernment Council of the System so as to solve conflicts between the parliament and the Guardian Council and as an advisory body.¹¹⁸ In whatever way, all of the 45 members of the mentioned council are directly appointed by the leader, and practically play almost no substantial part inside the Islamic Republic.

As it was already mentioned the armed forces (comprised of the Army, the IRGC and the Police) are under the control of the supreme leader. Among them, the Revolutionary Guard¹¹⁹ after the 1980s war, which was not only a divine blessing,¹²⁰ but additionally a tranquilization for the revolution, has achieved monstrous vast economic advantages across the country. In some cases, it even disrupted the economic deals of the republican part with the foreign companies, e.g., in 2004, the army of Guardians of Revolution as a branch of the Iranian Armed Forces rudely contrary to law by its military equipment closed the newly built Tehran's International Airport. The construction's tender was won by a Turkish company and some parts were completed, but intrusively the Revolutionary Guard called the deal a security threat and forced the government to cancel it.¹²¹ This occurrence evidently once again demonstrated conflict and critical relation within Islamic Republic's structures, particularly between the unpredictable and impulsive power of the de facto factual factions and the rightful efforts that leastways pretend to end the system's economic and political isolation. Furthermore, such narratives raise one of the greatest worries and concerns of any foreign investors interested in this country's market.¹²²

¹¹⁸ Iranian Constitution 1979, Chapter 8th The Leadership, Art. 112.

<http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000.html> . In fact, it was created upon the revision to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran on 6th February 1988. The Editors of Frontline. "The structure of power in Iran: An overview of the Iranian government and political system".

<https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/inside/govt.html> .

¹¹⁹ The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was designated as a terrorist organization by some countries (since 2018) and in particular by the United States (since 2019). The Editors of Asharq Al-Awsat. "Saudi Arabia, Bahrain Add IRGC and Individuals to Terror Lists". Asharq Al-Awsat. Online edition. 23 October 2018. <https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1435571/saudi-arabia-bahrain-add-irgc-and-individuals-terror-lists?amp> . Rebecca Ballhaus and Jessica Donati. "U.S. Designates Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Terror Organization". The Wall Street Journal. Online edition. April 8, 2019.

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-designates-irans-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-a-foreign-terrorist-organization-11554733155> .

¹²⁰ Said Khomeini after the beginning of the war in a speech on 30th September 1980 to the frontiersmen.


¹²¹ The Editors of BBC News. "New Tehran airport shut by army". BBC News. Online edition. 8 May 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3696801.stm .

¹²² Farnaz Fassihi. "The Two Faces of Iran's Dual Government". The Wall Street Journal. Online edition. 22 January 2016. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-two-faces-of-irans-dual-government-1453488727> .

This Revolutionary Guard was internationally developed, when in 1982 was deployed (by the Quds Force) to Lebanon so as to support the Shi'i militia of Hezbollah,¹²³ and it has since become active in supporting Islamic revolutionary proxies in other zones. To find a way out of the American boycott after the hostage crisis of the American embassy in Tehran (1979 -1981), the IRGC had self-weaponized and purchased from People's Republic of China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Russia (the former Soviet Union).¹²⁴

Anyhow, to sum up briefly, through a Fraenkelian view, for four decades, the Islamist Republic has ruled through a parallel system. The elected bodies are carefully supervised by the committees appointed by religious authorities. Clearly visible, the entire organizational constitutional outfit with the Guardian Council is the leverage or the exertion of force for the theocratic factual segment behind the facade of the republic legal section. To halt the Iranian society as a part of the Shi'i Ummah, this segregation is well managed by the supreme leader and his entourage.

Model 2. Power mechanism of the Islamic Republic based on the Fraenkel's theory



It is vividly depicted that the system's democratic and autocratic characteristics have a type of synergetic interplay through both the elected levels and the theocratic authorities. In this synergism, the supreme leader and his affiliated groups possessed a deterministic convincing

¹²³ O'hern. Iran's Revolutionary Guard: The Threat That Grows While America Sleeps. 46.

¹²⁴ Ephraim and Suwaed. The A to Z of Middle Eastern Intelligence. 124. The Editors of Frontline. "The structure of power in Iran: An overview of the Iranian government and political system". <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/inside/govt.html> .

might. Meanwhile, the highlighted points in this system are the multiple positions and the kinship relationship of the most officials, e.g., a very prominent member of the Assembly of Experts (since 1999-) acts simultaneously as the very decisive member of the Guardian Council (since 2001-) and also both as the very head of the Judiciary System (2009-2019), as well as the head of the Expediency Council (2018-).¹²⁵ One of his brothers is the head of Majles (since 2008-),¹²⁶ and the other brother of him is the executive secretary of the High Council for Human Rights of the Judiciary of Islamic Republic of Iran (since 2004-2019).¹²⁷

Although, this work ventured to apply the Fraenkel's theory, in that it is sophisticated and fruitful for analyzing the Islamic Republic and its ruling mechanism in contemporary Iran, we have to keep in mind that this particular religious regime with some fascistic traits is different from the Nazis' fascism, because it has not totally abolished its so-called republican constitution, which is based on a double structure of republic and theocracy under the reign of the religious leader. In the German case, despite the fact that the Weimar constitution nominally continued to exist under the Nazis' rein, via the development of the emergency circumstances based on "the decree of the Reich president for the protection of people and state" or "the Reichstag fire decree" of 28th February 1933 and "the law to remedy the distress of people and Reich" or "the Enabling Act" of 23rd March 1933, which was factually a type of amendment for this constitution, Hitler and his cabinet were blessed by an absolute power to self-determining enact laws, free from both the Reichstag's legislation and the constitution of the German Reich.¹²⁸ This dictatorial unwritten constitution abolishment, namely the written legal amendment practically transferred the normative state's power to the prerogative one-party state.

¹²⁵ Sadeq Larijani, who is in the sanction list of the EU, as endorsed and allowed harsh punishments for retribution crimes (Qisas), crimes against God (Moharebe and Hodoud) and crimes against the state (Ta'zirat). Council Regulation (EU) No 264/2012 of 23 March 2012, amending Regulation (EU) No 359/2011, concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran. Official Journal of the European Union. Pp. L 87/26-36. 24 March 2012.

<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:087:0026:0036:EN:PDF> . The US also separately sanctioned him for serious human rights abuses against Iranian residents. Treasury Sanctions Individuals and Entities for Human Rights Abuses and Censorship in Iran, and Support to Sanctioned Weapons Proliferators. United States Department of the Treasury. 12 January 2018. <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0250> .

¹²⁶ Ali Larijani.

¹²⁷ Mohammad-Javad Larijani.

¹²⁸ András Sajó and Renáta Uitz. *The Constitution of Freedom: An Introduction to Legal Constitutionalism*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. Copyright. 2017. Pp. 419-420.

2.8. *The theory of Behemoth State as an anti-totalitarian model*

To go to provide a critical scrutiny of the more hidden layers of the structure of the rule of Islamic Republic, the repressive force of the Iranian 2009 social movement, as well as an inhibiting or restraining regime system Franz Leopold Neumann (1900-1954)¹²⁹ as an early member of the Frankfurt School, who is best known for his theoretical analyses of the Nazi party, is the second scholar to consider.

His appraisal of the government mechanism of the Nazis, *Behemoth* (1942)¹³⁰ emphasizes on the Nazi economic power, besides a detailed study of different aspects of this type. This innovative pioneering contribution over the Nazi organization also involved and later opened the way to a new deconstructive idea of a totalitarian state, which is not recognizable in particular in the first edition of his work.

Neumann shows how the Nazi ideology had no rational philosophical background and as a result predicted its downfall, in which the Nazis seemed undefeatable. In addition, he demonstrates the machinery of Nazi rule and the ways in which pre-existing structures had put their talent and experience to the service of criminality.¹³¹

In terms of the literature of totalitarian thesis in connection to the rise of the Nazi party and Hitler's attainment of power, he refers to the lately vast literature re-examinations of state and government. He goes through the distinctions between a liberaler constitutional state as the product of the French revolution and the applied substance of the English constitution from one side, and a nationaler constitutional state developed in the Italian Fascism and the German National Socialism from another side, granted, the Nazi case characterized as a state that restored friendly relationship between justice and political necessities.¹³² According to his investigations "various types of totalitarian states were distinguished", thus, while he clarifies the distinction between the totalitarianism and the absolutism, accentuates on the Nazi state as a peculiar type, something "more than a mere system of coercion... a form of life of the racial Volk", infiltrating all over the public spheres of the society. Then he refers to Hitler, addressing to

¹²⁹ Emil Walter-Busch. *Geschichte der Frankfurter Schule: Kritische Theorie und Politik*. München: Wilhelm Fink. 2010. Pp. 84-85.

¹³⁰ Franz Leopold Neumann. *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism*. Originally published: 1942 by Victor Gollancz LTD. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. 2009. Metaphorically, *Behemoth* can be referred to a mythological beast or creature, a large animal similar to elephant, hippopotamus, among others. Bruce M. Metzger and Michael D. Coogan. *The Oxford Guide To People And Places Of The Bible*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. 2004. p. 33.

¹³¹ Neumann. *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism*. ix.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 47.

the SA leaders in Bad Reichenhall on 1st July 1933, “the third phase of the revolution must be the establishment of the totality of the state”.¹³³

Based on Neumann, while, during the rise of the Nazis to power, they claimed to support the rights of workers, small farmers, and small businesses, in practice, under their sovereignty differences between male and female, skilled and unskilled workers, among other economic inequalities were deepened, unions were crushed, thus the cartels were empowered. The cartels and the political authority merged together. In the meanwhile, behind this cartelization there was a centralization beneficial to industries. Among the specific Nazi policies which have implemented this sort of capitalism, there is the Aryanization. Accordingly, the Jewish properties were confiscated, not towards the state, but in the direction of the Nazi subsidized industrial parts. Then, the war gave the Nazis not only glory but stabilization of their power. To industry it brought profit by overcoming and taking control over the foreign markets and accumulation of capital.¹³⁴

Basically, Behemoth was depicted as a total thing like what was already described in the Jewish mythology and the writings of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679).¹³⁵ Correspondingly, the structure of the Nazi regime was a chaotic, lawless, and amorphous monster. Its policies expressed a sort of sporadic overlapping and occasional contending drives of the four symbiotic related but by the same token separated power centers, the Nazi party, the armed forces, the German state bureaucracy and the big businesses. The innate vulnerability of the Nazi stemmed, according to Neumann, from its very nature as conspiracy among these four self-interested groups, each of which sought to expand the German power and territory without relinquishing authority or status to any of the other structures.¹³⁶ Hence, as is shown by Neumann, the so-called Nazi totalitarianism was made up not of one unified structure but at least of four pillars held together only by precarious arrangements between their respective elites. Hitler’s functionality in such system, according to the theory, was probably merely to embody and express compromise of the four mentioned ruling elite groups.¹³⁷ Comparatively, while, for Fraenkel the Nazi state was comprised of solely two structures of power, normative and prerogative, in Neumann’s analysis, it primarily is composed of four centers. Thus, the Fraenkel and Neumann’s analyses of the Nazi power are able to provide a kind of anti-totalitarian approach that demonstrates not a

¹³³ Ibid., 48.

¹³⁴ See Ibid., 261-291.

¹³⁵ See Thomas Hobbes. Behemoth oder Das Lange Parlament. translated in German by Peter Schröder. Hamburg: Felix Meiner. 2015.

¹³⁶ Neumann. Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism. vii.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 468-469.

centralized organized four-star state with clear legal hierarchical arrangement, but a highly decentralized one functioning without understood transparent lawful rule.

Neumann, affirmatively, furthermore, in the appendix of the expanded edition of 1944 over the structure of power of the eventful totalitarian Nazi state under the war in a deconstructive report uncovered a process of decentralization of administration. He explained how the administrative national level paled versus the regional and local levels of the *Gaue*¹³⁸ and therefore those who gradually gained more power were the territorial heads or the *Gauleiters*. They were convinced to fully direct all necessary administrative spheres of the complex structure within the organizational apparatus of the fascistic party, hence made practical and effective use of the party's extreme fear and relative welfare characteristics for the exclusive mass influence, manipulation and stranglehold. Strictly speaking, as the massive air attacks began to move more quickly and thus the military set of circumstances became progressively worse, the procedure of the decentralization of administration, policy-making and commanding in diverse issues such as economy, labor supply, housing and warfare transmitted and subordinated to the territorial units.¹³⁹

Nonetheless, the Neumann's major model by demonstrating a Behemoth state, as well as the Fraenkel's theory of dual state by distinguishing a normative sector from an arbitrary state power are merely more and less able to explain the early stages of the Nazi dominion and the very personal specifications of the Nazi leaders' rule, based on a type of totalitarianism, which literally also embraced a kind of Hitler-centered analysis. Although, their analyses cast light upon the ostensible totalitarianism and has contributed to set our attitude towards given elements in other similar entities, our cases that are in many respects peculiar phenomena cannot fully fit them.

As a matter of fact, Neumann and Fraenkel could not so much explain the progressive debilitating organizational bureaucratic process of the public institutions through arbitrary exercise of power. In practice, from the central discretion to the very local, an accelerating fragmentation in the administrative apparatus was accompanied with the transferred decentralized power and its subsequent formation of independent executive bodies such as the *Gaue*, controlled by the influential ministers, *Gauleiters*, among other party officials pursuing

¹³⁸ Gau means a territorial unit such as district or region within a country in Germanic languages. Egbert Jahn. *German Domestic and Foreign Policy: Political Issues Under Debate*, Vol. 2. Heidelberg: Springer. 2015. p. 129.

¹³⁹ Martina Steber and Bernhard Gotto (eds.). *Visions of Community in Nazi Germany: Social Engineering and Private Lives*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. 2014. p. 101. Neumann. *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism*. 526, 535-537.

their self-promoted radicalized plans and agendas.¹⁴⁰ Though, on the other side, based on Christopher Robert Browning (1944-), a Holocaust historian, this is not a secret any longer that the Gauleiters were the major assembled spectators for the Hitler's secret speech of December 12th, 1941, which indirectly suggested and encouraged a form of polycratic ruling, radicalization and the destruction on a mass scale.¹⁴¹ In any manner, this expansionistic policy and trend under the Nazis' reign ultimately accelerated the process of the dissolution of unity and authority of the government, in that, from other direction, the occupied territories also were autonomously directed by the party functionaries.¹⁴²

One of the consequences of such a polycratically disorganized regime was the power overlapping of the officials who each claimed to represent the Hitler's volition to a great extent. The other output was a hugely chaotic system that more pragmatically than ideologically made Hitler well contented, in that it successfully created a type of contest and rivalry among his subordinates in the different levels of the running administration, keeping him away from any type of feasible turbulence. This wide range of Nazi disorganization, power centers, independent institutions and associations furthermore made the critical circumstances of unclarity of responsibility and administrative confusion among the officials.¹⁴³

As an obvious example, the so-called trouble to deal with the Jews in the occupied territories of Poland (1939) and Lithuania (1941) gave a rise to the process and plans of the Ghettoization or demographic reorganization in urban centers (since 1938). For this purpose, Reinhard Heydrich (1904-1942)¹⁴⁴ ordered to dissolve the small Jewish communities (less than 500), accommodating in "urban concentration centers" next to the train rails. At this stage, conclusive fierce competition and rivalry between the officials rose and encouraged a decentralized system of territorial autonomy. In order to execute the bio and racial policies, choosing Poland as a location for relocating the Western European Jews became controversial chiefly among Hitler,

¹⁴⁰ Hans Mommsen. "Cumulative radicalisation and progressive self-destruction as structural determinants of the Nazi dictatorship". in *Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison*. edited by Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. Pp. 75-87. 1997. p. 75.

¹⁴¹ Christopher R. Browning. *The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942*. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press. 2004. Pp. 407-409.

¹⁴² Mommsen. "Cumulative radicalisation and progressive self-destruction as structural determinants of the Nazi dictatorship". 75.

¹⁴³ See Roderick Stackelberg. *Hitler's Germany: Origins, Interpretations, Legacies*. Oxon: Routledge. 1999. Pp. 140-141. See also Roderick Stackelberg. *The Routledge Companion to Nazi Germany*. New York: Routledge. 2007. p. 123.

¹⁴⁴ A Nazi high-ranking official as well as an SS senior group leader, Gestapo's director (1934-1939), and the chief of the Reich main security office (1939-1942). Alexander Mikaberidze (ed.). *Atrocities, Massacres, and War Crimes: An Encyclopedia*, Vol. 1. California: ABC-CLIO. 2013. p. 244.

Heinrich Himmler (1900-1945)¹⁴⁵ and Heydrich. As a matter of fact, some of the Nazi leaders, officials and bureaucrats wanted simply to get rid of them and the other were merely looking for their labor functionality. The project of forming the Polish isolated and underprivileged urban areas for resettling the European Jews was started in the early 1940 and remained unfinished as the Nazi leaders put forward "the so-called Madagascar plan". The war conditions and the possible difficulties of transportation made the implementation of this plan totally infeasible. In any case, gradually, the prediction of the process of reducing the victims' strength and effectiveness through the uninterrupted pressure of the forced labor and starvation in the ghettos, alongside the war's economic woes, made "the implementation of the Final Solution" probable, although, at that time, the ghettos' authorities "had no premeditated plans for mass murder."¹⁴⁶

Along with the military invasions to the Soviet front, in summer 1941, the special task forces (Einsatzgruppen) began the mass killings of the Jews inside the Russian territories (via shootings and gas vans). In Lithuanian case, the bureaucratic fierce conflict rose within the members of the special task forces and the civil administrative officials accompanied with the military army as recruiters of the Jewish labors. In this relation, a report is left by a special task force in Lithuania, 1st December 1941 "I wanted to eliminate the working Jews and their families as well, but the Civil Administration and the Wehrmacht attacked me most sharply and issued a prohibition against having those Jews and their families shot".¹⁴⁷

2.9. *Between Functionalist and Intentionalist debates*

Theoretically, as an issue of fact, it was Raul Hilberg (1926-2007), by some means Neumann's student, who unfolded the very last bit of Neumann's job, stressing this extreme decentralization of the Nazi machinery, engaged in the destruction process of the Holocaust.¹⁴⁸ The anti-totalitarian perspective of Hans Mommsen (1930-2015)¹⁴⁹ is also to support this approach.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁵ One of the most powerful Nazi leaders, the Reich leader-SS and the chief of Nazi police (1936-1945). *Ibid.*, 245.

¹⁴⁶ Carol J. Greenhouse, Elizabeth Mertz and Kay B. Warren. *Ethnography in Unstable Places: Everyday Lives in Contexts of Dramatic Political Change*. Durham: Duke Univ. Press. 2002. Pp. 39-40.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 41.

¹⁴⁸ See Raul Hilberg. *The Destruction of the European Jews*. Originally published: 1961. New York: Holmes & Meier. 1985.

¹⁴⁹ See Hans Mommsen. "Hitler's position in the Nazi System" in his *From Weimar to Auschwitz: Essays in German History*. Cambridge: Polity Press. Pp. 163-188. 1991.

¹⁵⁰ Daniela Baratieri, Mark Edele and Giuseppe Finaldi (eds.). *Totalitarian Dictatorship: New Histories*. New York: Routledge. 2014. p. 7.

Their investigations recapitulated the debates in terms of the origins of the calamity of the Nazi final solution for the so-called Jewish question into two main critical controversial approaches of thought. Firstly, the intentionalistic (e.g., Daniel Goldhagen),¹⁵¹ which asserts a sort of consistent systematic policy, traceable in the early Nazis' notions towards the Shoah or what Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) called as the "medieval pictures of hell".¹⁵² Secondly, the functionalistic stand (e.g., Götz Aly),¹⁵³ that as a matter of fact focuses on the institutional and organizational specifications of the prerogative Nazi state, rather than the so-called total power of Hitler. Accordingly, the extermination of the Jews as the improvisation and radicalization of the Nazi dictatorship was not an already thoughtfully planned decision, but in response to the changing circumstances,¹⁵⁴ thus the Holocaust did not come from the higher levels, but bureaucratically from the lower faces. Based on such polarized pattern, for instance, the first edition of Neumann's work could be deemed as an intentionalist and the last part of the second edition of his work inspiring for the functionalists.

Beyond the bounds, Mommsen points at the fact that the Nazi leaders were merely ideologues, while, so as to implement such mass murder, other people were required, the people who even were not necessarily primarily guided by the ideological deliberations. Furthermore, in such process, the radicalized decisions were gradually accumulatively developed. This reasoning focuses on the lower rank as well as the higher ranks to implement the so-called "Final Solution".¹⁵⁵

Prior to Mommsen, Hilberg as a sort of moderate functionalist historian that in his major work essentially pursues all the detailed roads towards the mass genocide and the concentration camps strived to merge the given intentionalistic and functionalistic set of reasons and argumentations, thus he argues, this disaster was "not so much a product of laws and

¹⁵¹ Daniel Jonah Goldhagen (1959-) is a notable intentionalist, see Daniel Jonah Goldhagen. *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and The Holocaust*. New York: Vintage Books. 1997.

¹⁵² Hannah Arendt. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Harcourt. 1979. p. 447.

¹⁵³ Götz Haydar Aly (1947) is a radical functionalist who in understanding the creation of the Holocaust considers no role for the Nazi leaders, but deems a bottom-up approach from the lower ranks of the Nazi officialdom. Gustav Seibt. "Niemand ist auf der sicheren Seite". *perlentaucher.de*. Das Kulturmagazin. 3 May 2002. See also Götz Aly. "Final Solution": Nazi Population Policy and the Murder of the European Jews. trans. Belinda Cooper and Allison Brown. London: Arnold. 1999.

<https://www.ushmm.org/research/competitive-academic-programs/fellows-and-scholars/all-fellows-and-scholars/goetz-aly-2002> .

¹⁵⁴ Greenhouse and others. *Ethnography in Unstable Places: Everyday Lives in Contexts of Dramatic Political Change*. 39.

¹⁵⁵ Hans Mommsen. The "Functionalist" and the "Intentionalist" schools of thought (An Interview). Adi Gordon, Amos Morris Reich, Amos Goldberg (Interviewers). Jerusalem: Shoah Resource Center, The International School for Holocaust Studies. Ruhr University Bochum. 12 Dezember 1997.

https://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%203850.pdf . p. 2.

commands as it was a matter of spirit, of shared comprehension, of consonance and synchronization".¹⁵⁶ Further, he in an interview in terms of the individuality and intentionality of the Holocaust remarked that generally speaking lessons cannot be learned if it is considered as an extraordinary unique event, "for me the Holocaust was a vast, single event, but I am never going to use the word unique, because I recognize that when one starts breaking it into pieces, which is my trade, one finds completely recognizable, ordinary ingredients that are common to other situations, such as Rwanda or Cambodia and possibly many others I have not examined". If people take an individual event as a unique one, by means of the very unique individuals, they never think it will come to them, nonetheless the history proportionally repeats.¹⁵⁷

As a result, an amalgamation of the intentionalistic perspective together with the functionalistic viewpoint in socio-historical understanding and interpreting the encouragement of the anti-Semitism that eventuated to the improvisation and genesis of the Holocaust and the Nazis' policies is noteworthy. This view generates a type of synergic model, which considers an interaction through both the higher levels and the lower ones. In this synergism, Hitler and Nazi leaders possessed no comprehensive or far-reaching plan of action, but were the deterministic might in the absence. Here a form of contest among the different levels of Nazi functionaries caused the cumulative self-radicalization, depicted in their effective and persuasive speeches to generate progressively ultimate policies.¹⁵⁸ In the meantime, predominantly, the single-minded low ranked bureaucrats (with excessive enthusiasm) implemented what they supposed their superordinates would officially with satisfactory agree and accept based on their previously formulated ideology.

2.10. Intentionalism and the Shi'ite ideology

With respect to this elaborated literature and as regards the already mentioned Nazi's constitutional differences,¹⁵⁹ in the case of the Islamic Republic, theoretically, from an intentional angle, since as early as 1963 Khomeini began his political hate speech with opposing the

¹⁵⁶ Raul Hilberg. *The Destruction of the European Jews*. Originally published: 1961. New York: Holmes & Meier. 1985. Pp. 54-55.

¹⁵⁷ Raul Hilberg in Lucy Russell. *Teaching the Holocaust in School History: Teachers Or Preachers?*. New York: continuum International Publishing Group. 2006. p. 56.

¹⁵⁸ Mommsen. The "Functionalist" and the "Intentionalist" schools of thought. https://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%203850.pdf . 2.

¹⁵⁹ Although, comparably the religious leaders exhibited an extremistic side of the Islamic Shi'a ideology, their theocratic republican constitution (though its fakeness) made it different from a pure fascistic (e.g., Nazi) or even a pure religious fascistic, caliphate (e.g., Saudi-Arabia) type, a state without any republican constitutional element.

Shah's pro-Israeli policies,¹⁶⁰ and basically aimed a collapse for the Israeli regime as one of his ideals. His cohorts denied the holocaust and called it as a myth.¹⁶¹ He with a sort of duality, while promised a full democracy, quickly mobilized a mass militant movement (alike fascies, a bundle of young mullahs and their tough revolutionary warriors tied around the axe of Shari'a) and jumped into the terror and horror phase. The Islamic regime intolerantly and discriminately ruled with iron fist, destroying all democratic rights in the country, thus publicly and secretly whipped unveiled women and drinkers, and executed intellectuals, Marxists, homosexuals, ethnic and religious minorities, addicts, along with torturing and taking thousands lives of those who were titled as "Moharebs"¹⁶² or enemies against God.

The emphasis on the military intelligence service and the power of the revolutionary guardians is the main characteristic of this Islamic factual state, which can be partially explained by its provocative contentious ambitions. These forces are to a large extent trained so as to repress the internal uprisings, but not to merely fight against an external enemy. Under such circumstances there is a ubiquitous spying feeling, where everybody might potentially be an agent.

Although, based on the 1983 parliamentary legislation, the philosophy of existence of the Islamic Ministry of Intelligence was specified to collect and process information about people and events across the Globe, it has taken the mission for neutralizing the so-called secret plots against the Islamic regime.¹⁶³ The Intelligence Ministry accompanied with IRGC supporting proxies for Islamic Republic's intentions in foreign countries (particularly in the Middle East), as

¹⁶⁰ Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch. *Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System*. London and New York: Routledge. 1997. p. 89.

¹⁶¹ Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, president of Iran from 2005 to 2013, since his presidency several times addressed this issue. Mark Hitchcock. *The Apocalypse of Ahmadinejad: The Revelation of Iran's Nuclear Prophet*. New York: The Doubleday Religious Publishing Group. 2007. p. 13.

¹⁶² Moharebeh or war against God is a charge mostly against people who criticize the Islamic regime. Another related crime is spreader corruption on the earth or Mofsedeh-fel-arz which is also applicable against intellectuals. Both of these Shari'a law charges have capital punishment and are stemmed from surahs Al-Ma'ida (the spread tablecloth full of food and blessing) verses 33 and 34, "Indeed, the penalty for those who wage war against God and his messenger and strive corruption on earth, should be killed or crucified or their hands and feet should be cut off from opposite sides or exiled from the land. That is for them a disgrace in this world, and for them in the hereafter is a great punishment", "except for those who return before you apprehend them. So, know that God is forgiving and merciful", Al-Baqara (the cow) 279th verse "If you do not, then take notice of a war by God and his messenger. But if you repent, you may keep your capital, neither wronging, nor being wronged", and Al-Furqan (the moral criterion) 52nd verse "So do not obey the disbelievers but strive against them with a mighty struggle".

¹⁶³ Ephraim and Suwaed. *The A to Z of Middle Eastern Intelligence*. 124-125.

well as, organizing and conducting the elimination of the political dissidents and intellectuals within Iran's borders,¹⁶⁴ alongside abroad.¹⁶⁵

On the other side of this secret hidden outfit which even its members are called as "anonymous soldiers" of the 12th hidden Imam, Mahdi,¹⁶⁶ there is a judiciary system, in which a judge can function as prosecutor, as well as jury. Under the reign of this supreme leader-oriented judiciary, alongside the public courts so as to cope with civil and criminal cases, there are the Revolutionary Courts and Special Mullahs' Courts to harshly revenge and deadly eliminate those opponents who think, write, give speech or act against the Islamic revolution among other particular cases. The verdicts of these courts are not appealable at all.¹⁶⁷

In this way, this republican theocracy with a type of ideological fiction was gifted to survive over the time. The ultimate application of terror power has eliminated the sense of factuality and the common sense, based on the Shi'i ideology, its religious propagandistic rituals and fictional narrations. The eventual outcome of such political system outlaws its oppositions and strives to interfere every Iranian social sphere as a prelude to the Middle Eastern domination.

2.11. Functionalism, the self-radicalized forces and arbitrary measures

From a functionalistic point of view, this so-called totalitarian state is not a centralized super-state with a clear legal hierarchy of order, but a highly decentralized state working without clear legal order. The implication of such unwritten and unclear orders is the circumstances under which the final decision makers and executors of the orders regularly take the more radical possibility, just to avoid troublesomeness and inconveniences. In such system there is an organizational mechanism of self-radicalization or cumulative radicalization, a self-induced production of emergency situations.¹⁶⁸

Khamenei in a speech on 7th June 2017 implicitly criticized the president Rouhani's so-called moderate policies and ordered his supporters (IRGC, Basij and security anonymous plainclothes forces) to act autonomously in emergency occasions. He declared that they should

¹⁶⁴ Sciolino. *Persian Mirrors: The Elusive Face of Iran*. 239.

¹⁶⁵ The Editors of Frontline. "The structure of power in Iran: An overview of the Iranian government and political system". <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/inside/govt.html> .

¹⁶⁶ In Islamic Shi'a eschatology Mahdi equals messiah, savior or liberator. The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Mahdī". Encyclopædia Britannica. Online edition. May 11, 2015. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/mahdi> .

¹⁶⁷ Iranian Constitution 1979, Chapter 11th, The Judiciary, Articles 156 and 157. http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html .

¹⁶⁸ Mommsen. The "Functionalist" and the "Intentionalist" schools of thought. https://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%203850.pdf . 2.

be “fire at will” against enemies of the regime. Although, it was already an established enforced current and not a new course at all, revalidated more arbitrary amassed-radicalized repressive measures against the non-Muslims, intellectuals, dissenters, opposed critical activists and morally islamically non-standard men and particularly women, based on personal choice and whim, rather than the rightful procedures. Specifically, the establishment of this issue was already done in Art. 8 of the Islamic constitution of 1979 as one of the community principles, “it is a universal and reciprocal duty that must be fulfilled by the people with respect to one another, by the government with respect to the people, and by the people with respect to the government. The conditions, limits, and nature of this duty will be specified by law.”¹⁶⁹ Then, accordingly, the ratified law allowed some people to commit murder as punishment for apostasy or insulting Muhammad and Islam. These individuals were instrumentally entitled to present this issue as their defense in their courts. It was widely abused against the Baha’is, among other minorities.¹⁷⁰

Factually, this issue was defined in accordance to the mullahs’ regime interpretation of the Quranic verses such as verse 71st, surah Al-Tawbah (Repentance),¹⁷¹ and verse 104th, surah Ali’Imran.¹⁷² Hereupon, “enjoining what is proper or good and forbidding what is reprehensible or evil”¹⁷³ or promotion of virtuous behavior showing high moral standards and prevention of vicious immoral wicked behavior are considered as two substantial religious duties in this Islamic ruled society so as to make the Ummah free from error. For instance, in the chain murders and disappearances of more than 107 critical intellectual writers and political activists during roughly two decades (1979-1998), the pattern of murders did not come to light until the late 1998, at the presidency of Khatami, when five dissidents were murdered merely within two months. An Iranian news agency revealed the story, as Khatami had formed an investigation

¹⁶⁹ Iranian Constitution 1979. http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html .

¹⁷⁰ Shirin Ebadi. Iranian Nobel Laureate Blasts Khamenei’s “Fire at Will” Policy Against Domestic Opponents (An Interview). Center for Human Rights in Iran. Online edition. 22 June 2017. <https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2017/06/iranian-nobel-laureate-blasts-khameneis-fire-at-will-policy-against-domestic-opponents/> .

¹⁷¹ “The Believers, men and women, are protectors one of another, they enjoin what is just, and forbid what is evil: they observe regular prayers, practice regular charity, and obey God and his messenger. On them will God pour his mercy, for God is exalted in power, wise.” Quran. <https://zeker.tebyan.net/#SourehID=9&Aye=71&pi=0&PageID=198&TabIndex=0&T=fa.makarem,en.yusufali> .

¹⁷² “Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: They are the ones to attain felicity.” Ibid., <https://zeker.tebyan.net/#SourehID=3&Aye=104&pi=0&PageID=63&TabIndex=0&T=fa.makarem,en.yusufali> .

¹⁷³ W. Madelung. “Amr Be Ma’ruf”. Originally published: 1989. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/amr-be-maruf> .

committee about. The regime finally attributed the murders to “a small number of irresponsible, misguided, headstrong and obstinate staff... who are no doubt under the influence of rogue undercover agents and acting towards the objectives of foreign and estranged sources when committing these criminal acts.”¹⁷⁴ The serial murders of 16 women in the holy city of Mashhad during 2000-2001 by someone who believed the victims did not deserve to live, were also from the same category. He was a self-described lone-wolf aggrieved private citizen who was going “to cleanse and make the city free of dirt and impurity” (prostitutes).¹⁷⁵

In other case, six aggregative-radicalized Basij members admitted to killing five people in the southeastern city of Kerman between 2002 and 2003. They justified the killings by accusing the victims of selling drugs and engaging in extramarital sex, thus labeling them as morally corrupted individuals based on the Shari’a laws. 13 other murders were conducted in the same city with the same method until their arrest. Finally, the Supreme Court overturned the Kerman chain murders case.¹⁷⁶

In 2014 the serial acid attackers committed tens of cases, mostly in the city of Isfahan. These radical vigilante elements self-righteously recognized that their targeted female victims were not hijabed or veiled enough, and therefore undertook Shari’a law enforcement without legal authority.¹⁷⁷

The arbitrary IRGC elements, a day after the implementation of the portentous nuclear deal between Iran and world powers, on 14th July 2015, and right after the time Rouhani as the head of the republic statutory state extended his hands to the world, held an unexpected drama, unfolded at Tehran’s International Airport. These hard-line self-determining forces seized the wife and mother of Jason Rezaian (1976-), the Washington Post reporter who was jailed in Iran for nearly 18 months. The two women, disappeared for hours, locked away in a room with no telephone contact. Finally, the women were released by some efforts.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁴ Michael Newton. *Famous Assassinations in World History: An Encyclopedia*, Vol. 1. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO. 2014. Pp.87, 91.

¹⁷⁵ Harold Schechter and David Everitt. *The A to Z Encyclopedia of Serial Killers*. New York: Simon and Schuster. 2006. Pp. 99-100.

¹⁷⁶ Saeid Golkar. *Captive Society: The Basij Militia and Social Control in Iran*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. 2015. p. 79.

Vahid Sepehri. “Iran: Supreme Court Upholds Principle Of Morality Killings”. Radio Farda. Online edition. April 23, 2007. <https://www.rferl.org/a/1076041.html> .

¹⁷⁷ Alex Vatanka. “Iran Abroad”. in *Authoritarianism Goes Global: The Challenge to Democracy*. edited by Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner and Christopher Walker. Maryland: John Hopkins Univ. Press. 2016. p. 64.

¹⁷⁸ Andrew Roth. “Jason Rezaian’s wife, mother describe their tortuous final hours in Iran”. The Washington Post. Online edition. January 21, 2016. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/jason-rezaians-wife-mother-describe-their-torturous-final-hours-in-iran/2016/01/21/> .

The show at the airport was just one of the several similar episodes over the past years. In 2011, in response to the UK's imposition of economic sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program, a mob of Basij militiamen stormed the British embassy, vandalized the facility and the ambassador's residence.¹⁷⁹ On 2nd January 2016, some rogue Basij members, attacked the embassy and consulate of Saudi Arabia in Tehran and Mashhad.¹⁸⁰ Many members of the militia shared photos of the burning embassy on the Net. The proper state tried to compensate by distancing itself from those who carried out the attacks. Based on the Iranian national media, some were arrested, but their identities and affiliations have not been revealed. In other event, on 12th January 2016, some arbitrary members of the Revolutionary Guard arrogantly released 10 detained American sailors.¹⁸¹

This trend of chaotic rogue autonomy found other expressions beyond the borders of the country. In 2019, an Iranian diplomat based at the Iranian embassy in Austria was detained in Germany as he was in touch with a couple plotting bomb attack against the Iranian opposition in Paris. In this relation, Islamic regime's former ambassador to Germany unprecedentedly criticized the terrorist operations of the rogue elements in abroad and Europe, hence for the first time, an official figure of the Islamic Republic, implicitly pointed to the existence of the rogue illegal operations under the mullahs' reign.¹⁸²

Confirmedly, the EU has a long list of such arbitrary activities on its territory. On January 9th, 2019 the Dutch authorities officially accused the Islamic Republic of being behind and plotting the political murders of two dissidents on Dutch soil in 2015 and 2017 that triggered the new European Union sanctions against Iran. In this connection, in June 2018, two regime's diplomats were expelled from the Netherlands. Two months later, in response to this expulsion, the Islamic regime also expelled two Dutch diplomats from Tehran, accused them as persona-non-grata. Consequently, on March 4th, 2019, the Netherlands recalled its ambassador from

¹⁷⁹ Robert F. Worth and Rick Glagstone. "Iranian Protesters Attack British Embassy". New York Times. Online edition. November 29, 2011. <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/world/middleeast/tehran-protesters-storm-british-embassy.html> .

¹⁸⁰ The Editors of BBC News. "UN condemns attack on Saudi embassy in Iran". BBC News. Online edition. 5 January 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35229385> .

¹⁸¹ Wills Robinson. "Iran mocks captured US sailors with Tehran street parade featuring students depicting their surrender while crowds hold up 'Death to America' banners". Daily Mail. Online edition. 11 February 2016. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3442762/> .

¹⁸² The Editors of Radio Farda. "Iranian Ex-Diplomat Admits Europe Has Strong Evidence Of Tehran's Plots". Radio Farda. Online edition. January 24, 2019. <https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iranian-diplomat-admits-europe-has-strong-evidence-of-tehran-plots/29728000.html> .

Tehran,¹⁸³ thus, an illegal arbitrarily operation resulted in an expensive serious diplomatic crisis for the regime.

Notwithstanding that these individuals, officials or non-officials, bottom-up from the very lower ranks bypassed the law, including common law, Islamic penal code, as well as international law, the regime denied that the elaborated self-radicalized attackers were driven by or connected to the hard-liners with religious motivations. As an issue of fact, the implication of a legal sanction and a prerogative order such as firing at will by encouraging to act based on ideology and religious duty is led to competitively ignoring the lawful state, arbitrarily decentralization of power, positioning above the law or lawlessness, and violating citizens' actual rights.¹⁸⁴ On the other side, the forms of the acts of these individuals offers the regime a plausible deniability to respond to possible questions about their legal and international accountability.

2.12. An Islamic Republic, beyond Functionalism and Intentionalism

This research, as a consequence, tends to postulate that in the case of Islamic Republic a combination of both factors functionalistically as well as intentionalistically drove the elaborated calamities, and could be also sufficient to explain the oppressive circumstances of the Green Movement.

According to this enhanced synthesis, under the mullahs' reign, with a sort of constitutional protection, the steadily arbitrary persecution of the Baha'is occurs in various forms of discrimination, arrest and imprisonment, exile, harassment, economic oppression (e.g., denying their pensions, forcing to repay their past earned pensions and salaries, depriving them of job positions, denying their healthcare, closure of their shops and businesses,...), exclusion from education, acts of destruction and violence, broadcasting anti-Baha'i hate speech through the national media and incitement to hatred, physical and mental torture, murder and execution, among other cruelties and injustices.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸³ Toby Chopra. "Dutch recall ambassador to Iran after diplomats expelled". Reuters. Online edition. March 4, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-netherlands-iran/dutch-recall-ambassador-to-iran-after-diplomats-expelled-idUSKCN1QL17E> .

¹⁸⁴ Ebadi. Iranian Nobel Laureate Blasts Khamenei's "Fire at Will" Policy Against Domestic Opponents (An Interview). <https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2017/06/iranian-nobel-laureate-blasts-khameneis-fire-at-will-policy-against-domestic-opponents/> .

¹⁸⁵ Archives of Baha'i Persecution in Iran. <https://iranbahaipersecution.bic.org/about> .

This Shi'i mullahs' persecution harshly began since the inception of the Babism in 1844 and later the Baha'ism in 1863.¹⁸⁶ Their justification for this antagonism simply was that after Islam no religion was supposed to be appeared.¹⁸⁷ But in fact, sociologically the reason for this opposition was that if the claims of the new religions were accepted, the socio-political influence of the social group of mullahs could be seriously jeopardized, especially in which the Baha'i's egalitarian thesis statement challenged the Islamic Shari'a law based superiority of men to women and Muslim to non-Muslim.¹⁸⁸

Khomeini declared his unfriendliness to the Baha'is before coming to power (since the 1940s) and made it clear that the Iranian Baha'i will be deprived of the basic human rights that other religious minorities might enjoy. He once described them as "Baha'i Jews", thus he even linked his anti-Baha'ism to the anti-Semitism.¹⁸⁹ He justified that "the Quran recognized only the people of the book as the religious communities. Others are pagans. Pagans must be eliminated."¹⁹⁰ After the Islamic revolution, the new constitutional document denied the Baha'is and did not grant them any rights. The Islamic courts, in their turn, do not protect Baha'is from killing and assaulting, thus allowing any harassment to them, albeit with a sort of legal immunity. The 8th secretary-general of the UN, Ban Ki-moon (1944-) in his 2016 report on the human rights situation in Iran, called the Baha'is as "the most severely persecuted religious minority".¹⁹¹ For an instance, on 18th June 1983, the regime hanged a 17-year-old young girl, Mona Mahmudnizhad (1965-1983), alongside other ten Baha'i girls and women. They were subjected to severe physical and psychological pressure and torture to deny their religious beliefs, but they did not, thus unfairly and arbitrarily were deprived of their lives. They were simply charged

¹⁸⁶ Per-Olof Akerdahl. Baha'i Identity and the Concept of Martyrdom. Uppsala: PhD Thesis, Baha'i-förlaget AB. 2002. Pp. 27-28.

D. M. MacEoin. "Bahá'ism vii. Bahá'í Persecutions". Originally published: 1988. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/bahaism-vii> .

¹⁸⁷ John W. Limbert. Iran: At War With History. New York: Routledge. 2017 (First published in 1987). p. 34.

¹⁸⁸ Ann Elizabeth Mayer. Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics. Boulder: Westview Press. 1995. p. 135.

¹⁸⁹ Michael R. Welton. "Habermas and the Meaning of the Post-Secular Society: Twin Complementary Learning Processes". in Critical Theory and Transformative Learning. edited by Victor C.X. Wang. Hershey PA: IGI Global. 2018. Pp. 16-17.

¹⁹⁰ The Editors of Human Rights and Democracy for Iran. "One Person's Story: Mona Mahmudnizhad". Human Rights and Democracy for Iran. Online edition. <https://www.iranrights.org/memorial/story/-2990/mona-mahmudnizhad> . Peter Terry. Proofs of the Prophets: The Case for Baha'u'llah. Lulu.com. 2008. p. 333.

¹⁹¹ Saeed Kamali Dehghan. "Ban Ki-moon troubled by lack of progress on human rights in Iran". The Guardian. Online edition. 4 October 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/04/ban-ki-moon-troubled-by-lack-of-progress-human-rights-iran> .

as Zionist¹⁹² and teaching children.¹⁹³ The regime's request to deny their Baha'i beliefs is evidence that the Baha'i religious belief was the main cause for their execution. In a 2016 case, a quite well-known man in the Baha'i community was stabbed to death outside his home in Yazd. The killers confessed that they killed him because he was an apostate.¹⁹⁴ Apart from these individuals, there have been many other cases of the murdered and executed Baha'is that vividly depicted, the Baha'is' persecutions have no prosecution.

In another important example event, the illegal surreptitious mass executions and burial in the mass graves of the some thirty thousand prisoners in the summer of 1988 demonstrated that nonetheless, there was not a clear plan by the leaders of the Islamic Republic to launch an event causing great calamity and distress, a suspect secret fatwa¹⁹⁵ or Shari'a-based order of the supreme leader facilitated a radical retaliatory initiative from below within the ranks of the Islamic revolutionary regime. Predominately, the victims were the people who were imprisoned for holding political or religious views that were not tolerated by the regime, e.g., the supporters of the People's Mujahedin of Iran, among other members of the leftist groups, from kid to big, female to male. At the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the operation of Forough-e Javidan (Eternal Light), a PMOI planned military attack with the Iraqi corps' support was a reason given in justification for the massacre. Howbeit, as the truth of the situation, at that time the Iranian prisons were highly overloaded with tens of thousands of political prisoners who had never been sentenced to death by the Islamic revolutionary courts. Most of them were serving their legal sentences. In some cases, the term of sentences were juridically terminated, but they were yet again captivated. Some even had been released but were astonishingly rejailed.¹⁹⁶ In accordance to the fatwa, those prisoners who insisted on their political and religious positions

¹⁹² This charge is normally presented against the Baha'is at Islamic courts, as the location of the most holy shrines and the Baha'i World Centre are in Israel. Margit Warburg. *Citizens of the World: A History and Sociology of the Baha'is from a Globalisation Perspective*. Leiden: Brill. 2006. p. 162.

¹⁹³ The Editors of Human Rights and Democracy for Iran. "One Person's Story: Mona Mahmudnizhad". <https://www.iranrights.org/memorial/story/-2990/mona-mahmudnizhad> .

¹⁹⁴ Ebadi. Iranian Nobel Laureate Blasts Khamenei's "Fire at Will" Policy Against Domestic Opponents (An Interview). <https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2017/06/iranian-nobel-laureate-blasts-khameneis-fire-at-will-policy-against-domestic-opponents/> .

¹⁹⁵ An issued noncompulsive but authoritative legal opinion or sentence by a high ranked mufti or mullah in an Islamic society. Wael B. Hallaq. "Fatwa". Originally published: 1996 by New York: Macmillan. *Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa*. Encyclopedia.com. 2016. <https://www.encyclopedia.com/philosophy-and-religion/islam/islam/fatwa#3424600948> .

¹⁹⁶ The editors of the Human Rights Council of the UN. "The massacre of political prisoners in 1988 in the Islamic Republic of Iran". United Nations, General Assembly, A/HRC/28/NGO/113, Human Rights Council, Twenty-eighth session, Agenda item 4, Human Rights situations that require the Council's attention. 27 February 2015. https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1251315/1930_1429174715_g1503786.pdf . p. 2.

and were recognized as Mohareb and Apostate, should be sentenced to death.¹⁹⁷ The specific mechanism of the administering of the trials were imprecisely personal by the tasked autonomous death committees (comprised of a Shari'a judge, an Intelligence Ministry representative and a prosecutor or substitute members, e.g., local or provincial prison chiefs) throughout the country (in more than 70 cities),¹⁹⁸ in whatever way without the law and proceedings. The prisoners were asked if they still support the PMOI, if yes, they were executed. If no, they were asked to televisedly confess against the PMOI or cooperate with the regime against the PMOI. A plain no in any stage could simply lead to a hard to swallow execution.¹⁹⁹ The virgin girl prisoners were raped before execution, as the mullahs believe, the virgins by death go to the heaven, thus in their own notion, they deprived them of the defined so-called paradise.²⁰⁰ Despite the fact that the death committees' members never revealed the scope of the killings, later not only did not deny the incident, but defended and represented it as necessary so as to consolidate the Islamic system.²⁰¹

As the fatwa was so ambiguous, the procedures were truly simple. It took merely a couple of minutes for the committees to decide each case. In this connection, Hussein Ali Montazeri

¹⁹⁷ Christina Lamb. "Khomeini fatwa 'led to killing of 30,000 in Iran'". The Telegraph. Online edition. 19 June 2001.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20080329051448/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2001/02/04/wiran04.xml> .

¹⁹⁸ The Editors of the Justice for Victims of 1988 Massacre in Iran (JVMI). "Perpetrators". Justice for Victims of 1988 Massacre in Iran (JVMI). 2017. <https://iran1988.org/perpetrators/> .

¹⁹⁹ The Editors of the Justice for Victims of 1988 Massacre in Iran (JVMI). "1988 Massacre of Political prisoners in Iran, A Crime Against Humanity". Justice for Victims of 1988 Massacre in Iran (JVMI). 2017. <https://iran1988.org/1988-massacre/> .

²⁰⁰ The executed virgins were raped to deprival of heaven, presented cases in Iran tribunal which was formed in 2007 as an International people's court in Hague to investigate the allegations of Human Rights violations under the mullahs during the 1980s. Robert Mackey. "Iranians Say Prison Rape Is Not New". The New York Times. Online edition. August 28, 2009.

<https://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/28/iranians-say-prison-rape-not-new/> .

²⁰¹ The Editors of Persian Deutsche Welle. "Ahmad Khatami: Imam Khomeini by the 1988 executions served to the nation to a great extent". Deutsche Welle Persian. Online edition. 19 August 2016.

<https://p.dw.com/p/1Jle4> . The Editors of the Justice for Victims of 1988 Massacre in Iran (JVMI). "New Report Published – 1988 Massacre in Iran: Evidence of a Crime Against Humanity". Justice for Victims of 1988 Massacre in Iran (JVMI). 18 October 2017.

<https://iran1988.org/new-report-published-1988massacre-iran-evidence-crime-humanity/> .

(1922-2009),²⁰² the Khomeini's designated successor of the time strongly disagreed and condemned the mass executions. He by sending letters to Khomeini tried to attract his attention towards the radical interpretations so as to implement his fatwa and its tragic consequences of confusion and lawlessness. Since Khomeini rejected him, on 15th August 1988, he met the Tehran's death committee. Although, these present official members at this meeting were not in an accountability position, and Montazeri at that time was less powerful than compel them to be accountable and confess the whole truth, during the meeting Montazeri advised one of them, that "before you are an intelligence official, you are a mullah. Montazeri meant, instead of radical bureaucratically dealing with the order, he could take a moral attitude that at least does not allow to kill women and children. In a seemingly compassionate tone, the member of the death committee replied, "You should be confident if there was another group other than us, the number of the executions in Tehran were tripled." "We tried to prevent from extremism." "We tried to execute just one person from each family," and "the children who were arrested at the age of 16-17 were not executed." "In the case of the girls, God was witness that we have ignored and discounted as far as we could... we begged them to write just two sentences (that they are not loyal to the PMOI anymore), to administrate the order "we were obliged to execute those who remained loyal to their beliefs."²⁰³ Montazeri at the end of the meeting remarked "The greatest crime in the Islamic Republic, for which history will condemn us, has been committed by you"²⁰⁴ (he meant the all death committees, from Tehran to the regional components). The inducement of this secret fatwa encouraged a hugely chaotic judicial circumstances that therefore more pragmatically attracted the Khomeini's satisfaction, in that it successfully created

²⁰² After the victory of the revolution, he became chairman of the Assembly of Experts on the Constitution, and he himself included the principle of Velayat-e Faqih in the constitution. Then he was elected as the deputy of the supreme leader. However, Khomeini dismissed him from office as a result of his disagreement with the regime's 1988 massacre of more than 30,000 political prisoners. In the last two decades of his life, he continued to criticize the government's policies, and after a sharp critique of his former student, Khamenei, he spent long years officially and non-officially in house arrest until he died. The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Hossein Ali Montazeri". Encyclopædia Britannica. Online edition. May 11, 2016. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hossein-Ali-Montazeri> . See also Sussan Siavoshi. Montazeri: The Life and Thought of Iran's Revolutionary Ayatollah. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 2017.

²⁰³ Hussein Ali Montazeri and the Tehran's death committee. "Ayatollah Montazeri sound file about mass execution of political prisoners in 1988". Meeting's full audio file. Youtube. August 11, 2016. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=48lhBXm-dNo> . The Editors of the Justice for Victims of 1988 Massacre in Iran (JVMI). "Audio transcript of Iran officials' remarks about 1988 massacre". <https://iran1988.org/audio-transcript-iran-officials-remarks-1988-massacre/> .

²⁰⁴ The Editors of the Justice for Victims of 1988 Massacre in Iran (JVMI). "1988 Massacre of Political prisoners in Iran, A Crime Against Humanity". <https://iran1988.org/1988-massacre/> .

a type of contest among his young mullah subordinates to docket “the largest massacre of political prisoners since World War II.”²⁰⁵

In this way, this fatwa on the other side by transmitting the judicial might to the subordinated autonomous territorial units overshadowed the central judicial system and made the critical circumstances of ambiguity of responsibility. They, via their assigned power, overdid in the way of implementing the fatwa and did their best to execute the most in order to set Khomeini’s mind at rest and ease. They executed the women, while, based on Shari’a law, if a woman becomes apostate, her sentence cannot be execution, she has to merely repent. When she repents, would be released, otherwise must remain in jail, and at the time of saying prayer must be lashed, and economically kept in a damaging situation of lack of material benefits, including her basic necessities.²⁰⁶

In a tragic case, in Isfahan, a pregnant woman was among the executed prisoners. In another extremely astonishing instance, the committee also arrested the roughly 15-year-old sister of a hanged prisoner. Within two days, the death committee drew conclusion that she was also sympathetic towards the PMOI, thus she was executed.²⁰⁷

The most members of the death committees later with a sort of impunity or free from the injurious consequences of their activities attained the very key positions in various levels of the Islamic Republic, e.g., the ministerial and judicial offices, assembly and parliamentary membership, guardianship of financial foundations and holy shrines among other prerogative and normative benches.²⁰⁸ They were rewarded, because, in practice they administratively implemented the Khomeini’s issued authoritative but not compulsory order via a short, effective, efficient, indeed self-radicalized process. In fact, these final decision-making committee members did not function within a legal transparency of order, but through a highly decentralized secret context, that had an important implication, they had to in more radical possibilities come to those resolutions, conservatively just to avoid the probable dilemmas and inconveniences.

²⁰⁵ Cited from Geoffrey Robertson, an Australian jurist who has gathered a detailed report about the killings of 1988, as “Mullahs without mercy” (2010) in The editors of the Human Rights Council of the UN. “The massacre of political prisoners in 1988 in the Islamic Republic of Iran”.

https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1251315/1930_1429174715_g1503786.pdf . 4.

²⁰⁶ Mehran Kamrava (ed.). The New Voices of Islam: Reforming Politics and Modernity - A Reader. New York: I.B.Tauris. 2006. p. 124.

²⁰⁷ Cited from Hussein Ali Montazeri’s remarks in The Editors of the Justice for Victims of 1988 Massacre in Iran (JVMI). “Audio transcript of Iran officials’ remarks about 1988 massacre”.

<https://iran1988.org/audio-transcript-iran-officials-remarks-1988-massacre/> .

²⁰⁸ The Editors of the Justice for Victims of 1988 Massacre in Iran (JVMI). “Perpetrators”.

<https://iran1988.org/perpetrators/> .

2.13. *Further comparison, slightly shamefaced, in the presence of God or before law?*

To a moderate degree to compare to another case, the formation of an anti-semitic fictional consensus²⁰⁹ and its following so-called Jewish matter required to be rationally administrated by an effective and efficient bureaucratic process, which was empowered by bureaucratically trained people similar to Otto Adolf Eichmann (1906-1962),²¹⁰ who carefully and perseverantly did his duty under the complicated war circumstances, insofar as, without his effective detailed proposals in accurately organizing and transporting the Jews towards the ghettos and the designed extermination camps, probably the number of victims could not be as high as it was. In 1940, after the Nazi invasions and primary successes versus France and the Lowlands, he was the very person who was tasked to prepare the already put forward for consideration Madagascar island plan²¹¹ to facilitate the European Jews towards. As a matter of fact, he based on the assignment that Heydrich laid on him made a memorandum declaring the implementation of the resettlement of the Jews in the French colonial island, a territorial solution which was never materialized, with regard to the complex detailed coordination and operation of the plan (that demanded many logistical supplies and facilities), the failure of the German Air Force versus the United Kingdom's aerial warfare force and the blockade of Germany. Anyhow, while, the primitive Rademacher's Madagascar plan for a SS-controlled super-ghetto considered an autonomous Jewish self-administration, Heydrich with the assistance of Eichmann and his team competitively and radically envisaged a much more limited form of Jewish self-government, confined to the selected tasks. Later, a sophisticated Eichmann memorandum alluded to a resettlement of 5.8 million Jews from German-run territories into an unclear region, which depicted a radical significant increase in comparison to the figure of 4 million Jews cited in the primary plan. In fact, the notion of the deportation of the Jews to an isolated inhospitable island in Africa testified to a further gradual evolving radicalization in the Nazi bureaucrats'

²⁰⁹ Stefan Kühl. *Ordinary Organizations: why normal men carried out the Holocaust*. Originally published as *Ganz normale Organisationen. Zur Soziologie des Holocaust*. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag. 2014. trans. Jessica Spengler. Cambridge: Polity. 2016. p. 46.

²¹⁰ Cyprian P. Blamires and Paul Jackson (eds.). *World Fascism: A Historical Encyclopedia*, Vol. 1. California: ABC-CLIO. 2006. p. 194.

²¹¹ The previously abstract plan was relatively and plausibly proposed by Franz Rademacher (1906-1973), the Nazi diplomat and the director of the Jewish desk in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1940-1943). Paul R. Bartrop and Eve E. Grimm. *Perpetrating the Holocaust: Leaders, Enablers, and Collaborators*. California: ABC-CLIO. 2019. p. 227.

proposed plans.²¹²

Considering these facts, after the demise of the Nazis, in a highly criticized Jerusalem court (1961), Eichmann did not accept any of his charges. In all probability, such a defensive position from him was not a matter of prejudice and insistence on the ideology of Nazism, but as he was the manufacture of a bureaucratic hierarchical system. Eichmann's attorney Robert Sevatiou (1894-1983)²¹³ to justify the Eichmann's position remarked that "Eichmann feels guilty before God, not before the law."²¹⁴ Although, this remark was never confirmed by him, it depicted the issue of the fact that his functionality in such system was merely to act in accordance with the commands, ambitions and priorities under the legal instructions. In the other words, Eichmann as a government's official in a governing body, albeit in particular one who comprehended as being attached to an established way of accuracy at the cost of the humanity, was required by law to comply with the orders of his superiors. The bureaucratic self-imposed logic transformed him into a small piece of the large chain of the Nazi administrative apparatus, and forced him to submissively, blindly and uncritically follow the command of his superiors and the orders of a ruling top level flattened decentralized hierarchical form of organizational system.

2.14. An extremity in abnormality from the village of Józefów to the village of Qarna

To complete the investigation, the theory of ordinary organizations of Stefan Kühl (1966-) has explanatory power to suggest the truth that the severe oppressions, extremely harsh punishments and brutalized mass murders of innocent people can be also organized via mechanisms of the normality of organizations, in which ordinary individuals are persuaded to lawfully (albeit in the gray zones of legality)²¹⁵ or unlawfully participate in exercising physical or non-physical forces against some particular individuals or groups and their properties in a spectrum form an impassive acceptance to an active participation, in a supposed society.²¹⁶ The legality and legitimacy of the activities inside some organizations are to a great extent subject to the beliefs of the members in the rightfulness of their performances, thus these organizations

²¹² Christopher R. Browning. *The Path to Genocide: Essays on Launching the Final Solution*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 1995. Pp. 18-20. Dan Stone. *Histories of the Holocaust*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. 2010. p. 75. Robert Gerwarth. *Hitler's Hangman: The Life Of Heydrich*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. 2011. Pp. 179, 181, 183.

²¹³ Michael Löffelsender. *Kölner Rechtsanwälte im Nationalsozialismus*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 2015. p. 51.

²¹⁴ Hannah Arendt. *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. New York: Viking. 1964. p. 21.

²¹⁵ Kühl. *Ordinary Organizations: why normal men carried out the Holocaust*. 139.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 55.

persuade their members to undertake and perform what they might not carry out outside the organizational framework. Furthermore, the integration of these elaborated members in essential supporting structure of an assumed organization causes and brings them about fully fulfilling their parts to reach an extremity in abnormality, in the absence of feeling guilty. Accordingly, the most part of the events resulted in the Holocaust under the Nazis were facilitated and executed by ordinary members of the state or state-involved organizational bureaucratic frameworks. The plausibility of Kühl's theory can be investigated not only in the historical and holocaust cases, such as SS-controlled paramilitary organization of the Reserve Police Battalion 101 (mostly included by plain parents, neighbors and average individuals from simple non-military professions, not particular individuals trained by the so-called well-oiled Nazi totalitarian machine for particular ambitions), which cooperated with the Nazi army in occupying Poland, at first, in guarding the prisoners and resettling the Jews, later in causing the Holocaust in the Polish occupied territories (e.g., in July 1942, they executed some 1500 Jewish residents of the Polish village of Józefów),²¹⁷ but in addition, in socio-psychological experiments in the form of the simulated organizations similar to what was carried out on obedience to authority figures (1961-1963)²¹⁸ by Stanley Milgram (1933-1984)²¹⁹ and the Stanford Prison (1971) by Philip G. Zimbardo (1933-)^{220, 221} The participants of such organizational cases and the mentioned experiments by agreeing to participate, implicitly declared that they were prepared to obey within the zone of indifference.²²² The ordinariness of the simulated organizational mechanisms can also be clearly defined based on the very general characteristics of every organization, namely, the fact of being a member of an organized body, a system in which

²¹⁷ See Christopher R. Browning. *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland*. London: Penguin Books. 2001. p. 1-2.

²¹⁸ See Stanley Milgram. "Behavioral Study of obedience". *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 67: 4. Pp. 371-378. 1963.

²¹⁹ Per Saugstad. *A History of Modern Psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 2018. p. 329-330.

²²⁰ See Philip G. Zimbardo. *The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil*. New York: Random House. 2007.

See also Philip G. Zimbardo. "A Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil: Understanding How Good People Are Transformed into Perpetrators". in Arthur G. Miller (ed.). *The social psychology of good and evil: Understanding our capacity for kindness and cruelty*. New York: Guilford. Pp. 21-50. 2004.

²²¹ Stefan Kühl. *How normal Organizations produce Brutalities: On the variations of Milgram's obedience experiment*. Working Paper. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld. 6/2009.

<http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/soz/personen/kuehl/pdf/Working-Paper-6-2009-How-normal-Organization-produce-brutalities.pdf> . p. 1.

²²² Stefan Kühl. *Ordinary Organizations: Simulated Brutality Reinterpreted from an Organizational Sociology Perspective, Version 7.0*. Working Paper. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld. 5/2009.

<http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/soz/personen/kuehl/pdf/Working-Paper-5-2009-Ordinary-Organizations2.pdf> . p. 18.

individuals are ranked according to its ruling authority or power and the reason for which an organization is created.²²³ In a way that is appropriate to this theory, the sociologically recognizable presented organizational motivations²²⁴ (created by identification of ideal typical pictured goals²²⁵ coercion,²²⁶ attractive teamwork,²²⁷ privileges and remunerations²²⁸) are able to encourage and incite the supposed members of an assumed organization. In this framework the process of working together to the same end is postulated on the existence of a zone of indifference in which a range of stated orders and regulations are acceptable by the supposed members without judging or questioning. Moreover, such a zone supports the activities which are not performed based on the members' initiatives, but acceptable in the context of membership, loyalty and expectation, thus in this way the members will be indifferent to perform the tasked activities. In this analysis, the payment-oriented organizations such as professional armed forces (self-justified as guarantors of peace and in the case of mass murders in fact as fictitious utopia creators) normally require for their particular purposes a relatively larger zone of indifference from their members than the motivation-based organizations such as political parties or labor unions which offer their members occasional services and favors that can be found elsewhere.²²⁹ In general terms, in such expandable zones towards extremity (during time) the members are supposed to conduct a potentially wide range of activities that were not explicitly advertised for their recruitment. The activities which might "turn ordinary men into willing executioners".²³⁰

In the Islamic Republic case, on September 2nd, 1979, namely only eight months after the victory of the Islamic revolution that practically exposed an asset to a sort of radicalism, the village of Qarna witnessed an almost underreported tragedy of a brutal massacre of innocent children, women and men, committed by some arbitrary hard-mouthed perpetrators of the newly organized Revolutionary Guard within a zone of indifference. In other terms, it was perpetrated

²²³ Kühl. How normal Organizations produce Brutalities: On the variations of Milgram's obedience experiment. <http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/soz/personen/kuehl/pdf/Working-Paper-6-2009-How-normal-Organization-produce-brutalities.pdf> . 1.

²²⁴ Kühl. Ordinary Organizations: why normal men carried out the Holocaust. 36.

²²⁵ Ibid., 44.

²²⁶ Ibid., 58.

²²⁷ Ibid., 102.

²²⁸ Ibid., 88-89.

²²⁹ Kühl. How normal Organizations produce Brutalities: On the variations of Milgram's obedience experiment. <http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/soz/personen/kuehl/pdf/Working-Paper-6-2009-How-normal-Organization-produce-brutalities.pdf> . 8.

See also Kühl. Ordinary Organizations: why normal men carried out the Holocaust. 159-166.

²³⁰ Browning. Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland. 216. See also Goldhagen. Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and The Holocaust.

by some rogue members of the very early revolutionary forces, consisting of ordinary popular volunteers in pursuit of the goals of the newly born revolution. In the absence of feeling guilty, some non-armed civilians were shot dead, some were stabbed, and their children were killed under the boots and kicks. The survivors spent several days finding the bodies across the surrounding areas, since the perpetrators wanted to pretend a true hit and run battle. In fact, the incident occurred merely two weeks after the Khomeini's speech on a radical reaction versus the so-called "anti-revolutionary elements". The day after the massacre, 18 Kurdish mullahs telegrammed Khomeini, accusing him to radicalize the revolutionary forces against the Kurds. Khomeini replied that the mass killing would be investigated. Finally, although, the Islamic Republic officials attributed this calamitous incident to those who were neither revolutionary nor the true followers of Khomeini and promised to punish them, to date, no one was reported, arrested or punished.²³¹ Instead, these brutal slaughters continued mainly across the four Kurdish-inhabited provinces of Iran (West Azerbaijan, Kermanshah, Kurdistan and Ilam with a population of about seven million), by those revolutionary members who were indifferent to perform their activities. Predominately, these elements were encouraged and organized by the self-radicalized local mullahs' interpretations of the heedless inconsiderate speeches of the religious originator of the Islamic Republic (Khomeini).²³²

In similar fashion, this trend was illustrated in the entirely elaborated 1980s extrajudicial terror, continued in the heavily and bloodily repressed student protest of 1999, as well as its following massive countrywide protests, and highlighted during and after the recent Green social movement. In all cases, the reaction of the affiliated perpetrators of the regime was instant radical crackdown and severe measures to restrict and discourage the so-called undesirable oppositions. Practically, this direction in which the regime has been developing, alongside with other positional administrative policies therefore depicted a type of non-official devolution, the transfer of the power to the lower levels (from the central to the territorial administration). In fact, this decentralization of arbitrary autonomous organizational power inside the system of Islamic Republic resulted in a highly chaotic intransparent legal hierarchy of order.

²³¹ The Editors of the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center. "Remembering Qarna: 38 Years Ago, Iranian Revolutionary Guards Massacred a Village of Kurdish Civilians". Abdorrahman Boroumand Center. Online edition. January 9, 2017. <http://blog.iranrights.org/remembering-qarna-38-years-ago-iranian-security-forces-massacred-kurdish-civilians/> .

²³² Helmet Maroufi. "The Genocide of the Kurds in Iran is one of the most Significant Underreported Human disasters Worldwide". The Herald Report. Online edition. December 5, 2018. <https://herald.report/the-genocide-of-the-kurds-in-iran-is-one-of-the-most-significant-underreported-human-disasters-worldwide/> .

Shahabaddin Sheikhi. "The Tragedy of the Gharna Massacre: Iran Kurdistan Report, Part II". Ekurd Daily. Online edition. November 6, 2010. <https://ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2010/11/irankurd681.htm> .

At the same time, in such system, an organizational mechanism of self-radicalization in turn led to an important implication in case of its unwritten and unclear orders, accordingly, those elements, who finally must decide and perform the orders, regularly take the more radical possibility just to avoid trouble and inconveniences. Furthermore, these orders and the occasional autonomous decisions of these prerogative elements are located prior to the present fragile legal hierarchical formalities. The other consequence is that the adopted policies have created a type of overlapping and occasional contending among the related but by the same token separated power centers, such as Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (or IRGC including Quds Force, Basij, Khatam ol-Anbia Base²³³ among others), the influential Imams of Friday Prayer, the big foundations and the legal bureaucratic officials and bodies, each of which on the one hand pursuing their self-promoted decisions, plans and agendas, on the other hand seeking to strengthen the regional penetration and the strategic depth of the regime, both at home and abroad. In this general developing direction, the radical religious leaders have always implicitly criticized the moderate policies and encouraged the radical supporters (in particular IRGC, Basij and security anonymous MOIS-plaincloth forces) to take action autonomously or to be fire at will in emergency occasions and against the so-called enemies of the regime.

During the emergency circumstances of the 2009 election results protests, Neda Agha-Soltan (1983-2009) a young woman student was among the publicly killed protesters.²³⁴ She was shot by a member of Basij,²³⁵ the paramilitary organization mostly included by naive youngsters, plain parents, neighbors and average individuals from simple non-military professions, not particular individuals who are prepared to obey within the zone of indifference. Her death moment was released all over the world very quickly (a widely watched death of a human being in the human history, thus became iconic in the struggle of the Green Movement).²³⁶ The incident came after the supreme leader's speech or his green light in a Friday Prayer after the election for the Basij and law enforcement forces to suppress the protesters.²³⁷

²³³ International Business Publications. US-Iran Political and Economic Relations Handbook, Vol. 1 Strategic Information and Developments. Washington DC: Global Investment & Business Center. 2018. p. 137.

²³⁴ Hamid Dabashi. Shi'ism: a religion of protest. London: The Belknap Press of the Harvard Univ. Press. 2011. p. 322.

²³⁵ Paul Mason. Why It's Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions. London: Verso Books. 2012. Pp. 35-36.

²³⁶ Hamid Dabashi. Iran: The Rebirth of a Nation. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 2016. p. 148.

²³⁷ The Editors of BBC News. "Amnesty International: Iran's Supreme Leader's remarks, green light for repression". BBC News. Online edition. 19 June 2009.

http://www.bbc.com/persian/lq/iran/2009/06/090619_ba-ir88-amnesty-khamenei.shtml .

According to this analysis, this regime is made up not of one unified structure but at least of several pillars held together by arrangements between their elites. In such system, the supreme leader's functionality is to embody of the ruling centers. His public and secret speeches indirectly suggested and encouraged a form of polycratic ruling and radicalization. One of the consequences of such a polycratically disorganized regime with power overlapping is the officials who each claimed to represent the regime's peculiarly deterministic volition to a great extent. The other output of this hugely chaotic lawless system with an unclarity of responsibility and administrative confusion among the officials is that the forces more pragmatically than ideologically make the supreme leader well contented, in that he successfully created a type of contest and rivalry among his subordinates and devotees in the different bodies, keeping him away from any type of feasible turbulence. Hence, these forces have acted on the basis of the circumstances and had no premeditated plans for killing of the diverse groups and individuals (especially the particular ethnic, religious or intellectual groups).

Socio-organizationally, the religious leaders, as the ideologues to implement their policies require to recruit from the normal people who are not necessarily guided by their ideological deliberations. By this reasoning, we are able to focus on the lower levels as well as the higher to research the implementation of the elaborated disastrous events. As a result, an amalgamation of the intentionalistic perspective together with the functionalistic viewpoint supports a type of synergic model, which considers interaction and arrangement through both the higher and the lower layers. In this synergism, the radical religious leaders possess no comprehensive or far-reaching plan of action but are the deterministic might and predominantly, the single-minded low-grade forces (filled with excessive enthusiasm) implemented what they supposed their superordinates would with satisfactory agree and admit based on their already articulated line and ideology.

In most cases, these aggregative-radicalized elements (officials or non-officials) bottom-up either bypassed the law or undertook Shari'a law enforcement without legal authority. Some of these elements throughout their assigned power overdid in the way of implementing the issued authoritative but not compulsory commands, ambitions and priorities, thus did their best to execute the most via a short, effective, efficient, indeed self-induced-radicalized process in order to set ruling mullah's mind at rest and ease. They were self-persuaded to leastwise in the gray zones of legality fully fulfill their parts, thus reached an extremity in abnormality, in the absence of feeling guilty. With this analysis, the procedure of these measures has provided the regime a plausible deniability to respond to the possible questions about its legal accountability versus such events.

3. The utopian terrestrial doctrine of Khomeini and the signification of the Islamic Republic

The 1979 revolution in Iran in a plain manner recalled a greater attention to agential factors such as religious ideologue, leadership, ideology and political religion for a single revolutionary change. Since the French revolution to the Iranian case, many scholars made efforts so as to investigate the role of agential factors in explaining and theorizing revolutions. The vulnerability of classical Marxist theory for the first time was stated by Weber in terms of the rise of capitalism,²³⁸ then affected by the Russian revolution (1917), emerged the works of Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937)²³⁹ and Georg Lukács (1885-1971)²⁴⁰. Gramsci bequeathed the concept of hegemony and Lukacs challenged the complexities of class consciousness. The ideas of these two facilitated the emergence of the influential Frankfurt school after the World War II. Michel Foucault (1926-1984)²⁴¹ presented a different perspective on power and discourse. Despite of all these scrutinies, in 1970s, the main body of analyses of revolutions remained around the political economy. The peak of this view is crystallized in the Skocpol's one dimensional structuralistic work of 1979 that discussed how simply social revolutions are foundational transformations of societal circumstances and class structure. Accordingly, she drew the conclusion that the revolutions might not be necessarily made, but come. The Iranian revolution in 1979 forced her to reconsider her ideas and to accept this fact that, in some revolutions and mainly in the Iranian one, revolutionary religious ideals and ideologies stimulated the actors. She as a structuralist in studying social revolutions, gathered enough courage to write her ad hoc article "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution"²⁴², which considered the role of religion and intellectual in shaping political action. She recognized the Shi'ite Islam as sophisticated symbolic resource to justify resistance against unjust authority, even though she still emphasized on the structural elements.

²³⁸ See Max Weber. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Originally published in three articles: 1904, 1905 and 1920, Collected and Translated by Talcott Parsons, 1930. London and New York: Routledge. 1992.

²³⁹ Eugene F. Provenzo and John Phillip Renaud (eds.). *Encyclopedia of the Social and Cultural Foundations of Education: A-H*. California: SAGE. 2009. p. 905.

²⁴⁰ Terry Eagleton. *Ideology*. New York: Routledge. 2013. p. 31.

²⁴¹ Adrian Loretan. *Religionsfreiheit im Kontext der Grundrechte: Religionsrechtliche Studien, Teil 2*. Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich. 2011. p. 213. Foucault's writing in 1978 "Iran: the soul of a world repulsions" emphasizes on powerful independent factor of the failure of the Western humanism. He considers Iranian revolution as a reaction to the political culture of the Western capitalistic system in Iran.

²⁴² See Theda Skocpol. "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution." *Theory and Society*, Vol. 11, No. 3, Pp. 265-283. May 1982.

As a matter of fact, having fine insight and clever judgment over a single revolution in a supposed society sounds inconceivable without investigating its religious records and dispositions,²⁴³ in particular in the case of a legal one, however all great revolutions include legal and constitutional transmogrifications.²⁴⁴

The 1979 revolution in Iran, which was the outcome of the Joint efforts of the groups with both religious and secular backgrounds, promoted a hybrid political theocratic system for a constitutional reconstruction. This reorganization brought up the first contemporary case to formally attempt to adopt Islamic prefix to define republican status after a revolution, even though, there were already several similar compounds with totally different essences and motivations.

3.1. The Islamic Republic, a wide spectrum

The first Islamic Republic in the modern context was the Islamic Republic of East Turkistan (1933-1934), an ephemeral republic as the outcome of the first ethnic-independence quest for forming an independent state by the Turkish ethno-linguistic groups, in particular Sunni Muslim Uyghur population in Kashgar, a city in the current Chinese autonomous administered region of Xinjiang.²⁴⁵ Whereas, in this republic the Shari'a law was declared as criterion, constitutionally, also the modern regulations had practical arrangements.²⁴⁶ Although, this identitarian pan-Turkist movement of the post-World War I era was highly influenced by the Soviet Union²⁴⁷ and was internationally recognized to declare an independency, was shortly broke out with the Chinese invasion and repression.²⁴⁸

With the onset of the terrorist attacks across the Europe and the US, the Islamic radicalism rose among the Uyghurs against the Chinese central and regional governments.²⁴⁹ In today's region, a wide variety of groups are searching for independence. Some follow secularism and some pursue an Islamic theocracy, such as East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which is a collaborator

²⁴³ Harold J. Berman. *Law and Revolution, the Formation of the Western Legal Tradition*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. 1983. p. 165.

²⁴⁴ Hauke Brunkhorst. *Critical theory of legal revolutions, evolutionary perspectives*. London: Bloomsbury. 2014. p. 2.

²⁴⁵ Güljanat Kurmangaliyeva Ercilasun and Konuralp Ercilasun (eds.). *The Uyghur Community: Diaspora, Identity and Geopolitics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2018. Pp. 1, 27, 41.

²⁴⁶ J. Todd Reed and Diana Raschke. *The ETIM: China's Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat*. California: ABC-CLIO. 2010. p. 42.

²⁴⁷ Ercilasun. *The Uyghur Community: Diaspora, Identity and Geopolitics*. 36.

²⁴⁸ Enze Han. *Contestation and Adaptation: The Politics of National Identity in China*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. 2013. p. 42.

²⁴⁹ Reed. *The ETIM: China's Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat*. 46.

to the Islamic fundamentalist Salafist movements of Uzbekistan, Taliban, Al-Qaeda,²⁵⁰ ISIL (over hundreds Uyghurs specifically cooperated in Syrian war),²⁵¹ among others, thus it is considered a part of a large global jihadist movement, not a mere separationist-nationalist one seeking reestablishment of an Islamic Republic any more.

Pakistan is the second instance, which gained its independence from the British-Indian Empire in 1947. It remained under the British Dominion until the adoption of a republican constitution. This constitution proclaimed an Islamic Republic, even though, this kind of republic was not politically at the agenda of the independence movement of 1940s (aimed at the formation of Pakistani nation from the Indian Muslim-majority areas). In fact, the Islamic Republic was promoted after the establishment of the mentioned nation. Among the controversies between the East and the West Pakistan, the religious leaders, for the most part from Jamaat-e-Islami (1941-) group,²⁵² demanded their proportion of the newly born government, thus proposed an Islamic condition for the constitution and facilitated the establishment of an Islamic Republic (1956-) to conduct affairs in accordance to revived Islamic Shari'a and sovereignty of Allah. Simultaneously, this constitution provided a democratic parliamentary system of governance with a federal legislature and provincial autonomy, similar to the British form of the parliamentary administration. The democratic rights and freedoms such as freedom of speech and expression, assembly and association were all provided in this document. In any case, despite of all these provisions, since 1958 due to the internal struggles and the military coups the Pakistani Islamic constitution has been several times abrogated, suspended, restored and amended. In the 1973 version, several Islamic institutions were presented, such as the Federal Shari'a Court, a body in charge of the lack of inconsistency in the laws, based on the Islamic orders, and the Council of Islamic Ideology to canalize the interpretation and application of Islam (comparatively speaking, the Iranian case of Guardian Council's tasks includes both of them). These mechanisms have implemented unpleasantly rough anti-Islamic regulations.²⁵³ In today's Islamic Republic of Pakistan, in the shade of such constitutional protection, with roughly 95 percent Muslim (mostly walk behind the Sunni branch of Islam), there are tens of thousands Islamic seminaries, which facilitate Jihadi recruitments by predominately teaching Arabic language, quranic and quotational interpretations and Shari'a laws. They simply encourage

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 69-71.

²⁵¹ James M. Dorsey. China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. 2019. Pp. 115-116.

²⁵² Mohd. Zakirullah Firdausi. Jamat-e-Islami of India: A Political Perspective. Hillsborough: Lulu Press Inc. 2014. p. 97.

²⁵³ The Editors of the National Assembly of Pakistan. "Parliamentary History". National Assembly of Pakistan. Online edition. 2019. <http://www.na.gov.pk/en/content.php?id=75> .

religious radicalism such as martyrdom operation or suicide bombing. After the September 11th, 2001, by the American shove two laws were passed to create the new state seminaries and to register and supervise the old ones (particularly the Saudi-financed seminaries).²⁵⁴

Finally, Mauritania is the last case before Iran to contemplate. After the World War II, Mauritania along with the rest of French colonies was involved in a series of reforms towards an inward decentralized autonomous administration, which climaxed following the 1960's tribal uprisings and ended in its independence and self-governance under the Islamic Republic (1960-) title. This composition additionally made a visible impression on a political aspiration that Islam might bring together the majority Sunni Muslim Mauritians under a common heading. According to its constitution, Islam became its official religion and its republican term guaranteed "freedom of conscience and religious liberty to all." The legal system of Mauritania grew mix between French civil law and Shari'a law. Nevertheless, atheism and blasphemous speech generally are crimes against Islam, and are harshly punished, even by death penalty.²⁵⁵ Astonishingly, slavery is still widespread under the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, and the country is ranked first in terms of the percentage of slave population (about 10 to 20). It was only in 2007 that slavery was declared criminal in the country. However, the Mauritanian Islamic government denies the existence of slavery in this country and represses the anti-slavery activism.²⁵⁶

A simple comparison between these pioneering Islamic Republics reveals that none of them were evolved through a social revolution-centered movement or a relatively sudden turnaround in structure and existing constitutional orders of an established nation-state authority, but throughout identitarian independence movements along with elitistic Islamization from above in already islamically cultivated mass contexts. To put it differently, in all three cases Islam (the Sunni branch) was applied as a common denominator so as to form a new united identified independent nation.

In contrast, the Islamic Republic of Iran was as a result of a traditional type of revolution in a Shi'i Muslim but not so fanatic religious context.

²⁵⁴ Sabrina Tavernise. "Pakistan's Islamic Schools Fill Void, but Fuel Militancy". The New York Times. Online edition. May 3, 2009.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/04/world/asia/04schools.html?pagewanted=all&r=0> . Michael Busch. "WikiLeaks: Saudi-Financed Madrassas More Widespread in Pakistan Than Thought". Foreign Policy In Focus. Online edition. May 26, 2011.

https://fpif.org/wikileaks_saudifinanced_madrassas_more_widespread_in_pakistan_than_thought/ .

²⁵⁵ Charles Henri Toupet, Alfred G. Gerteiny, Charles C. Stewart and Hubert Jules Deschamps.

"Mauritania". Encyclopædia Britannica. Online edition. March 6, 2019.

<https://www.britannica.com/place/Mauritania> . Kevin Boyle and Juliet Sheen. Freedom of Religion and Belief: A World Report. New York: Routledge. 2003. p. 41.

²⁵⁶ John D. Sutter. "Slavery's last stronghold". CNN. Online edition. March 2009.

<http://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2012/03/world/mauritania.slaverys.last.stronghold/index.html> .

3.2. The revolutionary document of Velayat-e Faqih a basis for a new constitutionalized Shari'a

In the traditional forms of revolution, predominantly, the leadership factor plays a major role. Leaders specify ideas and ideals in order to gather, mobilize and organize mass populations. Then, when people responded their call, they are the sole agents to determine the speed and range of a social movement or revolution.

In 1979 revolution, the leader was known as the processor of an ideology of agitation and mobilization that presented new regulations based on new interpretation of the Shari'a and the history of Islam. On the other direction, whereas, the first Pahlavi (the Iranian Imperial State 1925-1941) took more intensive anti-Islamic measures in comparison with the second Pahlavi (1941-1979),²⁵⁷ we had never witnessed such severe revolutionary reaction from mullahs, Islamic hard-liners and their devotees. Thereupon, in 1979, elements of ideologue and leadership with a tangible document (a set of beliefs held and taught by Khomeini as the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih)²⁵⁸ played major roles.

Khomeini by his doctrine and accepting the Imam title, legitimated the right for the rule of the mullahs after God and the prophets. In accordance God has given the political authority, responsibility and absolute custodianship for establishing the rule of the Islamic Shari'a and the maintenance of the Islamic nations or Ummah to the prophets and then to the Shi'a Imams. In the absence of the infallible Imam, the Jurist mullahs as his representatives and the only true commentators and guardians of the Shari'a are exclusively entitled to inherit such an authority. This theory by itself clearly confined people to interfere in administration of society, public and political affairs, especially in macro issues. Khomeini in order to demonstrate that his custodianship does not recognize any border and so as to be adopted by every human race (promotion of exporting the revolution to other countries, specifically the Islamic ones) unveiled the notion of identity in Ummah which evolves to both nationality and religion (albeit nationality plays pale in this synergy), and specially refers to a transnational religious Muslim community,

²⁵⁷ Hamid R. Kusha. *The Sacred Law of Islam: A Case Study of Women's Treatment in the Islamic Republic of Iran's Criminal Justice System*. New York: Routledge. 2002. p. 44.

²⁵⁸ Ruhollah Khomeini. *Islamic Government (Hukumat-i Islami, Persian, Originally 1970)*. Trans. Hamid Algar, non-officially published. 1981.

based on the Islamic lexicon.²⁵⁹ In the meantime, he via the utopian Shi'ite messianic thought²⁶⁰ enriched his distorted picture of Islamic Ummah towards an ideal global rule.²⁶¹

In addition to this doctrine, the mystique prophetic exposure of Khomeini, not only uniquely acquired the realization of the mass-based revolutionary movement (as a result of a coalition on the idealistic basis, not the materialistic one),²⁶² but also paved the road for its consolidation, although in the form of a pseudo-democratic regime ruling by a mixture of terror, and granting privileges to allegiant adherents. Then, constitutionally, in order to actualize his position allocated an extreme power for himself. He, as a grand mullah, did not separate politics from religion and implemented his rule based on the so-called divine laws. In this way, in the conception of his founded system, while, the laws of the state became required to be compatible with the laws of Shari'a, it gave promotion to the republican exclusivities. Theoretically, this admixture of theocratic and republican elements was authenticated based on the constitution of the revolutionary Islamic Republic with 14 chapters, 177 articles (was confirmed to regulate religious, legal, social and political affairs, adopted by a perfunctory referendum on 2nd and 3rd December 1979, and replaced the constitution of 1906 movement). While, its Arts. 1 and 2 awarded sovereignty on God, Art. 6 gave authority to direct popular vote for president and members of the legislature, then, all these democratic procedures and capacities were subordinated to the very supreme leader's direct influence, particularly via the Guardian Council.²⁶³

On 24th April 1989, Khomeini in order to consolidate his republic issued a decree convening an assembly for revising the constitution. It made several changes to the constitution, e.g., eliminating the need for the leader to be a Marja' Taqlid (literally a source to follow),²⁶⁴ a label provided to the highest level in Shi'a Usuli authority that entitles a grand mullah to permissively

²⁵⁹ Joel Thierstein and Yahya R. Kamalipour (eds.). Religion, Law, and Freedom: A Global Perspective. Connecticut: Praeger. 2000. Pp. 135-136.

²⁶⁰ Accordingly, the 12th Imam, Mahdi lives in occultation and will appear again with Jesus Christ to fight anti-Messiah (Dajjal). While, in Islam, in most cases, the utopian messianic notions are exclusively in Twelver Shi'a (The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Mahdi". <https://www.britannica.com/topic/mahdi>), the utopian reflections of the prophet Muhammad authority of primary circumstances of Islam are predominately presented in reactionary sects of the Sunni tradition.

²⁶¹ Iranian Constitution 1979, Introduction part "... the Constitution, on the basis of the draft proposed by the government ... in one hundred and seventy-five articles arranged in twelve chapters, in 1979, and in accordance with the aims and aspirations set out above, with the hope that this century will witness the establishment of a universal holy government and the downfall of all others."
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html .

²⁶² See Michel Foucault. Iran: the soul of a world repulsions. New York: Vintage Books. 1978. Pp. 54, 56 and 60.

²⁶³ Iranian Constitution 1979. http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html .

²⁶⁴ John L. Esposito (ed.). "Marja al-Taqlid". in The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Oxford Islamic Studies, Online edition. 17 April 2018. <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1437> .

make legal decisions within the confines of the Islamic Shari'a laws for followers and less credentialed mullahs. Furthermore, it made an Expediency Council to settle possible disputes between the legislature and the almost Guardian omnipotent Council.²⁶⁵

Historically, in fact, the innovativity of the Khomeini's revolutionary document was presented in a country that already experienced the prevalence of the Shi'i branch of Islam in its 16th and 17th centuries (via the dominant sword of the Safavid dynasty 1501-1736).²⁶⁶ Later on, there had been a major evolutionary shift in this branch, namely, a period of transition of knowledge in its Jurisprudence (Fiqh) and leading system, from Akhbari²⁶⁷ to Usuli,²⁶⁸ that made the mullahs financially independent from the state, brought them a hierarchical status with civil and institutional organization, thus a growing social role as a Marja' Taqlid or Ayatollah al-Uthma. Essentially, the Khomeini's fundamental revolutionary alteration in Usuli Shi'a based on the Velayat-e Faqih doctrine was a supplement to the elaborated evolutionary change. He genuinely formulated his interpretation of an already existed political theory in his lectures in the late 1960s and published it as Islamic Governance of Jurist in 1970, which in 1979 became the instruction for the Islamic part of the Islamic Republic's mixed manner of governing.

Before expressing the presence by Khomeini, many Shi'a mullahs not only did not legitimate any authority after the hidden Imam, but also did not claim the ideal governance of mullahs. Nonetheless, they never blocked the approaches that recognized the emergence of a supreme political power in a de facto way. From the viewpoint of the traditional mullahs, Velayat-e Faqih was merely the custodian of the Faqih over the religious institutions and schools, as well as unattended children and women, wards, insanes, and no longer alive people, but Khomeini

²⁶⁵ Ibid., <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000.html> .

²⁶⁶ Rudi Matthee. "Safavid dynasty". Originally published: 2008. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/safavids> . The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Safavid dynasty". Encyclopædia Britannica. Online edition. June 6, 2017.

<https://www.britannica.com/topic/Safavid-dynasty> . Gabor Agoston and Bruce Alan Masters. Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire. New York: Infobase Publishing. 2009. p. 279.

²⁶⁷ In the Shi'ite jurisprudence refers to a jurisprudential school which relies on simple understanding of Islamic laws and seeks truths in obtaining practical commandments and verdicts in relation to Quran and hadiths (various reports describing the words, actions, or habits of the prophet Muhammad and twelve Shi'a Imams) as the only source of law, without applying reason. Todd Lawson. "Exegesis vi. In Akbari and Post-Safavid Esoteric Shi'ism". Originally published: 1999. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/exegesis-iv> . E. Kohlberg. "Akbariya". Originally published: 1984. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982.

<http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/akbariya> .

²⁶⁸ Is the school of jurisprudence of most Shi'a Muslims, which relies on deep conception of Islamic laws and creates a potential of reproduction and rethought for defining and interpreting modern world phenomena. Ibid., <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/akbariya> .

advanced the term to the extent that it embraced the entire society.²⁶⁹ For this reason, the thesis statement of Khomeini was accepted predominantly by merely the young mullahs.²⁷⁰ On the other side, based on the traditional conception of the theory, the supreme Faqih as the representative and the successor of Mahdi (the absent Imam) could be a person determined by Mahdi himself, neither via self-appointment (having assumed a position without the endorsement of others) nor even a selection council. In this relation, the Shi'i mullahs have always criticized the Sunni tradition due to the selection of the successor of the prophet Muhammad based on a council.²⁷¹ There are also some quotations from Shi'i Imams and in particular the 6th one, Ja'far al-Sadiq (702-765 AD) that explicitly invalidated any right to form a government before Mahdi.²⁷²

As a conclusion, this theory was not constructed based on the religious jurisprudence but rationally based on the political religious actuality so as to motivate a revolutionary movement. More precisely, this turning point with a particular interpretation turned the Shi'i political thinking from an elitist esoteric passive sect into a mass mobilizing movement, and changed the conventional obedient followers of Shi'ite into militants against oppression. In this way, it illegitimated the political system and assigned the establishment of a new system as a religious task on a high ranked mullah.²⁷³ In fact, the ideal ideas of Khomeini were rooted in the Shi'i elements of leadership (Imamat), the absence of the hidden 12th Imam or occultation (Ghaybat), besides Martyrdom (Shahadat), Jihad and political consequences of these beliefs, and was under the influence of Ali Shari'ati (1933-1977)²⁷⁴ a religious-leftist intellectual²⁷⁵ (inspired by

²⁶⁹ Majid Mohammadi. *The Longevity of Clerical Business As Usual: A Socio-political History of Iranian Twelver Shi'i Clergy*. Ebook, Dan & Mo Publishers. 2018. Pp. 236-237.

²⁷⁰ Ervand Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press. 1982. Pp. 475-477.

²⁷¹ John A. Shoup. *Ethnic Groups of Africa and the Middle East: An Encyclopedia*. California: ABC-CLIO. 2011. p. 17.

²⁷² Muhammad Baqir Al-Majlisi. *Bihar al-(A)nwar al-Jami' ahli-Durar Akhbar al-A'immat al-Athar*, Vol. 53 (Arabic). Beirut: Muassasat al-Wafa. 1983 (Originally is collected between 1694 and 1698). p. 8. Muhammad ibn Ya'qub Al-Kulayni. *Al-Kafi*, Vol. 8 (Arabic). Tehran: Dar Al-Kutub Al-Islamiya. 1983 (Originally is collected during 20 years around the late 9th and early 10th centuries). p. 295. Online edition (Arabic). <http://lib.eshia.ir/11005/8/295/%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9> .

²⁷³ See Said Amir Arjomand. *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic revolution in Iran*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. 1988.

²⁷⁴ Robbie Shilliam (ed.). *International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, colonialism and investigations of global modernity*. New York: Routledge. 2011. p. 115.

²⁷⁵ See Hamid Algar. *The roots of the Islamic revolution*. London: Open press. 1983.

Fanonism²⁷⁶) and other non-clerics ideologues, who conducted disagreement through their innovative eclectic ideals against the idea of the traditional Shi'ite.²⁷⁷

3.3. *Hildebrand, a thousand-year-old terrestrial objectivity to compare*

Khomeini by and large performed comparable to Hildebrand of Sovana (1025-1085), known as Gregory VII, a prominent fanatic pope (1073-1085) of the history of medieval Church, who endeavored hard in the course of his bitterly conflict for the papal position, authority and therefore, erection of a strong Christian theocracy, although, the overall result of his revolution was absolutely different and led to a kind of separation of the sacred from the profane sphere, especially in the realm of the Church and the kingdom of the emperor. On the basis of his re-examinations of the principles of Christianity (Dictates Papae or 27 papal authoritatively and categorically dictated orders), in 1075, the Roman Church with its office of papacy was considered as a foundation founded and conferred directly by the Lord, without error in the past and future, was the sole and absolute authority for the Christianity,²⁷⁸ princes shall kiss solely the feet of the pope, who was permitted to excommunicate and depose emperor from office, and for him alone it was lawful to make new laws, according to the needs of the time, thus, no chapter and no book shall be considered as canonical without his authority.²⁷⁹ The last circumstance in fact, recognized the papal lawful monopoly or exclusive control over all legislative power. Gregory unlike to his predecessors prescriptively and publicly proclaimed his Dictatus Papae as a turning point to call to take part in a contest of the imperial grandeur. His document by sanctification and canonization freed the Church from all secular authorities, granted it a hierarchical arrangement, thus strengthened and legitimized the divine papal supremacy and absolutism as an official self-designation "the Servant of the servants of God", the regal and custodian of the oppressed poor outcasts, enslaved, widowed and orphans (to unite the oppressed and deprived people and attract their support). In this way all political-

²⁷⁶ Frantz Fanon (1925-1961). See Alice Cherki. Frantz Fanon: A Portrait. New York: Cornell Univ. Press. 2006.

²⁷⁷ See Norman Calder. Accommodation and Revolution in Imami Shi'i Jurisprudence: Khomeini and the Classical Tradition. Middle Eastern Studies 18, No. 1. 1982.

²⁷⁸ Particularly it achieved the exclusive eligibility for appointment, dismissal and trial of priesthood, bishops and the pope as the entitled occupier of Apostolic Throne and the leader of the worldwide Roman Church, a principle which later causes the Investiture Controversy. Uta-Renate Blumenthal. "St. Gregory VII, pope". Encyclopædia Britannica. Online edition. May 21, 2019. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Saint-Gregory-VII> .

²⁷⁹ Ernest F. Henderson (ed.). Select Historical Documents of the Middle Ages. London: George Bell and Sons. 1905. Pp. 366-367.

religious and imperial-papal authorities (as two sides of a coin) were crystalized under the canonical juridification of the theocratic absolutism, and therefore reflected the fact that there is no sovereignty and legitimacy beyond legality.²⁸⁰

Although Gregory beforehand implicitly endorsed the rulers' sovereignty under God's rule, changed his attitude on his re-examinations. These re-examinations inside the political actuality more and less put forward a type of holy unattached institution as the terrestrial representative of Jesus for consideration. Since the sovereign ruler Henry IV (1050-1106)²⁸¹ did not comply with his commands and neglectfully reacted, he declared a prohibition on his emperor.

Consequently, his influential document of papal primacy, which challenged the necessary inner and outer-relations of eligibility of power for both the spiritual sovereign Church foundation and the secular sovereignty of emperor,²⁸² pressured Henry to apply for a visit to him. As Henry attracted his forgiveness, severely repressed his opponents. The pope who was highly scared re-excommunicated him, but the measures were too late, and the proceedings were all to the loss of the pope. Henceforward, although, the attempts to expand the role of the papacy met not much success for Gregory, his concepts in 12th and 13th centuries resulted in papal monarchy. In fact, Gregory became interested in politics and represented his new canon law (supervising in election of the pope), when Henry's father died as the Holy Roman emperor and the German monarchy was seriously weakened.²⁸³

To a similar degree, Khomeini, in the 60's of his life, constituted his political aspirations and more specifically propounded his sort of manifest of his notions, not at the era of the secular anti-mullah first Pahlavi, but under the second Pahlavi (Mohammad Reza the son of Reza Shah), who had a respectful relationship with the mullahs and was not as strict as his father. In the both cases, the great energy and enthusiasm in pursuit of virtuous force and religious conviction attracted the popular loyalty. For instance, Gregory confirmed celibacy for the Church's clergy, thus by restraining them from sexual intercourse donated a popular chaste appearance to the Church officials and simply resembled them to the holy spirit of Jesus Christ. Furthermore, it could be financially lucrative for his institution, as the assumed possessions of the Church's clergies (without wife and children) after their death were practically gone to the Church.²⁸⁴

²⁸⁰ Brunkhorst. Critical theory of legal revolutions, evolutionary perspectives. 127.

²⁸¹ Clifford J. Rogers (ed.). The Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military Technology, Vol 1. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. 2010. p. 256.

²⁸² Brunkhorst. Critical theory of legal revolutions, evolutionary perspectives. 126-127.

²⁸³ Blumenthal. "St. Gregory VII, pope". <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Saint-Gregory-VII> .

²⁸⁴ Todd D. Baker. Exodus from Rome: A Biblical and Historical Critique of Roman Catholicism, Vol. 1. Bloomington: iUniverse. 2014. p. 156.

Similar to Gregory who decades before becoming a pope initiated his self-articulated regulations,²⁸⁵ Khomeini presented his prescriptive theocratic theory of Velayat-e Faqih rule in his lectures years before his role in the 1979 revolution and the public proclamation of Islamic Republic.

With all these explanations, the reinvention of the legal and religious contradictions of the Gregory's revolution more and less is identifiable in the Islamic revolution, in which the political power, the religious domain and the new legal orders are combined to reflect a constitutional order restoring and restituting the traditional antagonists. This dialectical method, however, forcefully legitimized the distinctions between the sacred and profane,²⁸⁶ in both cases. In Khomeini's case, although, the constitution of Islamic revolution was similar to the Persian constitution of 1906 in the sense of the establishment of an effective separation of powers, ideologically, it differed the absolute ultimate political power of ruling to the very absolute Velayat-e Faqih or the supreme leader's position. This new constitutional order stressed on the Islamization of society via reorganizing a Shari'a-based judiciary so as to solidify its regime control.²⁸⁷

²⁸⁵ Blumenthal. "St. Gregory VII, pope". <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Saint-Gregory-VII> .

²⁸⁶ Brunkhorst. Critical theory of legal revolutions, evolutionary perspectives. 128.

²⁸⁷ Majid Mohammadi. Judicial Reform and Reorganization in 20th Century, State-Building, Modernization, and Islamicization. New York: Routledge. 2008. p. 259.

4. The Persian Constitution and the Constitutionalism

The constitutional movement as a (fragile) basis of democracy and development in Iran, took place between 1905 and 1911. In fact, it paved the way towards the modern outfit of governance and led to the establishment of a parliament during the Qajar Dynasty (1794-1925)²⁸⁸. It also created new opportunities and possibilities for many different social groups that fought for shaping the course of the changes, and ultimately transmogrified some sections of society, in some way.

A century before this movement, Persia²⁸⁹ experienced one of the most complicated periods in its history. A period of hardship, impoverishment and disgrace due to the imposed consecutive wars defeats and unfair peace treaties. Simultaneously, the modern social and political changes occurred relatively quickly in Western (and partially in Russian) societies, made the Iranian society capable of making comparisons and drawing rational judgments about their own social necessities.²⁹⁰

As a matter of fact, by the direct chronical political and economic influences of the Great Britain and Russia during the Safavid dynasty reign, the belief in superiority of the Western civilization, its culture and technology was widespread among the Iranians. The Qajar Shahs, royal families and aristocrats simply inherited such a belief, and submissively accepted the truth of this supremacy. They realistically evaluated themselves at least politically and militarily inferior, wishing to follow the West as the potential role model, and therefore transmitted such a belief to the society. As a result of such an acceptance, at long last, the Qajar monarchs and aristocrats focused their attention on visiting Europe, sending their sons and talented students to Europe to study, establishing modern schools, hiring European teachers, importing some modern inventions, and translating some up-to-date books. With the decree of Abbas Mirza (1789-

²⁸⁸ The Safavid dynasty had the support of seven Qezelbash tribes, the Qajar tribe (with Turkmen descent) was one of them. They first settled near present-day Armenia during the Mongol period. Ehsan Yarshater. "Iran ii. Iranian History (2) Islamic period (page 5)". Originally published: 2004. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/iran-ii2-islamic-period-page-5> . The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Qājār dynasty". Encyclopædia Britannica. Online edition. February 7, 2017. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Qajar-dynasty> .

²⁸⁹ Persia was the official international name of Iran until March 1935. Ali M. Ansari. Modern Iran: The Pahlavis and After. Second edition, New York: Routledge. 2007. p. 78.

²⁹⁰ Timothy C. Dowling (ed.). Russia at War: From the Mongol Conquest to Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Beyond. Santa Barbara, Ca: ABC-CLIO. 2015. Pp. 728-729. Elton L. Daniel. "Golestān Treaty". Originally published: 2001. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <https://iranicaonline.org/articles/golestan-treaty> . Chahryar Adle. History of Civilizations of Central Asia, Vol. 5, Towards the contemporary period, From the mid-nineteenth to the end of the twentieth century. Turin: UNESCO. 2005. Pp. 470-476. N. S. Fatemi. "Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919". Originally published: 1985. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <https://iranicaonline.org/articles/anglo-persian-agreement-1919> .

1833)²⁹¹, the first group of students was directed to England. Then he restructured and modernized the Persian army on the French armed forces.²⁹² After the sudden death of Abbas Mirza, Fath Ali Shah (1797-1834)²⁹³ chose Mohammad (1834-1848), the son of Abbas Mirza, as the crown prince, in that Abbas Mirza, before death, in order to make an educated person out of his son, hired him some tutors of modern curriculums. He generally urged his sons to become familiar with European culture and its technologic achievements.²⁹⁴

Despite of these thoughts of changes and modern measures, Fath Ali Shah was also truly attentive to the power and influence of Shi'ite mullahs in the society, thus he attempted to meet their demands via donating gifts and lands, as well as recognizing their supremacy over the judicial system.²⁹⁵ Fath Ali Shah by identifying the Shi'ite as the main religion, introduced himself as the Shah of the Shi'ite world, thus his religious policies turn into the central procedure in the Qajar ruling system.²⁹⁶

At a later time, Naser-al-Din Mirza (1831-1896)²⁹⁷, the other ruler of Qajar had greater enthusiasm for the Europe and European phenomena. In the first years of his rule, his first minister and chief commander of the military, Amir Kabir (1807-1852)²⁹⁸ took advantage of the Naser-al-Din Shah's interest in Western improvements and executed fundamental changes in the educational system. Amir Kabir was a key figure in the Qajar dynasty and truly understood the requirement for change in the government, judicial system, military, economy, and education. His important measure was the establishment of Dar ul-Funun School (the

²⁹¹ The son of Fath Ali Shah, his crown prince (however died before the death of his father) and father of the line of Qajar rulers from Mohammad Shah on. H. Busse. "Abbas Mirza Qajar". Originally published: 1982. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/abbas-mirza-qajar>.

²⁹² Ibid., <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/abbas-mirza-qajar> .

²⁹³ The second Shah of Qajar dynasty.

²⁹⁴ Amanat. Pivot of the universe: Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy, 1831-1896. 27-28.

²⁹⁵ Abbas Amanat. Pivot of the universe: Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy, 1831-1896. Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press. 1997. p. 5.

²⁹⁶ Mahshid Modares. "Cultural Improvements in Iran During the Qajar Period and the West-late 18th c. until 1906-07 Constitutional Movement-". Iran Chamber Society. Online edition. 2007. http://www.iranchamber.com/culture/articles/cultural_improvements_iran_qajar.php .

²⁹⁷ The Shah of Persia (Iran) from 1848 until 1896 when he was assassinated. For roughly half a century, he was the Persia supreme ruler and is known as the first modern Shah who officially visited Europe. See also Amanat. Pivot of the universe: Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy, 1831-1896.

²⁹⁸ Mirza Taqi Khan, Amir Kabir (Great Prince) the chief minister to Naser-al-Din Shah for the first four years of his reign and one of the most capable and innovative figures to appear in the whole Qajar period. The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Mīrzā Taqī Khān". Encyclopædia Britannica. Online edition. February 26, 2018. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mirza-Taqi-Khan> .

Polytechnic School 1851), the first modern school in Iran for the new sciences, as well as new way of thinking to the socio-legal and political phenomena.²⁹⁹

4.1. *An intellectual souvenir*

At the Qajar era, the phenomena of sending and missioning some individuals and students to the European countries, with the major goal of rescuing the country via the realization of ways towards technological, economic and military progress ended in further unexpected consequences. As science, industry and technology were not easily transportable products, the important ramification of this policy was what these individuals and illuminati brought with as attitudinal, intellectual and cultural souvenirs. Accordingly, since they returned home, encountered and challenged the mullahs as the only traditional privileged thinking group of the society, as well as the absolute unqualified monarch. They as the first group of the Persia, for the first-time questioned religion, judiciary and monarchical system, thus, contextualized the constitutional movement as a new solution to save the country.

To realize such contextualization the Iran's first press was published (in Tabriz from 1837) by Mirza Saleh Kazerouni,³⁰⁰ one of the returned students. The second important newspaper (actually regularly weekly) of this period was printed from 1851, titled Vaghayeh Etefaghiyeh (The Happenings), as a result of the Amir Kabir's endeavors and the Naser-al-Din Shah's blind interest. It was published for ten years, informing people about prices of foods, government's announcements, the monarch's travels, and events in different provinces.³⁰¹

These publications alongside with the speeches of the returnees from West and the newly established schools played crucial roles in awaking and educating people, and led to the procurement of a socio-constitutional movement. They enlightened activists, artists, poets, writers, mullahs, politicians, merchants, and ordinary average people in terms of the new opportunities towards new technology, culture, political and social changes across the Globe. These mentioned informative and reformative measures were presented in a context where

²⁹⁹ Amanat. Pivot of the universe: Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy, 1831-1896. 166-168.

³⁰⁰ It is not clear how long he continued publishing his newspaper or which subject he chose, but he should be given the credit of being the first Persian reporter.

³⁰¹ Ahmad Tajbakhsh. History of Civilization and Culture of Iran during the Qajar Period. Shiraz: Navid Shiraz. 2003. Pp. 392-394.

there were general financial weak points for the government, disgraceful commercial concessions to the Western powers, and a general inaccessibility and inflation in the country.³⁰² As regards these internal matters and under the influence of the international affairs, the old woefully sustained extravagant Qajar structure, that was symbolized by Naser-al-Din Shah (a person half a century in reign), consequently, by the will of a strong social movement was replaced with the new institution of constitutional political social order. The monarch Mozaffar ad-Din Shah (1853-1907)³⁰³ signed the constitution in 1906, but he died shortly after and replaced by Mohammad Ali Shah (1872-1925)³⁰⁴ who in 1907 dissolved the parliament and declared the abolishment of the constitution. This Shah of Qajar alleged this document contrary to the very Islamic Shari'a law. Astonishingly, he bombarded the parliament with the military and political support of Russia and Britain. This led to another pro-constitutional movement. In July 1909, pro-constitution forces marched from the main Persian provinces to Tehran, deposed the Shah, and reestablished the constitution. Then, the parliament voted to place Mohammad Ali Shah's 11-year-old son, Ahmad (1898-1930)³⁰⁵ on the throne. Eventually, in 1925, Iran's parliament amended Persian constitution of 1906 to replace the Qajar dynasty with the Pahlavi dynasty as the legitimate sovereign of Persia,³⁰⁶ thus the demands for changes could not end with the constitutional movement.

4.2. *Constitutional revolutions, a historical theoretical background*

In order to recognize the religious-legal association of this constitutional movement, the scrutiny of the ideas of Hauke Brunkhorst (1945-), a distinguished political sociologist, specializes in constitutionalism and critical theory sounds noteworthy.

With reference to the democratic revolutions, he traces an impressive process of social and institutional learning about inclusion of formerly socially, culturally, economically, and politically

³⁰² Hassan Hakimian. "Economy viii. In The Qajar Period". Originally published: 1997. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <https://iranicaonline.org/articles/economy-viii-in-the-qajar-period> .

³⁰³ Reigned in Persia between the years 1896 and 1907. The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Mozaffar od-Dīn Shāh". Encyclopædia Britannica. Online edition. November 5, 2009. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mozaffar-od-Din-Shah> .

³⁰⁴ The anti-constitutional Shah of Persia from 1907 to 1909. In 1925 he died in San Remo, Italy, in exile. In fact, Mohammad Ali Shah, who abdicated following the constitutional revolution, has been since then remembered as a symbol of dictatorship in the Persian history. Yarshater. "Iran ii. Iranian History (2) Islamic period (page 5)". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/iran-ii2-islamic-period-page-5> .

³⁰⁵ The last ruling member of the Qajar dynasty governed from 1909 to 1925. Yarshater. "Iran ii. Iranian History (2) Islamic period (page 5)". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/iran-ii2-islamic-period-page-5> .

³⁰⁶ Hassan Arfa. "Reza Shah Pahlavi". Encyclopædia Britannica. Online edition. March 9, 2018. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Reza-Shah-Pahlavi> .

excluded groups and classes, which was simultaneously acquired at the price of the exclusion for the other groups and classes.³⁰⁷ While, he is enthusiastic about studying the evolutionary socio-legal and constitutional changes, holds this idea of Kant and Hegel, that law can be potentially defined as the existence of freedom.³⁰⁸ Brunkhorst at “Critical Theory of Legal Revolutions” (2014)³⁰⁹ one of the potential critical general surveys so as to fundamentally change the conventional perspectives towards the complexity of social evolution and revolution, debates the global history of legal and constitutional discourses. In his theory, he innovatively, simultaneously amalgamates and distinguishes the critical-normative and socio-evolutionary-functional approaches³¹⁰ in order to reconstruct the great legal revolutions that resulted in the modern set of law.

Historically, in the world constitutional revolutions, the papal revolution, initiated by Gregory VII in 11th and 12th century, the idea of justice was revived and institutionalized in tradition of monasticism. The protestant reformation as a radical religion-based (Western church) revolution in the 16th century and the emergence of the constitutional state were the decisive moments in the evolution of law. Afterwards, in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, revolutions transformed the British, French and Spanish Atlantic worlds. During this time, people rebelled against their rulers in pursuit of political liberty and economic opportunity, challenged social and political structures on both sides of the Atlantic. Subsequently, the greater part of America was independent from British and Spanish dominations, and France government with a monarch at the head was dropped down. These new sovereign states were highly affianced with the idea of legal equality. Then the egalitarian world revolution sought to remove economic inequalities, the decentralization of power and present totally equal societies with equal legal rights for everyone. By the 20th century and the Euro-Asian cases of Russia and China (ended in Leninism and Maoism) the state structural social ideals and approaches were examined. The post-World Wars wave of legal revolutions opened up the possibility of co-evolutionary progress in cosmopolitan world society,³¹¹ among the nation state identities. This wave of global transformation functioned through decolonization and a transition from authoritarianism and totalitarianism to democracy and human rights, in the second half of the 20th century.

³⁰⁷ Hauke Brunkhorst. “Constitutionalism and democracy in the world society”. in *The twilight of constitutionalism?* Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. Pp. 179-200. 2010. p. 179.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 180.

³⁰⁹ Brunkhorst. *Critical theory of legal revolutions, evolutionary perspectives.*

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 75.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, 415.

Accordingly, there “was no democracy before 1945”³¹² and there “is no longer any space for any action outside the law, or outside the legal system”.³¹³

The declaration of the rights of the human of 1789 (set by French National Constituent Assembly in French revolution) was a dual declaration for citizens³¹⁴ and thereby illustrated the co-evolutionary relation between cosmopolitan and national rights. Hence, democracy without transnational dimensions seems impossible, because it is always constituted based on transnational body of legal norms in the global transitional wave.³¹⁵

As regards to these historical elaborations, the critical theory of Brunkhorst to uncover and support an alternative perspective towards the revolutionary trends reflects simultaneously the evolutionary processes, as well as the conflict of interests between the lower and the ruling classes that gave rise to the great successive revolutions, and finally led to “a series of normative learning processes”.³¹⁶ His blended view (of Luhmann and Marx) in class struggle for legal revolutions echoes this thesis statement, a revolution always is a legal revolution, in that there is always a struggle for rights and seeking change in the new legal formation of a society, as a result in dualism of state and law, state is the law and vice versa.³¹⁷ State does not and cannot exist outside the law and it is the law which constitutes the state, thus there is “no sovereignty beyond legality”.³¹⁸

To a greater or lesser extent, the Persian constitutional movement and revolution brought about a change in the political culture of Persia, it made the state a domain of political contestation, spread the representative principles, the idea that individuals had a right to participate in governance and in selecting those who stood for their interests. This movement presented the Persian the notion of citizenship and made the law not dynasty, as the basis for political legitimacy. Finally, Persia, in the modern era, tried to keep free from foreign influence via the parliament and legality, also, depicted to the monarch that his sovereignty and policies could not exist outside the law.

Brunkhorst’s reconstructions of the methodological distinction between evolutionary and revolutionary changes, normative development via evolutionary adaptation and revolutionary moments, counterrevolutionary ideological battles and developments, indeed, the systematic

³¹² Ibid., 390.

³¹³ Ibid., 432.

³¹⁴ Ibid., 266.

³¹⁵ Ibid., 391.

³¹⁶ Ibid., 464.

³¹⁷ Ibid., 348.

³¹⁸ Ibid., 127.

role of religion and religious ideas are noteworthy.³¹⁹ Accordingly, the meaning of democracy, legitimacy and state are impossible to understand, without knowing their religious origins, inasmuch as religious factors played a central role in the papal, protestant, Atlantic³²⁰ and egalitarian revolutions.³²¹ Moreover, in the history of legal revolutions, religion and law have shown such closeness that can be defined as a coupling of religion-law.

In constitutional revolution of Persia and its consequence, namely the first Persian constitution, the coupling of the Islamic Shari'a law and civilian law was evidently recognizable, inasmuch as the realization of legitimacy of such constitution was impossible without the reception of its religious provisions and prescriptions. By the primary constitutional demands, some mullahs such as Sheikh Fazlollah Noori (1843-1909),³²² argued against constitutionalism on the basis of the islamically impossibility of creating equality of citizenship for Muslims and non-Muslims, male and female, indeed rich and poor.³²³ This debate even continues to this day, as a mere subject in the form of occasional talk show between the prerogative organs and the reformists of the Islamic Republic under a divine Shari'a-based constitution.

At any rate, since 1906 "a complex of ideas, attitudes, and patterns of behavior elaborating the principle that the authority of government derives from and limited by a body of fundamental law"³²⁴ has cohabited with the religious dutiful Shari'a law. This cohabitation did not obligate the laws to be Islamic, but merely not to be against Islam, to put it differently the laws could verily be unislamic, but not at variance with any specified Islamic law. Nonetheless, through this relatively peaceful coexistence in this document, an absolute unrestrained dominion of the Shari'a law over the country's affairs was successfully confined. For instance, it gave rights to the Persian religious minorities, such as Zoroastrians, Christians and Jews³²⁵ who based on the Shari'a law

³¹⁹ Ibid., 118-126.

³²⁰ Ibid., 238-239.

³²¹ Ibid., 369.

³²² He was a mullah who fought against the Iranian constitutional revolution and was executed for treason by Constitutionlists as a result. In today's Iran, he is considered as a martyr in the fight against blasphemy and democracy by Islamic regime in Iran. Vanessa Martin. "Nuri, Fazl-Allah". Originally published: 2014. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/nuri-fazl-allah> .

³²³ John L. Esposito, James P. Piscatori. "Democratization and Islam". 45, Middle East Journal. 1991. Pp. 427, 435.

³²⁴ Don E. Fehrenbacher. *Constitutions and Constitutionalism in the Slaveholding South*. Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press. 1989. p. 1.

³²⁵ Iran's 1906 Constitution and Its Supplement. <http://fis-iran.org/en/resources/legaldoc/iranconstitution> .

were considered as enemy in the society (particularly, in accordance to a superficial Shi'i interpretation of surah Al-Mumtahanah, 1st verse).³²⁶

³²⁶ (Examining her) "Those you who have believed, do not take my enemies and your enemies as allies, extending to them affection while they have disbelieved in what came to you of the truth, having driven out the prophet and yourselves, only because you believe in God. If you have come out for jihad in my cause and seeking means to my approval, take them not as friends. You confide to them affection, but I am most knowing of what you have concealed and what you have declared. And whoever does it among you has certainly strayed from the soundness of the way". Quran. <https://quran.com/> . However, hermeneutically, the entire context and the history of the period of the revelation makes it clear that, during the time of Muhammad in Mecca and Medina espionage had grown as a result of the hypocritical newly converted, Christian and Jewish hard-liners who used every opportunity to weaken the newly born Muslim community, they were as a matter of fact the possible addressee of this verse. Tafsir Nemooneh. <https://zeker.tebyan.net/#SourehID=60&Aye=1&pi=0&PageID=549&TablIndex=2&T=fa.makarem,fa.ghomshei,en.yusufali&ta=5> .

5. An implication of the literature review

In this first chapter it was endeavored to introduce and explore the importance of the research topic and the investigation of the transformations during the contemporary Iranian social movements. In order to inspect the reformative Green social movement, this study highlighted the facts of the structure of power of its repressive force, the Islamic Republic state, which in turn was fertilized by the 1970s revolutionary social movement.

As it was specified, generally, Islamic Republic is a title for several countries that are constitutionally regulated on the Shari'a law. After the independence movements ended in the Islamic Republic of East Turkistan, Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Islamic Republic of Mauritania,³²⁷ which were to secure the nation claims and rights within the processes and frameworks of the weak polities, and explored independent state building in the Sunni Muslim World, the Iranian case, as a result of a revolution, was obviously an evolution at least in Islamic Shi'ite movements and political thought by an organized guided ideology and leadership. By such characteristics, this type strengthened the possibility of revolution and governance even within the framework of strong nation states after the Caliphate for the radicalized Islamic groups. It was elaborated that this regime has regionally launched a sort of proxy ongoing conflict and struggle versus its neighbors for religious (sectarian) political influence, besides, it has been able to control and repress any form of struggle inside its borders, howbeit in the absence of success in material and socio-economic terms and perspectives.³²⁸

It was made known how the mullahs as the authorities of this state have a different interpretation of Islam, Quran and therefore have regulated a legislation system and a constitution based on the Shari's laws. In what is investigated the method of mullahs' regime to interpret the Quran and Shari'a laws is to literally quote the text without its context, which is not the only possible and plausible interpretation. The advanced hermeneutic interpretation is able to contextualize and historize the old text-books and make most of them compatible with the updated world and human rights.³²⁹ In other words, the revealed Quranic articles or Wahy are interpretable in the view of other readers, similar to every other text. In this chapter it was tried to make such a differentiation as the ruling mullahs' interpretation versus other interpretations,

³²⁷ Dzikansky and Others. Terrorist Suicide Bombings: Attack Interdiction, Mitigation, and Response. 289.

³²⁸ Hahn. Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations. 241. Abedin. "Iran: Expert Discusses Iran's Quds Force And U.S. Charges Concerning Iraq". https://web.archive.org/web/20080416114504/http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=02&y=2007&id=36B123CE-693B-448E-BF7D-A541E2A7BD12 .

³²⁹ An-Na'im. "Toward an Islamic Hermeneutics for Human Rights". 229-242.

thus, some chunks dealt with hermeneutics as literary criticism and modernist deconstruction of the Quran.

Predominately the Iranian middle-class were annoyed and critic of such religious radical policies and their consequences, in particular an international isolation for the country. By the Green movement, they desperately but legally searched political changes and wanted their socio-economic circumstances to be improved. This movement, in fact, was sparked in the events of an electoral process. Although, the reelection of the president was immediately asserted by the supreme leader, the demonstrations were held almost every day and lasted up until two years. The regime's reaction was drastic heavy crackdown. Afterwards, the reformist opposed candidates were house arrested and gradually, the social movement subsided.

In any event, right after the repression, the intersection of freedom of opinion and expression became extremely narrowed. Inasmuch as, according to the World Press Freedom Index in 2010, Iran ranked 175 out of 178 countries in the world.³³⁰ Even though the right of freedom of opinion among some other universal human rights are declared by the constitutional law of the 1979 revolution, the freedom after expressing opinion is not legally guaranteed at all. In this regard, Reporters without Borders' annual report over Iran reflects the victimization of Arts. 18 and 19 more than other fundamental Human Rights based on the Universal Declaration. It depicts that the Islamic Republic constitutionally provides the protections, benefits and freedom of expression only for some groups.³³¹ According to Karl Loewenstein and Giovanni Sartori, this sort of constitution can be categorized as semantic facade or fake constitution, which has seized a legitimate sovereignty so as to include some groups that are excessively entitled to deny freedom to others.³³² In effect, this kind of constitution is not capable to confine the arbitrary application of authoritarian sources of power, with all its formal hierarchical outfits. In this chapter further a theoretical overview on the comparable analytical literature of the Nazi movement and system was presented, despite of its essential differences. Accordingly, through a Fraenkelian view,³³³ for four decades, the Islamic Republic has ruled through a parallel system. The elected bodies are carefully supervised by the working groups appointed by the religious authorities. Clearly visible in this system, the entire organizational constitutional outfit with the Guardian Council is the leverage or the exertion of force for the theocratic factual

³³⁰ World Press Freedom Index. 2010. <https://rsf.org/en/world-press-freedom-index-2010> .

³³¹ The Editors of Reporters without Borders for Freedom of Information. "Press freedom violations recounted in real time (January -December 2018)". <https://rsf.org/en/news/press-freedom-violations-recounted-real-time-january-december-2018> .

³³² Loewenstein. Political power and the Governmental Process. 147-150. Antons. Routledge Handbook of Asian Law. 78.

³³³ See Fraenkel. The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship.

segment behind the facade of the republic legal section. To rein the Iranian society as a part of the Shi'i Ummah, this segregation is well managed by the supreme leader and his close entourage, who for the good reasons are frightened to criticize him and typically tell him what he wants to hear rather than what he requires to hear. Khamenei similar to his predecessor receives his information through the mentioned entourage. He synchronizes the policies and decisions through such group of people surrounding him.

Although, this chapter ventured to examine the Fraenkel's theory, this particular religious regime with some fascistic traits is different from the Nazis' fascism, because it has not totally abolished its so-called republican constitution based on the double structure of republic and theocracy under the reign of the religious leader. In the German case, despite the fact that the Weimar constitution nominally continued to exist under the Nazis' reign, via the development of the emergency circumstances based on "the Reichstag fire decree" and "the Enabling Act" (a type of factual constitutional amendment), Hitler and his cabinet were enjoyed by an absolute power to self-determining enact laws, unprovided with both Reichstag and constitution.³³⁴

To go to provide a critical scrutiny of the more hidden layers of the structure of the rule of the Islamic Republic, the Neumann's work was considered. According to his research, the structure of the so-called Nazi totalitarianism was not unified but chaotic, lawless and monstrous (Behemoth). Its policies expressed a sort of sporadic overlapping and occasional contending drives of the four self-interested symbiotic related but by the same token separated power centers (Nazi party, armed forces, state bureaucracy and big businesses), each of which sought to expand the German power and territory without relinquishing authority to any of the other structures.³³⁵ Comparatively, while, for Fraenkel the Nazi state was comprised of solely two structures of power, normative and prerogative, in Neumann's analysis, it primarily is composed of four centers. Thus, the Fraenkel and Neumann's analyses of the Nazi power are able to furnish a kind of anti-totalitarian approach that demonstrates not a centralized organized state with clear legal hierarchical arrangement, but a highly decentralized one functioning without understood transparent lawful rule.

As specified, Neumann, affirmatively, furthermore, in an expanded edition detailedly unveiled the Nazi's decentralization of administration. Accordingly, the administrative national level paled versus the regional levels (e.g., Gaue) and therefore those who gradually gained more power were the territorial heads (e.g., Gauleiter).³³⁶

³³⁴ Sajó and Uitz. *The Constitution of Freedom: An Introduction to Legal Constitutionalism*. 419-420.

³³⁵ Neumann. *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism*. vii.

³³⁶ Steber and Gotto. *Visions of Community in Nazi Germany: Social Engineering and Private Lives*. 101. Neumann. *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism*. 526, 535-537.

Nonetheless, both Neumann's model of Behemoth and Fraenkel's theory of dual state are merely more and less able to explain the early stages of both Nazi and Islamic authorities. They did not so much explanatory potentials so as to evaluate the progressive debilitating organizational bureaucratic process of the public institutions through arbitrary exercise of power. Theoretically, Hilberg developed the last part of Neumann's work, stressing this extreme decentralization of the Nazi machinery.³³⁷ The anti-totalitarian perspective of Mommsen is also to support this approach.³³⁸ Their investigations summed up the debates (intentionalistic and functionalistic stands) in terms of the origins of the calamities of the Nazis. Therefore, the extermination was not an already thoughtfully planned decision, but in response to the changing circumstances. As is narrated by Mommsen, the Nazi leaders were merely ideologues, while, so as to implement such mass murder other people were required, the people who even were not necessarily primarily guided by the ideological deliberations. Furthermore, in such process, the radicalized decisions were gradually accumulatively developed. This reasoning considers an interaction through both the higher levels and the lower ones to implement the so-called Final Solution.³³⁹ More to the point, as Browning alleged, the Gauleiters were the major assembled spectators for the Hitler's secret speech (December 12th, 1941), which indirectly suggested and encouraged a decentralized system of regional autonomy or a form of polycratic ruling, rivalry, radicalization and the destruction in a large volume.³⁴⁰ It is worth noting that, later, gradually, the war conditions, economic woes, the prediction of reduction of the forced labor's effectiveness and starvation in the ghettos made the implementation of the Final Solution probable, although, at that time, it was clearly specified that the ghettos' authorities had no premeditated plans for mass murder.³⁴¹ Hilberg also endeavored to merge the given argumentations, thus argues, this disaster was not a mere result of laws and commands but a type of shared exertion, comprehension and synchronization.³⁴² In this process, the Nazi leaders possessed no far-reaching plan of action, but were the deterministic might in the absence. Here a form of contest among the different levels of Nazi functionaries caused the cumulative self-radicalization depicted in their effective and persuasive speeches to generate progressively ultimate

³³⁷ See Hilberg. *The Destruction of the European Jews*.

³³⁸ See Mommsen. "Hitler's position in the Nazi System" in his *From Weimar to Auschwitz: Essays in German History*. 163-188. Baratieri, Edele and Finaldi. *Totalitarian Dictatorship: New Histories*. 7.

³³⁹ Mommsen. The "Functionalist" and the "Intentionalist" schools of thought.

https://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%203850.pdf . 2.

³⁴⁰ Browning. *The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942*. 407-409.

³⁴¹ Greenhouse, Mertz and Warren. *Ethnography in Unstable Places: Everyday Lives in Contexts of Dramatic Political Change*. 39-40.

³⁴² Hilberg. *The Destruction of the European Jews*. 54-55.

policies.³⁴³ In the meantime, predominantly, the single-minded low ranked bureaucrats implemented what they supposed their superordinates would officially with satisfactory agree based on their already articulated ideology.

From a new angle, as stated in the theory of ordinary organizations of Kühl, the brutalized mass murders can be also organized via mechanisms of the normality of organizations, in which ordinary individuals are persuaded to lawfully (albeit in the undefined gray territories of legality)³⁴⁴ or unlawfully participate in exercising physical or non-physical forces against some particular individuals or groups and their properties in a spectrum form an impassive acceptance to an active participation (within the zone of indifference).³⁴⁵ The legitimacy of their activities are to a great extent subject to their integration and their beliefs in the rightfulness of their performances, thus they are persuaded to fully fulfill their parts to reach an extremity in abnormality, to do what they might not do outside the organizational framework, in the absence of feeling guilty. The plausibility of Kühl's theory can be investigated not only in the historical organizational cases which encouraged the activities to turn ordinary men into willing executioners (e.g., the paramilitary Reserve Police Battalion 101, mostly civilians, who executed the Józefów's Jewish residents), but in addition, in socio-psychological experiments in the form of the simulated organizations (Milgram and Stanford Prison).³⁴⁶

The illegal surreptitious mass executions and burial in the mass graves of some thirty thousand prisoners in 1988³⁴⁷ demonstrated that nonetheless, there was not a clear plan by the leaders of the Islamic Republic to launch an event causing great disaster, a suspect secret fatwa or Shari'a-based order of the supreme leader facilitated a radical retaliatory initiative from below within the ranks of the Islamic revolutionary regime. The inducement of this secret fatwa encouraged a hugely chaotic judicial circumstances that therefore more pragmatically attracted the Khomeini's satisfaction, in that it successfully created a type of contest among his young mullah subordinates to docket the largest massacre of political prisoners since the World War

³⁴³ Mommsen. The "Functionalist" and the "Intentionalist" schools of thought.

https://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%203850.pdf . 2.

³⁴⁴ Kühl. Ordinary Organizations: why normal men carried out the Holocaust. 139.

³⁴⁵ Kühl. Ordinary Organizations: Simulated Brutality Reinterpreted from an Organizational Sociology Perspective, Version 7.0. <http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/soz/personen/kuehl/pdf/Working-Paper-5-2009-Ordinary-Organizations2.pdf> . 18.

³⁴⁶ Kühl. How normal Organizations produce Brutalities: On the variations of Milgram's obedience experiment. <http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/soz/personen/kuehl/pdf/Working-Paper-6-2009-How-normal-Organization-produce-brutalities.pdf> . 1.

³⁴⁷ The editors of the Human Rights Council of the UN. "The massacre of political prisoners in 1988 in the Islamic Republic of Iran". United Nations, General Assembly, A/HRC/28/NGO/113, Human Rights Council, Twenty-eighth session, Agenda item 4, Human Rights situations that require the Council's attention. https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1251315/1930_1429174715_g1503786.pdf . 2.

II.³⁴⁸ In fact, these final decision-making committee members did not function within a legal transparency of order, but through a highly decentralized secret context, that had an important implication, they had to in more radical possibilities come to those resolutions, deep-seated just to escape the probable troubles and inconveniences. In the following events, from the chain murders to the serial acid attackings³⁴⁹ and the Baha'is' persecutions (without prosecution),³⁵⁰ from the 1990s protests³⁵¹ to the Green movement protests³⁵² the reactions of the aggregative-radicalized affiliated elements of the regime were fire at will arbitrary measures. In practical terms, this trend ended in an informal transition of power from the central to the individual authorities. In fact, this organizational mechanism of decentralization of arbitrary autonomous power inside the system of Islamic Republic resulted in blackout and disordered legal hierarchy. The implemented policies in this system have caused overlapping and occasional contending among the related but at the same time segregated power centers (Ministry of Intelligence, Islamic Revolutionary Guards, Imams of Friday Prayer, foundations and bureaucratic bodies), each of which on the one hand pursuing their self-promoted agendas, on the other hand seeking to strengthen the strategic depth of the regime. According to the Neumann's model, this regime is made up not of one unified, but several diverse pillars held by the supreme leader's arrangement.

Socio-organizationally, the output of such polycratic ruling and extraordinarily chaotic radicalization with an unclarity of responsibility and administrative confusion among the officials is that the forces more pragmatically than ideologically make the supreme leader well contented, in that he successfully created a type of contest among his subordinates and devotees in the different bodies, keeping himself away from any type of feasible questionability. Hence, these forces have acted based on the circumstances and had no premeditated plans for killing of the diverse groups and individuals. Predominately, they were all radical religious leaders who always implicitly and explicitly criticized the moderate policies and encouraged the radical supporters and forces to act autonomously in self-determined emergency circumstances, especially, during the social protests and movements.

³⁴⁸ Robertson in The editors of the Human Rights Council of the UN. "The massacre of political prisoners in 1988 in the Islamic Republic of Iran".

https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1251315/1930_1429174715_g1503786.pdf . 4.

³⁴⁹ Vatanka. "Iran Abroad". 64.

³⁵⁰ Archives of Baha'i Persecution in Iran. <https://iranbahaipersecution.bic.org/about> .

³⁵¹ Elaine Sciolino. "Iran Students Halt Protests But Still Press For Changes". The New York Times. Online edition. July 18, 1999.

<https://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/18/world/iran-students-halt-protests-but-still-press-for-changes.html> .

³⁵² See Hashemi and Postel. The People Reloaded: The Green Movement and the Struggle for Iran's Future.

From another standpoint, the religious leaders, as the ideologues to implement their policies and repress require recruiting from the normal people who are not necessarily guided by the ideological deliberations. By this reasoning, we can simultaneously focus on the lower and higher levels (as well as an intentionalist-functionalist amalgamation) to assess the elaborated executed disastrous events.

In most cases, the radicalized officials or non-officials bottom-up either bypassed the law or undertook the Shari'a law enforcement without legal authority. Some of these elements throughout their assigned power overdid in the way of implementing the issued authoritative but not compulsory commands, thus did their best to execute the most via an efficient self-induced-radicalized process in order to set ruling mullah's mind at ease. They were self-persuaded to leastwise in the gray zones of legality fully fulfill their parts, thus reached an extremity in abnormality, in the absence of feeling guilty. With this analysis, the procedure of these measures has provided the regime a plausible deniability to respond to the possible questions about its legal accountability versus such events.

As it was elaborated in the second part of this literature review, the 1979 revolution recalled a greater attention to the agential factors such as leadership, ideologue, ideology and political religion for a single revolutionary change. On the other side, having clever judgment over a single legal revolution sounds inconceivable without investigating its religious records. In this regard, the 1970s movement was the outcome of the Joint efforts of groups with both religious and secular backgrounds, promoted a hybrid political theocratic system for a constitutional reconstruction. This reorganization brought up the first contemporary case to formally attempt to adopt Islamic prefix to define republican status after a revolution, even though, there were already several similar compounds with totally different essences and motivations. The first was the short time Islamic Republic of East Turkistan (1933), the outcome of the first identitarian pan-Turkist quest for forming an independent state by the sectarian ethno-linguistic groups (Sunni Uyghur in current autonomous Xinjiang).³⁵³ In today's region, a wide variety of groups (secularist to fundamentalist Salafist ISIL collaborator or part of a global jihadist) are searching for independence, not a mere separationist seeking the reestablishment of the Islamic Republic anymore.³⁵⁴ Secondly, Pakistan, which gained its independence from the British-Indian Empire in 1947. The movement basically aimed at the formation of Pakistani nation from the Indian Sunni Muslim-majority areas. Pakistan remained under the British Dominion until the adoption of

³⁵³ Han. *Contestation and Adaptation: The Politics of National Identity in China*. 42.

³⁵⁴ Reed. *The ETIM: China's Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat*. 46. Dorsey. *China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom*. 115-116.

an Islamic Republic (1956-) by Jamaat-e-Islami group. Since then, the Islamic constitution as a result of the internal struggles and the military coups has been several times abrogated, suspended, restored and amended.³⁵⁵ Under today's Islamic Republic of Pakistan there are tens of thousands Islamic (Saudi-funded) seminaries, which facilitate Jihadi recruitments by predominately teaching Arabic language, quranic and quotational interpretations and Shari'a laws.³⁵⁶ Mauritania is the last case before Iran to contemplate. After the World War II, the majority Sunni Mauritians along with the rest of French colonized nations were involved in independence movement, which by 1960 ended in an Islamic Republic.³⁵⁷

A simple comparison between these pioneering Islamic Republics reveals that none of them were evolved through social revolution-centered movement or a relatively sudden turnaround in structure and existing constitutional orders of an established nation-state authority, but throughout identitarian independence movements along with elitistic Islamization from above in already islamically cultivated mass contexts. To put it differently, in all three cases Islam (the Sunni branch) was applied as a common denominator so as to form a new united identified independent nation.

In contrast, the Islamic Republic of Iran was as a result of a traditional type of revolution in a Shi'i Muslim but not so fanatic religious context. In such traditional forms of revolution, predominantly, leadership plays a major role.

In this case, the leader was an ideologue and mobilizer that presented new regulations based on new interpretation of the Shari'a and the history of Islam. His document (Velayat-e Faqih)³⁵⁸ legitimized the right for the rule and absolute custodianship of the mullahs after God, prophets and the Shi'a Imams. In accordance with the absenteeism of the unerring Imam, the Jurist mullahs as his representatives and the only true commentators and guardians of the Shari'a, are exclusively entitled to inherit such an authority. This theory by itself clearly confined people to interfere in administration of society, public and political affairs, especially in macro issues. Khomeini, as a grand mullah, did not separate politics from religion and implemented his rule based on the so-called divine laws. In this way, in the conception of his founded system, while

³⁵⁵ The Editors of the National Assembly of Pakistan. "Parliamentary History".

<http://www.na.gov.pk/en/content.php?id=75> .

³⁵⁶ Tavernise. "Pakistan's Islamic Schools Fill Void, but Fuel Militancy".

https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/04/world/asia/04schools.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 .

Busch. "WikiLeaks: Saudi-Financed Madrassas More Widespread in Pakistan Than Thought".

https://fpif.org/wikileaks_saudifinanced_madrassas_more_widespread_in_pakistan_than_thought/ .

³⁵⁷ Toupet, Gerteiny, Stewart and Deschamps. "Mauritania". <https://www.britannica.com/place/Mauritania>

. Boyle and Sheen. Freedom of Religion and Belief: A World Report. 41.

³⁵⁸ Khomeini. Islamic Government (Hukumat-i Islami, Persian, 1970).

the laws of the state became required to be compatible with the laws of Shari'a, it gave promotion to the republican exclusivities. He at the end of his life, in order to consolidate his republic ordered a constitutional amendment, which eliminated the need for the leader to be a Marja' Taqlid.³⁵⁹

Historically, the innovativity of the Khomeini's revolutionary document was presented in a country where already had experienced the prevailation of the Shi'ite in its 16th and 17th centuries (via the dominant sword). Later on, there had been a major evolutionary shift in this branch, namely, a period of transition of knowledge in its Jurisprudence (Fiqh) and leading system, from Akhbari to Usuli, that made the mullahs financially independent from the state, brought them a hierarchical status with civil and institutional organization, thus a growing social role as a Marja' Taqlid.³⁶⁰ Essentially, the Khomeini's fundamental revolutionary alteration in Usuli Shi'a based on the Velayat-e Faqih doctrine was a supplement to the elaborated evolutionary changes.

From the viewpoint of the traditional mullahs, Velayat-e Faqih was merely the custodian of the Faqih over the religious institutions and schools, as well as unattended children and women, wards, insanes, and no longer alive people, but Khomeini advanced the term to the extent that it embraced the entire society,³⁶¹ for this reason the thesis statement of Khomeini was accepted predominantly by merely the immature mullahs.³⁶² Furthermore, based on this conception the successor of the absent Imam exclusively could be a person determined by Mahdi himself, not via self-appointment. In this relation, the Shi'i mullahs have always criticized the Sunni tradition due to the selection of the successor of the prophet Muhammad based on a council.³⁶³ Thus, this utopian terrestrial doctrine was not constructed based on the religious jurisprudence but rationally innovatively based on the political religious actuality so as to motivate a revolutionary movement. This turning point with a particular interpretation basically turned the Shi'i political thinking from an elitist esoteric passive sect into a mass mobilizing movement, and changed the conventional obedient followers of Shi'ite into militants against oppression. In this way, it

³⁵⁹ Said Amir Arjomand. "Constitution of the Islamic Republic". Originally published: 1992. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitution-of-the-islamic-republic#article-tags-overlay> . Iran's 1979 Constitution and its Amendment. <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000.html> .

³⁶⁰ Kohlberg. "Akbariya". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/akbariya> .

³⁶¹ Mohammadi. The Longevity of Clerical Business As Usual: A Socio-political History of Iranian Twelver Shi'i Clergy. 236-237.

³⁶² Abrahamian. Iran Between Two Revolutions. 475-477.

³⁶³ Shoup. Ethnic Groups of Africa and the Middle East: An Encyclopedia. 17.

illegitimated the political system and assigned the establishment of a new system as a religious task on a high ranked mullah.³⁶⁴

As is demonstrated, Khomeini by and large performed comparable to Gregory VII, a prominent fanatic pope of the history of medieval Church, who endeavored hard in the course of his bitterly conflict for the papal position, authority and therefore, erection of a strong Christian theocracy, although, the overall result of his revolution was absolutely different and led to a kind of separation of the sacred from the profane sphere, especially in the realm of the Church and the kingdom of the emperor. On the basis of his re-examinations of the principles of Christianity (Dictates Papae or 27 papal authoritatively dictated orders) the Roman Church (with its office of papacy) was considered as a foundation founded and conferred directly by the Lord, had never ever erred and would not in the future, is the sole and absolute authority for the Christianity³⁶⁵ in appointment, dismissal and trial of its priesthood, bishops and the pope as the entitled occupier of Apostolic Throne, princes shall kiss solely the feet of pope, the pope is only entitled to excommunicate and depose emperor from office, as well as exclusive control over all legislative power.³⁶⁶ Gregory unlike to his predecessors prescriptively and publicly proclaimed his Dictatus Papae as a turning point to call to take part in a contest of the imperial grandeur and by sanctification and canonization freed the Church from all secular authorities, granted it a hierarchical arrangement, thus strengthened and legitimized the divine papal supremacy and absolutism as an official self-designation "the Servant of the servants of God". He by claiming the custodian of the oppressed poor outcasts, enslaved, widowed and orphans tried to unite them and attract their supports. In this way all political-religious and imperial-papal authorities were crystalized under the canonical juridification of the theocratic absolutism, and therefore reflected the fact that there is no supreme power, authority and legitimacy to the further side of lawfulness and rule-of-law. Consequently, since his influential document of papal primacy highly pressured and challenged the necessary inner and outer-relations of eligibility of power for both the spiritual sovereign Church foundation and the secular sovereignty of emperor (Henry IV) the course of actions turned all to the loss of him.³⁶⁷ Henceforward, although, the attempts to expand the role of the papacy met not much success for Gregory, his concepts in 12th and 13th centuries resulted in papal monarchy. In fact, Gregory became interested in politics and represented his new canon law, when Henry's father died as the Holy Roman emperor and the

³⁶⁴ See Amir Arjomand. *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic revolution in Iran*.

³⁶⁵ Blumenthal. "St. Gregory VII, pope". <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Saint-Gregory-VII> .

³⁶⁶ Henderson. *Select Historical Documents of the Middle Ages*. 366-367.

³⁶⁷ Brunckhorst. *Critical theory of legal revolutions, evolutionary perspectives*. 126-127.

German monarchy was seriously weakened.³⁶⁸ To a similar degree Khomeini, in the 60's of his life, constituted his political aspirations and more specifically propounded his sort of manifest of these notions, not at the era of the secular anti-mullah first Pahlavi, but under the second Pahlavi (Mohammad Reza the son of Reza Shah), who had a respectful relationship with the mullahs and was not as strict as his father. In both cases, the great energy and enthusiasm in pursuit of virtuous force and religious conviction attracted the popular loyalty. For instance, Gregory confirmed celibacy for the Church's clergy, thus by restraining them from sexual intercourse donated a popular chaste appearance to the Church officials and simply resembled them to the holy spirit of Jesus Christ.³⁶⁹ Khomeini also by accepting the prefix Imam symbolized and spiritualized himself and his school to the Shi'ite Imams or the children of prophet Muhammad. Moreover, similar to Gregory who decades before becoming a pope initiated his self-articulated regulations,³⁷⁰ Khomeini presented his prescriptive theocratic theory of Velayat-e Faqih rule in his lectures years before his role in the 1979 revolution and public proclamation of the Islamic Republic.³⁷¹

With all these explanations, the legal and religious contradiction of Gregory's revolution more and less was reinvented in the Islamic revolution, in which the political power, the religious sphere and the new legal orders formed a juridified constitutional system enabling the dialectical reconciliation of opposites. This dialectical method, however, legitimized the distinctions between the sacred and profane,³⁷² in both cases. Finally, both doctrines have a commonality of being utopian based on the religious jurisprudence and at the same time rationally terrestrial based on the political religious actuality so as to motivate revolutionary movements, despite of their thousand-year distance.

In the last place, to review the Persian Constitutional Revolution and the constitutionalism theory, the Brunkhorst's argues over the history of the world revolutions (2014) are examined. Accordingly, we are able to trace an impressive process of social and institutional learning about inclusion of formerly socially, culturally, economically, and politically excluded groups and classes, which was simultaneously acquired at the cost of the exclusion for the others.³⁷³ Furthermore, a coupling of religion-law is recognizable in this trend, namely the meaning of democracy, legitimacy and state are impossible to understand without knowing their religious

³⁶⁸ Blumenthal. "St. Gregory VII, pope". <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Saint-Gregory-VII> .

³⁶⁹ Baker. Exodus from Rome: A Biblical and Historical Critique of Roman Catholicism. 156.

³⁷⁰ Blumenthal. "St. Gregory VII, pope". <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Saint-Gregory-VII> .

³⁷¹ Khomeini. Islamic Government (Hukumat-i Islami, Persian, 1970).

³⁷² Brunkhorst. Critical theory of legal revolutions, evolutionary perspectives. 128.

³⁷³ Brunkhorst. "Constitutionalism and democracy in the world society". 179.

origins.³⁷⁴ In the same vein, the coupling of Shari'a law and civilian law is evidently differentiable in particular in the first Persian constitution, inasmuch as its legitimacy was impossible to comprehend without knowing its religious provisions and prescriptions. In this respect, the quotation "our politics is our religiosity and our religiosity is our politics"³⁷⁵ was extensively applied by the mullahs to justify the homogeneity of their Shari'a law-based rule.

It was clearly explained, how a revolution always is a legal endeavor and there is always a struggle for rights and seeking change in the new legal formation of a society, thence in dualism of state and law, state is law and vice versa.³⁷⁶ In the Persia case, the constitutionalists tried to prevent from the foreign influence via parliament and legality, then, depicted to the monarch that his sovereignty and policies could not exist outside the law, thus confirmed the Brunkhorstian thesis statement, there is no sovereignty beyond constitutionality and legality.³⁷⁷

³⁷⁴ Brunkhorst. Critical theory of legal revolutions, evolutionary perspectives. 238-239, 369.

³⁷⁵ This sentence is quoted from Hassan Modarres (1870-1937), an influential mullah and member of the parliament. Roy P. Mottahedeh. *The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran*. New York: Simon & Schuster. 1985. p. 224.

³⁷⁶ Brunkhorst. Critical theory of legal revolutions, evolutionary perspectives. 348

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 127.

6. Method

With the intention of providing measured comparable explanations for the Iranian contemporary religious, legal and political changes, this investigation is aimed to be utilized by the comparative historical research method, which has been initiatively applied since the works of those who often regarded as the first social scientists and in particular the originators of the academic discipline of sociology to the modern sense of the research methodology.

This applicable method aids the study to trace the outcomes of sociological phenomenon of social movement, throughout examining historical specific individual events, important turning points and processes.

By means of this kind of appraisal, the examination of a limited number of cases (macro social units) or a "small-n design" (three social movements) facilitates the identification of the similarities and differences (in this research the most similar patterns, notwithstanding their differences).

As far as the methodological procedures are concerned, this method will equip the research by some techniques and strategies in order to applicably compare and analyze. Accordingly, three different strategies of causal assessment will be practiced, narrative appraisal based on conjunctions of unique events inside the historical contexts and across times, nominal comparison, based on John Stuart Mill's System of Logic (1843), the methods of agreement and difference³⁷⁸ or the Boolean algebra, and ordinal comparison, stood on the Fuzzy logic³⁷⁹ or fuzzification of the input values.³⁸⁰

A careful attention to these strategies, demonstrates the strengths and limitations of them. The narrative report is one of the most comprehensive detailed strategy of the causal appraisals with a type of high scrutiny within a single case. The product of this analytical technique that explores the causes of a particular social phenomenon will be a causal narrative model with a relatively huge number of explanatory causes and factors. The factors progress from the opening contributing ones to the final stage or the end of the narrative.

³⁷⁸ John Stuart Mill. *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation*, Vol. 1. London: Harrison and Co. 1843. Pp. 450-454.

³⁷⁹ See L.A. Zadeh. "Fuzzy sets". *Information and Control*, 8: 3. Pp. 338-353. 1965.

³⁸⁰ See James Mahoney. "Nominal, ordinal, and narrative appraisal in macro causal analysis". *American journal of sociology*, 104: 4. Pp. 1154-1196 (especially 1157-1168). January 1999.

The meaning of causal relationships in a narrative analysis can be elaborated as follows: a specific incident facilitates the circumstances towards one or more new events.³⁸¹

To manage with the untestability of large numbers of explanatory variables of a causal narrative claim, the nominal comparison is presented as a strategy for causal evaluation. This strategy is set on the agreement and difference techniques that are brightly presentable via the Boolean logic. Accordingly, a nominal set of data or table is contained by the non-parametric variables, and is able to depict the causal factors in similar process for the researched cases. Logically, the values in this technique and type of comparison are set based on the mathematical but non-statistical Boolean algebra, a special algebraic structure that denotes to variables in conjunction, True (Yes or 1) and in disjunction, False (No or 0), in contrast to the predictable algebra that converts the values into the operations-based numbers (founded on elementary arithmetic: addition, subtraction, division and multiplication).³⁸²

The application of the Boolean logic can be simply defined as: $X \vee Y$.³⁸³

The last strategy to employ is the ordinal comparison. Although, the emphasis of this technique is also on the notion of causality, and its table is contained by the non-parametric variables, its data is set ordered. This type of ranking or scaling of the causes and factors provide good information about the order of values, and creates the ability to quantify the difference between each case, however, by non-standardized values between the scores.

This strategy is fully understandable through Fuzzy logic. Literally, fuzziness by the sense of inaccuracy and imprecision introduces a different calculative approach. Accordingly, multi-valued Fuzzy logic-based data sets as mathematical resources are capable to deal with the partial imprecise and non-numerical information and evidence, where the values of variables for cases are rangeable, scoreable and representable between totally correct and entirely incorrect,³⁸⁵ similar to an ordinary check for customer satisfaction.

This logic goes beyond the Boolean logic of purely fixative between true or false values, as it floats an unlimited space between scores.

³⁸¹ See James Mahoney. "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology". *Theory and Society*, Vol. 29: 4. Pp. 507-548. August 2000.

³⁸² J. Donald Monk. "The Mathematics of Boolean Algebra". *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Online Edition. Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 2018. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/boolalg-math/> . The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Boolean algebra". *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Online edition. October 20, 2011. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Boolean-algebra> .

³⁸³ "v" in mathematical language means "Or".

³⁸⁴ The Editors of *Encyclopedia of Mathematics*. "Boolean algebra". *Encyclopedia of Mathematics*. Online Edition. https://www.encyclopediaofmath.org/index.php/Boolean_algebra .

³⁸⁵ Petr Cintula, Christian G. Fermüller and Carles Noguera. "Fuzzy Logic". *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Online Edition. Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 2017. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-fuzzy/> .

Subsequently, in nominal comparison, the Fuzzification is mainly a mathematical logic to verify the asymmetrical relationships with significant variances (of causal factors), not to examine the symmetrical relationships with statistical functions. Thus, a Fuzzy set of data merely permits our research to estimate the degree to which a variable is influential over the formation of the social movements and their consequences.

The Fuzzy logic in use can be well-defined as: $1 = X \wedge Y > 1$.³⁸⁶

In consequence of the essence of the comparative assessment, the major way of collecting data will be secondary resources (including archival media articles, letters, works of historians, among others) in each case, despite the fact that such finding set of data could be controversial on account of the essential incompleteness and partiality of the past various factors, accounts and narrations, the complication of the social phenomena such as social movements, besides the extent and level of the social units, here, a big country in three different time periods. To avoid and even overcome such methodological limitations, defenselessnesses and vulnerabilities, each historical event and factor should not be considered distinct from the other contextual processes over time (e.g., via process tracking).³⁸⁸

Method: Comparative Historical Research

Approach: Qualitative

Technique of Collecting Data: Secondary Resources

Strategies of Causal Assessment: Narrative Appraisal, Nominal and Ordinal Comparisons

Case (a particular historical event) and Unit of Analysis (a major entity to analyze): Social Movement

Level of Analysis (location, size and scale of research target): Iran in 120 years

³⁸⁶ “ \wedge ” in mathematical language represents “And”.

³⁸⁷ The Editors of Encyclopedia of Mathematics. “Non-precise data”. Encyclopedia of Mathematics. Online Edition. 2014. https://www.encyclopediaofmath.org/index.php/Non-precise_data . The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. “Fuzzy logic”. Encyclopædia Britannica. Online edition. March 13, 2019. <https://www.britannica.com/science/fuzzy-logic> .

³⁸⁸ See James Mahoney. “The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences”. Sociological Methods and Research, 41: 4. Pp. 566-590. November 2012., and also, James Mahoney. “Mechanisms, Bayesianism, and Process Tracing”. New Political Economy, 21. Pp. 493-499. 2016.

Chapter II. The contemporary Iranian Social Movements

Recognizing and tracing the socio-historical grounds and variables of legal, religious and political transformations via scrutinizing over the various elements and vital subsystems of the society

7. An explanation to the Constitutional Movement 1905-1911
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 - 9.1. The crisis of participation, the reformation of revolution
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 - 9.6. A green light to the rogue forces for bloodshed
 - 9.7. The severe measures and an ignominy in Kahrizak
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 - 9.9. The Arab Spring and the house arrest put an end to this movement
 - 9.10. The role of both self-radicalized and organized arbitrary militias
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 - 9.12. Consideration
 - 9.13. Revival of the networked movements, a feminist movement and its significances

7. An explanation to the Constitutional Movement 1905-1911

7.1. *Persia in relation to the international sphere*

The socio-historical changes of Safavid dynasty were really important to the contemporary Iranian history, because since then, the Persian political religious atmosphere changed to a great extent. It brought Persia an official religion (with specific emphasis on Shi'ite), a relative economic stability, a relative concentrated political power, and a serious role in the international sphere. Such role was as a result of a grave confrontation with Ottoman Caliphate and an occasional companionship with the Western powers, particularly against Ottoman. Nonetheless, when all is considered, this dynasty had absolutely different levels of weakness-strength, a spectrum from thorough instability to perfect stability, from absolute power and authority to complete collapse and ultimate distinction.

As a result of this first Persian Shi'i dynasty, the social group of mullahs at this interval acquired enough credit and influence in the Persian society. By the justification of the Shi'i theoretic approach for the coexistence of religion and government, the Shahs of Safavid claimed the protection of Shi'ite and implicitly positioned the country against the Sunnite of Ottoman Empire. Safavid in the light of such authority, sanctified legitimacy and acceptability successfully controlled the Persian social forces and classes such as peasant, urban and in particular the nomadic tribes (which formed almost fifty percent of the Persian population).³⁸⁹ The dominion over tribal forces was really significant, because, since 10th to 20th centuries every important Persian dynasty had nomadic background. Such social structure that economically was based on commodity to commodity exchange (among tribespeople, rural and urban) was gradually challenged throughout interaction with the Western imperialism and the Russian imperial empire (1721-1917)³⁹⁰. The imperialistic demands and requirements for raw materials increased to the extent that brought plenty instability to the country. On the other side, the industrial changes of the Western countries and exporting low price competitive products had devastating influences on the Persian economic markets.³⁹¹

The 1905 social movement was a national liberating attempt to revolt against such circumstances, in legal and constitutional framework. This movement aimed to confine the Shah's unlimited power, restrict arbitrary policies and to stop different commercial concessions

³⁸⁹ John Foran. *Fragile Resistance: Social Transformation in Iran from 1500 to the Revolution*. Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press. 1993. Pp. 43-50, 60.

³⁹⁰ Geoffrey Swain. *Trotsky and the Russian Revolution*. London, New York: Routledge. 2014. p. XV.

³⁹¹ Keddie. *Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran*. 22-23.

or colonial privileges to the external-powers, mainly two imperialistic dominions of the time, Tsarist Russia and Great Britain, that surrounded the north and south of Persia.³⁹²

From a historical analysis, this movement and its revolution could also be contemplated as one in the series of bourgeois revolutions of the 19th century. The commercial bourgeoisie infant of this revolution was roughly died in the northern parts of Iran. As with the onset of the rise of imperialism, in the opposite direction, it coincided with the beginning of the proletarian revolutions and the era of the Leninistic evolution of Marxism. Although, its demands did not go beyond the frivolous requests of a newly emerging commercial bourgeoisie, it faced from its very beginning, with the brutal hostility of Great Britain, from the south, and the militarist state of the Tsarist Russia from the north.

The great fire of revolution mostly gave off flames in the open fireplace of the Persian northern parts, adjacent to Tsarist Russia. Accordingly, the provinces of Tehran, Azerbaijan, Gilan and Mazandaran formed the main centers of the revolutionary movement and organized the main battleground during the constitutional endeavors. Whereas, the southern regions, an area virtually under British domination was in relative tranquility. Apparently, the Great Britain, ruled by an advanced bourgeois state was not supposed to be against the establishment of a constitutional system. Nevertheless, this super-power with its colonies spread throughout the East and Africa (particularly the subcontinent of India, with a large population) genuinely was opposed to any development of a revolutionary movement in the region, that could influence the masses and stir them up against the British sovereignty. As a result, it was inevitable to Britain to bilaterally play in the region, one policy over the whole of the northern half of Persia, and another in the south.³⁹³ To put it another way, as to Britain, the compromise with a genuine revolutionary movement in Persia sounded unavoidable, it took a two-way approach to the revolutionary movement in 1905. Accordingly, the British embassy called for constitutionalism, which was not neglected by many historians, including the British Professor, Edward Brown, the author of the History of the Iranian Revolution (1910), to prove the goodwill of Britain and finally to exonerate of it from the responsibility for repressing the revolution.³⁹⁴

In any case, the Persian constitutional movement (1905-1911) was a set of efforts and events that led to the signing of the constitutional order by Mozaffar ad-Din Shah Qajar on August 5th,

³⁹² Hakimian. "Economy viii. In The Qajar Period". <https://iranicaonline.org/articles/economy-viii-in-the-qajar-period> .

³⁹³ Hereupon, it is about long time that Great Britain settled its bases on the southern and northern shores of the Persian Gulf.

³⁹⁴ Mansour Bonakdarian. "Great Britain iv. British influence in Persia, 1900-21". Originally published: 2002. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/great-britain-iv> .

1906, continued until the Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar period to convert the authoritarian rule to constitutional government, finally ended in the formation of a National Assembly and adoption of the first constitution of Persia or in one title “the Birth of a Constitution in Iran”.

On the social movement side, freedom and equality which were carved on the flag of the revolution became barriers when it came to power, as the movement was already supported by some reactionary social forces like mullahs.

At the time of the Qajar, Persia was very weak, and its position in the world was paled, and on the other side the world had been transformed.³⁹⁵ Since the beginning of the kingdom of Naser al-Din Shah Qajar, the popular dissatisfaction increased and affiliated with the oppression of the government. The establishment of the Academy (Dar ul-Funun 1851) and the gradual acquaintance of the Iranians with global changes had driven the idea of change and the need for the rule of law and the end of a tyrannical regime. The writings of intellectuals prepared the constitutional context. Furthermore, the speeches of some intellectuals introduced and promoted the thoughts of freedom and constitutionalism to the masses of the ordinary and religious people from diverse groups and classes. Publications such as Hable Almatin³⁹⁶ and later Mullah Nasraddin³⁹⁷ also played role in awakening public sphere spreading the thought of liberty, opposition against tyranny and petrification of the influential group of mullahs.

³⁹⁵ Abbas Amanat. “Constitutional Revolution i. Intellectual background”. Originally published: 1992. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982.

<http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-i> .

³⁹⁶ It was published in Kolkata (India) 1893, and then in Tehran 1907. Hable Almatin means a rigid rope that refers to Surah Ali’Imran or The Family of Imran, verse 103, (“And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided. And remember the favor of Allah upon you - when you were enemies and He brought your hearts together and you became, by His favor, brothers. And you were on the edge of a pit of the Fire, and He saved you from it. Thus, does Allah make clear to you His verses that you may be guided”). A sample text: people who have discovered the extraordinary natural intelligence and a six-thousand-year-old Iranian intelligence and discovered the mysterious existence of others, then it is not possible for mullahs to deceive them by their magic. Secondly, they are captive of despotism ... this is a form of tyranny with cruelty and oppression. Furthermore, it is well known that, in a way, there is a religious trend that would destroy the Shari’a of the foundation of Islam and promote the religious oppression. Hable Almatian. Magazine. The first year, No. 48. Kolkata (India). 1893. p. 1.

³⁹⁷ This magazine was edited in Turkish and occasionally in Russian language. It was originally published in Tbilisi (Georgia) 1906-1917, then continued in Tabriz (Iran) 1921, and Baku (Azerbaijan) 1922-1931. The name chosen for this magazine is a legendary humorous character that is known in literature and folklore of the most Middle Eastern countries as seemingly simple-minded mullah with special vision and intuition. Based on its content, it was not safe to humiliate the Mullahs and also defend women’s rights, as a result Iranian Mullahs issued a fatwa (an issued legal opinion by a high ranked mullah) for the excommunication and murder of its editor.

Afterwards, the political factor of the assassination of Nasir al-Din Shah, known as the shadow of God, the pivot of the universe, the refuge of Islam and finally the shield of the Islamic Shari'a³⁹⁸ led to greater efforts in the constitutional rounds.³⁹⁹

7.2. *A triangular alliance (merchants, mullahs and intellectuals) for a protest movement*

The Persian constitutional movement occurred in Qajar period, an era of serious engagement of the country with the modern powers, confrontations, failures and imposed shattering treaties. These circumstances on the one hand magnified the necessity of awareness and importance of modern technology, on the other hand provoked the mutual contrast of science and religion, and led to many cultural, economic, social and political changes.

The narration was that in 1905 protests already occurred against the cruel monarchy, but the movement was triggered by the increasing price of sugar in Tehran. In December 1905, some merchants including two Sayyids⁴⁰⁰ were punished for overpricing. They were bastinadoed⁴⁰¹ in public. An uprising of the merchant group in Tehran happened, afterwards, they went on strike and closed the bazaar (traditional market). Bazaars in the contemporary Iranian towns have been located in the old central quarters in the company of mosques, with economic, religious and even political functions, as the financial base for the Shi'i institutions.⁴⁰² Therefore mullahs supported the uprising not only due to their already formed alliance between 1890 and 1892

³⁹⁸ Amanat. Pivot of the universe: Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy, 1831-1896. 10.

³⁹⁹ Amanat. "Constitutional Revolution i. Intellectual background".

<http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-i> .

⁴⁰⁰ Sayyid (master or lord) is an Arabic honorific title of respect, sometimes restricted, to the Banu Hashim, members of the Islamic prophet Muhammad's clan, in particular, the descendants of through his grandsons, Hasan ibn Ali (625-670 AD) and Husayn ibn Ali (626-680 AD), sons of Muhammad's daughter Fatimah (605 or 615-632 AD) and Ali ibn Abi Taleb (600-661 AD). In Iran, the Sayyid people are highly privileged and sacredly popularly trusted by ordinary average people, indeed the government. The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Sayyid". Encyclopædia Britannica. Online edition. November 10, 2014. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/sayyid> .

⁴⁰¹ A very humiliating and truly painful punishment where the soles of one's feet are caned normally in public.

⁴⁰² Ahmad Ashraf. "BAZAR iii. Socioeconomic and Political Role". Originally published: 1989. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/bazar-iii> .

over Tobacco movement,⁴⁰³ but in addition, due to the fact that the bazaar was their traditional sponsor. These two protesting groups accompanied with a small fraction of radical intellectual reformers (mostly graduated students from abroad) sought sanctuary in a holy shrine near Tehran, soliciting mainly the dismissal of the Belgian Monsieur Joseph Naus⁴⁰⁴ and the prime minister, besides the establishment of a House of Justice among other demands. The Shah promised to dismiss the prime minister and establish the court system, thus ordered to respectfully accompany the sanctuary's people (particularly the mullahs) back to Tehran. As soon as the Shah did not keep his promises, it created an even larger program which sought refuge in a holier shrine, outside Tehran. This time the Grand Ayatollahs (high ranked mullahs) threatened to leave the country to the holy shrines in Iraq. Some merchants and a lot of people

⁴⁰³ The Tobacco Protest in Persia was a mullahs and merchants-led rebellion in opposition to a Shah's concession (1890) to Great Britain. It was triggered by bazaar-men and mullahs in Tehran, and got culminated in an exciting impressive event via a strong religious Shi'i fatwa of 1891 by Grand Ayatollah Mirza Hassan Shirazi (1814-1896) against tobacco application. Mansoor Moaddel. "Shi'i Political Discourse and Class Mobilization in the Tobacco Movement of 1890-1892" *Sociological Forum*, Vol. 7, No. 3. September 1992. p. 455. Nikki R. Keddie. *Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891-92*. London: Frank Cass. 1966. Pp. 3, 5.

⁴⁰⁴ At the time of Mozaffar al-Din Shah Qajar, he came to the Ministry of Customs of Iran (Besides the head of Iran's Department of Treasury, Iran's postal services, Iran's Immigration Services and member of National Security Council) and became one of the influential figures in the beginning of the Iranian constitutional movement. The story was that on March 15th, 1898, three Belgian experts were assigned mission to Iran so as to carry out customs affairs, Naus was the head of them. At the beginning he worked under the supervision of the Chancellor. A year later, when the king with his Chancellor travelled abroad, in their absence, Naus positioned at the Ministry of Customs. He changed the customs duties in Iran and managed the affairs in the European way. His management as the Director General of the Customs within a short time (about one year) had very promising results and customs revenue increased by more than 35% (factually he earned customs revenue from £ 200,000 to £ 600,000 in a year). Hence, he did a set of custom, trades, and tariff reforms, which prioritized foreigners over Iranians. He was able to implement a taxation system in both transit duties for passage through the interior of the country and the compulsory levy on all commodities. As a result of this compulsory contribution or successful raising funds to the state revenue or the court of Mozaffar al-Din Shah, the Persian customs revenues rose in early 1904. Thereafter, more Belgian advisers arrived in Iran. In spite of the support of the king, Naus had always problem with the lords and landlords. Furthermore, as people and mullahs saw the tariffs at a loss, could not stand the existence of a foreigner. The Belgians in response discriminated against an Iranian and a foreigner and even a Christian Iranian and a Muslim Iranian. These issues made Naus disgusted. The merchants who also had problem with him, on the pretext of his liquor offer to a mullah in front of a liquor store closed the market for two days. Finally, a photo of Naus, dressing in mullah's dress and turban at a Masquerade ball was distributed among the people. Mullah Sayyid Abdollah Behbahani reacted and affiliated this incident to insulting to Islam and called for the dismissal of Naus and Eyn-ed-Dowleh (1845-1927) the Prime Minister. Merchants took sanctuary in Shah-Abdol-Azim shrine and Mohammad Ali Mirza, the crown prince, temporarily convinced Behbahani that Naus would be dismissed. Meanwhile, this event and several other events brought mullah Sayyid Mohammad Tabatabai closer to Behbahani, this alliance sparked the constitutional revolution. In the end, with the pressure of constitutionalists and United Kingdom monarchy Naus was dismissed from Iran following the constitutional revolution and the coming of the National Assembly. Kasravi. *History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution*. 29, 31. Annette Destrée. "Belgian-Iranian Relations". Originally published: 1989. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/belgian-iranian-relations> .

from dissimilar groups and classes also sat at the British Embassy to support the sanctuary's people and mullahs. At the beginning of the movement, the main issue was focused on the House of Justice, but in the following with the rise of the movement, gradually, the issue of parliament and the limitation of power of the Shah were also raised. The participated different groups of the revolutionary movement shared the goal of ending royal corruption and stopping the dominance of the foreign powers. They argued the role of the Shah as always as the consolidator of Qajar and its corrupted wealthy aristocrats at the expense of surrendering the country's resources to the external-powers. For instance, the tax advantages on import-export were arranged to an external-power, which was at the loss of the Persian merchants. Mozaffar ad-Din Shah was highly dependent on external financial aid and by selling off the assets of country tried to repay them, thus was unable to advance the country's economy. Nonetheless, he at last ceased to resist against the demonstrators and at least complied to order the establishment of a house of justice (10th January 1906). As a result of this achievement, some protesters who took sanctuary in the sacred places or holy shrines returned in triumph and the royal carriages were greeted by a delighted crowd.⁴⁰⁵

7.3. *The creation of a constitutional moment*

As the Shah did not keep his promises and as the previously addressed demands were not the case anymore, ones again, in the summer of 1906 approximately 14,000 men from unlike groups and classes camped out in the gardens of the British Embassy. At this juncture, for the first time, the term of constitution was addressed. Many gave speeches, many more listened, where could be called as an open-air school of political science for studying constitutionalism.⁴⁰⁶ From constitutional theoretical point of view, such space and discourse potentially is able to create "constitutional moments".⁴⁰⁷ In our case, in such moment, the demand for parliament and constitution to limit the power of the Shah was born. Therefore, the Shah inevitably agreed the establishment of such parliament and constitution. The first parliamentary election was held with an overwhelming majority from Tehran for the merchant class. Later, the fundamental laws organized the electoral system, besides the internal frameworks of the parliament and the

⁴⁰⁵ Sandra Mackey. *The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation*. New York: Dutton. 1996. Pp. 150-155. Vanessa Martin. "Constitutional Revolution ii. Events". Originally published: 1992. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-ii> .

⁴⁰⁶ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 84.

⁴⁰⁷ A concept introduced by the American constitutional lawyer Bruce Ackerman (1943-). See Bruce Ackerman. *We the People*, Vol. 1, Foundations. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press. 1991.

senate. Theoretically, the Shah was placed from then on under the rule of the constitution, and the crown became a divine gift given to him, albeit this time by the people. On the other side, the fundamental law gave the elected legislature a final approval right over all loans, concessions, and budget plans. This first constitution of Iran was defined as a legal entity, a supreme document and guide for other laws. It also well-defined for the political principles, structure, hierarchy and the limits of monarchy and guaranteed the rights of people. Hence, no law could be inconsistent with the constitution. It divided into five chapters with many articles that developed over several years.⁴⁰⁸ The Belgian and other European constitutions served as a partial model for it. In any rate, despite all its inhibiting mechanisms, with the insistence of the pro-monarchy mullahs, a constitution that emphasized on a strict separation of powers into legislative, judicial, and executive functions finally was undermined by the Islamic Shari'a laws. Accordingly, the supplemented Art. 2⁴⁰⁹ determined a committee of mullahs as experts in Islamic jurisprudence to evaluate and reject legislation at variance with the Islamic prospectus.⁴¹⁰ Consequently, in spite of the elaborated extensive hard-fought struggles for Persian sovereignty and independence from the domination of super-powers, in 1907 the British and Russian forces split Persia into three parts, the north for Russia, the south for Britain and the center remained intact and neutral. Nonetheless, Russia that was not satisfied with this amount, in 1911, occupied Tehran. In this way, in a period of time that the Persians realized the constitutionalism via rebellions, lost their independency under the control of external-super-powers.⁴¹¹

7.4. *From a sword-based Shi'iteization to a knowledge-centered evolution*

Historereligiously, behind the scene, it is a matter of fact that the constitutional revolution in Persia was also in direct connection to a series of events of political recognition in the Shi'ite school. As I already explained, the process of Shi'a power building in Iran started since the formation of the

⁴⁰⁸ Iran's 1906 Constitution and Its Supplement. <http://fis-iran.org/en/resources/legaldoc/iranconstitution> .

⁴⁰⁹ Article 1 and 2 of the supplementary fundamental laws of 1907, established Islam as the official religion of Persia, and specified that all laws of the nation must be approved by a committee of Shi'a clerics. Later, these two articles were mainly ignored by the Pahlavis, which sometimes resulted in anger and uprising of clerics and religious masses. Ibid., <http://fis-iran.org/en/resources/legaldoc/iranconstitution> .

⁴¹⁰ Ann Katharine Swynford Lambton. "Mahkama: Iran". in *Judicial Practice: Institutions and Agents in the Islamic World*. Bogac A. Ergene (ed.). Boston: Brill. 2009. Pp. 91, 111-112.

⁴¹¹ W. Morgan Shuster. *The Strangling of Persia*. London: T. Fisher Unwin. 1912. Pp. 48, 119, 179. Also, see Tilmann J. Röder. "The Separation of Powers: Historical and Comparative Perspectives". in Rainer Grote and Tilmann J. Röder, *Constitutionalism in Islamic Countries: Between Upheaval and Continuity*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. Pp. 321-372. 2012.

Safavid dynasty, namely when the Shi'ite in Iran was in minority, but was concentrated only in Iraq, Bahrain and southern Lebanon. The political project of the Safavid dynasty forced the majority of Persians to convert into Shi'ite. Then the leaders of the dynasty officially approved the Shi'a as the major religion instead of the dominant Sunni tradition. This sword-based Shi'iteization (16th and 17th centuries) led to a dramatic profound change and the admission of the Shi'a principles, values, norms, rituals, mythology and totally its truly symbolic system.⁴¹² The Safavid elders introduced themselves as Sadat (Sayyids) and the descendants of the prophet Muhammad, and in this way, made themselves religiously legitimate, and in order to consolidate the bases of their power, brought some Shi'i clerics mostly from Lebanon and Bahrain to Iran.⁴¹³ This type of clergy or mullah was subordinate to the government, affirmed its power and was never an independent group in that era of the Persian history. By the Qajar kings, who were not enjoyed by a genuine religious legitimacy, and constantly subjected the country to the aggression of external-powers, the relationship of the mullahs with the government was deteriorated. This deterioration coincided with the Shi'a transition from Akhbari to Usuli that introduced a new generation of mullah or representative of the Imam (the 12th Imam of Shi'a)⁴¹⁴ based on Usuli principles. This unprecedented version of mullahs attained an organizational hierarchical status, received religious funds from followers, achieved the

⁴¹² Actually, a main component of the Shi'i Islam is its rituals. These rituals as the main active ingredient in the process of Iranian cultural reproduction have evolved in response to the changing circumstances. Without a doubt, these rituals strengthen the myths which provide the key resource so as to create excitement, in particular for the social movements. Furthermore, the mentioned rituals prepare a face to face communicative atmosphere in order to express propaganda by the mullahs. Therefore, contrary to the trend of decline in rituals as the medium of communication due to the growth of rational discourses, in Shi'ite the ritual practices have achieved a continuing importance, in that they help to effectively unify the Shi'as and define alternative realities that are outside the totalizing world views.

⁴¹³ Francis Robinson and Ira M. Lapidus. *The Cambridge Illustrated History of the Islamic World*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 1996. p. 72. Steven R. Ward. *Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces*. Washington DC: Georgetown Univ. Press. 2009. p. 44. See also Roger Savory. *Iran Under the Safavids*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 1980.

⁴¹⁴ The timeline (based on AD) of leading or Imamate of Shi'a Imams in the sight of Shi'ite Twelver (the largest branch in Shi'ism): 632_661_670_680_712_732_765_799_817_835_868_874_____ so far. The 1st Imam, Ali from 632 to 661AD (29 years). The 2nd Imam, Hasan from 661 to 670AD (9 years). The 3rd Imam, Husayn from 670 to 680AD (10 years). The 4th Imam, Ali al-Sajjad or Zayn al-Abidin from 680 to 712AD (32 years). The 5th Imam, Muhammad al-Baqir from 712 to 732AD (20 years). The 6th Imam, Ja'far al-Sadiq from 732 to 765AD (33 years). The 7th Imam, Musa al-Kadhim from 765 to 799AD (34 years). The 8th Imam, Ali al-Ridha from 799 to 817AD (18 years). The 9th Imam, Muhammad al-Jawad from 817 to 835AD (18 years). The 10th Imam, Ali al-Hadi from 835 to 868AD (33 years). The 11th Imam, Hasan Askari from 867 to 874AD (7 years). The 12th Imam, Mahdi from 874AD to present time (more than 11 centuries). A grand mullah can introduce himself as the representative of the so-called alive and well 12th Imam, based on Usuli principles and also claims his authority, according to absolute Velayat-e Faqih theory or the guardianship of the Islamic Jurist in the period of occultation which gives the very grand mullah the custodianship over people or the Islamic Ummah. The Editors of Encyclopaedia Iranica. "Imams in Twelver Shi'a Islam". Originally published: 2015. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/imams-shiism-crossref> .

trusteeship of the sacred places or holy shrines, and was therefore economically independent, besides enjoying a growing social role in the Shi'i society. The realized evolution of knowledge in the leading and Jurisprudence (Fiqh) of Shi'a was in fact the transition from the really simple perspective to an updated sophisticated conception in the way of understanding towards the religious subject matters, Islamic social law and the general requirements in connection to the modern world phenomena.⁴¹⁵

As the mullahs' system came out of alignment and entered a hierarchical arrangement, the principle of following a source of imitation and emulation or religious reference (Marja' Taqlid) became worth noting. This principle literally provided a high-ranked mullah by the label of "grand sign of God" (Ayatollah al-Uthma)⁴¹⁶ with the authority to make legal or even socio-political decisions within the confines of Islamic law for followers and less credentialed mullahs.

With any interpretation of Shi'ism and at every historical point of view, the most important feature and subject in it is the principle of leadership or Imamate and Imam's discovery. In that, in Shi'a, the position of Imamate not only includes the judicial, executive and even military roles of the successor of the authority of prophet Muhammad, but also it is the crystallization of the spiritual dimension of his prophet mission. Therefore, regarding to this logic, since the legitimacy of the authority of the prophet Muhammad lays on Imam, he is the only legitimate leader of the entire Muslim community (Ummah). The principle of absenteeism will rise as the next importance in Shi'a, wherever the Imam or the successor to the prophet is absent. Accordingly, any power on the earth is illegitimate, unless it proves that it is able to exercise the authority of the absent Imam (the 12th one, Mahdi) on behalf of him. While the Akhbari, at the time of the absence of Imam did not allow any mullah to issue fatwa, the Usuli believes that there are certain rules and sources of law that a qualified mullah can infer from. Hereon, in the time of absence, the Usuli divided the people into two groups of the sources of imitation and the followers, thus, it granted the mullahs a potential transnational leadership position in various issues of the social life of the Ummah.⁴¹⁷

⁴¹⁵ Lawson. "Exegesis vi. In Akbari and Post-Safavid Esoteric Shi'ism".

<http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/exegesis-iv> .

Kohlberg. "Akbariya". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/akbariya> .

⁴¹⁶ After the Quran and the prophets and Imams, maraji are the highest authority on religious laws in Usuli Shia Islam.

⁴¹⁷ Lawson. "Exegesis vi. In Akbari and Post-Safavid Esoteric Shi'ism".

<http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/exegesis-iv> .

Kohlberg. "Akbariya". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/akbariya> .

In the course of the Persian constitutional movement, this Usuli mullah played an unprecedented role. Insofar as Ahmad Kasravi (1890-1946)⁴¹⁸ in his precise account of the history of the Iranian constitutional revolution⁴¹⁹ writes “If we turn to the truth, then the mullahs of Najaf and particularly the two Sayyids⁴²⁰ and other mullahs who insisted on constitutionalism did not know the true meaning of the constitutionalism and the result of spreading of European way of laws, fundamentally, they were not familiar to the essential paradox of the constitutional principles and the Shi’ite creed. They witnessed on the one hand, Iran’s dismay and the government’s inabilities, and on the other hand, did not realize any way for it other than constitutionalism as well as parliamentarism. As a result, they were pushing for a strong support of constitutional movement, however, they could not ignore their Shi’ite compounds. Inevitably, they were trapped by these two affiliations.”⁴²¹

Some modernist mullahs even sought to attribute, adapt and explain constitutional ideas with Islamic thought. Muhammad Hossein Naini (1860-1936) poses in “the punishment of ummah and the reformation of nation” (1909)⁴²² that freedom and equality in a constitutional state are already considered as the main goals of the prophet Muhammad. He divided a tyranny into political and religious, and linked both to each other in order to keep one another. At the same time, he considers the legitimacy of the government, during the absence of the 12th Imam, subject to the constitution, the formation of a National Assembly and the supervision of mullahs on its ratified laws. By formulating his point of view and in response to opponents of constitutionalism, he stated that Shari’a is divided into two categories, laws, based on the Quran

⁴¹⁸ Ahmad Kasravi was a notable Iranian linguist, historian, lawyer and reformist. He was assassinated by “Fada’iyan-e Islam”, which was the first underground modern pioneer Shi’ite Islamist terrorist group in Iran, formed in the 1946 under the leadership of a young mullah Sayyid Navvab Safavi (1924-1955) with the goal of establishing an Islamic state. Farhad Kazemi. “Fedaian-e Eslam”. Originally published: 1999. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/fedaian-e-esla> .

⁴¹⁹ Ahmad Kasravi. The History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (Tarikh-e Mashruteh-ye Iran in Persian) was originally written in 1940. Tehran: Amir Kabir Publication. 1961.

⁴²⁰ Sayyid Mohammad Tabatabai (1842-1920) and Sayyid Abdollah Behbahani (1840-1910) the mullah theologian leaders of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution who played an important role. Hamid Algar. “Abdallah Behbahani”. Originally published: 1982. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/abdallah-behbahani> .

⁴²¹ Kasravi. History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 287.

⁴²² Muhammad Hussein Naini. The punishment of Ummah and the reformation of nation (Tanbih al-Ummah wa Tanzih Al-Milla) was originally written in Persian and translated into Arabic. Baghdad: Institute of Strategic Studies. 1909. This interesting book is contained by five chapters, Chapter One: The principle of religious and rational governance is constitutional, Non-authoritarian and confined government or rational and religious rule, Consultation on the basis of religious and rational governance, Muawiyah I (602-680) the founder of tyranny in Islam, Shi’ite infallibility and Sunni allegiance to Islam’s limitations, Chapter Two: Evidence to restrict monarchy, Chapter Three: The Need for Constitutionalist Formation, Chapter Four: Conflicts of the Constitutionalist, Chapter Five: Terms and Responsibilities of MPs.

that are not negotiable and other known principles of Islam which are changeable, temporal and spatial.⁴²³

Contrary to the constitutional expectations, some anti-constitution mullahs, similar to Sheikh Fazlollah Noori explicitly specified the conditionality of freedom in the central religious text of Islam, Quran, and emphasized that the construction of the Quran is basically against the freedom of writing and expression. He expressed that freedom is absolutely false, and even this word in Islam is completely blasphemous and scandalous contemplated.⁴²⁴ Factually, he for the first time clearly indicated the profound contradiction between the Islamic reactionary beliefs and the democratic potentials of constitutionalism.

7.5. A constitutional legislative birth just before a monarchical death

Despite all these barriers, shrinkings and justifications, finally, as is already briefly mentioned, the monarch Mozaffar al-Din Shah Qajar signed the Constitutional Decree on 5th August 1906. He writes: “Excellency the Chancellor, as God has given me the glory of the advancement and prosperity of Persia, ... to ensure the well-being and security of the people and the consolidation of the foundations of the government, the legislative reforms should be implemented in the government. We determined that the National Assembly elected of the Qajar princes, mullahs, aristocrats, landlords and merchants ...” as this decree, mentioning “the Qajar princes, mullahs, aristocrats, landlords and merchants”, did not consider other classes of the nation, another order was issued on the request of the representatives of the camped men in the gardens of the British Embassy and the shrines: “The Chancellor, in completing my former handwriting which was a clear statement in the establishment of the National Assembly, we reiterate that all the nation of this country fully aware of our remarks. After the election, the constituents of the parliament will keep the chapters and conditions of the Islamic Consultative Assembly in accordance with the approval and signature of the electorate, so that it deserves the kingdom, the nation and the holy rules of the shari’a ...” As is shown, in the secondary decree, the terms “National Assembly” and also “Islamic Consultative Assembly” for parliament are added to

⁴²³ See Naini. The punishment of Ummah and the reformation of nation (Tanbih al-Ummah wa Tanzih Al-Milla).

⁴²⁴ Martin. “Nuri, Fazl-Allah”. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/nuri-fazl-allah> .

please the mullahs.⁴²⁵ Subsequently, the mullahs and others who took sanctuary and sit-in Shah-Abdol-Azim shrine,⁴²⁶ the shrine of Fatima Masumeh⁴²⁷ and the British Embassy returned home. People from different groups and classes celebrated the constitutional decree. By and large the decree of the August 1906, which afterward was known as the constitutional edict, provided an authority for convening the first Persian parliament, and also elevated the term Shari'a which was not even mentioned in it.⁴²⁸ Similarly, an electoral instruction on 8th September 1906, was introduced as a code of rules and included the deliberative functions of the parliament. The first parliament opened in Tehran on October 7th, 1906. Representatives drafted the constitution and obtained its affirmation in the last days of the life of Mozaffar al-Din Shah.⁴²⁹

In this parliament, the classes were distinguished, the conditions and qualifications for the deputies and electorate were set, local and provincial councils were formed, and the legal immunity of deputies was guaranteed. The legislative functions of the parliament were not clearly acknowledged until the principles of the Persian constitution were adopted on 30th December 1906. This document was also known at first as the fundamental code of rules, and defined the duties and functions of the national assembly, its limitations, and its relations with the various departments of the government.⁴³⁰

Under the constitution, the parliament was assigned with the following financial, political and legislative duties: planning and monitoring the implementation of national budget, ratification of transference or sale of underground resources and ratification of industrial and agricultural contracts, approval of changing the borders of the country, ratification of treaties with foreign governments, approval of formation of national companies, ratification of any governmental contracts, ratification of government credits and loans, budgeting and ratification of the construction of roads and railways.⁴³¹

⁴²⁵ Mehdi Malikzadeh. *The History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (Tarikh-e Enqelab-e Mashruteh-ye Iran in Persian)*, seven volumes. Tehran: Elmi Publication. 1974. Pp. 379-380. Amanat. "Constitutional Revolution i. Intellectual background". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-i> .

⁴²⁶ Located in Rey, near Tehran, and is considered as holy place by Shi'a Muslim.

⁴²⁷ Lies 125 kilometers by road southwest of Tehran in Qom and is also considered as a holy place by Shi'a Muslim.

⁴²⁸ Edward Granville Browne. *The Persian revolution of 1905-1909*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 1910. Pp. 353-354.

⁴²⁹ Said Amir Arjomand. "Constitutional Revolution iii. The Constitution". Originally published: 1992. *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-iii> .

⁴³⁰ Browne. *The Persian revolution of 1905-1909*. 362-365.

⁴³¹ Rouhollah K. Ramazani. *The Foreign Policy of Iran: A Developing Nation in World 1500-1941*. Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia. 1966. p. 86.

7.6. *An anti-constitutional crown prince, as a constitutional monarch*

The representatives of the first legislature with the whole heart struggled to reform the circumstances, therefore managed to drive Monsieur Joseph Naus, the Belgian Chief of the Persian Customs and Treasury out of the country. Nonetheless, after the death of Mozaffar al-Din Shah Qajar, his crown prince Mohammad Ali Shah objected the constitutional and parliamentary assembly and did not invite the representatives to his coronation.⁴³²

This Shah of Qajar by the Russians' supports was convinced to be hostile towards the parliamentarians and constitutional council. He also by the Russians' pressures dismissed his prime minister Moshir al-Dowleh (1840-1907)⁴³³ and called Amin al-Soltan (1858-1907),⁴³⁴ the long-term prime minister of the pre-constitutional era.

In any rate, Mohammad Ali Shah who initially refused to sign the constitutional law, after some protests, especially in Tabriz, was persuaded to issue a piece of handwriting and promise to accompany the constitutional movement. Despite of such agreement, the Shah was still opposed to the constitution and the constitutionalists, until his notorious prime minister Amin al-Soltan was assassinated.⁴³⁵ Then, he went to the Majles and swore allegiance. Several days after the oath ceremony, Mohammad Ali Shah accompanied with the other tyrants and anti-constitutional elements and mullahs (e.g., Sheikh Fazlollah Noori) this time seriously confronted the parliament. More precisely, in the year 1908, on 4th June, Mohammad Ali Shah changed his command center in order to efficiently battle the constitutionalists. He left his palace for the Bagh-e Shah (the King's Garden), a palace residence just outside the city, where he was able to be safe under the protection of the Cossack Brigade, and cut the telegraph lines to Tehran. As a matter of fact, it was a coup d'état, not astonishingly, merely one week after finding petroleum in

⁴³² Kasravi. History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 201-203.

⁴³³ Mirza Nasrullah Khan, titled Moshir al-Dowleh, was the first Persian constitution prime minister. Jane Lewisohn. "Flowers of Persian Song and Music: Davud Pirnia and the Genesis of the Golha Programs". Journal of Persianate Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 79-101. 2008. p. 82.

⁴³⁴ Mirza Ali Asghar Khan, titled as Amin al-Soltan and Atabak, was the last prime minister of Iran under Naser al-Din Shah Qajar, prime minister of Mozaffar al-Din Shah Qajar and Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar. J. Calmard. "Atabak-e A'zam, Amin-al-Soltan". Originally published: 1987. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/atabak-e-azam> .

⁴³⁵ Ibid., <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/atabak-e-azam> . During this period the weekly journal of Sur-e Esrafil (May 30, 1907-March 1909) played an important role in encouraging people to confront the Shah and his court.

Persia.⁴³⁶ He wrote: "Dear Moshir al-Dowleh, due to the warm weather in Tehran, and as it was difficult for me, I have gone to the garden of Shah ..."⁴³⁷

Then the Shah ordered to arrest eight famous prominent constitutionalists,⁴³⁸ he sought to send them to exile before cannonading the parliament.⁴³⁹ The parliamentarians reacted and opposed to these measures of the Shah. Eventually, the Shah ordered the Russian Colonel Vladimir Platonovitch Liakhov (1869-1919)⁴⁴⁰ to attack the parliament. Liakhov surrounded the parliament with his Cossack Brigade forces and successfully closed the building on June 23rd, 1908. The representatives were scattered, and many parliamentary defenders were killed during the attack. The Shah appointed Liakhov as the military governor and ordered him to pursue the representatives and other constitutionalists. As a result, some constitutionalists were captured, tortured and killed in the King's Garden, brutally before the Shah's eyes.⁴⁴¹

After the invasion of the Majles, the arrest and execution of the liberators and constitutionalists, the movement was temporarily blocked. The cruel unjust treatment and oppression in Tehran was the beginning of a period known as "Minor Despotism" in the Persian history (June 1908- July 1909).⁴⁴²

By distribution of the news of the attack on the parliament, the riots shifted to the other cities of Iran. The people of Tabriz from different groups and classes including the middle-class intellectual democrats, who had direct ties with the social democrats of Baku⁴⁴³ resurrected in favor of the constitutionalists and against Mohammad Ali Shah's despotism. At this time, the Tabriz Association practically replaced the National Assembly.⁴⁴⁴ In response, the Shah sent his forces to suppress. The constitutionalists mobilized the people and organized the armed forces

⁴³⁶ On May 26th, 1908 the first Persian oil field was discovered by a British man, William Knox D'Arcy who had obtained a concession to explore petroleum in Persia in 1901. Farhad Kazemi. "Anglo-Persian Oil Company". Originally published: 1985. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982.

<http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/anglo-persian-oil-company> . Stephen Kinzer. All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2003. Pp. 48-49.

⁴³⁷ Kasravi. History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 581.

⁴³⁸ Ibid., 593.

⁴³⁹ Malikzadeh. The History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 705.

⁴⁴⁰ He was the commander of the Persian Cossack Brigade during the rule of Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar. Muriel Atkin. "Cossack Brigade". Originally published: 1993. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/cossack-brigade> .

⁴⁴¹ Kasravi. History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 603, 633-638, 650-652, 658.

⁴⁴² Fakhreddin Azimi. The Quest for Democracy in Iran: A Century of Struggle against Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. 2008. p. 42.

⁴⁴³ Mansoureh Ettehadieh. "Constitutional Revolution v. Political parties of the constitutional period". Originally published: 1992. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 2011.

<http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-v> .

⁴⁴⁴ Kasravi. History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 732.

to counter the governmental forces. Within a period of eleven months from the June 1908, the people of Tabriz, headed by Sattar Khan (1866-1914),⁴⁴⁵ resisted against more than thirty thousand invading forces headed by Eyn-ed-Dowleh (1845-1927).⁴⁴⁶

As a group of the Persian Caucasus joined the people and constitutionalists of Tabriz,⁴⁴⁷ Mohammad Ali Shah asked Nikolai II (1868-1918)⁴⁴⁸ to support him for the siege of Tabriz. In Azerbaijan, after the closure of the Tabriz-Jolfa road, and the complete siege of Tabriz, hunger and horrible famine came to the people, and the work of the liberators became tougher. To deal with such circumstances, with the help of nearly 150 young people (mostly from the American Memorial School), led by an American teacher Howard Conklin Baskerville (1885-1909), a rescue team was formed. On April 19th, 1909 the head of the group was shot dead. After that, the other members of the group continued the struggle, and some of them were killed, and little progress was made. Eventually, the group failed to break the siege.⁴⁴⁹

Later, on April 28th, 1909 the Russian government and the British agreed that the Russian troops to enter Tabriz and breaking the line of siege on the pretext of protecting the foreigners and delivering food to them. As a result of the arrival of the Russian troops, the siege of Tabriz was defeated, and the Shah's forces moved away from the city.⁴⁵⁰

The end of the Tabriz's uprisings did not mean the victory of the reactionaries, as the efforts of the liberators and constitutionalists continued in other parts of the country. On February 8th, 1909 in Gilan the constitutionalists and revolutionaries killed the ruler of Rasht and conquered the city. After a short time, all Gilan was captured by the libertarians. By the virtue of this victory, they wrote some letters to the foreign ambassadors explaining that they did not purpose to fight the Shah, but only seek to revive the constitution. In response, the Shah sent his troops to reclaim and re-capture Gilan, however they were defeated and retreated.⁴⁵¹

⁴⁴⁵ He is known in Iran as a national heroic leader of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. Anja Pistor-Hatam. "Sattar Khan". Originally published: 2009. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/sattar-khan-one-of-the-most-popular-heroes-from-tabriz-who-defended-the-town-during-the-lesser-autocracy-in-1908-09> .

⁴⁴⁶ Abdol Majid Mirza Eyn-ed-Dowleh, Qajar prince and prime minister of Mozaffar ad-Din Shah and was a stubborn opponent of Iran's constitution. J. Calmard. "Ayn-al-Dawla, Abd-al-Majid". Originally published: 1987. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/ayn-al-dawla-soltan-abd-al-majid-mirza> .

⁴⁴⁷ Kasravi. History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 726.

⁴⁴⁸ He was the last Emperor of Russia.

⁴⁴⁹ K. Ekbal. "Baskerville, Howard C.". Originally published: 1988. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/baskerville-howard-c> .

⁴⁵⁰ Malikzadeh. The History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 1132-1133.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid., 1036, 1059-1061, 1069, 1072.

7.7. *A constitutional triumph to depose the anti-constitutional monarch*

On the other side of Iran, the city of Isfahan was captured by the constitutionalists and the Bakhtiari⁴⁵² forces, headed by Sardar As'ad Bakhtiari (1856-1917).⁴⁵³ While in Tabriz, the constitutionalists were surrounded by the government forces and its foreign collaborators, Bakhtiari tribe moved to Tehran and with the support of the Gilan constitutionalists succeeded in defeating the minor despotism. By the entrance of the revolutionaries in Tehran, almost after five days of struggle, finally, the constitutional forces were able to take full control of the city and on 13th July 1909 were the triumph and conquest realized. After the Mohammad Ali Shah seeking sanctuary and refuge at the Russian embassy, a supreme Majles of more than 300 members, drawn from all groups, deposed eventually him from the kingdom, and placed his minor son Ahmad (1898-1930)⁴⁵⁴ as the new king on the throne. Moreover, several of his supporters, including Sheikh Fazlollah Noori, were tried and hanged by a special tribunal. The Supreme Assembly also appointed the Interior, War, Foreign, Finance, Justice, Education, Post and Prime Ministers. At this time, while, the second round of parliamentary election was held at two levels, Mohammad Ali Shah was sent to exile.⁴⁵⁵ Thus, on 15th November 1909, approximately one year after the closure of the first parliament, the second parliament was opened with the presence of the newly appointed young Shah. Despite of such attainments, when the constitution was to be re-enacted, some tried to snatch the work from the constitutionalists and suffocate the law in the cradle. At the same time, the concerns increased about the permanent stay of the Russian troops.⁴⁵⁶

This new parliament or Majles by the instant task of reinstating the country's order passed a new electoral law, lowered the property qualification for voters, abolished the representation by class and property, and reduced the number of seats for Tehran, in favor of the other provinces and some minorities (the Jews, Zoroastrians, Armenians, and Assyrian Christians). Then the

⁴⁵² The Bakhtiari tribe is a southwestern and one of the two biggest tribes in Iran. J.-P. Digard, G. L. Windfuhr, A. Ittig. "Baktiari tribe". Originally published: 1988. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/baktiari-tribe> .

⁴⁵³ A. A. Sa'idi Sirjani, J. P. Digard and A. H. Nava'i. "Baktiari (1)". Originally published: 1988. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/baktiari-1-nesba-of-a-number-of-baktiari-chiefs##01> .

⁴⁵⁴ M. J. Sheikh-ol-Islami. "Ahmad Shah Qajar". Originally published: 2011. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/ahmad-shah-qajar-1909-1925-the-seventh-and-last-ruler-of-the-qajar-dynasty> .

⁴⁵⁵ Martin. "Constitutional Revolution ii. Events". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-ii> . Malikhzadeh. The History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 1076, 1085, 1171, 1174, 1231.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid., 1295-1296.

proceedings continued with the negotiations for withdrawal of Russian troops, a proposal for a loan from the national bank to rebuild the administration, an arrangement for the Swedish officers to reorganize the gendarmerie, as well as the invitation of American financial advisers to reform the tax system.⁴⁵⁷

Despite of the heavy blow to the despotism, along with the re-establishment of parliament, the Persian constitutional movement was not able to influence and direct the domestic powerful forces such as landlords, besides the external-factors. The Russians tried to bring back the dismissed Shah (Mohammad Ali) in order to interrupt and neutralize the measures of the parliamentarians and the invited advisers. Nonetheless, since the people and the constitutionalists were united together, the anti-constitutional attempts temporarily failed, and in September 1911, the deposed Shah's army was defeated, and Mohammad Ali fled to Russia.⁴⁵⁸

7.8. The last Shah of Qajar dynasty, an end for the constitutional movement

On 29 November 1911, Russia with the British support issued an ultimatum against Persia, as a final demand (statement of terms) that its rejection could result in retaliation. It created a hard time to the constitutionalism, and urged Persia to lastly dismiss William Morgan Shuster (1877-1960)⁴⁵⁹ and his associates. The constitutionalists and parliamentarians refused to accept this ultimatum. To deal with the crisis and manage the aggression of the Russians, the government dissolved the parliament and accepted the conditions of the ultimatum. Nevertheless, the Russians invaded the northern regions of Iran including Tabriz and Rasht, and launched massacres. The slaughter of Tabriz lasted several months.⁴⁶⁰

In this way, the seven-year boom of the Persian constitutional movement stopped, and the real constitutionalists went away. In such circumstances, a puppet group took power and authority. This assembly did whatever the external-powers said, at the losses of the Persians, thus remained even after the World War I and the removal of the pressures. In this period, although,

⁴⁵⁷ Martin. "Constitutional Revolution ii. Events". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-ii> .

⁴⁵⁸ Malikzadeh. The History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 1385-1296. Cyrus Ghani. Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: From Qajar Collapse to Pahlavi Power. London, New York: I.B. Tauris. 1998. p. 12. Elena Andreeva. "Russia v. Russians at the Court of Mohammad-Ali Shah". Originally published: 2009. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/russia-iv-russians-at-the-court-of-mohammad-ali-shah> .

⁴⁵⁹ American lawyer, civil servant, financial expert, and publisher, who served as treasurer general to the Persian government in 1911. The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "William Morgan Shuster". Encyclopædia Britannica. Online edition. February 16, 2018. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/William-Morgan-Shuster> .

⁴⁶⁰ Malikzadeh. The History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 1451, 1508, 1498, 1525.

Ahmad Shah's coronation on 21st July 1914 was celebrated by national great jubilation and triumph, his popularity rapidly declined. This unpopularity was to a great extent as a result of the World War's complications and miseries. Hence, the first four years of his direct reign coincided with the occupation of Iran by various international troops. On the other direction, this period was contemporaneous with Russia October 1917 Revolution that provided the Shah, people and Persia by some new opportunities as well as threats. In addition to the political affairs outside Ahmad Shah's territory, he personally was fully engaged in corrupted activities. Consequently, the authority of this last Shah of Qajar dynasty was considerably destabilized, when on 21st February 1921 (40 days before the retreat of the British troops) a division of the Persian Cossack brigade under the command of Reza Khan (1878-1944)⁴⁶¹ marched from Qazvin to Tehran and occupied the capital. Ahmad Shah appointed him as the commander in chief of the armed forces. Two months later, Reza Khan entered the cabinet as the minister of war. From then on, Reza Khan became the actual power in Persia. Thus, there was a struggle for supremacy between a frightened weak pleasure-loving monarch and a smart powerful (wishful for the throne) minister of war, in the Persian political sphere during the remaining four years of Qajar dynasty's reign. On 28th October 1923, Reza Khan while pretended a disinclination to be appointed as the prime minister, facilitated the Shah's immediate departure for Europe. The Shah left the country on 5th November 1923, and never returned Persia. On 13th March 1924, the Majlis held an extraordinary session and appointed a special committee to address a republic. Simultaneously, the Turkish National Assembly had on March 3rd passed three laws, abolishing the caliphate, overpowering the ministry of religious affairs and the system of religious endowments and placing all religious schools and seminaries under the national ministry of education. These real-time changes in a neighboring country created a profound apprehension among the Persian mullahs, who feared that the proclamation of a republic in Iran would have similar consequences for the role of Islam and their religious establishments. The assembly could not make decision, and Reza Khan went Qom to consult with the powerful mullahs. In this way, once again, the reactionism of the mullahs influenced the republican ideal of the Persian constitutionalists. On 31st October 1925, the Majlis approved a bill deposing the Qajars and trusting Reza Khan. The majority of representatives voted in favor of the bill. On December 12th, a special committee modified articles 36, 37, 38, and 40 of the constitution and by a vote of 257 to 3 conferred the crown on Reza Shah and his male

⁴⁶¹ An army officer who became Iran's prime minister from 1923 to 1925, and the king of Iran from 1925 to 1941 also the founder of the Pahlavi Dynasty. The kingdom of Reza Shah was the end of the Qajar dynasty and the beginning of the Pahlavi regime. Arfa. "Reza Shah Pahlavi". <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Reza-Shah-Pahlavi> .

inheritors. This ended the reign of Ahmad Shah and the 130-year-old Qajar dynasty. The deposed Shah subsequently took up permanent residence in France.⁴⁶²

7.9. *The constitutional struggle, a new arena for women's participation*

In the course of the elaborated constitutional movement, unlike to the almost semi involved role of the Persian peasants, merely limited in a number of stay-in strikes to support the unions of craftsmen and workers in the north of Iran, under the penetration of the Russian radicals,⁴⁶³ the part played by the Persian women, though small, was truly worth noting. In the constitutional movement, the intellectual women grew bold and brave to fight the tyranny. Women participated in Tehran and other cities in taking sanctuaries of 1905-1906. The proclamation of a constitution that simply deprived them of the right to vote did not reduce their enthusiasm for political activities, and they therefore established dozens of associations and schools. On account of their secret activities, there is not much information about. William Morgan Shuster as an observer of the constitutional events writes these associations had a regular organization, and he had himself a number of confrontations with these constitutional associations.⁴⁶⁴ "The Persian women since 1907 had become almost at a bound the most progressive, not to say radical, in the world." "The women did much to keep the spirit of liberty alive. Having themselves suffered from a double form of oppression, political and social, they were the more eager to foment the great Nationalist movement for the adoption of constitutional forms of government, and the inculcation of Western political, social, commercial, and ethical codes." He continued "I had ample opportunity to observe the frequent manifestations of the influence and high purposes of the Muhammadan women". "It was well known in Tehran that there were dozens of

⁴⁶² Sheikh-ol-Islami. "Ahmad Shah Qajar". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/ahmad-shah-qajar-1909-1925-the-seventh-and-last-ruler-of-the-qajar-dynasty> .

⁴⁶³ Foran. *Fragile Resistance: Social Transformation in Iran from 1500 to the Revolution*. 184, Janet Afary. "Peasant Rebellions of the Caspian Region during the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906-1909", in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. Vol. 23, No. 2. Pp. 137-161. May 1991. p. 137.

⁴⁶⁴ "A few examples may suffice. While sitting in my office one morning last summer, I was told that one of the Persian clerks in the Treasury Department wished to see me on an important matter. Information comes unexpectedly and from such curious sources in the Orient that no offer can be safely rejected. This young man came in. I had never seen him. We spoke in French, and after receiving permission to talk freely, with many apologies he said that his mother was our friend; that she had commissioned him to say that my wife should not pay a visit to the household of a certain Persian grandee, by whose family she had been invited, since he was an enemy to the Constitutional Government, and my wife's visit would make the Persians suspect me. I thanked him, and at the time did not myself know of the contemplated call, but soon learned that it was planned, and, of course, advised against it. I called the young Persian again and asked him how his mother knew of this purely private social affair of my wife's; he said that it had been known and discussed in the secret society to which his mother belonged, and that it was decided to warn me against it." Shuster. *The Strangling of Persia*. 185-186.

more or less secret societies⁴⁶⁵ among the Persian women, with a central organization by which they were controlled.”⁴⁶⁶

As he clearly pictured, the Persian women established the underground societies and planned out violent and non-violent activities and procedures to express their support for the constitutionalism and their objection to the Anglo-Russian policies. Their organizations were diverse and numerous and were formed during the first period of the movement chiefly in defense of the constitutionalism, the establishment of the right to equality and the elimination of oppression against women. In the Qajar period, women’s attitude to their circumstances was easily acceptance and submission. The girls were taught and socialized to sit quietly and have little mobility, not to question, and always obey men, even their younger brothers. At a time when no social group was able to defend its own right and interest, regarding the strong gender segregation, the Persian women encountered both, the severe domestic restrictions and the lack of interaction in the public sphere, especially among the lower-classes of the society that lasted until the Pahlavi era. For instance, at home, female guests were welcomed only by women, and male guests only by men, in the busy streets at busy times, women had to walk across a walkway and men from another, women who wanted to go across the other side of the street should be given permission from the constabulary, and they would move quickly under his supervision. Despite the fact that the women’s public activities increased during this political transformation in the form of participation in some battles and demonstrations and to organize private associations and secret organizations, inside the first Persian constitution, many women’s rights were ignored. For example, marriage and divorce laws, and child custody right were relinquished, besides the women remained deprived of the right to vote along with the insanes and criminals. According to Kasravi, after the proclamation of the constitution, and when trying some trade people to establish the National Bank, women sold their bangles and jewelry (bracelet and anklet) to secure the bank’s capital.⁴⁶⁷ In the early stages of the

⁴⁶⁵ Associations such as, Women’s Freedom Society in 1907, Society of Masked Women, Patriotic Opiates Association in 1910, the secret Union Women in 1907, Iranian Women’s Association in 1910, Society of Ladies of the Homeland in 1910, Ladies of Iran in 1910, Women’s Effort Society in 1911 and the Council of Women of the Center in 1911. See Eliz Sanasarian. *Women’s Rights Movements in Iran: Mutiny, Appeasement, and Repression from 1900 to Khomeini*. New York: Praeger. 1982. Poupak Tafreshi. “The struggle for freedom, justice, and equality: The history of the journey of Iranian women in the last century”. 2010. All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs). 929.

<http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/929> . Pp. 8-9.

⁴⁶⁶ Shuster. *The Strangling of Persia*. 183, 184.

⁴⁶⁷ One day, at the foot of a pulpit (minbar) of a mullah in a mosque a woman said: “Why does the Iranian government borrow from abroad? Are we dead? I am a laundress. I give one Toman (the super unit of Real, the currency of Iran) as my share. Other women are also ready. Kasravi. *History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution*. 180-182.

movement, women were mostly influenced by the mullahs and because of mullahs' support for constitutionalism, they also were convinced to emerge out of their homes and participate in demonstrations and other collective behaviors that were considered traditionally non-conventional. This national women's movement was a minority movement and part of the great national movement of Persia with the goal of the independence of the country and the implementation of the constitution. In fact, the participation of some of these women in these political events was to some degree spontaneous, with their new nationalist sentiment and willingness. In Tabriz, in a battle between the constitutionalists and the monarchists, the bodies of twenty women who went to the battlefield with men's clothes were found. In any case, the first group of women who participated in the Iranian women's rights movement were either themselves constitutionalists and activists of the national movement of the 1900s or from the families of nationalistic intellectuals. After the constitutional revolution, only a few pro-constitutional women stayed as women's rights activists. To put it another way, after the constitutional fever had cooled down, the mass of uneducated women returned to their homes and only the educated and enlightened ones pursued the women's rights, in particular the right for education and the abandonment of the veil. Finally, on August 4th, 1911, a member of parliament for the first time raised the issue of equality between men and women in the National Council and called for women's right to vote, which shocked the parliament and prompted the parliamentary mullahs' opposition.⁴⁶⁸

7.10. Further consequences of the constitutional movement

As a historical fact, the first Persian parliament was assembled before the proclamation of the constitution. Its members were elected in agreement with the royal decree of August 1906. This Majles was initiated on 7 October 1906. Its head immediately prioritized to draft the internal regulation of the parliament as well as the constitution. Swiftiness was considered necessary to institutionalize the Majles and the proposed Senate, bearing in mind the worsening of the health of Mozaffar ad-Din Shah. After the presentation of the constitution, in mid-February 1907, its inadequacy in the sight of the pro-monarchy forces and the mullahs prompted a new committee to draft a supplement.

⁴⁶⁸ In another example, a group of women contacted women activists in England in 1911, asking them to apply their political influence in British government to support the Iranian constitutionalists, however they responded unfortunately, they had no political authority in their government and as a result, no power to support the Iranian people. Sanasarian. *Women's Rights Movements in Iran: Mutiny, Appeasement, and Repression from 1900 to Khomeini*. 17-25.

Incidentally, the constitutional law of 1906 consisted of a short foreword and fifty-one articles, at least six of which (Arts. 12, 31-32, 34, 46, 48) fully or partially corresponded to articles in the Belgian constitution. five others (Arts. 13, 18, 23, 25, 42) corresponded to the provisions of 1879 Bulgarian constitution. The further part, as "On the functions, limits, and rights of the Majles" includes Arts. 15-31.⁴⁶⁹ In accordance, the parliament was given legislative power through Arts. 16, 21, associated with the Senate Arts. 17, 19. Arts. 18 and 22-26 protect the authority of the parliament over the international treaties and economic concessions so as to supervise equally the Persian natural capitals and the government financial affairs. The parliamentary revision and inquiry of each cabinet ministers of ruling government also were guaranteed in this part. It additionally projected an assembly of together the Senate and the consultative Majles in order to solve possible contentions of the Approved bills and matters. Its constitutional document supplement of 1907, comprising of 107 articles, by Arts. 8-25, certified an orderly detachment of the powers of government. Arts. 26-28, specified the legislative powers of provincial councils. The organization of the counts and judiciary system was clarified in Arts. 71-89. All the Persians were declared as equal before the state laws by Art. 8, their lives, property, honor, and domiciles were protected in Arts. 9, 13-17. Freedom of association and the press in Arts. 20 and 21 were acknowledged. Art. 27 derived indirectly from the thinking of Charles Montesquieu (1689-1755), and distinguished among legislative, judicial, and executive branches of government. The legislative power was shared by the Shah, the parliament, and the Senate, each with the right to initiate legislation by Art. 27. The supplement to the document included a number of features which was not found in the Belgian constitution, reflecting the role of religion and Shari'a in the Persian society. The editors of the supplement tried to accommodate Shi'a Islam as the established religion by Art. 1. In the following, Art. 2 referred to the monarch as the Shah of Islam. Furthermore, a committee of no fewer than five mullahs was entitled to reject any proposal at variance with the so-called sacred laws of Shari'a.⁴⁷⁰

The primary goal line of the constitutional movement that unquestionably was to limit the absolute rule of the Shah was not easily achieved by the first draft of document. In this version, particularly the Arts. 15, 17 and 47 focused merely on the authorization of laws by the Shah and the Arts. 28 and 29 defined his control over the ministers, nonetheless, it brought no orderly characterization for his rule. This incongruity was explained in a supplement.

⁴⁶⁹ Amir Arjomand. "Constitutional Revolution iii. The Constitution". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-iii> .

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid., <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-iii> .
Iran's 1906 Constitution, <http://fis-iran.org/en/resources/legaldoc/iranconstitution> .

In accordance, the Shah stood as the head of the executive by Art. 27 and the supreme commander of the armed forces by Art. 50, thus he was entitled to declare war and peace through Art. 51. This time he constitutionally was not eligible to veto the course of legislature in Art. 49. Nonetheless, it could ambiguously restrain the regal decrees or orders. For instance in the Art. 35 of the main text, in terms of the crucial issue of limiting monarchical power that declared “monarchy is a trust bestowed upon the person of the Shah by the nation”, the top prince, Mohammad Ali added (in his own hand) “through divine gift”.⁴⁷¹

In the first electoral law, approved by the Shah on 9th September 1906, the electorate was divided into six classes of guilds, princes and members of the Qajar family, mullahs, notables and nobles, merchants, besides landowners and peasants with different levels of literacy.

Table 2. The educational composition of representatives of the first five Majleses of the constitutional era (figures are in percentage)⁴⁷²

Periods of Majles	Religious literacy	Diploma and less	Bachelor	PhD
The first period	58	23	15	4
The second period	50	25	17	8
The third period	69	14	13	4
The fourth period	57	31	10	2
The fifth period	54	30	12	4

In neither the main constitution nor its supplement an amendment is projected. For this reason, in 1925, when Reza Khan aimed to depose the last Qajar Shah, a mechanism for amending the constitution had to be originated. On 31st October 1925 the Majles terminated the Qajar monarchy and ordered a constituent assembly in order to amend the constitution. By a single act of the constitutional assembly Arts. 36-38 of the supplement were modified and the monarchy was delivered to Reza Shah Pahlavi and his masculine children. However, when Reza Khan capped, the parliament began to pale. Then, as early as October 1945, his son

⁴⁷¹ Amir Arjomand. “Constitutional Revolution iii. The Constitution”.

<http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-iii> .

Iran’s 1906 Constitution, <http://fis-iran.org/en/resources/legaldoc/iranconstitution> .

⁴⁷² Younes Morvarid. From Constitutionalism to Republic: A view at the periods of the Legislative Assembly during the Constitutional Revolution: The first Constitution. (Az Mashroote ta Jomhoori: Negahi be advare majalese ghanoongozari dar dorane Mashrootiat: Mashrootiate aval) Tehran: Ohedy.1998. p. 80.

Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1919-1980)⁴⁷³ recognized that a revision of the constitution could boost his royal authority. After an abortive attempt on his life on 4th February 1949 the parliament agreed to the convening of a constituent assembly to amend the constitution. They voted to amend Art. 48 of the constitution of 1906 so as to grant the Shah the power to dissolve the parliament and the senate, separately or together, on condition that he had a reason and ordered new elections. Furthermore, an additional article for amendments of the constitution was passed. In accordance an elected constituent assembly was able to amend if only an issue was proposed by majorities of two-thirds in both houses. The Shah's approval was also required. In April 1951, after the assassination of the prime minister, the Shah was forced to appoint an experienced legislator, as Mohammad Mosaddeq (1880-1967)⁴⁷⁴. Under the pressure of Mosaddeq's programs for reform and nationalization of oil, the constitutional tensions peaked. The era of parliamentary domination came to an end with the coup d'état of 1953. In May 1961 Mohammad Reza Shah applied his granted power via Art. 48 to dissolve the parliament and began his land reform or so-called White Revolution. As he continued to increase his exercise of royal power, the parliament once again became a mere rubber stamp. As the Shah converted more autocratic faced with growing public dissatisfaction and popular insurgence throughout 1978, he therefore went abroad with his family in January 1979, sparking a series of events that quickly led to the dissolution of the state on 11th February 1979, officially ended the first Persian monarchical constitution.⁴⁷⁵

By all accounts, this practiced constitutionalism was partially in its general sense, as an archetype of beliefs based on the general principles to legitimate the Persian states, to limit a

⁴⁷³ The firstborn male child of Reza Shah Pahlavi was named Mohammad Reza, schooled in Switzerland and came back Iran in 1935. In 1941 the Great Britain and Soviet Union fearful of the connection of Reza Shah and the Nazis, occupied Persia and directed Mohammad Reza on the throne. The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi". Encyclopædia Britannica. Online edition. November 30, 2017. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mohammad-Reza-Shah-Pahlavi> .

⁴⁷⁴ Mohammad Mosaddeq was a legislator who nationalized the Persian oil. Between 1951 and 1953, he as the Shah's prime minister endeavored to limit monarch's authority and mandate. His prime ministerial was challenged and overthrown by a coup d'état. The upheaval was supported by the United States' CIA and the United Kingdom's Secret Intelligence Service, along with the green light of the influential mullahs such as Sayyed Abul-Qasem Kasani (1877-1962) the speaker of the Majles during the oil nationalization. Kashani was also the spiritual father of the Islamist terrorist group of Fada'iyan-e Islam which later engaged in public nationalist constitutionalists figures' assassinations in Iran. The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Mohammad Mosaddeq". Encyclopædia Britannica. Online edition. February 26, 2018. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mohammad-Mosaddeq> . Ali Rahnama. "Kasani, Sayyed Abul-Qasem". Originally published: 2011. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/kasani-abul-qasem> . James Buchan. Days of God: The Revolution in Iran and Its Consequences. New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc. 2012. Pp. 65-66.

⁴⁷⁵ Amir Arjomand. "Constitutional Revolution iii. The Constitution". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-iii> . Iran's 1906 Constitution, <http://fis-iran.org/en/resources/legaldoc/iranconstitution> .

set of fundamental laws, to call for a political entity of an institutionalized mechanism and to contain the power of the Shahs in order to protect the interests and freedoms of the Persian citizens. Nevertheless, the expansion of this new thought in Iran led to the other social movements and revolution, which transmogrified the dynasties' absolute power and created other circumstances.

The new situation promoted the Islamic constitutionalism, an absolutely newly forged and constructed construction in political literature. In this sense, the abandoned legacy of the constitutional movement was at least the introduction of the ideas and ideals of the separation of powers, check and balance of each of the ruling powers, human rights, women's rights, social justice, taxation system, elements of the recent history international political culture and balanced international relations, making laws within the urban, rural, and nomadic societies, free and competitive political parties and fair quarrels, non-political culture for military organizations, the free press, freedom of religions, and expansion of education to the Persian society. By the 1600s, some social thinkers began addressing the question of who should be sovereign over a society as supreme ruler. As the absolute rule of kings paled, enlightenment philosophers argued for different divisions of power into constituent or distinct elements. As it was mentioned, the Persian constitutionalism brought in an understanding of the idea of separation of powers system. The presented principle by thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704), Charles Montesquieu (1689-1755) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778),⁴⁷⁶ was gradually introduced into Persian political system from the twentieth century and was recognized in the fundamental rights of the nation. Consequently, this system later merged by the political religious school system of Islam, which although theoretically recognized the separation of powers,⁴⁷⁷ based on its foundations has not hitherto practically acknowledged the main philosophy of a government divided into branches.

⁴⁷⁶ Franz von Kutschera. *Der Weg der westlichen Philosophie*. Paderborn: mentis. 2019. p. 540.

⁴⁷⁷ Iranian Constitution 1979, Art. 57. http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html .

8. An explanation to the Anti-Shah Movement resulted in the Revolution 1979-so far

8.1. A temporary heterogeneous alliance against contradictory reforms for an endless revolution

In terms of the historical tangible events, the Iranian revolution obviously took place over a period between 1978 and 1979, however, in factuality, it was rooted in many years away and continued to today's Iran.⁴⁷⁸ Its revolutionary movement, which was supported by various social groups and classes with different ideologies (comparable to socialism, liberalism, nationalism, as well as Islamism) consequently overthrew the Pahlavi monarchy and facilitated the establishment of the very Islamic Republic under the religious leaders.⁴⁷⁹ This last instance of the classical kinds of the 20th century also was astonishingly supported by an important part of the secular and leftist intellectuals, who found their ideals along with its principles. Despite the fact that, the primary goal of some opposition groups was not the overthrow of the royal regime (they pursued merely the implementation of the 1906 constitution), in the following, the chain of the events made the formation of an incompatible impermanent coalition and unity among the religious and non-religious forces unavoidable for resistance, regime change and a confirmation for an Islamic rule. In this connection, although, Khomeini as the leader of the movement in his years of exile proposed the establishment of an Islamic state headed by the mullahs instead of the hereditary monarch,⁴⁸⁰ in the course of the movement and battle more focused on the weak points of the regime and the issues that caused dissatisfaction among the masses, and never ever addressed an Islamic constitution and the principle of his Velayat-e Faqih theory. Accordingly, many of those who were primarily sympathetic to his leadership, afterwards, simply disagreed him and pulled apart.⁴⁸¹

On the other side, the monarch Mohammad Reza, After the coup d'etat of the 19th August 1953, asserted his power and launched his controversial reforms called the White Revolution (1963-

⁴⁷⁸ Behrooz Moazami. *State, Religion, and Revolution in Iran, 1796 to the Present*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2013. Pp. 1-3.

⁴⁷⁹ Ali Ansari and Kasra Aarabi. "Ideology and Iran's Revolution: How 1979 Changed the World". The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. Online edition. 2019. <https://institute.global/policy/ideology-and-irans-revolution-how-1979-changed-world> .

⁴⁸⁰ Khomeini. *Islamic Government (Hukumat-i Islami, Persian, 1970)*.

⁴⁸¹ Ervand Abrahamian. *The Iranian Mojahedin*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. 1989. p. 1.

1979) or “the revolution of the Shah and the people”.⁴⁸² The main focus of these series of economic and social changes with the consultations of the Shah’s prime ministers of the time was verily the land reforms and the elimination of the management of landlords. The other aspects of this proposal included some principles such as nationalization of forests, selling the shares of state owned factories as a backbone for the land reforms, granting shares to factory workers, controversial amendment of the electoral law to grant the women the right to vote and equal political rights, creation of Knowledge Corps, establishment of the Health Corps, urban and rural modernization, combating inflation and financial corruption, free and compulsory education, free nutrition for schools’ students and infants, coverage of social security and national insurance, among others, besides a national referendum (January 26th, 1963).⁴⁸³ The plan was beforehand represented at the National Congress of Farmers in Tehran. The implementation of this top to bottom project reform was an anticipated event to release the potential peasantry or proletarian revolution. However, instead, this badly planned so-called White revolution by increasing urbanization paved the road towards the 1979 revolution.⁴⁸⁴ The land reforms by the abolition of the landlord-peasant relationship, especially in terms of the agricultural lands, as a matter of fact, ruined the management system of the agricultural activities, without presenting any other substitute model to reorganize it. In fact, it was inevitable for rural unemployed peasants to move towards cities and transmogrifying into the raw material for an urban revolution. Further, the increasing oil revenues in the 1960s and 1970s contributed to some economic improvements and the transformation of the Iran’s social structure with increasing social distance and social tensions. The White Revolution and its land reforms,⁴⁸⁵ as well as the Shah’s pro-American and Israeli governments’ policies were confronted by a new generation of mullahs, in particular Khomeini. Moreover, in the Pahlavi era began a transition to the modern judicial system. Whereas, in the past, only mullahs were influential in this domain,

⁴⁸² See Gholam Reza Afkhami. *The life and times of the Shah*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. 2008. Pp. 229-237.

⁴⁸³ Dieter Nohlen, Florian Grotz and Christof Hartmann. *Elections in Asia and the Pacific: A Data Handbook*, Vol. 1, Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. 2001. p. 68. Ervand Abrahamian. *A History of Modern Iran*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2008. Pp. 131-134.

⁴⁸⁴ Amir Arjomand. *The Turban for the Crown, The Islamic revolution in Iran*. 71-73. Khosrow Mostofi, Peter William Avery and Others. “Iran- The White Revolution”. *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Online edition. April 11, 2018. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Iran/The-White-Revolution#ref315913> .

⁴⁸⁵ Inasmuch as the Usuli mullahs were already financially dependent on bazaar and landlords, and the mentioned reforms were against their properties.

Pahlavi sent many to abroad to study law and then appointed them to the country's judiciary, and in that way made the mullahs desperate.⁴⁸⁶

In the meantime, a number of Iranian thinkers similar to Ali Shari'ati had a profound effect on the revival of Shi'a political thought, representing a revolutionary interpretation of Shi'a as an emancipating ideology in the minds of social activists, especially students. Also, in a book of 1962, Jalal Al-e-Ahmad (1923-1969) applied the key Iranian pre-revolutionary term of Westoxification among the young revolutionaries, to describe the fascination with and dependence upon the West to the loss of traditional Islamic culture. In his analysis, the Western essential problems are described as moral negligence, social injustice, devaluation of religion, and money obsession, all of which are fueled by capitalism, and resulted in cultural alienation. The book turned to a semi-Bible among the leftists, as well as the Islamic Marxists. The term was also adopted by both Khomeini and Shari'ati to describe the results of the Shah's semi-modernizational program.⁴⁸⁷

During this period, the blocked political mobility and lack of political development after the coup d'état of 1953 convinced a number of Marxist and Islamist groups to transmogrify into guerrilla organizations. Eventually, even the conservative mullahs accompanied with their traditional allies non-political merchants (bazaar-men) joined to the opposition under the tense policies of the Shah's Rastakhiz (Resurgence) party (1975-1979).⁴⁸⁸

The aforesaid tensions and dissatisfactions, accompanied with the openness of the political atmosphere under the pressures of the US government and the human rights organizations, facilitated the mass rallies in 1976.⁴⁸⁹

⁴⁸⁶ Willem Floor. "Judicial and Legal Systems v. Judicial System in the 20th Century". Originally published: 2009. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/judicial-and-legal-systems-v-judicial-system-in-the-20th-century#sec2>.

⁴⁸⁷ John L. Esposito (ed.). "Westoxification". in The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Oxford Islamic Studies, Online edition. 17 April 2018. <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2501> , Mehrzad Boroujerdi. "Gharbzadegi: The Dominant Intellectual Discourse of Pre- and Post-revolutionary Iran." in Samih K. Farsoun and Mehrdad Mashayekhi (eds.). Iran: Political Culture in the Islamic Republic. London, New York: Routledge.1992. p. 31.

⁴⁸⁸ As the only inclusive party, was formed by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. After the announcement of the formation of the party, all the legitimate parties and syndicates of Iran, such as the New Iran Party, and the People's Party were merged. In the next step, the imperial system forced all the government employees to join the party. The party, whose goal was to increase the number of members, in 1975 five million and four hundred thousand people were admitted to its various congress centers. However, people who were members of the party only entered their names at party offices and did not actually take steps to achieve the real goals of the party. The party was formed on the basis of three principles, the imperial system, the constitution and the white revolution. The Shah proposed the opponents of the party to prepare their passports and leaving the country. Abrahamian. The Iranian Mojahedin. 25-27. See Afkhami. The life and times of the Shah. 434-444.

⁴⁸⁹ Abrahamian. Iran Between Two Revolutions. 498-500.

On the other direction, the protesters were benefited by the Shi'ite rituals and traditions. As it was earlier stressed, the Shi'ite culture presents a particular value system for martyrdom and its consecutive mourning ceremonies.⁴⁹⁰ Accordingly, in this revolution, the chains of the organized gatherings, which each ended in victimizing of their participants and repeating the consecutive ceremonies, amplified the severe violent street protests. The events such as the disaster of Cinema Rex fire on 19th August 1978,⁴⁹¹ shootings to protesters in a number of demonstrations including in the event of the black Friday,⁴⁹² torturings and murderings of the anti-royal elements by Shah's SAVAK⁴⁹³ and the late Shah's concessions to the opposition led to a loss of reconciliation.⁴⁹⁴

Subsequently, a sudden period of economic decline during which trade and industrial activity were reduced (generally identified by a fall in GDP) led to mass strikes and joining of the working-class forces to the demonstrations. As an issue of fact, it turned the scope of the protests from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands and even millions, and paralyzed the country's economy.⁴⁹⁵ At last, on the repression front, the common religious values among the repressive forces and the demonstrators therefore made the oppressive machine of the regime partly incapable.

⁴⁹⁰ J. Calmard. "azadari". Originally published: 1987. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/azadari> .

⁴⁹¹ In the evening of the incident, the Cinema Rex in Abadan was screening a socio-political movie. In fact, the fire was made intentionally and roughly killed 700 people, in that the doors of the cinema hall were already locked. The coincidence of this event with the protests and riots of the 1979 revolution and the prolongation of its aftermath in the years after the revolution created various speculations about the incident, revolutionaries accused SAVAK and the old regime accused the mullahs. Ali M. Ansari. *Modern Iran since 1921: The Pahlavis and After*. First edition, London: Longman, Pearson Education. 2003. p. 259.

⁴⁹² The event occurred during the unrest that ultimately ended in the last kick. On 8th September 1978 demonstrations of dissidents and revolutionaries in southern neighborhoods in Tehran led to a bloody suppression of protesters by the military forces of the Shah. This event truly and practically disrupted the possibility of a peaceful reform. Abrahamian. *A History of Modern Iran*. 159-161.

⁴⁹³ Sazeman-e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar (1957-1979), literally Organization of National Intelligence and Security operated as the Shah's secret police inside and outside of Iran. SAVAK was active in suppressing the anti-regime elements, alongside the fight against foreign intelligence and intrusion. SAVAK inmates and human rights activists repeatedly accused SAVAK interrogators of using violence and torture techniques. Some tortures like whipping and beating, electric shock, inserting scabs or boiling water into the anus, closing heavy weights to the testicles and pulling teeth and nails for confessing and obtaining information from armed guerrillas. Mark J. Gasiorowski. "Central Intelligence Agency". Originally published: 1991. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/central-intelligence-agency-cia-in-persia> .

⁴⁹⁴ Abbas Milani. *The Shah*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2011. Pp. 292-293.

⁴⁹⁵ Michael M. J. Fischer. *Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution*. Madison, Wisconsin: Univ. of Wisconsin Press. 1980. p. 189.

Khomeini before returning from exile, initiated and organized an important group as the Council of the Islamic Revolution (on 10th January 1979),⁴⁹⁶ then one week later, the Shah left the country.⁴⁹⁷ With the departure of the Shah and the failure of his nationalist prime minister, Shapour Bakhtiar (1914-1991),⁴⁹⁸ two days of armed struggle between guerrilla organizations accompanied with thousands of armed volunteers against the Imperial Guard and the declaration of neutrality of the army on February 11th, 1979, the monarchy finally deceased in Iran.⁴⁹⁹

In due course, on 30th and 31st March 1979, hurriedly, probably fearing the Shah's return and giving an international legitimacy to the revolution, by holding a referendum on creating an Islamic Republic, the former regime obviously legitimately was abolished by 98.2 percent. As the content of the Islamic Republic was absolutely vague, some groups opposed it and boycotted the referendum. The mullahs to compensate this matter included the young unexperienced revolutionaries, by lowering the voting age, from 18 to 16. Then the Islamic Republic's constitution was drafted, based on a special interpretation of Shi'i jurisprudence and simply established a theocratic government or the rule of the Faqih. By this means, the 1906 document was stated as invalid and the new constitution was promoted by a referendum in December 1979.⁵⁰⁰ In the years after the revolution, other incidents such as hostage taking at the US embassy on 4th November 1979,⁵⁰¹ Iraq invasion to Iran on 22nd September 1980,⁵⁰² the

⁴⁹⁶ The Islamic revolutionary council was a secret group that Khomeini set up for preempting the revolution in Iran. The existence of this council was not disclosed before and months after the victory of the revolution for security reasons. Finally, the revolutionary council that was actually ruling the country was dissolved in 12th August 1980, when the parliament was established. Some members of the council were killed in the early months of the revolution, and most of the remaining members of the council were in the following years disapproved and disqualified by the mullah hard-liners of the Islamic Republic. Shaul Bakhash. *The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution*. New York: Basic Books. 1984. Pp. 64-65. Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. 245.

⁴⁹⁷ Milani. *The Shah*. 414.

⁴⁹⁸ John H. Lorentz. *The A to Z of Iran*. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. 2010. p. 45.

⁴⁹⁹ Hossein Bashiriyeh. *The State and Revolution in Iran, 1962-1982*. London & New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. 1984. Pp. 119-121.

⁵⁰⁰ Dilip Hiro. *Holy Wars: The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism*. New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, Inc. 1989. p. 169.

⁵⁰¹ The events following the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran and taking all personnel hostage by roughly 300 Islamist- leftist students with subsequent wide-ranging repercussions on Iran's domestic circumstances as well as on Iran's international relations. It happened after the deposed Shah had been admitted by the US for medical treatment. The crisis lasted 444 days and ended on 10th January 1981, when the hostages were freed, however, it affected Iran's destiny for decades. Mohsen M. Milani. "Hostage Crisis". Originally published: 2004. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/hostage-crisis> .

⁵⁰² It was the longest war in the century following the Vietnam War, which lasted nearly eight years. Saskia M. Gieling. "Iraq vii. Iran-Iraq War". Originally published: 2006. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/iraq-vii-iran-iraq-war> .

drastic tragic Iranian Cultural Revolution (1980-1983)⁵⁰³ and the severe repression and subduing of the political organizations with diverse atheistic and anti-Khomeini ideologies, distorted the revolution to a higher extent.

8.2. *A constitutional monarch and a coup against a legitimate national government*

To narratively analyze this revolution, it begins with September 1941, when Iran was occupied by the forces of both the British Empire and the Soviet Union (later by the US), Reza Shah was removed from his kingdom and therefore was exiled.⁵⁰⁴ Negotiations among the delegates of the occupying powers over the appointment of the new king lasted for a while. The British options were Mohammad Reza the son of Reza Shah Pahlavi and the grandson of Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar (a British resident and Royal Navy officer of the British Empire).⁵⁰⁵ Finally, on the proposal of the United Kingdom and with the implicit Soviet-American agreement, Mohammad Reza was elected to the kingdom of Iran, instead of his father. The Iranian parliament also approved these changes, insofar as, the monarchy of Mohammad Reza was introduced as the free choice of the Iranian nation.⁵⁰⁶

After the dismissal and approval by the allies during the World War II, Iran in a period between 1941 and 1953 underwent the longest course of political open space in its contemporary history. In this era, not mullahs, but intellectuals were in mobilizing and organizing the masses against the structure of power, and non-religious organizations similar to the main left organization in

⁵⁰³ The Iranian Cultural Revolution is said to a series of events related to the higher education system under the Islamic Republic, aimed at intellectual cleansing over the professors and students who were considered to be westernized or leftist in the sight of the Islamic Republic. Another goal of the Iranian Cultural Revolution was the unity of the seminary of Qom and the university. Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. 250, 290. After closing the universities in June 1980, Khomeini issued a decree on 12th June: "For some time, the necessity of the cultural revolution, which is an Islamic matter and the will of the Muslim nation, has been announced, and so far no effective action has been taken, the Islamic nation, especially students are committed to believing in it, and also are worried about plundering of the plotters,...Muslims and adherents of Islam are afraid that God forbidden to miss the opportunity and doing nothing positive, and the culture left the same as the past...The continuation of this tragedy..., will bring a deadly blow to the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic, and any indifference towards this vital matter would be great treason against Islam and the Islamic country." Ruhollah Khomeini. Originally 1980. Published by Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution. *History of Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution*. Online edition. 2011.

<http://en.farhangelm.ir/SCCR/History-of-Supreme-Council-of-the-Cultural-Revolut> .

⁵⁰⁴ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. *The logic of political survival*. Massachusetts: Institute of Technology, 2003. p. 425.

⁵⁰⁵ Afkhami. *The life and times of the Shah*. 67.

⁵⁰⁶ Mohammad Gholi Majd. *Great Britain & Reza Shah: the plunder of Iran, 1921-1941*. Gainesville: The Univ. Press of Florida. 2001. Pp. 381-382.

recent Iranian history, the Tudeh party and then the Iranian National Front successfully recruited among the middle-class and urban working-class.⁵⁰⁷

On the other side, during the 1940s and early 1950s, Iran's share of Iran's 1933 oil contract was truly low. In 1950, for example, Iran's highest income and share from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was less than 12 percent and the total received amount was only 16 million Pounds, while, the UK government received about 51 million Pounds merely as tax from the company's revenues. This contract was due to end in 1961, and the Shah was under pressure to accept another contract that was due to be ended in 1993. The British managers of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company calculated that as long as they had influence on the Shah, there was no need to take any kind of measure in pursuit of their goals. Moreover, they presumed that the Shah was heavily indebted to them, on account of the role of the United Kingdom in his coming to power and coronation.⁵⁰⁸

By the opening of the 16th parliament, the new imposed oil contract was definitively denied, and the unilateral article on the nationalization of the oil industry was placed on the agenda of the parliament. The British Embassy urged the Shah to do his best to prevent the adoption of the article, however, at this stage, the Shah was totally determined not to interfere in the regular process of the parliamentary legislation. In fact, at that time, the Iranian public sphere was such that no one was willing or daring to object or reject the plan. Even when the Americans warned the Shah that the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry would jeopardize the American oil interests in the rest of the world, he urged the Americans not to oppose him. In fact, the Shah was truly traumatized by the growing strength of the National Front.⁵⁰⁹

Mosaddeq, as the leader of the National Front and a popular nationalist, to take Iran at this crucial turning point called for the reformation of the Iranian foreign policy and the ending of the concessions to the external-super-powers.⁵¹⁰ Subsequently, as Mosaddeq was highly supported by the massive demonstrations of the middle-class as well as the large strikes of the workers in Iranian oil industry (organized by the Tudeh party), therefore succeeded in turning the nationalization of Persian oil industry (20th March 1951) into a leverage pressure on the Shah. Afterwards, he reached the prime ministerial position under the influence of the public enthusiasm and even overshadowed the control and authority of the young Shah of Iran over

⁵⁰⁷ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 531.

⁵⁰⁸ Iran's 1933 oil contract was a contract which was signed between the Iranian government and Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (today British Petroleum Company), which was signed during the Reza Shah era following the abolition of the Darcy Contract. Mostafa Elm. *Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath*. New York: Syracuse Univ. Press. 1992. Pp. 38, 51, 53.

⁵⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 81-82, 85.

⁵¹⁰ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 189.

the Iranian imperial army. By and large, during his prime ministerial, he did his finest to confine the Shah's power based on the constitutional specifications, and he thrived almost in all domains other than the army. At that time, the army remained remarkably loyal to the Shah and was signally influenced by its American military advisers, although, some in the upper ranks of the army were among the Mosaddeq's supporters.⁵¹¹ In this regard, Mosaddeq tried to foreclose the War Ministry from the Shah's control, though the Shah refused. Then, Mosaddeq resigned, but with the increase and expand of the protests, the Shah was forced to retreat, hence, he returned to the prime ministerial.⁵¹² During this period, undoubtedly Mosaddeq enjoyed from the highest superiority in the country.⁵¹³

The nationalization of the oil industry for the oil monopolizes and the British Empire was an irreparable blow, particularly when this movement was able to become a driving force for other nations in the region to acquire their rights, and therefore to jeopardize the benefits of the other super-power, the United States. For this reason, eventually, Britain was able to obtain the US approval for a military coup against the government of Mosaddeq. Thereupon, the United States accompanied with the United Kingdom overthrew his government throughout the coup d'etat of August 19th, 1953, of course with the assistance of the proponents of the monarchy in the Iranian army, mullahs, preachers and their followers, some landowners and conservative politicians.⁵¹⁴

The Shah, before the start of the operation, went to his villa in Kelardasht, somewhere in the north of Iran, and by failing in the first phase of the coup, went to Baghdad and then to Rome, but after the coup and the conquest of the building of the radio and other governmental centers, returned to his monarchy. Mosaddeq was thereupon deposed, imprisoned and exiled to Ahmedabad, an Iranian village.⁵¹⁵

This event had a long-lasting impact on the Persian collective consciousness. In an era when the various schools, such as liberalism, socialism and impartial foreign policy were presented all over the Globe, the Pahlavi monarchy and its army were publicly symbolized as the bearer of the capitalist Western powers and their intelligence agencies. Also, since then, in addition to the

⁵¹¹ Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. 129.

⁵¹² Annabelle Sreberny and Ali Mohammadi. *Small media, big revolution: communication, culture, and the Iranian revolution*. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota. 1994. (Originally published as "Small Media For a Big Revolution: Iran" at *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol. 3, No. 3, Pp. 341-371. Spring 1990.) p. 57.

⁵¹³ Abbas Milani. *Eminent Persians: the Men and Women Who Made Modern Iran, 1941-1979*. Vol. 1. New York: Syracuse Univ. Press. 2008. P. 242.

⁵¹⁴ Abrahamian. *A History of Modern Iran*. 116-120.

⁵¹⁵ Milani. *Eminent Persians: the Men and Women Who Made Modern Iran, 1941-1979*. Vol. 1. 244.

Great Britain, the United States was recognized as a new imperialist enemy by the Iranian ideologues. With the occurrence of this coup, the ideologies and political parties such as the National Front and the Tudeh party were suppressed and their members were sentenced to short- or long-term imprisonment, exile and execution. As a result of the repression of the secular and non-religious forces, the way was paved for the emergence of the newly posed eclectic Islamic ideologies.⁵¹⁶

Several months after the coup, by the Shah's endeavors, a consortium agreement was signed with the American, British, French and Dutch oil cartels in order to monopolize the Iranian oil extraction and production. This time, the share of Iran was based on 50-50.⁵¹⁷ On December 7th, 1953, on the eve of the Richard Nixon's (1913-1994)⁵¹⁸ visit to Tehran, a demonstration took place at the Tehran University against the consortium agreement and also Nixon's visit. In this rally, three students were killed. Up until the present time, every year, it is commemorated by both religious and secular students.⁵¹⁹

8.3. An extra-constitutional pro-Western monarchy with ambitions and undercover police

The Shah after returning to power was determined to prevent repetition of the situation of Mosaddeq's prime ministerial. In this regard, the Shah by putting his foot in the footsteps of his father ignored the essential functions of the Persian constitution.⁵²⁰ Therefore, the 1954 election to the 18th parliament was held with the handpicked candidates under the monarchical control. In 1955, the Shah ousted his full-bodied prime minister, Fazlollah Zahedi (1892-1963)⁵²¹ and became the undisputed ruler of Iran.⁵²²

⁵¹⁶ Abrahamian. A History of Modern Iran. 122.

⁵¹⁷ James Bamberg. British Petroleum and Global Oil, 1950-1975: The Challenge of Nationalism. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 2000. p. 43.

⁵¹⁸ Richard Milhous Nixon at that time was the Vice President of the United States. Later he became the 37th American President and the 1st who resigned from the presidential position. He ended the US invasion of Vietnam in 1973 and returned American captives to the house. The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Richard Nixon". Encyclopædia Britannica. Online edition. April 15, 2018. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Richard-Nixon> .

⁵¹⁹ Houchang E. Chehabi. Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran under the Shah and Khomeini. London: I. B. Tauris Co Ltd. 1990. p. 134.

⁵²⁰ In accordance to the Persian Constitution, the government was obliged to be accountable to a parliamentary body based on free elections, the power of the Shah was limited, and freedom of speech and press were guaranteed. <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000.html> .

⁵²¹ A person who the Americans considered him as the real powerful man of Iran.

⁵²² Keddie. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. 135.

Due to the lack of oil revenues during the nationalization of oil, the first economic development plan of 1949 remained intact. However, during the second economic development program between 1956 and 1962, numerous electric water projects were carried out, part of which was due to the discovery of new oil fields near Qom. Then, since 1957, Iran made the first series of oil contracts, based on partnership with some foreign companies. These types of contracts sounded more psychologically satisfactory for the Iranians rather than the previous ones with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (based on the percentage of profit). In 1957, the Shah concluded that the internal situation was calm enough to allow some limited political freedom, thus he canceled the military law which was issued after the coup. He made a new attempt to form a Western style parliamentary system and founded two parties as Mellian (Nationalists) and Mardom (People). At the same time, protests against fraud in the 20th parliamentary elections, pushed the Shah to dissolve this parliament.⁵²³

Concisely, in the first decade after the coup, Mohammad Reza Shah tried to chase what had been abandoned after his father to improve the country's financial system and bureaucracy. Hence, with the aid of a dramatic increase in oil revenues, he succeeded in realizing the Reza Shah's dream of creating a massive state structure.⁵²⁴ He primarily appointed the leaders of the coup into the key positions, received financial assistance from the United States and the technical cooperation of the Israeli and American intelligence agencies (Mossad and CIA) and the US Police (FBI) so as to form a new secret police SAVAK (1957).⁵²⁵ This security organization expanded to a point where it was able to easily target a large number of Persian people, strictly censor the mass media and apply torture in any way to eliminate the dissents.⁵²⁶ In the following years, the Shah ruled as an autocratic self-reigning kingdom, who simultaneously represented himself as a reformist monarch and a close financially military ally to the United States and the West. For instance, by his vast military investment, the increasing annual budget and the purchase of as many as weapons, created one of the most exquisite armies of the world,⁵²⁷ which in 1977 became the fifth largest military force.⁵²⁸ In fact, it was a large portion of the country's oil revenue that was allocated to armament. He had uproariously personally numerous travels to Britain and other powerful countries so as to shop as many as

⁵²³ Roger M. Savory. "Muhammad Rida Shah Pahlavi". in C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs & Ch. Pellat (eds.). *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Vol. 7. Leiden: E. J. Brill. 1993. Pp. 446-451.

⁵²⁴ Abrahamian. *A History of Modern Iran*. 123.

⁵²⁵ *Ibid.*, 128. Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 419.

⁵²⁶ Abrahamian. *A History of Modern Iran*. 126.

⁵²⁷ Richard W. Cottam. *Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study*. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press. 1988. p. 143.

⁵²⁸ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 435-436.

military equipment. Even the Shah's supporters such as Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890-1969),⁵²⁹ were worried about his military obsession.⁵³⁰ Perhaps, the Shah that considered himself as a military genius, felt that he did not have enough power to defend himself, thus demanded much more weaponization.

As is earlier elaborated, the decades of the 1960s and 1970s Iran underwent a sort of socio-economic development, considerably due to the increased oil revenues. As ports and roads expanded, large dams were constructed, and more than 800 kilometers of railroads (connecting Tehran to other major cities) were created. Hence, Iran experienced a small industrial revolution, which resulted in a high GDP of the increasing number of factories and the production of some major industries. The requirement for human resource development also resulted in increasing number of schools, universities and medical facilities. This economic prosperity was indeed remarkably beneficial to the religious foundations, because in the wake of this boom, bazaar, as the old mullah's ally, became rich enough to fund numerous and growing religious institutions such as mosques, seminaries (theological schools) and Husseiniehs (congregation halls for Shi'i commemoration ceremonies). In so far as by the mid-1970s, probably for the first time, the religious institutions were able to send mullahs and preachers regularly towards the distant poor villages and towns.⁵³¹

In any case, behind the facade lighting of this so-called modernization, there was the American shove indeed. To flash back, up until the 1960s, the Iranian predominately agricultural economy was greatly dependent on the foreign aids. The administration of the United States, headed by John F. Kennedy, stipulated the payment of the future loans to implement the land and liberal reforms, which they considered the best protection barrier against a communistic revolution. As a result, the Shah led Ali Amini (1905-1992),⁵³² a person trusted by the Americans, to prime ministerial position, and Hassan Arsanjani (1922-1969)⁵³³ as agriculture minister to implement the land reforms program aimed at eliminating Iran's reliance on agriculture and instead promoting an independent farmer class. Although, the land reforms were part of the Amini government's policies, the Shah, after dismissing him, appointed his own best friend, Asadollah

⁵²⁹ See Lucia Raatma. Dwight D. Eisenhower. Minneapolis: Compass Point Books. 2003.

⁵³⁰ This issue was clearly specified in a secret telegraph message. Hilton L. Root. Alliance Curse: How America Lost the Third World. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution Press. 2008. p. 243.

⁵³¹ Abrahamian. Iran Between Two Revolutions. 427-428, 433.

⁵³² Reinhard Schulze. Geschichte der Islamischen Welt: Von 1900 bis zur Gegenwart. München: C.H.Beck. 2016. p. 271.

⁵³³ See Milani. Eminent Persians: the Men and Women Who Made Modern Iran, 1941-1979. Vol. 1. 85-91.

Alam (1919-1978),⁵³⁴ and by some brief modifications, introduced the reforms as his own initiative and with all its whims, put it all in the charter of its six controversial articles, the so-called White or Shah and People Revolution.⁵³⁵

The Shah believed that by implementing such land reforms, he would not only acquire the American full prior consent, but in addition would attract the support of the peasants through the abolition of the landlord regime.⁵³⁶ The official goal was the modernization of the country by the end of the 20th century.⁵³⁷ However, in practice, the plan turned merely into an advertising show, and never achieved the desired outcome.⁵³⁸ In turn, the reforms transformed the wealth generation system of the aristocracy that was the traditional ally of the Shah.

8.4. The White Revolution and autocratic semi-modernizational measures, their external and internal provocations and ramifications

The White Revolution widened the gap between the mullahs and the Shah.⁵³⁹ While, within less than one decade after the coup, the relation between the Shah and the mullahs were peaceful, by the adoption of the revolutionary plans, as well as the recognition of the Israeli government by the Iranian regime, this relation truly deteriorated.⁵⁴⁰ Moreover, the article of the right to vote for women was in appearance one of the major controversial issues of the White Revolution, which more than any other provoked and persuaded the mullahs to oppose.⁵⁴¹

The mullahs were also seriously worried about their major financial traditional ally in the bazaar and the landlords, who were evidently endangered by the measures. The other main powerful opponent of the Shah's reformist programs was the National Front, which proclaimed the White

⁵³⁴ He was the prime minister who significantly stimulated the mullahs via execution of the reformist plans, in October 1962, right before the presentation of the controversial White Revolution, he represented the bill of Provincial Associations which was adopted years ago by the first parliament. According to this bill, women were given the right to vote, as well as the condition of being Muslim and swearing on the Quran was eliminated from the preconditions of the electoral law, as it aimed to constitutionally recognize the women and religious minorities' rights. The mullahs and their devotees harshly reacted, thus the government officially abolished it within less than two months. Milani. *Eminent Persians: the Men and Women Who Made Modern Iran, 1941-1979*. Vol. 1. 51.

⁵³⁵ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 421-424.

⁵³⁶ Saeed Rahnama and Sohrab Behdad (ed.). *Iran after the revolution: crisis of an Islamic state*. New York: I. B. Tauris. 1995. Pp. 24-25.

⁵³⁷ Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi, Peter McDonald and Meimanat Hosseini-Chavoshi. *The Fertility Transition in Iran: Revolution and Reproduction*. London: Springer. 2009. p. 21.

⁵³⁸ William A. Dorman and Mansour Farhang. *The U.S. Press and Iran: Foreign Policy and the Journalism of Deference*. California: Univ. of California Press. 1987. Pp. 113, 118.

⁵³⁹ Heather Lehr Wagner. *The Iranian Revolution*. New York: Infobase Publishing. 2010. p. 42.

⁵⁴⁰ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 424-425.

⁵⁴¹ Rahnama. *Iran after the revolution: crisis of an Islamic state*. 35-36.

Revolution as a return to tyranny, nevertheless, they already lost their major power and influence under the coup. Thus, the mullahs should have ridden almost singly. For instance, the grand influential mullah Hossein Borujerdi (1875-1961), issued a fatwa on the forbiddenness of the land grabbing.⁵⁴² Among the opposed mullahs, a new opposition figure was appeared as Khomeini. This over 60-year-old mullah taught mysticism at Qom seminary, and began his critical lectures since 1962. Khomeini, while, avoided addressing issues such as land reforms and women's right to vote (the main issue of which was opposed by other mullahs), was determined to deal with the controversies that most angered the masses, namely the influence of the United States on the Shah. Anyhow, as a result of his attempts and the other mullahs, in June 1963, people protested the Shah's plans in the major cities of Iran, which ended in a bloody repression. After the incident, Khomeini was exiled (firstly in 1964 to Turkey, then after less than a year to Iraq) and the leaders of National Front were arrested. Comparatively, as the Tobacco Movement had been an exercise for the Persian Constitutional Movement, the June 1963 uprising was a teeny rehearsal for the mullahs and masses in the 1979 Revolution.⁵⁴³ The land reforms and the White Revolution led to new tensions in the Iranian social structure that was not expected by the Shah. These reforms instead of uniting abandoned peasants to the regime, in best situation, created a large number of independent farmers and workers who did not feel any sense of loyalty to the Shah. As a result, the White Revolution that was designed to preempt a Red Revolution, paved the way for the 1978-1979 social movement and

⁵⁴² Savory. "Muhammad Rida Shah Pahlawi". 448.

⁵⁴³ Up until the June 1963 uprising, Khomeini was not recognized as a source of imitation or even an Ayatollah (grand mullah). The people did not seriously know him. The discussion of his Ijtihad and his authority was not a matter of importance at all, and he was accepted only as one of the mysticist orator mullahs, no more. From the old time in Najaf and Qom seminaries, the young mullahs were only entitled to be a source of imitation, throughout the recognition of their masters. Khomeini's master was the grand mullah Boroujerdi who never ever announced his Ijtihad. After the Khomeini's arrest, the Shah wanted to execute him. The grand mullahs who saw him in real danger, decided to announce him as an Ayatollah or Mujtahid, since the Iranian Constitution did not allow the Shah to execute the Mujtahids. Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 424-426. Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. 146-147. Amir Arjomand. *The Turban for the Crown, The Islamic revolution in Iran*. 86. Erfan Qaneei Fard. *Dar Damgahe Hadeseh (In The Net of Events)*. Los Angeles: Ketab Corp. 2012. Pp. 137-138.

Revolution,⁵⁴⁴ albeit in Black.⁵⁴⁵ Despite the fact that the White Revolution played role in economic and technological progress, the failure of some parts such as the land reforms programs and the relative lack of democratic reform, prepared the circumstances for the regime collapse.⁵⁴⁶

With the Arab-Israeli war (1967) and the boycott of Arab oil sales, the Shah provocatively refrained from joining the oil embargo against Israel.⁵⁴⁷ He surpassed Saudi Arabia in the oil production, and in 1970 made Iran the largest oil producer in the Middle East.⁵⁴⁸ The oil price increased and Nixon to deal with this high price was forced to two times reduce the exchange rate of dollar in 1971 and 1972. OPEC which was headed by the Shah responded to the Nixon's policy and in two stages increased the oil price.⁵⁴⁹ On the other hand, the discovery of oil within the Persian Gulf's waters allowed the Shah to conclude new exploration and extraction contracts with small and new companies outside the consortium.⁵⁵⁰

Between 1963 and 1972, the Iran's GNP increased fourfold and the health standards increased dramatically. As a result, the population grew at an alarming rate of three percent per year, and Iran was no longer able to produce its own food resources.⁵⁵¹

Nevertheless, the Shah's opponents ultimately enjoyed every opportunity for humiliating him and refused to accept his way of development. One of the accusations and criticisms of the Shah was the financial corruption of his royal family and affiliates.⁵⁵² A vast proportion of the oil rents was wasted in royalty, administration and weaponization, the rest was invested into the

⁵⁴⁴ Abrahamian. *A History of Modern Iran*. 139-140.

⁵⁴⁵ In the course of the importance of the black color for the Islamic revolution, I should elaborate that the terminology of the word of black, in Arabic 'Aswad, has direct connection to Sayyid means gentleman, master and an honorific title denoting people known as descendants of prophet Muhammad. The Ka'aba house is covered with black. There are also some quotations that express the (imaginary) alive hidden 12th Imam will come with the Muhammad's black velvet flag. When Imam Husayn was martyred, the Banu Hashim women were wearing black in his mourning, and they did not change their clothes anymore. Therefore, wearing a black dress during the mournings of the Imams, especially in the two months of Muharram and Safar, is considered as virtuous expressing sympathy with those sacred things and reviving them. In mourning seasons and occasions, Shi'a people even cover some walls with black, sayyid mullahs put on black, shi'i traditional veil for women is black, among other examples.

⁵⁴⁶ Robert Graham. *Iran: The Illusion of Power*. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1979. Pp. 19, 96.

⁵⁴⁷ Gawdat G. Bahgat. *American oil Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea*. Gainesville, Florida: The Univ. Press of Florida. 2003. p. 124.

⁵⁴⁸ Bamberg. *British Petroleum and Global Oil, 1950-1975: the Challenge of Nationalism*. 173.

⁵⁴⁹ John W. Young, John Kent. *Oxford International Relations Since 1945*. Oxford: Oxford Univ. press. 2013. Pp. 302-303.

⁵⁵⁰ Parviz Mina. "Oil Agreements in Iran". Originally published: 2004. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/oil-agreements-in-iran> .

⁵⁵¹ Savory. "Muhammad Rida Shah Pahlawi". 450.

⁵⁵² Abbas Milani. *The Persian Sphinx: Amir Abbas Hoveyda and the Riddle of the Iranian Revolution*. New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers. 2000. Pp. 349, 382-383.

economic structure.⁵⁵³ The ineffectiveness of this economic structure facilitated this corruption. For instance, the great companies bribed the government executives and royal family so as to resolve their problems and receive the required authorizations.⁵⁵⁴ The hands of the Shah, his family and their friends were roughly in every branch of economic activities. According to a credible economist, in the last few years of the monarchy, a large amount of money directly from the oil revenues was deposited into the secret accounts of the royal family outside Iran.⁵⁵⁵ In another example, the role of the Shah in OPEC was considered by his opponents as another evidence for Shah's service to the American imperialism. They addressed that even the high price of oil would be against Japan and Europe to benefit of the United States. There were also two other Shah's measures which were criticized by the mullahs. Firstly, at the beginning of the 1970s, millions of dollars were spent by the Shah in Iran's 2500-year anniversary celebration in Persepolis,⁵⁵⁶ where the largest gathering of the world leaders was held.⁵⁵⁷ Secondly, in March 1976, the Majles approved a new era based on the supposed year of the accession of the first Achaemenid Emperor, Cyrus the Great and changed the basis date of the Persian history to 559 BC. This official calendar of the country was announced as the Imperial calendar, thus, 21st March 1976 became the first day of the year 2535 in the Imperial era. Khomeini, six months after the calendrical system change, in his message on the occasion of the feast of breaking the fast (Eid al-Fitr),⁵⁵⁸ which is an important religious holiday based on the Islamic Hejri calendar declared the application of the Imperial calendar as a forbidden act (Haram). However, eventually, two years later, in the course of the revolutionary movement, the Persian Solar Hejri calendar based on the prophet Muhammad's migration from Mecca to Medina on 19th March 622 AD was officially reverted.⁵⁵⁹

⁵⁵³ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 427.

⁵⁵⁴ Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. 137, 159-160.

⁵⁵⁵ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 437.

⁵⁵⁶ Persepolis is the ruined monuments of the acropolis of the city of Parsa, northeast of Shiraz in ancient Persia. It was founded in the late 6th century BC by Darius 1st as the ceremonial and the dynastic capital of Persia under the Achaemenid Persian kings. It as one of the best-known sites of the ancient world, was registered by the UNESCO as a World Cultural Heritage in 1979. Alireza Shapur Shahbazi. "Persepolis". Originally published: 2009. *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. Online edition. 1982.

<http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/persepolis> .

⁵⁵⁷ Sreberny. *Small media, big revolution: communication, culture, and the Iranian revolution*. 68.

⁵⁵⁸ A holy celebrated fest of breaking the fast by Muslims worldwide that marks the end of Ramadan, the month of fasting. Cenap Cakmak. *Islam: A Worldwide Encyclopedia*. Vol. 1. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO. 2017. Pp. 399-400.

⁵⁵⁹ Lance Latham. *Standard C Date/Time Library: Programming the World's Calendars and Clocks*. Lawrence: R&D Books, Miller Freeman, Inc. 1998. Pp. 345, 350. Antonio Panaino, Reza Abdollahy, Daniel Balland. "Calendars". Originally published: 1990. *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/calendars> .

The reproducing and reviving the Persian ancient traditions crashed the Shi'a culture and demonstrated two periods of Iranian history, the ancient glorious and the dark calamitous of the Islamic one. It should be mentioned that within the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi, also the idea of Persian aristocracy, and the emphasis on Aryanism were wide spread in Iran.⁵⁶⁰ Reza Shah's emphasis on Iranian identity had a profound negative impact on the people who were for long years under the influence of Islam and the mullahs. He drastically banned the Shi'i mourning, as well as the mullahs and women's traditional Islamic veil and clothes by force. Some traditional old female generations who felt nudist without veil, were locked up at home.⁵⁶¹

The autocratic measures of the Shah also created for him some armed foes, which their background returned to the beginning of the young Shah in 1941, when the Iranian political parties such as Tudeh and National Front were born. Until 1949, The Shah's assassination in the University of Tehran, the Tudeh party was the most successful among the others. After the mentioned event, the Tudeh party of Iran was declared as illegal. By the coup, the activity of the National Front was additionally banned. As already was elaborated, in 1957, the Shah came to the conclusion that for the sake of his rule, he required two parties. He directed two apparently opposite parties which did not have influence outside the parliament. Eventually, the two parties' controversy over electoral fraud⁵⁶² persuaded the Shah to build his own single party Rastakhiz in 1975. He announced that it was the only legal party in Iran (shaped up or shipped out).⁵⁶³ In this case, he not only did not contemplate democracy to Iran, but considered it as an obstacle to his so-called modernizational process. He believed that a tyrannical government, alike his father's rule, would be more beneficial to the country.⁵⁶⁴ The Shah in the last 16 years of his reign was the ultimate decision maker for all key moments of the country,⁵⁶⁵ and therefore unknowingly encouraged the peaceful parliamentary parties into the armed radical groups. Since 1972, they intensified the revolutionary armed struggles, and the country got stuck in a revolutionary hatred cycle of terrorism, counterterrorism and mutual violence. The increasing violence of the security forces even caused the critiques of the international sphere.⁵⁶⁶

⁵⁶⁰ Orly R. Rahimiyan. "Judeo-Persian Communities vi. The Pahlavi Era (1925-1979)". Originally published: 2009. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/judeo-persian-vi-the-pahlavi-era-1925-1979> .

⁵⁶¹ Farzaneh Milani. *Veils and Words: The Emerging Voices of Iranian Women Writers*. New York: Syracuse Univ. Press. 1992. Pp. 34-35.

⁵⁶² Kenneth Janda. *Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey*. Vol. 2. New York: Free Press. 1980. p. 861.

⁵⁶³ Afshin Matin-Asgari. "The Pahlavi Era: Iranian Modernity in Global Context". Touraj Daryae (ed.). in *The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. 2012. p. 361.

⁵⁶⁴ Elm. *Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath*. 51.

⁵⁶⁵ Milani. *The Shah*. 408.

⁵⁶⁶ Savory. "Muhammad Rida Shah Pahlawi". 448.

From another side, there was yet again a strong Western support for the Shah autocracy, which rebounded to his coming to the reign and the occupation of Iran (lasted until 1946). In such circumstances, the Shah also was not able to pursue a harmonious foreign policy,⁵⁶⁷ thus inevitably sought to establish firm relations with the West.⁵⁶⁸ In the Western side, Britain preferred to deal with a single person rather than bargaining a parliament or a cabinet, and the United States favored a strong monocratic state neighboring the Soviet borders for creating more security in the region.⁵⁶⁹ Hence the both Western powers were interested in empowering and strengthening the Shah in Iran and the Middle East.⁵⁷⁰ Furthermore, in the course of the international sphere, the return of the Shah to the monarchy after the coup with the help and support of the United States caused the Shah's attachment to the US, a determining factor in his foreign policy since then.⁵⁷¹ During these years, the Shah was constantly on the front of the Western bloc against the eastern bloc and even the Third World countries belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement. He allowed the United States to set up a spy network inside the Iranian border and joined to the CENTO.⁵⁷² He openly opposed the Nasser's Pan-Arab movement,⁵⁷³ and even during the 1967 war between the Arabs and Israeli people, in the form of de facto, recognized the Israeli regime and in the course of the conflict, took the part of Israel. While, the majority of the Third World countries wanted a boycott against South Africa and its racist policies, the Shah was selling oil to the Apartheid regime.⁵⁷⁴ Quite astonishingly, indeed spontaneously, from the mid-1960s, the Shah improved his relations with the Soviet Union to reduce his political and technical dependence on the West. Following

⁵⁶⁷ Amin Saikal. "Iranian Foreign Policy, 1921-1979". Edited by Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly, C. Melville. in *The Cambridge History of Iran: From Nadir Shah To The Islamic Republic*. Vol. 7. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 2008. p. 426.

⁵⁶⁸ Spencer C. Tucker and Priscilla Mary Roberts (eds.). *The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Iraq Conflicts*. Vol. 1. California: ABC-CLIO. 2010. p. 568.

⁵⁶⁹ Elm. *Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath*. 51.

⁵⁷⁰ Cottam. *Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study*. 86.

⁵⁷¹ Saikal. "Iranian Foreign Policy, 1921-1979". 426.

⁵⁷² The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was formed during the Cold War with the aim of fighting the Soviet Union and the influence of Marxism. It was basically formed in 1955 with American initiative and support between Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and the United Kingdom. It was dissolved in 1979. Joseph A. Kechichian. "Central Treaty Organization". Originally published: 1991. *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/central-treaty-organization-cento-a-mutual-defense-and-economic-cooperation-pact-among-persia-turkey-and-pakistan-wi> .

⁵⁷³ Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein (1918-1970) the second President of Egypt, creator of the union between Egypt and Syria, and the main flagship of Pan-Arabism in the 1960s. William J. Duiker, Jackson J. Spielvogel. *The Essential World History*. Boston: Cengage Learning. 2011. p. 779. Adeed Dawisha. *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair*. New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press. 2003. p. 184.

⁵⁷⁴ Ervand Abrahamian. *The Coup: 1953, The CIA, and The Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations*. New York: The New Press. 2013. p. 217.

the Shah's visit to Moscow in 1965, new economic and political relations with the Soviet Union were formed. This betterment in relations, in addition to economic gain, improved the position and power of the Shah in front of the West, regional rivals and the internal oppositions.⁵⁷⁵ He strengthened the Iranian sovereignty on the three contentious islands⁵⁷⁶ and instead abdicated the claims of sovereignty over Bahrain.⁵⁷⁷ Then, powerfully signed the 1975 Algiers Agreement and ended the border disputes with Iraq.⁵⁷⁸ He successfully, managed to utilize the oil and OPEC leverage against his Western allies. Regarding all these measures, yet again, oppositions accused him as an American puppet, who after the departure of the British army from the Persian Gulf genuinely assumed the role of the gendarme of the region.⁵⁷⁹ Confirmedly, the Nixon doctrine (1969) after the Indochina wars sought to secure the American interests in the bipolar system of the Cold War throughout building the regional powers.⁵⁸⁰ Following the international order, the Shah sought to gain more military and industrial strength, which the Iranian non-monetary structure did not respond to, thus in this way the country became more technically and militarily dependent on the Americans. Even with the presidential of the Democrats, Jimmy Carter (Presidency 1977-1981) in the United States, came no more change to the nature of the American politics and Nixon doctrine. Although, Carter emphasized on the issue of human rights and the control of the sale of weapons to the non-Western allies, he also favored Shah's leadership and policies and praised him as a "great leader".⁵⁸¹ The oil price collapse in the mid 1975 led to an economic downturn, with increasing inflation in the years between 1975 to 1977, therefore a general discontent and national wide rallies. In such situation, capital flight occurred, namely some flew their money rapidly out of the country. At the same time, the mullahs, bazaar-men and intellectuals, the three major active corps of the constitutional movement became increasingly alienated to the regime. Then a chain of unplanned policies by the Shah pushed the move of the revolutionary forces. Some measures

⁵⁷⁵ Amin Saikal. *The rise and fall of the shah*. New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press. 2009. Pp. 94-96.

⁵⁷⁶ Farhang Mehr. *A Colonial Legacy: The Dispute Over the Islands of Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tumbs*. Maryland: Univ. Press of America. 1997. Pp. 53-54.

⁵⁷⁷ Carol Ann Gillespie. *Bahrain*. Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers. 2002. p. 47.

⁵⁷⁸ Jasim M. Abdulghani. *Iraq and Iran: the years of crisis*. Vol. 1. Kent: Croom Helm Ltd. 1984. Pp. 152-158.

⁵⁷⁹ Saikal. "Iranian Foreign Policy, 1921-1979". 204-208.

⁵⁸⁰ Kei Koga. *Reinventing Regional Security Institutions in Asia and Africa: Power shifts, ideas, and institutional change*. Abingdon: Routledge. 2017. p. 32, Albert Lau. *Southeast Asia and the Cold War*. Abingdon: Routledge. 2012. p. 172.

⁵⁸¹ Saikal. *The rise and fall of the shah*. 204-208.

such as the destruction of the old bazaars in Tehran and Mashhad,⁵⁸² the announcement of the Imperial calendar instead of the Hejri calendar, the approval of prime minister's⁵⁸³ budget cuts plan which was in principle the abolition of the subsidy to the mullahs,⁵⁸⁴ the latest of these series of actions, the publication of an article against Khomeini. As the reactionary demonstration of the mullahs in Qom was deadly repressed, Khomeini was fully equipped to sit on the revolutionary movement's wave and a chain of protests was formed every forty days, imitation of the tradition of mourning for martyrs in Shi'ite. In such circumstances, Khomeini, in an interview on May 9th, 1978, with the Le Monde newspaper called for the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime and the monarchical constitution. He well confident of victory, repeatedly mentioned the phrase "when we came to power".⁵⁸⁵

8.5. *The mental makeup of the Shah*

The psychological state of the Shah, all through his reign, made him to autocratically architect the foundations of the royal structure around his own domination. Thus, with his shakiness and vulnerability, this architecture canalized all discontents towards him and his established construction, which therefore appeared simply collapsible.

With such characteristics, by the height of the crisis, during the last two years of his rule, he depicted an indecisive personality and made the most inaccurate decisions of his life. For instance, he displayed an obsession in terms of changing the senior majors of the army, in such a way that they always obey him. This issue eventually caused the fact that, such commanders, in his absence, were unable to decide properly. These army commanders, after a key event such as the black Friday (1978), avoided shooting the demonstrators, which was veritabily an important factor for the victory of the revolutionary movement (with negligible casualties).

At the time of the concluding revolutionary demonstrations, accidentally the Shah was deprived of all of his psychological sources and supports. Among his core affectionates, for instance, his

⁵⁸² Mashhad is the most sacred city in Iran. The city is named Mashhad (meaning the place of martyrdom) after Imam Reza, the eighth Shi'a Imam was murdered and buried there. W. Madelung. "Ali Al-Reza". Originally published: 1985. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982.

<http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/ali-al-reza> .

⁵⁸³ Jamshid Amouzegar (1923-2016) was the prime minister of Iran from 7 August 1977 to 27 August 1978.

⁵⁸⁴ Subsidies were paid to the mullahs in order to compensate the decline in their income from the implementation of the second phase of the land reforms.

⁵⁸⁵ Savory. "Muhammad Rida Shah Pahlawi". 446-451.

best friend and special advisor, Ernest Perron (1908-1961)⁵⁸⁶ passed away many years before the revolutionary incidents.⁵⁸⁷ Ashraf (1919-2016),⁵⁸⁸ his compassionate twin sister was sent to New York, as she had demonstrated a corrupted face in the view of the revolutionaries. Worst of all, Asadollah Alam, one of the most important political figures and assistants to him, cancerously died in the midst of the very revolutionary moments, and therefore left him alone.⁵⁸⁹ The Shah was also cancerously diagnosed, and hid this issue for some time.⁵⁹⁰ He as a person, who always believed from his childhood that he was somehow supported by God and the Shi'a Imams, when comprehended that he had a cancer, dramatically lost his self-confidence.⁵⁹¹ On the other hand, as between the 1960s and 1970s, Iran's economy rapidly grew, he felt that he really is omnipotent. According to a CIA report, he had felt a divine mission to run the country. Following the relative advancement of the country he proceeded tough policies against the leftist and moderate forces, however, believed that the mullahs (albeit other than Khomeini and his supporters) were his trusted allies in a war against communism and secular nationalism in Iran. This policy gave the mullahs opportunity to create an exclusive network among the people. Then more importantly, the Shah with illusion of this sort of divine protection arrogantly did not respond to the requests from his savior the United States so as to apply his influence on OPEC to lower the oil price.⁵⁹² Although, the Shah's family was not religious, he regarded

⁵⁸⁶ Ernest Perron was a Swiss man and actually the son of the gardener and handyman of a school in Switzerland, in which the Shah was trained.

⁵⁸⁷ Marvin Zonis. *Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. 1991. Pp. 116-117. Milani. *The Shah*. 49-50.

⁵⁸⁸ Andrew Scott Cooper. *The Fall of Heaven: The Pahlavis and the Final Days of Imperial Iran*. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 2016. p. XI.

⁵⁸⁹ Paasha Mahdavi. *Power Grab: Political Survival through Extractive Resource Nationalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 2020. p. 190.

⁵⁹⁰ Andrew Scott Cooper. *The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East*. New York: Simon and Schuster. 2011. p. 279.

⁵⁹¹ Martin S. Kramer. *Middle Eastern lives: The Practice of Biography and Self-Narrative*. New York: Syracuse Univ. Press. 1991. Pp. 15-16, 71-74. For the best account of the Shah's psychological state See Zonis. *Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah*. particularly Pp. 20-21.

⁵⁹² The matter led the United States to despair from the Shah and to beg to Saudi Arabia. In return, Carter resumed his efforts to improve the status of democracy in Iran. It was possibly the end of the unconditional support of the Shah from Washington. Milani. *The Shah*. 377, 383.

himself as a true believer.⁵⁹³ Intentionally or unintentionally, knowing or not knowing, he unlike to his father paradoxically supported the mullahs' ideology. For instance, at the time of Khomeini's objection to the principles of his White Revolution, he severely reacted to the mullahs' uprising. In other words, with the advent of his policies to modernize Iran, he correctly realized that the mullahs are the most important obstacle in the way of his developmental plans. Nonetheless, he underestimated the power of the mullahs to manipulate the masses. As a result of such paradoxical beliefs and mental state, he had also never estimated that he could be labeled as an apostate ruler, the enemy of Islam and God.⁵⁹⁴

8.6. The engineered socio-economic circumstances, blocked political system and radical eclectic groups

As the Shah socio-economically reconstructed some parts of the country, the new middle-class and industrial working-class were expanded, without modernizing the political sphere.⁵⁹⁵ Verily, between the years 1941-1953, via his measures, the number of two groups of people that were the main opponents of the Pahlavi regime, urban workers and intellectuals was quadrupled. As a consequence, the country underwent the increasing opposition of the social groups that were deprived of having the political institutions, such as independent labor unions, newspapers and political parties. The land reforms program partly boosted the commercial cultivation and increased the number of peasant landowners, but the amount of the granted lands to most of them, was not enough to set up independent agricultural projects. These restructurings also created a corps of atomized landless livestock and farmers, who had potentials to be attracted by the political orientations. Some of them, who were drawn to the marginal and slum areas of

⁵⁹³ Ali Rahnama. *Superstition as Ideology in Iranian Politics: From Majlesi to Ahmadinejad*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. 2011. p. 23. In fact, Mohammad Reza was influenced by the Iranian religious narrations and myths that were narrated by his relatives and servants. According to Ashraf, his sister, some of these stories were never erased from the mind of him. When he was schooling in Switzerland, he used to say prayers every day. The root of his religious orientation also returned back to his poor physical body in his early childhood, when he once suffered a severe disease, and a physician said, "The only other thing that comes from us is to pray". Then he dreamed Imam Ali brought him a healing remedy. Years after, he was totally convinced that there was a connection between his revelation and his physical improvement. He recalled also two other similar revelations in his life. When he was riding a horse to a holy shrine fell and dreamed a son of Imam Ali rescued him. His father, Reza Shah never believed his dreams. Hilariously, he narrated another revelation about meeting with the 12th hidden Imam. In an interview that was held shortly before his death in Cairo, he stated that religious beliefs are the spiritual component of any society and without them, society will be degenerated. In this interview, he described a real religion as the best guarantee for the moral and spiritual prosperity of the society. Afkhami. *The life and times of the Shah*. 25-26, 33.

⁵⁹⁴ Savory. "Muhammad Rida Shah Pahlawi". 451.

⁵⁹⁵ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 426-427.

the cities, later became the so-called revolutionary barefooted masses, the appropriate raw material for the revolution. On the other hand, this method of economic development magnified the class differences, which was really obvious and significant in Tehran. Although, the living standards of the middle-class families increased to some extent, the expansion of urban slums, heavy traffic and air pollution reduced the quality of the life. While, some lived in palaces, roughly 42 percent of the population in Tehran suffered from inappropriate accommodations. The gap between the capital Tehran and other cities of Iran was also clearly visible. For example, during the time that Tehran residents had better accessibility to education, health, media and job opportunities, 96 percent of the villagers did not have electricity. The other consequence of such engineered quasi-modernizational measures, as well as the sudden increase in the oil revenues was a sharp rise in the people's expectations, that later contributed to the intensification of the revolutionary tensions. This reality obviously revealed a gap between the claims and achievements of the regime on the one hand, and the unfulfilled and frustrated expectations of the society on the other hand. All in all, although, in the wake of these social welfare programs, significant progress was made in particular in the health and educational systems, Iran yet again had one of the worst statistical facts in terms of the child mortality, welfare facilities and the percentage of the people with normal education in the Middle East.⁵⁹⁶ On the other side, the autocratic measures of Mohammad Reza Shah, particularly after the coup, violated the constitution of the country.⁵⁹⁷ His despotic security forces repressed the oppositions. These policies and the intolerance of criticism progressively blocked the legal political debates through the constitutional rights. The denial of having political prisoners, tortures and executions facilitated the radicalization of the opponents and challengers.⁵⁹⁸ The review of the underground press of the regime's opponents reveals a young generation of intellectuals, that while, respecting the views and tactics of their leftist and nationalist predecessors, succeeded in designing and developing some new ideas in line with the Shi'a ideology.⁵⁹⁹ The emergence of these new intellectual dissidents was also the result of the weakening of the activity and popularity of Tudeh party (as the main Iranian leftist party) and the Iranian National Front.

Tudeh party, after the coup, softly continued to play a role in the process of the pre-revolutionary movement. Thus, it succeeded to do some activities in the early 1970s, including

⁵⁹⁶ Ibid., 446-449. Abrahamian. *A History of Modern Iran*. 139-142.

⁵⁹⁷ Mackey. *The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation*. 219.

⁵⁹⁸ Fathali M. Moghaddam. *The Individual and Society: A Cultural Integration*. New York: Worth Publishers. 2002. p. 49.

⁵⁹⁹ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 450-451.

running a radio station, publication of regular magazines, as well as the formation of small underground nuclei at Tehran University and the Iranian oil-rich areas. While, these political activities were the major target of crackdowns and hard strikes of the regime, the critiques on the party's policies (blindly following the Soviet Union), besides the aging and death of its leadership gradually declined the attraction of the Tudeh Party. Furthermore, the rise of Maoistic tendencies or the issue of the Chinese-Soviet conflicts led to a serious split among the members of the party.⁶⁰⁰

In terms of the Iranian National Front, although, most of the arrested senior members of this party were shortly released after the coup, many of them either left the political sphere or the country. Nonetheless, in early 1960s, with the relative reduction of the regime's oversight the National Front organized several strikes, marches and published a newspaper. In 1961 two members of the National Front, Mahmoud Taleqani (1911-1979)⁶⁰¹ and Mehdi Bazargan (1907-1995),⁶⁰² along with several like-minded reformists, formed the Liberation Movement party. This party was banned by the government following the June 5th, 1963 uprising. Nevertheless, it continued to hold secret gatherings in Tehran and organized forces abroad, especially North America and France, insofar as, it had great efforts in the revolutionary years, and this was due to its close relationship with Khomeini.⁶⁰³

Importantly, the prominent thinker of the Liberation Movement was one of the main ideologues of the 1979 revolution, Ali Shari'ati.⁶⁰⁴ The only clear message of Shari'ati's works was that Islam, especially Shi'ism, is not a simply conservative personal non-political belief, but a

⁶⁰⁰ Ibid., 451-457.

⁶⁰¹ Mahmoud Taleqani had a history of imprisonment for opposing Reza Shah's rule. Unlike other mullahs, he was known as a prominent mullah supporting the National Front in Tehran after the coup. He played an important role as an interlocutor and communicative link between the two different opposition groups, namely the mullahs and the nationalists. As Taleqani was associated with some secular revolutionaries during his long imprisonment, he was sympathizing to them. Taleqani in his works aimed to show that Shi'ism is essentially inconsistent with the oppressive tyranny and consistent with democracy, as well as socialism. He sought to eliminate the gaps between Islam and the contemporary world, as well as the differences between the conservative traditional mullahs and the modern intellectuals, a contradiction that contributed to the defeat of the constitutional movement and national struggles. Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. 195-196.

⁶⁰² Bazargan was one of the most important political religious leaders of the revolution, a child of a wealthy and very religious businessman, and was obviously well educated in Paris. He had anti-communistic ideas, rejected secularism and believed that politics should be guided via religion. Ibid., 198-199.

⁶⁰³ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 460, 462.

⁶⁰⁴ He was from a religious landlord background, educated in Paris through a governmental scholarship. In Paris, he was engaged in political activities in favor of the Cuban and Algerian revolutions and was influenced directly and indirectly by a number of neo Marxists professors, theologians and leftist emancipatorians such as Georges Gurvitch (1894-1965), Louis Massignon (1883-1962), Henry Corbin (1903-1978), Jean-Paul Charles Aymard Sartre (1905-1980), Vo Nguyen Giap (1911-2013), Ernesto Che Guevara (1928-1967) and Frantz Omar Fanon (1925-1961). Ibid., 464-466.

revolutionary ideology that must struggle against any form of oppression, exploitation and injustice, particularly in the forms of Feudalism, capitalism and imperialism. According to him, the mission of prophet Muhammad was not only to establish a mere religious community, but also to form a dynamically revolutionary progressive nation moving on towards an ideal classless society. Additionally, the Shi'a imams, especially the 3rd one, Husayn,⁶⁰⁵ raised the flag of uprising to fight the corrupt Caliphate. Although, Shari'ati considered the Marxist approach necessary for understanding the modern history, he strongly criticized the certain aspects of Marxism, especially the institutionalized Marxism of the orthodox communist parties. He emphasized the only way to defeat imperialism for the Iranians and other Third World nations is to re-discover and return into their own roots, national heritage and indigenous culture. He always explicitly criticized the old-line mullahs and accused them to be cooperative with the ruling class, institutionalizing the Shi'ism and thus converting it into a dried stick branch of Islam.⁶⁰⁶ Shari'ati became popular widely among middle-class, students, armed and non-armed leftist groups and also religious families. In 1977, when the political atmosphere became opener, and his works came out of censorship, hundreds of thousands of them were sold.⁶⁰⁷ In his works, ideology is considered as a preeminence of culture and based on his historical analysis all the developments in the history and civilization were after the advent of the Shi'a ideology. By differentiating between ideology and culture, he introduces the values and potentials of Shi'a Islam as a rebellious school. His paradoxical mystery was to transform the traditional Shi'ite myths into a modern-day revolutionary mobilizer instrument. While, he criticized the tradition, he was a critic of the modernity, it was undoubtedly the forerunner of religious intellectualism in Iran. He used to give his speeches in Tehran, at Hosseinieh Ershad, a modern religious center, with SAVAK's implicit consent, as SAVAK supposed his ideas could be attractive and tranquilizer to the leftist young generation. However, later, as SAVAK succeeded to arrest some members of some armed militant leftist organizations, such as

⁶⁰⁵ The enchanted and sanctified religious history of the early Islam includes the narrations in connection to the legitimacy of the prophet Muhammad grandchildren. Accordingly, there are many myths and exaggerative narrations about the divine legitimacy and sanctification of Shi'ite. For instance, annually, in the 10-day sacred religious commemoration with occasional bloody self-harm in Shi'a Muslim ritual, particularly in the holy Day of Ashura, millions of people, especially men and boys take part in a dramatic ceremony. It is held to mourn the death of the prophet Muhammad's grandson, Imam Husayn (626-680 AD), who was killed during the Battle of Karbala. The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Al-Husayn ibn Ali". Encyclopædia Britannica. Online edition. March 9, 2018. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/al-Husayn-ibn-Ali-Muslim-leader-and-martyr> .

⁶⁰⁶ Abrahamian. Iran Between Two Revolutions. 466-470. Abrahamian. A History of Modern Iran. 144-146.

⁶⁰⁷ Keddie. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. 207-217. Abrahamian. Iran Between Two Revolutions. 471.

People's Mojahedin Organization, surprisingly, found Shari'ati's speeches cassette tapes and the written form of his speeches in their stuff. As a result of increasing fear of his popularity, SAVAK arrested him, closed the Hosseinieh Ershad for a time in 1972, and at the end forced him to leave the country. One month after his accommodation in London, in 1977, he died due to a severe cardiac attack.⁶⁰⁸ His death gave Khomeini and other mullahs a fabulous position to fully interpret his legacy under the pure Islamic thoughts. Evidently, shortly after the revolution his works were forbidden and collected.⁶⁰⁹ Because, the functionality and justifiability of his revolutionary ideology was not valid any more in order to clarify the society circumstances under the mullahs' sovereignty.

8.7. *The saga of Siahkal*

A number of university students who were wholeheartedly disappointed by the formerly peaceful methods of the Tudeh, the National Front and the Liberation Movement parties so as to succeed against the regime, formed some secret small discussion groups to examine the revolutionary experiences of China, Vietnam, Cuba and Algeria, as well as translate the works of Mao, Giap, Che Guevara and Fanon. The outcome of these discussions, examinations and translations was the formation of a number of Marxist and Islamist groups that prescribed the only emancipatory way as armed struggle or guerrilla warfare. The main of these groups were the Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas, a Marxist-Leninist underground group, and the People's Mojahedin Organization,⁶¹⁰ an Islamic Marxist militant one.⁶¹¹ The eminent icon of these groups was Bizhan Jazani (1938-1975) the founder and intellectual figure of the Fedai Guerrillas. Before forming his secret group, as he worked already in the youth branch of the Tudeh party, he was several times imprisoned in 1950s. Because of his vast knowledge in recent Iranian history, he was able to write instructional theoretic pamphlets for the Fedai Guerrillas during the time that he was serving his 15 years of imprisonment. His exuberant words about the working-

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid., 466. Abrahamian. *The Iranian Mojahedin*. 109-110. Milani. *Eminent Persians: the Men and Women Who Made Modern Iran, 1941-1979*. Vol. 1. 365-366.

⁶⁰⁹ Insofar as, I remember in 1996, almost 17 years after the revolution, when I was only a school adolescent, once two cars full of Basij members from our neighborhood mosque, came in front of the school door to capture me, on account of talking of his ideas in a class discussion.

⁶¹⁰ This group is at present active in exile, they yet again advocate the violent to overthrow the Islamic Republic.

⁶¹¹ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 481-482.

class pioneering party and revolutionary struggles probably were in the best way reflected among the young revolutionaries.⁶¹²

Some years after the formation of this guerrilla group, SAVAK infiltrated it and succeeded in arresting a number of members, including Jazani. The remaining members sent a team to the mountains covered with the north forest, which was a proper area for guerrilla warfare and their recruitment from villagers. Via irregular guerrilla battles, they were hoping to spark a national uprising against the large regular forces of the regime. Drastically, the group's program collapsed with the arrest of two members, as a result, the team decided to rescue them, via attacking the place of imprisonment, namely the Gendarmerie building in the village of Siahkal. After hearing the news, the Shah sent a huge troop to suppress them. Naturally, the huge troop accomplished to kill all of them. Although, the incident was a military defeat, the Fedai Guerrillas and other militant groups called it the "Siahkal Rebellion" and propagandistically held it dear as a major victory that could frighten the entire regime.⁶¹³

The background of the other main guerrilla group, the People's Mojahedin Organization, similar to the Fedai Guerrillas, returned to the early 1960s, with the difference that the members of the Fedai Guerrillas were often the former members of the Tudeh party or the Marxist faction of the National Front, but the People's Mojahedin was formed from the former members of the religious faction of the National Front, particularly the Liberation Movement. As the Mojahedin's views resembled Shari'atian thoughts and his interpretations of the revolutionary aspects of Shi'ism, many considered Shari'ati as an inspirational figure for the Mojahedin, although the Mojahedin provided their theoretical framework years before the beginning of Shari'ati's speeches in the year 1967. In the first half of the 1970s, the People's Fedai, the Mojahedin and other guerrilla groups turned to a series of bold armed operations such as bombing of the British and the US embassies, Israeli airline offices and police stations, plundering of banks, assassination of some Iranian and American military and law enforcement officials, as well as attempts to kidnap members of the royal family.⁶¹⁴ It seems such guerrilla operations resulted in an increase in the number of political prisoners, torture, suppression and censorship by SAVAK in the 1970s.⁶¹⁵ In the early 1977, both guerrilla organizations (People's Fedai and Mojahedin) were forced to revise their tactics as many members of them were either arrested or executed. In view of the fact that, the guerrilla movement failed to directly overthrow the regime, in early

⁶¹² Maziar Behrooz. *Rebels with a Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran*. London: I. B. Tauris. 1999. Pp. 52-54.

⁶¹³ Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. 220.

⁶¹⁴ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 488-491.

⁶¹⁵ Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. 222.

1978 with the advent of the revolutionary wave and the release of political prisoners, guerrillas, especially the People's Fedai, were in a better position to recruit and weaponize. Therefore, in February 1979, almost on the eighth anniversary of the saga of Siahkal, at the end of the Pahlavi's era, they fired their last bullets into the half dead body of the old regime.⁶¹⁶

8.8. A mullahs' typology in the pre-revolutionary phase

In the years following the events of the June 1963 (the uprising of the mullahs) three distinct groups among the mullahs were recognizable. The first category, which was perhaps the largest one, was formed by the non-political ones, who despite their dissatisfaction with some socio-religious problems, such as prostitution and alcoholism believed that the mullahs should avoid politics and deal with the spiritual sphere. This group was drawn into the political social movement from mid 1970s, due to the implementation of the government's undesirable policies, regarding the bazaar, financial sponsor of the mullahs and their religious institutions. The second group, moderate mullah oppositions, although, on the issues related to the women's suffrage and the land reforms (as interrupted the endowments of landowners to the mullahs under the Shari'a) objected the regime, preferred to remain in touch with the Shah to moderate his policies. Mohammad Kazem Shari'atmadari (1905-1986),⁶¹⁷ a high ranked mullah was the main figure of this group, who demanded the full implementation of the constitutional law, nothing more. The third category, which could be called as young tough mullahs, was led by Khomeini and had a secret and informal network. Prominent figures of this group were, Hussein Ali Montazeri, the distinguished high ranked mullah in Qom, who was three times imprisoned as antagonistic mullah against the regime, Mohammad Hosseini Beheshti (1928-1981),⁶¹⁸ the most sober member of them, Morteza Motahari (1919-1979),⁶¹⁹ the thinker and theorist of the group,

⁶¹⁶ Behrooz. *Rebels with a Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran*. 68-69.

⁶¹⁷ Shari'atmadari was the head of those mullahs who introduced Khomeini as Marja', constitutionally preventing his trial and execution. However, after revolution Khomeini ordered him to be turban off, namely in an unprecedented event in the history of Shi'ism, a high ranked mullah was deposed from authority. Then he was confined and under house arrest for the rest of his life. Milani. *Eminent Persians: the Men and Women Who Made Modern Iran, 1941-1979*. Vol. 1. 367-368, 371-372, 375-376.

⁶¹⁸ Among the supporters of the formation of the Islamic State in Iran, he played a very important role in the establishment of the Islamic Republic. He was killed, a short while after the victory of the revolution, in the wake of a blast in the office of the Islamic Republic Party. The Editors of *Encyclopædia Britannica*. "Mohammad Hosayn Beheshti". *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Online edition. May 10, 2002. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mohammad-Hosayn-Beheshti> .

⁶¹⁹ A mullah and a university professor who was one of the ideological architectures of the Islamic Republic. He was assassinated only some months after the birth of the revolution. Ali Mirsepassi. *Transnationalism in Iranian Political Thought: The Life and Times of Ahmad Fardid*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 2017. p. 366.

and two younger mullahs, the organizer of the group, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1934-2017),⁶²⁰ and Ali Hosseini Khamenei (1939-),⁶²¹ a semi-literate mullah with the lowest level of knowledge among them.⁶²² Khomeini, who was exiled in Najaf since 1963, gradually developed his interpretation of Shi'a Islam. He formulated the framework of his political theory in his series of lectures in the late 1960s, and then published it as "Hokumat-e Islami: Velayat-e Faqih" (1970), the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist or the Islamic Governance of the Jurist (without mentioning the author's name). This is the document that is the original thesis on which the theocratic Islamic Republic and its constitution is founded after revolution 1979.⁶²³ According to his theory, which is a thesis in the post age of Occultation of the 12th Imam, God has given to prophets and then to Shi'a Imams the political authority, responsibility and absolute custodianship for establishing the rule of the Islamic Shari'a and the maintenance of the Islamic nations or Ummah. Thus, in the absence of the infallible prophets and Imams, the Jurist mullahs as the representatives of them and the only true commentators and guardians of the Shari'a, are exclusively entitled to inherit such an authority and state. Until then, from the viewpoint of the traditional mullahs, Velayat-e Faqih was merely the rule of the Faqih over the religious institutions and schools, as well as over those who were ward and insane, but Khomeini advanced the term to the extent that it embraced the entire society.⁶²⁴ As a result, the interpretation and thesis statement of the irreconcilable mullah, Khomeini were predominantly adopted by the young mullahs.⁶²⁵

⁶²⁰ He was known as one of the most influential leaders for about four decades of the history of the Islamic Republic, however, at the end, his power was totally paled and disqualified vis-à-vis Khamenei. Finally, he died in mysterious circumstances, as said to a journalist his daughter Faezeh roughly one year after. They found contamination of radioactivity in his body, 10 times more than the allowed level. In Islamic Republic power struggle, Rafsanjani was removed and Khamenei remained.

⁶²¹ Via the direct support and influence of Rafsanjani he became the second Supreme Absolute Leader of the only rule of God in the Globe. In accordance to Islamic Republic constitution and as he claims, he is directly the representative of alive healthy 150 year old 12th Imam, namely Mahdi, thus, indirectly representative of God on the earth. As is specified in the Constitution 1979, Chapter 1st General Principles, Art. 2, It is a continuous leadership (Imamat) and perpetual guidance, and its fundamental role in ensuring the uninterrupted process of the revolution of Islam.

http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html .

⁶²² Spencer C. Tucker and Priscilla Mary Roberts (eds.). The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social, and Military History. Vol. 3. California: ABC-CLIO. 2008. Pp. 916-917.

⁶²³ In accordance the constitution of the Islamic Republic calls for a Faqih to serve as the Supreme Leader of the government.

⁶²⁴ It is possible that the idea of the Islamic state relies heavily on the concept of "Republic" (c. 380 BC) in Plato's book, and his view that the government should be run by a guardian who has received special training as philosopher king. Vali Nasr. The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future. New York: W. W. Norton & Company Ltd. 2006. p. 126.

⁶²⁵ whereas the Shari'ati's works were highly welcomed by the young generation. Abrahamian. Iran Between Two Revolutions. 473-477. Abrahamian. A History of Modern Iran. 146.

The Khomeini's post-traditional views were not merely confined to Velayat-e Faqih, he also was not supporting the mullah's conservative insight towards the royal constitutional system anymore. Thus, he addressed the traditional pagan royal system and its constitution as the legacy of the age of polytheism, which is totally opposed to the principles of Islam. He justified that in the sight of the prophet Muhammad, the hereditary monarchy was satanic and blasphemous, Imam Husayn also raised the flag of revolt to protect people against the hereditary Caliphate. He accused the moderate and non-political mullahs of abandoning their religious duties, taking refuge in the seminaries, and accepting the theory of separation of religion and politics or secularism, which he called the conspiracy of the imperialism. Khomeini during his speeches and declarations continued his 1963's strategy, applying sentences to attack on the weak points of the regime, such as "Mr. Shah is selling the country to the imperialists", "he supports Israel", "he violates the constitution", "he assists the rich to exploit the poor", "he spreads corruption and squanders the national valuable resources", "he weaponizes", "destroys the Iranian agriculture", "thus he makes Iran as much as possible dependent on the West". Khomeini also compared the Shah to Yazid (645-683 AD),⁶²⁶ and Pharaoh, therefore implicitly affiliated himself to the Husayn or Moses' characters. He sought to attract the companionship of more opposition forces, for instance, when Motahari objected the anti-mullah speeches of Shari'ati at Hosseinieh Ershad, he remained silent and without even mentioning the Shari'ati's name, tried to apply the phrases which were used by Shari'ati to his own speeches' benefit, such as "the wretched will inherit the earth", "The people will throw the exploiters into the rubbish bin of history", and "religion is not the opiate of the masses". Many young people, having heard these statements, unaware of his speeches in Najaf, immediately concluded that Khomeini agreed with Shari'ati's interpretation of the revolutionary Islam. By that means Khomeini created a broad alliance of the social forces ranging from the mullahs and the businessmen to the intellectuals and the urban poor, as well as of the political organizations varying from the religious Liberation Movement party and the secular National Front to the new guerrilla groups emerging from Shari'ati's followers at the universities or elsewhere. It was a truth, insofar as in the late 1978 and at the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty, the popularity of

⁶²⁶ He is the second hereditary caliph of the Umayyad caliphate, who is known amongst Shi'a people as the responsible person for Husayn's martyrdom, when he ordered Husayn's rebellion to be repressed in 680 AD. The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Yazīd I". Encyclopædia Britannica. Online edition. July 20, 1998. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Yazid-I> .

Khomeini was to a degree which his advocates took a probably blasphemous step to call him by the title of the twelve infallibles of Shi'a, namely Imam.⁶²⁷

8.9. *Resurrection, the Shah's univalent party*

On the Shah's direction, in 1970s, the Resurrection (Rastakhiz) party took some last provocative measures against traditional market. One of them was its direct supervision in the interest rate of the retailers and shopkeepers in bazaar. Following this policy, the party blamed the bazaar as the responsible for the country's high inflation. The party by opening some branches in bazaar, exercised strict control over the price of most commodities, and imported a large amount of wheat, sugar, and meat so as to shorten the hands of the traditional dealers and retailers. During this period, the Guild Councils punished (by penalizing, jailing and exiling) many traders. Furthermore, the government announced the need to eradicate the old inefficient bazaars and to replace by the efficient supermarkets. These unprecedented measures were a declaration of war to the bazaar and their ultimate traditional beneficiaries, the mullahs. The regime further began a massive concurrent attack on the mullahs. A new army was established as Religious Corps to teach what was called "true Islam" to the villagers. For instance, they tried to legalize an increase in the age of marriage of girls, thus, asked judges to be more coercive in enforcing the family protection law. Many prominent mullahs issued fatwas against the Rastakhiz, as they considered it contrary to the constitutional laws, the interests of the country, and the principles of the Shari'a law. Khomeini by publishing a declaration called the cooperation with the party as Haram or forbidden. A few days after the religious ban was issued, the mullahs affiliated with Khomeini were arrested.⁶²⁸

The declaration of war by the Shah against the bazaar and religious institutions attracted additionally the moderate oppositions and even the non-political mullahs to the young extremist mullahs and Khomeini. This alliance provided Khomeini by large financial resources and a vast organizational network. Accordingly, the bazaar-men sponsored many activists and students, massive labor strikes, besides the families of those people who lost their lives in the revolutionary phase.⁶²⁹

⁶²⁷ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 477-479, 534, Abrahamian. *A History of Modern Iran*. 147.

⁶²⁸ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 443-445, 497-498. Abrahamian. *A History of Modern Iran*. 151-153.

⁶²⁹ Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. 226-228.

8.10. *The Shah's International Relations, pressures for political openness*

As the economic crisis intensified in the form of acute inflation, and was associated with the destructive measures of the Rastakhiz party, appeared another crisis. It was in fact the external-pressure on the Shah's regime in order to force it to moderate its police controls and respect for the human rights. In early 1975, Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists in Geneva, as well as the United Nations affiliated International League for Human Rights condemned each the violations of the human rights by the Shah's regime. At the same time as the pro-human rights organizations were criticizing, the exiled and abroad Iranian students and opposition groups organized special committees to demonstrate the crimes of SAVAK against humanity. Subsequently, Western influential newspapers, such as London's Sunday Times released reports of how SAVAK's tortures really functioned. Meanwhile, Jimmy Carter emphasized the importance of the human rights issue in Iran for the United States in his 1976 presidential election campaign. The Shah, who did not want to lose the image of a leading reformist and keen on bringing the benefits of the Western civilization to Iran, showed a positive reaction to foreign pressures. As a result, in early 1977, he amnestied hundreds of prisoners, allowed the Red Cross to visit the prisons and then promised the International Commission of Lawyers, that the Iranian trials would be held in the civil courts. The decrease of crackdowns therefore encouraged the opposition to protest more loudly. In May 1977, a group of lawyers by sending an open letter to the Shah's Palace criticized the Shah's involvement in the judiciary process. In June, some literary figures and intellectuals in a letter to Amir Abbas Hoveyda (1919-1979),⁶³⁰ the Shah's prime minister criticized the quashing and censorship of the cultural and literary activities by SAVAK and revived the Iranian Writers' Association. In summer and fall of the same year, some jurists, intellectuals and writers, as well as bazaar-men and mullahs openly expressed their critiques by writing letters.⁶³¹

The conclusion of such international pressures and political openness was the Guadeloupe summit meeting. Roughly a month before the revolution, between 4th and 7th January 1979, in the Guadalupe Island, the four influential leaders of the West Germany, France, Britain and

⁶³⁰ After the Revolution, he was tried by the revolutionaries, convicted and executed as a fighter against God and corrupted person on the earth. Abbas Milani. "Hoveyda, Amir-Abbas". Originally published: 2004. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/hoveyda-amir-abbas>. William R. Polk. Understanding Iran: Everything You Need to Know, from Persia to the Islamic Republic, from Cyrus to Ahmadinejad. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2009. p. 133.

⁶³¹ Abrahamian. Iran Between Two Revolutions. 497-503. Ervand Abrahamian. Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran. Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press. 1999. p. 119.

United States gathered to discuss various world issues,⁶³² including Soviet effects, the Middle East and the Iranian political crisis. There, they supported the idea “the sooner the Shah left Iran the better”.⁶³³

As an issue of fact in the Marxist view, the clergy is known as a top part of the Pyramid of Capitalist System. Accordingly, in Iran’s case, the mullah’s approach to the communism was critic indeed, perhaps, this issue was also considered during the Cold War along with the Carter’s policy to support an Islamic movement. Confirmedly, Khomeini in a propagandistic campaign against the Iranian Left and Marxist forces declared that Iran after the Shah’s overthrow would still supply the Western oil requirements and would not be an ally to the Eastern bloc.⁶³⁴

Moreover, today’s revealed documents reflecting that the US had extensive contact with Khomeini, during the revolutionary phase.⁶³⁵ On November 28th, 2016, WikiLeaks discloser and whistleblower web site, released publications related to 1979, Iranian Revolution, labeled “demonstration”. Among these political messages, there is a message from William Healy Sullivan (1922-2013)⁶³⁶ the latest US ambassador to Iran, about his meeting with Mohammad Reza Shah and General Robert Hayeser, during which the Shah was annoyed in that they canceled their contact with Khomeini in order to warn him about his aggressive speeches and declarations, which could facilitate a collapse for Bakhtiar’s government (the last Shah’s prime minister). Finally, the US president’s contact to Valéry Marie René Georges Giscard d’Estaing (1926-2020)⁶³⁷ depicts how both French and American governments drastically changed their policy versus the both Shah and Khomeini. In this message the unexpected intense anger of the

⁶³² Jimmy Carter. *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*. New York: Bantam Books. 1982. p. 240.

⁶³³ Manouchehr Ganji. *Defying the Iranian Revolution: From a Minister to the Shah to a Leader of Resistance*. Westport: Praeger. 2002. p. 35.

⁶³⁴ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 524.

⁶³⁵ In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan criticized Jimmy Carter for his policy in the Cold War about the fall of the Shah and support for Khomeini, and described it as a dark spot in US political history. Debate Between the President and Former Vice President Walter F. Mondale in Kansas City, Missouri, October 21, 1984. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39296> . Saeed Kamali Dehghan and David Smith. “US had extensive contact with Ayatollah Khomeini before Iran revolution”. *The Guardian*. Online edition. 10 June 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/10/ayatollah-khomeini-jimmy-carter-administration-iran-revolution> .

⁶³⁶ American ambassador to Iran from 1977-1979. Joseph M. Siracusa. *Encyclopedia of the Kennedys: The People and Events That Shaped America*. Vol. 3. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO. 2012. p. 767.

⁶³⁷ President of the French Republic from 1974 until 1981. Alexandra Hughes and Keith A. Reader. *Encyclopedia of Contemporary French Culture*. London, New York: Routledge. 1998. p. 271.

Shah, due to the passive confrontation of the West to Khomeini is clearly mentioned.⁶³⁸

8.11. *The accelerators of Shi'ite mourning cycle, from the death of Khomeini's son to the Goethe's poetry nights*

The uprisings, in particular among the religious groups were elevated on 23rd October 1977, when, the Khomeini's eldest son, Mostafa (1930-1977) unexpectedly and suspiciously died. As his death was widely attributed to SAVAK, it resulted in extensive a series of the Shi'i protest mournings in Qom, Tehran, Yazd, Mashhad, Shiraz, Tabriz, among other cities.⁶³⁹

On the intellectual challengers' front, up until mid-October 1977, they were rather secretly engaged and active by writing statements and letters, forming new groups, reviving old groups, and publishing publications. A new stage in the process of expressing opposition took place when protest activities appeared in sequential street demonstrations. This turning point took place on October 19th, after nine nights political peaceful poetry sessions, organized by the Writers' Association and the Iranian-German Cultural Association. The security forces attempted to disrupt the tenth night, they dispersed some thousand student listeners who reacted by angry protests with anti-government slogans. Ten days later, student demonstrations rose more, and Tehran's main universities closed down in protest. Subsequently, major universities in the country went on strike to commemorate the 7th of December 1953 (the Persian unofficial student day). Then, the arrested protesters in the previous unrest were acquitted after some short trials in civil courts, hence such trials clearly revealed to the society that SAVAK is no longer able to use the military courts to suppress the regime's opponents.⁶⁴⁰

On 7th January 1978, another incident intensified the street protests. It was an article titled "Iran and Red and Black colonialism"⁶⁴¹ in Ettela'at newspaper, which accused Khomeini of being a foreigner devious author of the Sufi lyrics, collaborative to the communists as well as a British spy during his young age. This article outraged the city of Qom. The seminaries and the bazaar closed down and called for a regime's public apology. Thousands of mullahs and their

⁶³⁸ Julian Assange. "WikiLeaks releases more than half a million US diplomatic cables from the momentous year of 1979". WikiLeaks. November 28, 2016. <https://wikileaks.org/plusd/pressrelease/?c3> . Julian Assange. "Decision on Khomeini". WikiLeaks. March 20, 2014. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1979TEHRAN00560_e.html .

⁶³⁹ Patrick Clawson and Michael Rubin. *Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2005. p. 90.

⁶⁴⁰ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 504-505.

⁶⁴¹ The article was allegedly provided by the Ministry of Intelligence and was actually interpreted as anti-Khomeini and mullahs.

supporters chanted slogans during a demonstration and wrestled the police. In the clashes some people were killed and hundreds were wounded.⁶⁴² The next day, Khomeini called for more demonstrations. The moderate mullah Shari'atmadari also criticized the Shah in an unprecedented interview with the international journalists. He described the behavior of the regime as "insulting". He additionally, along with some other mullahs, bazaar-men and other opponents urged the nation to strike and held an especial ceremony for the 40th day of the Qom's killed people.⁶⁴³

From then onwards, a series of ceremonies for the 3rd, 7th and 40th days of Qom's bleeding (each dedicated to the commemoration of the victims of the previous ceremonies) was nationwide held, which was an obvious example of the political ideological use of the Shi'a traditional rituals, and provided fabulous opportunities for protesters to gather together, exchange their oral information and more stimulate their sentiment against the regime. On February 18th, 1978, the 40th day of the Qom's bloodshed, some commemoration ceremonies were held in the big cities of Iran. In Tabriz, the protesters attacked to the police stations, Rastakhiz party offices, banks, luxury hotels, cinemas and liquor stores (which symbolized the Western lifestyle). Surprisingly, they for the first time shouted, "Down with Shah". The uprising of Tabriz lasted for two days and was repressed by tanks and warfare helicopters of the army forces.⁶⁴⁴ The ceremony of the 40th day of the Tabriz victims came on March 29th, 1978, and held in tens of cities, during which most bazaars and universities were shut down. These ceremonies were drawn to violence in some cities, especially in Yazd some were killed. The Yazd's 40th day ceremony fell on May 10th. On this day, the bazaars and the educational institutes went again on strike, and brutal violence was recurred in some cities. In Qom, the security forces shot the people and cut off the city electricity to repress the demonstrations, and after pursuing a group of protesters and undermining the old tradition of sit-in at the house of grand mullahs, killed two of the mullahs who had taken refuge in Shari'atmadari's house.⁶⁴⁵

⁶⁴² Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 505. Jahangir Amuzegar. *The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis' Triumph and Tragedy*. New York: State Univ. of New York Press. 1991. Pp. 247-248.

⁶⁴³ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 506.

⁶⁴⁴ Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. 226-228.

⁶⁴⁵ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 507-508.

8.12. *A temporary interruption for the crisis*

To deal with this crisis, the regime initiated by creating a secret SAVAK revenge committee, which started sending threatening letters to some of the intellectuals and lawyers who already wrote open protest letters to the regime. Also, in some cases the committee planned on bombing some offices of them. In a similar fashion, the Rastakhiz party formed a group of civilian police called "Resistance Corps" to attack the organized student groups, the Writers' Association and the National Front. Meanwhile, the regime abandoned some of its anti-bazaar policies that formerly caused the anger of the bazaar-men and mullahs. Then banned screening of the Western obscene movies, apologized Shari'atmadari due to attacking his house and dismissed the notorious head of the SAVAK. The Shah also went to Mashhad (holy shrine) for pilgrimage, and the prime minister Jamshid Amouzegar (1923-2016)⁶⁴⁶ by deferring of many economic development plans, tried to curb inflation.⁶⁴⁷

Temporarily, the regime's policies functioned, in a way that by the summer of 1978, for two months, there was no major upheaval. It was perhaps predominantly due to the recommendation of the influential mullah, Shari'atmadari amongst the religious and leftist opposition groups. Insofar as Amouzegar confidently declared in early June, "the crisis is over".⁶⁴⁸

8.13. *Death by burning, the last scene of Rex*

After two months of quietness, in July, during the first few days of Ramadan⁶⁴⁹ unrest erupted. The violent demonstrations were held in Tehran, Tabriz, Qom, Isfahan and Shiraz. In Isfahan angry protesters, who some were equipped by pistol, conquered most of the city. The government only managed to regain control of the city after declaring military rule and killing some protesters. After these unrests, the regime was preparing for another round of commemoration ceremonies, a great tragic catastrophe shook the country. On 19th August

⁶⁴⁶ He was an economist and served as prime minister of Iran from 7th August 1977 to 27th August 1978 when he resigned, roughly half a year before revolution. He also was the leader of Rastakhiz Party during his tenure as prime minister of Iran. Harris M. Lentz. *Heads of States and Governments: A Worldwide Encyclopedia of over 2.300 Leaders, 1945 through 1992*. New York: Routledge. 2013. p. 1577.

⁶⁴⁷ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 508-509.

⁶⁴⁸ Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. 231.

⁶⁴⁹ Is generally one of the most ritualistic months as well as the ninth month of the Islamic Hejri calendar, in which the Quran was revealed to Muhammad, according to the 185th verse of Surah Al-Baqara and Surah Al-Qadr. Fasting during this month is one of the five bases of Islam. Juan Eduardo Campo. *Encyclopedia of Islam*. New York: Facts On File. 2009. Pp. 580-581.

1978, (coinciding with the 25th anniversary of the 1953 coup), the Cinema Rex in Abadan in a working-class area was fired suspiciously and more than 400 men, women and children died. As during the marches of the previous month, the mullahs ordered to attack the cinema halls, screening the so-called Western sinful movies, the regime accused the mullahs and the Muslim Marxists, a claim which was hardly believed by the people.⁶⁵⁰ The next day, some ten thousand relatives of the victims, who gathered at their funeral, called SAVAK responsible for the incident, and chanted slogans against the regime. Later, in a post-revolutionary court, a group of religious fanatics was introduced as the creator of the incident. According to some resources, the group was affiliated with the senior grand mullahs.⁶⁵¹

8.14. A National Reconciliation and a Black Friday, an end for the moderate opposition

The Shah sought to reduce the severity of the crisis by giving more concessions to the opposition, he amnestied other hundreds of the political prisoners, expelled the military forces from universities and promised free elections. He so as to attract the mullahs' satisfaction appointed Jafar Sharif-Emami (1910-1998)⁶⁵² as the prime minister.

Sharif-Emami who called his government as "National Reconciliation", improved the press freedom and let the old political parties reorganize. He also canceled the controversial Imperial Calendar, released the most high-ranking mullahs from prison and closed tens of casinos. He arranged with the moderate opposition leaders, such as Bazargan, a peaceful ceremony for Eid al-Fitr. The moderates also promised him to refrain from chanting against the Shah and calling for more demonstrations.⁶⁵³

Although there was no problem with the ceremony, the crisis re-intensified within the next three days. In a message for Eid al-Fitr as a duty to all Muslims, Khomeini called for resistance until the Shah's expulsion from the country. In spite of the moderate opposition's call for refusing to march, the number of demonstrators increased more and more. In this way, exceeding half a million rallied in Tehran on September 7th, 1978, chanting "Independence, Freedom, Islamic

⁶⁵⁰ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 512-513.

⁶⁵¹ Afkhami. *The life and times of the Shah*. 458-459.

⁶⁵² He twice served as prime minister of Iran (1960-1961 and 27th August till 6th November 1978). He attempted but failed to stop the rise of Shi'ite activism in the revolutionary phase. His father was one of the renowned mullahs of Tehran during the Qajar period. The Editors of *Encyclopædia Britannica*. "Jafar Sharif-Emami". *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Online edition. October 16, 2015. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jafar-Sharif-Emami> .

⁶⁵³ Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. 231.

Republic". They for the first time called for the establishment of an Islamic Republic and overshadowed the demand of the moderate opposition on the implementation of the constitutional law. The Shah tried to decisively react so as to preserve his sovereignty, consequently, with the prohibition of street demonstrations, for the first time since 1963, a military government was announced in Tehran and other eleven big cities of the time. The next morning, on Friday, September 8th, there were intense clashes in southern Tehran. Roughly five thousand people, most students and working-class gathered in the Jaleh Square, many of whom were not aware of the early morning announcement of the military government. Some people after creating barricades on streets threw Molotov cocktails to the military trucks. Some war helicopters were used to disperse people, then commandos and tanks fired on the crowd, killed almost tens and injured hundreds.⁶⁵⁴

The black Friday created a profound impact on the relation between the Shah and the people. By the stimulation of the general sentiment of society and intensification of hatred, only remained a clear solution, a fundamental revolution. Hereupon, firstly, the Shah realized that the moderate and the secular opposition did not have necessary influence to control the popular passion and sensation. Secondly, the successive protests, repressions and killings reduced the possibility of planning, negotiating and compromising for the both sides. On the movement's direction, it turned out that for the inhabitants of the poor neighborhoods and slums, who were mostly the lost land peasant farmers, these revolutionary ideologies provided a sense of social solidarity in their new setting. In reality, they for the most part considered the religious ideology as a replacement for their lost rural community and listened to the mullahs' speeches with enthusiasm in the urban mosques. In this context and by the climax of revolutionary passion the Khomeini's popularity rose sharply. His speeches in terms of the incompatibility of an Islamic society versus a royal regime and the necessity of the full implementation of the Islamic rule also radicalized many lower-classes. This matter therefore caused the loss of the influence of the words of the moderate mullahs such as Shari'atmadari and Taleqani, who demanded merely the full implementation of the royal constitutional law. Anyhow, the day after the black Friday began a widespread wave of labor strikes. In fact, with the effects of the recession, and the reduction of workers' wage,⁶⁵⁵ the factory workers in addition to the strikes, joined to the popular demonstrations. Thus, with the Shah's suppressive measures, gradually, the primarily economic demands also became political. The lower and worker classes' participation turned the tens of

⁶⁵⁴ Afkhami. The life and times of the Shah. 462, 464-465.

⁶⁵⁵ Although legally an increase to the minimum wage was ratified in the mid-summer of 1978.

thousands of demonstrators into the millions, and finally made the final change possible.⁶⁵⁶ On October 6th, the commemoration ceremonies of the 40th day of the black horrible Friday were held similarly bloodily in the major cities. Afterwards following another series of strikes, almost all bazaars, universities, high schools, oil refineries and constructions, banks, newspapers, hospitals and large factories were shut down, and the strikers, in addition to their own union demands, urgently requested the dissolution of SAVAK, the abolition of the military rule, the release of the political prisoners and the Khomeini's return.⁶⁵⁷

In these incidents the manifestation of some social forces (developed from the Shah's semi-modernizational measures) were totally evident, such as, the middle- and working-class led by the intellectuals, the slum dwellers accompanied with the traditional religious masses organized by the mullahs and supported by the bazaar-men.

8.15. The Shah's hesitation versus the Khomeini's determination

The Shah versus these social forces and crises, made the worst contradictory decisions. For instance, on the one hand, he re-ordered the military rule, the arrest of the leaders of the National Front and put pressure on Iraq to dismiss Khomeini. On the other hand, he ordered to release the political prisoners including the important mullahs Montazeri and Taleqani, arrest his own officials including some famous regime's technocrats and Generals such as Hoveyda and Nematollah Nassiri (1911-1979),⁶⁵⁸ dissolve the Rastakhiz party, and accepted the economic demands of the workers. He promised free elections and compensating for the past mistakes, then from the national TV personally announced that he had heard the revolutionary message. In response, Khomeini that was transported from Iraq to Paris, sent a message, that if the Shah really heard the voice of the people's revolution, he must immediately resign and be tried at an Islamic court. In fact, contrary to the Shah's personality, the inelastic character of Khomeini did not allow him to consider any compromise with the monarchy. He addressed the Shah, as a betrayal of Islam and called for throwing him in the trash bin of the history. When the European

⁶⁵⁶ Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. 232. Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 515-517. Abrahamian. *A History of Modern Iran*. 160-161. Bakhash. *The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution*. 15. Ganji. *Defying the Iranian Revolution: From a Minister to the Shah to a Leader of Resistance*. 14.

⁶⁵⁷ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 517-518.

⁶⁵⁸ He was a military general, the third director of SAVAK. Nassiri was also a personal friend of the shah. In 1953, Nassiri personally delivered to prime minister Mosaddeq the warrant for his arrest. He was arrested together with other former officials on 8th of November 1978. When the shah left the country on 16th January 1979, Nassiri remained in prison and was sentenced to death in the Revolutionary Court. Kahana. *The A to Z of Middle Eastern Intelligence*. 210-211.

journalists asked him, what would replace the royal regime, for the first time Khomeini used the term “Islamic Republic” instead of his usual “Islamic rule”. It was crystal clear that he was advised to speak more internationally acceptable by the members of the Liberation Movement, the National Front and the student organizations who had joined him in Paris.⁶⁵⁹

By joining the nationalists to the Khomeini’s camp, the link between the secular and the religious forces was restored, and obviously the possibility of presenting any other option between the Islamic Republic and the Monarchy was totally eliminated.⁶⁶⁰

On December 2nd, in the month of Muharram,⁶⁶¹ with the strengthening of the coalition of opposition leaders, Marches and strikes were much more intensified. In Tehran, during the first three days of the month of Muharram, in December, following the call of the oppositions, hundreds of thousands of people went to the roofs of their homes and shouted “Allahoakbar” the God is great. In addition, thousands of people wearing shrouds (to demonstrate their willingness to be killed) rallied into the streets, violating the military rule. In Qazvin, some were rolled over by the tanks. Due to the deterioration of the situation, the regime gave additional concessions, for instance released some more political prisoners, and gave permission to hold mourning ceremonies, on condition of maintaining order and not chanting against the Shah. Then, more than half a million people took part in the march of Tasu’a Day,⁶⁶² led by the mullahs and the Liberation Movement party, and on Ashura Day, the population reached about two million. Undoubtedly, this massive rally clearly demonstrated the desire of the masses of the people to revolt and pull out the Shah.⁶⁶³

After these incidents, gradually, the position of the Shah deteriorated, as some forces in different cities refused to target people and joined them.⁶⁶⁴ It seems, it was partly as a result of the influence of the eclectic ideologies. Regarding to this assumption, it should be noted that the common religion among the suppressed people and the repressive forces made the forcible

⁶⁵⁹ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 518-520. Yvette Hovsepian-Bearce. *The Political Ideology of Ayatollah Khamenei: Out of the Mouth of the Supreme Leader of Iran*. New York: Routledge. 2016. p. 11.

⁶⁶⁰ Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. 234.

⁶⁶¹ The first month of the Islamic Hejri calendar and also one of the four sacred forbidden months in Islam. The tenth day of this month is the day of Ashura, anniversary of the martyrdom of Husayn the grandson of Muhammad as well as son of Ali, in the battle of Karbala, which to Shi’a Muslims is full of rituals and commemoration ceremonies. Cakmak. *Islam: A Worldwide Encyclopedia*. Vol. 4.1090-1091. Edward E. Curtis. *Encyclopedia of Muslim-American History*. New York: Facts On File. 2010. Pp. 63-64.

⁶⁶² The ninth day of the month of Muharram. This is the last day that Husayn, the third Imam of Shiite and his followers, was alive. This day has a great importance to the Shi’s, and they mourn on this day as the day of Ashura.

⁶⁶³ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 521-522.

⁶⁶⁴ Misagh Parsa. *Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution*. New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press. 1989. Pp. 322-323.

repression ineffective and ultimately, the influence of the revolutionary ideology on some parts of the corpus of the army, partially disrupted the inefficient repression system of the regime. On the militant front, simultaneously, the guerrilla groups were revived and found a better position via the amnesty and release of their members from prison, the return of their exiled associates, and their new recruitments among the young generation. These groups carried out several armed missions, such as bombing the military bases and assassination of the military officers. At the same time, similar to other groups, the Khomeini supporters developed their activities by publishing publications and posters with high circulation aiming to an expansion in their revolutionary thought.⁶⁶⁵

Consequently, these daily struggles of the opposition with the army and the massive strikes caused naturally a suspension on oil-exporting and a paralysis for the country's economy.

8.16. The last Prime Minister and a flight without return

After all these events, the Shah finally offered a proposal of a new national reconciliation government to the leaders of the National Front party. The proposal was rejected by them, on account of the Shah's disagreement with his withdrawal from the command of the armed forces and leaving the country. Nevertheless, afterwards, Bakhtiar, one of the younger leaders of the National Front suggested that if the Shah temporarily and some stubborn army commanders permanently left the country, and also the Shah promised not to rule but to reign, he would be the head of a civilian government in Iran. The Shah immediately accepted the seemingly imaginary proposal and appointed him as the prime minister on December 30th, 1978.⁶⁶⁶ Bakhtiar after taking office took some measures to please the oppositions. He promised to abolish the military rule, withdraw the Shah, dissolve the SAVAK and allow the Khomeini's return. He seized the assets of the Pahlavi Foundation, arrested a number of former ministers and released more political prisoners. Meanwhile, he warned the oppositions that if they barricade the implementation of the constitutional rule, he will run the armed forces rule. Although, Shari'atmadari and other moderate mullahs supported Bakhtiar, the other leaders of the National Front, who became at that time the collaborators of Khomeini, dismissed him from the party, and insisted on the removal of the Shah. Khomeini, by reinviting the people to strike and demonstration, declared the supporting Bakhtiar's administration as following the Satan.⁶⁶⁷

⁶⁶⁵ Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. 233.

⁶⁶⁶ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 524.

⁶⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 525.

On January 13th, 1979, about two million marched in almost thirty cities demanding the Khomeini's return, as well as the removal of Bakhtiar and the Shah. On January 16th, when the shah left the country to Cairo, allegedly for a short relaxation, hundreds of thousands went to the streets to celebrate his leave. On January 19th, after Khomeini called for a street referendum for determining the assignment of the monarchy and the government of Bakhtiar, roughly more than a million people came to the streets. As the airports became closed to prevent from the Khomeini's arrival, on January 27th and 28th, several protesters were shot dead. Eventually, on 1st February 1979, when Khomeini numbness⁶⁶⁸ was brought to Iran from Paris, after 14 years in exile, the Pahlavi regime was overthrown. At this time, as a matter of fact the royal regime's four strong pillars, modern army, rich supportive court system, bulky bureaucracy and Rastakhiz party were completely destroyed as a result of sixteen consecutive months of street battles, six months of popular rallies and five months of crippling strike. Then, immediately the government collapsed, and power fell into the hands of the newly formed organizations as committees. Most of these committees were run by the local Khomeini-oriented mullahs. The city committees tried to enforce rules, orders, traffic laws, distribute food stuff, price products and restore the religious courts of the Islamic Shari'a. Other younger mullahs gathered a number of tough youngsters from downtown areas and formed a militia that later became known as the Revolutionary Guards. Khomeini, by inviting people to continue the demonstrations until the withdrawal of Bakhtiar, appointed Bazargan to form an interim government and set up a secret revolutionary council for directing talks with the army chiefs.⁶⁶⁹

8.17. *The final blow*

At the same time, guerrilla groups such as the Iranian People's Fedai, the People's Mojahedin, the Tudeh Fedai party, the Mujahedeen Marxist and the Tudeh party played the last episode. On Friday evening, February 9th, when the Imperial Guard tried to repress the air force technicians' uprising at a military base, the guerrilla organizations helped the besieged airmen, and after six hours battle defeated the Imperial Guard. They also distributed weapons among the people. The next morning, guerrillas, air force men and rebels attacked nine police centers and the city's largest arm factory. Finally, on 11th February 1979, the clashes peaked, as the guerrilla organizations, the Tudeh Party, the runaway army members accompanied with

⁶⁶⁸ In the landing moments, when a journalist, inside the airplane asked Khomeini about his feelings of returning home, after long years, he answered "nothing".

⁶⁶⁹ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 527-528.

thousands of armed volunteers occupied most of the ammunition depots, barracks, military academy as well as Evin Prison. Consequently, on the same day, the chief of general staff of the army announced that the army would remain impartial in the battle between Bakhtiar and the Revolutionary Council. In the evening, the radio announced, "Here is Tehran, the true voice of the Iranian nation, the voice of revolution". Thus, after two days of intense conflict, the revolution was completed by a number of victims who were mostly from workers' neighborhoods in southern Tehran,⁶⁷⁰ and the 2500-year-old Monarchy with crown and boot was destroyed and substituted by Mullarchy with turban and sandal.

On 30th and 31st March 1979, Iranian people participated in a referendum by Khomeini's shove, and voted with a majority for the Islamic Republic,⁶⁷¹ as the only option for the future regime. The Iranian people at that time, more than thinking of determining the system and the type of government were only in thought of overthrowing the royal system and in order to achieve this goal, they chose the introduced innovatory system of Velayat-e Faqih. People never presumed that in a single republican system, an individual, a particular party or group is not entitled to rule, but an administration out of multi parties based on a constitutional setting. They voted the Islamic Republic, a system of theocracy of the ruling party, which is one party system dependent on the ideology of Velayat-e Faqih, through the central control mechanism.

8.18. An Islamic revolutionary extremism, an end for the post-revolutionary mediators

On 7th April 1979, former Iranian prime minister Hoveyda was tried and convicted as Mohareb or enemy against God by the sentence of the hanging judge of the Revolutionary Court, Sadeq Khalkhali (1926-2003)⁶⁷². He was shot dead by a rogue mullah before his execution. In addition, hundreds of senior officials of the former regime were executed by the Revolutionary Courts within two months after the revolution.⁶⁷³

Following the revolution and the demolition of the monarchy there was a very short period of publication freedom, which ended with the introduction of a draconian Press Law. Accordingly,

⁶⁷⁰ Ibid., 528-529. Abrahamian. A History of Modern Iran. 161. Keddie. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. 238.

⁶⁷¹ Mike Wells and Nick Fellows. History for the IB Diploma, Paper 2, Causes and Effects of 20th Century Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 2011. p. 223.

⁶⁷² The mullah head of the first revolutionary court, in the early years of the Iranian Revolution, who sentenced hundreds of people to be executed based on the Shari'a law. Abbas Amanat. Iran: A Modern History. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. 2017. p. 779. Siavoshi. Montazeri: The Life and Thought of Iran's Revolutionary Ayatollah. 10.

⁶⁷³ Mackey. The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation. 373. Baqer Moin. Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah. New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers. 1999. p. 208.

in August 1979, more than forty periodical publications including magazines, journals and newspapers were banned.⁶⁷⁴ Afterwards, the production and consumption of alcoholic beverages were announced as entirely Haram and prohibited.⁶⁷⁵ There were also some restrictions on broadcasting music on radio and television.⁶⁷⁶

In terms of the implication of this movement over the women of the society, despite the fact that the street rallies at first attracted a widespread female support and they had a significant active participation in the leftist and Islamist military and political organizations (in different levels of membership),⁶⁷⁷ after the revolution they were forcefully repressed by the segregation law in public spheres such as schools, sport places, coastal areas, among others.⁶⁷⁸ Afterwards, despite of their potent reaction by a massive unveiled demonstration to the Khomeini's issued decree on the obligatory complete veil, the Hijab Law was enforced by the very Islamic Consultative Parliament in 1983.⁶⁷⁹

As a matter of fact, under an ideological masculine repressive atmosphere there were not much opportunity for the Iranian female social mobility. Therefore, after the revolution, the feminine unemployment rate sharply elevated, on the way of the transformation of the labor market. While, in 1976, for instance, 10 percent of the female labor force at ages 15-24 years and only 2.9 percent of the women workforce at the age group of 25-29 were reportedly unemployed, in 2006, the rate for the same age categories, respectively reached to 49 percent (namely roughly half of the young women) and 25.4 percent.⁶⁸⁰ Inasmuch as, the Iranian women who once were locked up at home at the era of Reza Shah, as an outcome of his semi-modernizational or pro-westernizational measures and in particular the issuance of the decree of 1936, banning all Islamic veils or unveiling, this time, in 1983 mandatorily were revealed and sadly stayed at homes.⁶⁸¹

⁶⁷⁴ Harry Drost. *The World's news media: a comprehensive reference guide*. Essex: Longman. 1991. p. 237.

⁶⁷⁵ Marjolein Muys. *Substance Use Among Migrants: The Case of Iranians in Belgium*. Brussel: Vubpress. 2009. Pp. 76-77.

⁶⁷⁶ Derek Jones. *Censorship: A World Encyclopedia*. Vol. 2. New York: Routledge. 2001. Pp. 1206-1207.

⁶⁷⁷ As an example, Maryam Rajavi (1953-) who accompanied with thousands of women was highly engaged in the revolutionary struggles, at present is the leader of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran in exile, since 1993. Albert V. Benliot. *Iran: Outlaw, Outcast Or Normal Country?* New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc. 2001. p. 97.

⁶⁷⁸ Ira M. Lapidus. *A History of Islamic Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 2002. p. 865.

⁶⁷⁹ Ali Rahnama and Farhad Nu'mani. *The Secular Miracle: Religion, Politics, and Economic Policy in Iran*. London: Zed Books. 1990. p. 220. Minoo Derayeh. *Gender Equality in Iranian History: From Pre-Islamic Times to the Present*. New York: Edwin Mellen Press. 2006. Pp. 154-155. Shahram Khosravi. *Young and Defiant in Tehran*. Pennsylvania: Univ. of Pennsylvania. 2008. p. 44.

⁶⁸⁰ Roksana Bahramitash and Hadi Salehi Esfahani (eds.). *Veiled Employment: Islamism and the Political Economy of Women's Employment in Iran*. New York: Syracuse Univ. Press. 2011. Pp.161, 163.

⁶⁸¹ Milani. *Veils and Words: The Emerging Voices of Iranian Women Writers*. 19.

On November 4th, 1979, a revolutionary group as Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Path, occupied the US embassy in Tehran, took hostage 52 American diplomats and citizens, held them for 444 days, and recorded the longest hostage crisis in the history.⁶⁸² This event led to the resignation of the interim Islamized national liberal government of Bazargan.⁶⁸³ In this manner, the revolutionary moderates and mediators who were truly crucial elements in order to form a coalition of the absolutely diverse groups in the climax of the revolutionary phase were set gradually aside by the extremists, who possessed the maximum expectations from the revolutionary engine.

Before holding the first presidential election in January 1980, Khomeini banned the participation of the People's Mojahedin Organization from the presidential election, due to their boycott as well as lack of support for the referendum and its constitution, which caused severe criticism.⁶⁸⁴ On January 25th, Abolhassan Banisadr (1933-) was elected as the first president by the shove of Khomeini.⁶⁸⁵ In April 1980, Khomeini in his speeches harshly attacked the universities. This attack triggered the Islamization of the Iranian Academia under the name of the Cultural Revolution (1980-1983). Accordingly, the Revolutionary Council aimed at purging universities from dissident scholars and students. During this period, that resulted in the closure of universities for more than two years, violence in universities reached a peak, and several people were killed, hundreds injured, jailed and exiled.⁶⁸⁶

8.19. *War as a God-given gift*

Iran-Iraq's dispute intensified on 22nd September 1980, when Iraq invaded Iran and the war started, due to the ideological exportationist ambitions of the new revolutionary state on the one hand, and Saddam Hussein (1937-2006) who feared that the Shi'ite Islamic belief, opposed to the principles of his secular Iraqi regional branch of Arab Socialist Ba'ath party, would influence

⁶⁸² John W. Limbert. *Negotiating with Iran: Wrestling the Ghosts of History*. Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press. 2009. p. 1.

⁶⁸³ Tucker. *The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Iraq Conflicts*. Vol. 2. 689.

⁶⁸⁴ Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger. *Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in Honor of George Lenczowski*. Durham, London: Duke University Press. 1988. p. 250.

⁶⁸⁵ Lentz. *Heads of States and Governments: A Worldwide Encyclopedia of Over 2,300 Leaders, 1945 through 1992*. 396.

⁶⁸⁶ Amir Arjomand. *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic revolution in Iran*. 143. Shervin Malekzadeh. "Education as Public Good or Private Resource: Accommodation and Demobilization in Iran's University System". in Daniel Brumberg and Farideh Farhi (eds.). *Power and Change in Iran: Politics of Contention and Conciliation*. Indiana: Indiana Univ. Press. 2016. p. 128. Dilip Hiro. *Iran Under the Ayatollahs*. Oxon: Routledge Revivals. 1987. p. 160.

on a large Shi'a population living in Iraq, on the other hand. In other words, the negligence and inappropriate treatment of the revolutionary officials, especially the Khomeini's provocations, led to the Iraqi invasion to undermine the newly born state. In Khomeini's view, the 1979 revolution was carried out with Islamic motives and was not due to be limited inside the Iranian borders. He was thinking of expanding the discourse of the Islamic Revolution to the entire Islamic world and reviving Islamic Caliphate. In this direction, Iraq was considered to be the closest country to Iran with the strong presence of Shi'ite mullah authorities. At the same time, Khomeini also had a negative personal opinion of the Iraqi government and the person of Saddam. Actually, it was an old hatred of him, from when he was exiled in Iraq in 1964 and settled in the Shi'ite city of Najaf. In Najaf he established strong ties and network with the Iraqi Shi'ites. Following the 1975 agreement between Iran and Iraq to build good relations, the vice president Saddam under pressure of the Shah was persuaded to expel him from Iraq. At the time that Khomeini came to power, tried his best to encourage the Iraqi Shi'ites to repeat the experience of the Islamic Republic. For instance, he called for an insurgency by the Iraqi army against Saddam,⁶⁸⁷ his messages and his call to overthrow had been also translated in Arabic and distributed among the Iraqi people.⁶⁸⁸ Moreover, the border conflicts between Iran and Iraq rose for ten months to dominate Arvandroud, a river which separates the two countries. Iraq entered the Iranian province of Khuzestan⁶⁸⁹ and Saddam called Khorramshahr⁶⁹⁰ a new Iraqi province. During this war, many super-powers supported Saddam.⁶⁹¹ Khomeini after a while horrifically in a meeting on 30th September 1980 with the frontiersmen described the war as a "divine blessing for the Islamic Revolution".⁶⁹² In this new context, Khomeini and his associates, relying on the Usuli Shi'i jurisprudence and legal system were able to justify and legitimize every single measure. In fact, this war released the remaining revolutionary potentials of the revolted people with high revolutionary expectations, thus rescued the newly midwifed revolution and gave it a spirit of survival. In any case, this war accompanied with the domestic heavily armed battle, the

⁶⁸⁷ The Kayhan Newspaper. Tehran. on April 19th, 1980. The First Headline. p. 1.

⁶⁸⁸ The Jomhuri-e Eslami (Islamic Republican) Newspaper. Tehran. No. 293. on June 4th, 1980. p. 4.

⁶⁸⁹ Khuzestan is the richest province in Iran in terms of oil and gas resources, which are currently the main sources of income for the country.

⁶⁹⁰ A strategic border city in Khuzestan Province.

⁶⁹¹ Gieling. "Iraq vii. Iran-Iraq War". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/iraq-vii-iran-iraq-war> .

⁶⁹² Jonathan Matusitz. Symbolism in Terrorism: Motivation, Communication, and Behavior. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. 2015. p. 171.

international economic sanctions and pressures, as well as the oil price decline (1980s) created⁶⁹³ a constant political economic crisis for the revolutionary Iran.⁶⁹⁴

In the de jure part of the revolutionary state, the president Baniadr who was born in a mullah family close to Khomeini and in the first place seemed revolutionarily eligible, in continue by his criticism and disapproval to Khomeini and the circumstances was diagnosed as Munafiq (hypocrite), sympathetic and cooperative to the People's Mojahedin Organization. In the meantime, Baniadr called for a nationwide uprising. On June 21st-22nd, 1981 violent demonstrations in different cities of the country were launched by pro-Mojahedin and pro-Baniadr forces. In Tehran, the number of protesters reached about half a million, and after the reaction of Khomeini, other hard-liners and revolutionaries merely in the University of Tehran's district roughly tens were killed, hundreds wounded, and thousands arrested. The next day, Baniadr was dismissed, and Khomeini issued his arrest warrant on the charges of treason and conspiracy against the revolution.⁶⁹⁵

8.20. *The revolution and social classes*

This revolution similar to the epochal revolutions overturned the existing institutional order, in a way that since a short time before and during the first decade after the event, the Iranian economy which already suffered from structural imbalance in the process of production and capital accumulation, turned to the phase of deproletarianization of the working-class, the peasantization of agriculture, and an increase in petty bourgeoisie. As a matter of fact, apart from some populist striking memorable phrases expressed in the course of the revolutionary movement, the Islamic Revolution different and not similar to the other revolutions of the 20th century never promoted the working-class and the lower-class. Accordingly, in the post-revolutionary era the percentage of the working-class (e.g., the workers of the petroleum industry, manufacturing factories, construction sector, transportation, repair people, artisans in workshops ...) decreased compared to other social groups and classes.⁶⁹⁶ In addition, similar to

⁶⁹³ Inc., Ibp, Iran Investment and Business Guide Vol. 1, Strategic and Practical Information. Washington DC: Lulu.com. 2012. p. 54.

⁶⁹⁴ See Jahangir Amuzegar. "The Iranian Economy before and after the Revolution." Middle East Journal, vol. 46, no. 3, Middle East Institute. 1992. Pp. 413-425. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4328463>.

⁶⁹⁵ Keddie. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. 253-254, Abrahamian. The Iranian Mojahedin. 218-219.

⁶⁹⁶ Sohrab Behdad and Farhad Nomani. "What a Revolution! Thirty Years of Social Reshuffling In Iran" in Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, Vol. 29, No. 1. London: Duke Univ. Press. Pp. 84-104. 2009. p. 84, 89.

the monarchy's era, their fully controlled unions brought nothing to their class' rights, and every single strike of them resulted in a harsh crackdown.⁶⁹⁷ The number of the lower-class or statistically unspecified groups who placed in slums and downtown districts (e.g., seasonal workers, servants, porters, dustmen, street vendors, gardeners, beggars, prostitutes, drug dealers ...) since the revolution fluctuated,⁶⁹⁸ however, more or less there is a growing trend in the number of drivers⁶⁹⁹ and motorcyclists⁷⁰⁰ as unofficial taxi drivers (to convey passengers in return for payment of a fare), street vendors,⁷⁰¹ unemployed⁷⁰² and homeless people⁷⁰³ to their groups.

The average annual growth rate which was 13.2 percent during the years 1966 to 1976 dropped to 0.7 percent over the next 10 years 1976 to 1986, and 3.9 percent between 1986 and 1996. During the same period, the ratio of the petty bourgeoisie to the total employed workforce in Iran expanded from 31.9 percent to 39.9 percent, and the ratio of the working-class to the total employed workforce of the country declined from 40.2 percent to 24.6 percent, namely, the working-class population fell from 3,535,000 to 2,702,000. The number of capital owners grew from 182,000 people (2.1 percent of the employed workforce) in 1976 to 341,000 people (3.1 percent) in 1986. This expansion involved two main features, first, it included only traditional capital owners, and the number of modern capital owners had even fallen, secondly, this trend was accompanied by a significant reduction in the average size of manufacturing firms, as the

⁶⁹⁷ Glenn E. Curtis and Eric Hooglund (eds.). *Iran: A Country Study*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 2008. p. 106.

⁶⁹⁸ Behdad and Nomani. "What a Revolution! Thirty Years of Social Reshuffling In Iran". 89.

⁶⁹⁹ The Editors of Hamshahri Online. "13% of citizens work as taxi driver". Hamshahri Online (Persian). September 25, 2006. <https://www.hamshahronline.ir/news/4750/۱۳-کنند-درصد-شهروندان-مسافر-کشی-می-کنند>.

⁷⁰⁰ The Editors of Financial Tribune. "Tehran's Omnipresent Motorcycle Nuisance". Financial Tribune. Online edition. July 10, 2016. <https://financialtribune.com/articles/people/45165/tehran-s-omnipresent-motorcycle-nuisance>.

⁷⁰¹ The Editors of Tehran Bureau. "Tehran's vendors battle the streets to survive". The Guardian. Online edition. 15 September 2014. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2014/sep/15/iran-tehran-pedlars-survival>. Pooya Stone. "Street Vendors: The Unofficial Workforce of Iran". Iran Focus. Online edition. 30 September 2019. <https://www.iranfocus.com/en/life-in-iran/33933-street-vendors-the-unofficial-workforce-of-iran>. See also H. Mosammam Mohammadian, L. Ahmadi & M.T. Razavian. "An Investigation on the Phenomenon of Women Vendors in Tehran's Metro". *Urban Economics and Management*, 6, 1; 21. Pp. 71-84. 2018.

⁷⁰² See Abbas Valadkhani. "The Causes of Unemployment in Iran". *International Journal of Applied Business and Economic Research*, 1: 1. Pp. 21-33. 2003.

⁷⁰³ The Editors of Radio Farda. "Homelessness On The Rise As Economic Pressures Draw Jobseekers To Cities". Radio Farda. Online edition. July 27, 2018. <https://en.radiofarda.com/a/homelessness-on-the-rise-as-economic-pressures-draw-jobseekers-to-cities/29393773.html>. Keivandokht Ghahari. "Iran's homeless: Forced to live in cardboard cartons and vacant graves". Deutsche Welle. Online edition. 17 January 2017. <https://www.dw.com/en/irans-homeless-forced-to-live-in-cardboard-cartons-and-vacant-graves/g-37160370>. Misagh Parsa. *Democracy in Iran*. Massachusetts: Harvard Univ. Press. 2016. Pp. 131-132.

average number of workers per capital owner declined from 16.3 in 1976 to 5.3 in 1986. Given that, soon after the 1979 revolution, the extremists nationalized the large manufacturing and financial investitures. Then officially, the Islamic courts confiscated the property of them and accused the owners as corrupt on the earth, thus sentenced them to death. This Islamization revolutionary process gifted an increase in the activities of the state which was resulted in a massive redistribution of assets in favor of the mullahs' regime and its Islamic foundations, but at the loss of the private capital in all social economic sectors of the Iranian society.

*Table 3. The class composition of employed workforce in Iran per decade in percent (before and after 1979 revolution)*⁷⁰⁴

Social groups and classes	1976	1986	1996	2006
Capital owners	2.1	3.1	3.6	7.5
Middle-class	5.4	7.0	10.2	12.3
Petty bourgeoisie	31.9	39.9	35.7	36.0
Working-class	40.2	24.6	30.7	30.4
The rest	20.4	25.4	19.8	13.8

In terms of the class mobility and quality, as a matter of fact, some groups among the Iranian upper-class remained almost the same as the previous era, such as the landowners and the bazaar-men, however the mullahs accompanied with their Basiji guardian devotees climbed to a great extent. They became part of the upper-class by virtue of plundering the property of those who left Iran and having retained a considerable part of their wealth. For the most part, such people in the society obtained a theocratic socio-political influence for wealth and prosperity. The middle-class' composition demonstrates that its former social groups, such as professionals, managers, military officers, state employees, teachers, and small landowners have also transmogrified. In a way that, for instance, the last two are gradually excluded from the middle-class, teachers by low salary⁷⁰⁵ and small landowners by anti-agricultural policies, resembling the desertification through unconstrained dam construction on the rivers, which also

⁷⁰⁴ Behdad and Nomani. "What a Revolution! Thirty Years of Social Reshuffling In Iran". Pp. 84-85, 89-90.

⁷⁰⁵ The Editors of Radio Farda. "Teachers Protest Low Pay, Hold Demos In Iran". Radio Farda. Online edition. July 29, 2019. <https://en.radiofarda.com/a/teachers-protest-low-pay-hold-demos-in-iran/30081160.html> .

has triggered many agricultural and environmental damages.⁷⁰⁶

Moreover, the content of the middle-class with the state revolved occupations has been largely substituted by the regime's ideological religious cleansing and new recruitments from the non-urban and rural deprived groups. As is elaborated this revolution similar to the most revolutions of the 18th century resulted in inclusion of the formerly excluded social groups and classes, simultaneously at the price of the exclusion for the others.⁷⁰⁷

8.21. *Constitutional and legal consequences*

As it was previously narrated, shortly after the work began, a supplement was provided and added to the first Persian constitution. Such supplementation (by the shove of conservative anti-constitutional forces such as mullahs) was as a result of the fact that some of the applied components and provisions of this constitution were extracted from the European constitutional framework, thus obviously incompatible with the traditional Shi'i religious law (Shari'a). Although, at that time, there was no attempt to introduce an Islamic constitution, absolutely based on the Shari'a law, by the 1979 revolution, the circumstances for the representation of the phenomenon of the Islamic Constitution and supremacy of the theocratic Shari'a was marvelously realized. Accordingly, the revolutionary forces proposed a constitution which was based on Velayat-e Faqih, a radical transformation of the traditional Shi'ism theory and its exercise of authority. In fact, the traditional doctrine of the vice hidden Imam transmogrified into the Velayat-e Faqih or continuation of the narration of Imamate, which was derived from the particular interpretation of the Surah An-Nisa (the women) verse 59th of Quran "You who have believed, obey God and obey the prophet and those in authority among you. And if you disagree over anything, refer it to God and the messenger, if you should believe in God and the last day. That is the best way and best in result"⁷⁰⁸.

The draft of this constitution (presented in the spring of 1979) was in some respects similar to the 1906 constitution with its supplement, especially in the role of the mullahs' supervision,

⁷⁰⁶ In this relation, Kavous Seyed-Emami (1953-2018), an Iranian-Canadian university professor and environmentalist, who is murdered in Evin prison, did many researches on environmental water crises in Iran. Actually, he was accused by espionage charge, and his murdering was announced as suicide. Thomas Erdbrink. "He Fought for Iran's Environment and Was Arrested. Now, He's Dead." The New York Times. Online edition. February 10, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/10/world/middleeast/iran-environmentalist-dead-prison.html> . See Afshin Shahi. Drought: the achilles heel of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Asian Affairs. Vol. 50: 1. Pp. 18-39. 2019.

⁷⁰⁷ Brunkhorst. "Constitutionalism and democracy in the world society". 179.

⁷⁰⁸ Quran. <https://quran.com/> .

however, instead of the committee of five high ranked mullahs, a group was introduced as “Guardian Council”, consisting of 12 Shari’a expert mullahs (six of which without turban).⁷⁰⁹ It began with the name of God and recognized Khomeini as an Imam, as well as undisputed leader, who had run the social revolutionary movement through his messages from exile and had presented a vivid plan for ruling on the basis of Velayat-e Faqih. For this reason, the draft constitution became controversial mostly among the non-religious and religious groups and elements. As these debates situated alarming, Khomeini insisted that the mullahs should have the sole entitlement for revising the draft. In accordance, the Assembly of Experts altered the ratified (in the referendum of 2nd and 3rd December 1979) draft version. The new content was fully matching to the Shari’a law. It included an appendix backed by the Quranic verses and quotations. The chapter on leadership replaced the one on monarchy. Some provisions of the monarchical constitution were kept, e.g., Arts. 19, 20, the equality before the law, Arts. 22, 39, life and property security, freedom of opinion and choice, Arts. 23, 28, and the public deliberations of the parliament, Art. 69, as well as parliamentary procedure and the rights and accountabilities of the ministers vis-à-vis the parliament Arts. 70, 74, 88-90. The parliamentary supervision over taxation, government finance and international agreements were guaranteed by Arts. 51-55, 80, 77.⁷¹⁰

The similarities between the two constitutions, nevertheless, were paled by the dissimilarities. First of all, the Velayat-e Faqih cornerstone made this constitution apart from its predecessor. The other differences were embedded in the changes inside the international political constitutional culture during eight decades between these two constitutions. Among them, the idea of a republic with a head president to act as chief executive, elected by popular vote (for four years and eligible to rule for a second term) is noteworthy. Howbeit, in this constitutional case, based on the Art. 113. it was subordinated to the Islamic factual position of the very supreme Faqih. After the mentioned ideological principle, it further, proposed a theocratic judiciary system planed on the Islamic justice and Shari’a laws. Hereupon, this document is distinguished as both a republican and an ideological theocratic one. In fact, its theocracy is justified by the declaration that sovereignty and legislation are the exclusive entitlement of the

⁷⁰⁹ Iranian Constitution 1979, Arts. 4, 91, 94, 98 specify that all laws must be based on the Shari’a, recognizable by the leader appointed mullah and semi mullah jurists or the Council of Guardian with an interpretive power as well as a full veto right over the constitutional and non-constitutional laws. <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000.html> .

⁷¹⁰ Amir Arjomand. “Constitution of the Islamic Republic”. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitution-of-the-islamic-republic#article-tags-overlay> . Iran’s 1906 Constitution and Its Supplement. <http://fis-iran.org/en/resources/legaldoc/iranconstitution> . Iran’s 1979 Constitution and its Amendment. <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000.html> .

God and is applicable and transferable to the Imamate by the interpretation of one of the five Shi'i principles⁷¹¹ Art. 2.1-5. These articles, on the other hand, harshly reject the separation of religion and the political order. In this constitution, while, neither national sovereignty nor parliamentary representation is mentioned as a determining feature of the Islamic Republic, Art. 3 apparently emphasizes the participation of the entire people in the determination of their destiny and in Art. 7 the principle of consultation is presented derived from Quran, Surah Ash-Shuraa verse 38th "And those who have responded to their lord and established prayer and whose affair is determined by consultation among themselves, and from what we have provided them, they spend" and Surah Ali'Imran verse 159th "... So pardon them and ask forgiveness for them and consult them in the matter. And when you have decided, then rely upon God. Indeed, God loves those who rely upon him"⁷¹². This principle, nonetheless, is explicitly subordinated by the leadership obese pillar. Inasmuch as the separated powers mentioned in Arts. 58, 62-64 (the legislative), 60 (the executive), and 61 (the judicial) are all subjected to the effective element of the absolute Velayat-e Faqih, Arts. 5, 57, 107, 110.⁷¹³ In this relation, an Assembly of Experts is predicted which is indirectly elected by the leader himself, dramatically responsible for dismissal and approval of the very leader.⁷¹⁴

⁷¹¹ Monotheism, Prophethood and the Day of Resurrection are the principles of Islam and Shi'ite has two more principles of Imamate (leadership) and Justice. Rahnema. Superstition as Ideology in Iranian Politics: From Majlesi to Ahmadinejad. 296.

⁷¹² Quran. <https://quran.com/> .

⁷¹³ The authorities and responsibilities of the Velayat-e Faqih or supreme leader are contained by 1. determining the overall politics of the Islamic Republic system of Iran after consultation with the Expediency Council, 2. supervising the proper implementation of the general policies of the system, 3. issuing referendums, 4. commanding the armed forces, 5. declaring war, peace, and mobilizing forces, 6. issuing appointments, dismissals, and accepting the resignation of: a. the jurisprudents of the Guardian Council, b. the highest position of the judiciary power, c. the president of the mass media of the Islamic Republic of Iran, d. the chief of the general staff, e. the commander in chief of the Islamic Pasdaran Revolutionary Corps, f. the supreme commanders in chief of the security and armed forces, 7. coordinating the relationship among the three branches of the government and resolving any conflict among them, 8. resolving issues in the system that cannot be settled by ordinary means through the Expediency Council, 9. signing the appointment of the President of the republic, after his election by the public. The qualifications of the candidates for presidency, with respect to the conditions set forth by the constitution, must be confirmed by the Guardian Council prior to the general elections and approved by the leader for the first term (thus a President also is elected directly and indirectly by him, as he appoints the Guardian Council), 10. dismissing the President of the republic, with regard to the best interests of the country, after either the Supreme Court has issued a ruling convicting him of deviating from his legal duties, or the Islamic Consultative Assembly, based on Art. 89, has cast a vote against his competence, 11. pardoning or reducing the sentences of convicts, within the framework of Islamic criteria, after the head of the judiciary power has recommended such a motion. However, the leader can transfer some of his duties and authorities, he has also preempted the others' authorities. Iranian Constitution 1979, Chapter 8th The Leadership, Art. 110. <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000.html> .

⁷¹⁴ Ibid., Arts. 107, 108, 111.

By this document, although, the equality of men and women before law is obviously guaranteed in Arts. 3, 14, 20, 21, practically based on Shari'a law they are not considered equal at all, and subsequently, most of the provisions of the monarchical legislation for Family Protection Law are officially abandoned. In return for this law, the women's rights are defined and reduced largely in the course of Islamic recommendations so as to rear an obedient veiled housewife as well as a good mother. Also, it has addressed the civil rights, that presumedly all individuals are innocent unless proven guilty, Art. 37, and in Art. 38 torture is prohibited, however, the rogue autonomous sacred tortures are not defined at all. The ideas of welfare and social security under the influence of the idea of socialism are fully demonstrated in Arts. 3, 28-31, 43-46, 48, 49. Art. 48 in addition emphasizes on a balanced budgeting for all regions of the country. Ecological concerns are expressed in Art. 50 as a social obligation. To avoid dependence on foreign powers, the establishment of foreign military bases in Iran is forbidden, Art. 146, however, Art. 154 commits the Islamic Republic to protect the right based struggle of the oppressed poor people against oppressive cruel arrogant people anywhere in the world (it justifies Islamic Republic current presence in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, among others). Art. 13 recognized the Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians as the only religious minorities in Iran,⁷¹⁵ thus excluded the Baha'is among others.

In any case, the necessity for a constitutional amendment appeared when, a friction between President Khamenei and the state radical mullahs, led by prime minister Mousavi, over the constitutional executive power of the presidential and the prime ministerial positions greatly intensified after the cease fire with Iraq in August 1988. Further, the mandatory resignation of Khomeini's designated successor, Montazeri, in March 1989, added urgency to the need for constitutional review. It was given two months to revise the existing constitutional provisions on the leadership, centralization of power in the executive, judiciary, centralization of management of the media, and the number of deputies in the parliament. When Khomeini died, on 3rd June 1989,⁷¹⁶ the Assembly of Experts by the Rafsanjani's plot appointed Khamenei as a new omnipotent leader of Islamic Revolution. The Council consequently did the final revising of the constitution and submitted it on 8th July 1989. It made several changes in Arts 5, 107, 109, 111, eliminating the requirement for the leader to be a Marja' (a source of imitation) or faqih (a high ranked mullah) and to be confirmed by the nation, dropped the prime ministerial post, thus all its functions were transferred to the presidential in new Arts. 60, 69, 87, 125-127. By the new Art.

⁷¹⁵ Amir Arjomand. "Constitution of the Islamic Republic". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitution-of-the-islamic-republic#article-tags-overlay> . Iran's 1979 Constitution and its Amendment. <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000.html> .

⁷¹⁶ David Lea (ed.). A Political Chronology of the Middle East. London: Europa Publications. 2001. p. 59.

157, the supreme judicial council was replaced by a single chief justice, appointable by the leader for five years. Finally, by the amendment the already changed name of the Majles⁷¹⁷ constitutionally renamed from National Consultative Assembly to Islamic Consultative Assembly.⁷¹⁸

From another point of view, the amendments were assumed to be established because, at that time almost no serious Marja' had given strong support for Khomeini's policies,⁷¹⁹ thus it made his successor exclusively fit for the leadership.⁷²⁰ In the end, after approval by the leader, the amendments of the constitution as a hybrid⁷²¹ of the theocratic essence and democratic characteristics were approved by the sealed ballot boxes, albeit without any other drafts or choices. The result of such amendment was that the political pluralism which after the revolution became extremely limited, developed into the eclectic constitutional democratic institutions, albeit with unfair elections, violations of civil liberties, fully controlled media, omnipresent censorship, dependent judiciary, military repression, besides aggressive foreign policy and relationships aimed at the domination of the Middle East and beyond.⁷²²

Table 4. Democracy Index 2017⁷²³

Rank	Country	Score	Electoral process & pluralism	Functioning of government	Political participation	Political culture	Civil liberties	Category
150	Iran	2.45	0.00	3.21	4.44	3.13	1.47	Authoritarian

⁷¹⁷ On 22nd July 1980, the mullahs in order to complete the Islamization project changed the name of the Majles. Martin E. Marty und R. Scott Appleby (eds.). *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economies, and Militance*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. 1993. p. 95.

⁷¹⁸ Amir Arjomand. "Constitution of the Islamic Republic". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitution-of-the-islamic-republic#article-tags-overlay> . Iran's 1979 Constitution and its Amendment. <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000.html> .

⁷¹⁹ Daniel Brumberg. *Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. 2001. p. 146.

⁷²⁰ As Khamenei himself explicitly confirmed his ineligibility in the Assembly meeting for his appointment as a leader. A January 2018 leaked video from the mentioned meeting of 1989. Frud Bezhan. "Leaked Video Of Khamenei Raises Questions About Iran's Supreme Leadership". Radio Farda. Online edition. January 11, 2018. <https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-khamenei-leaked-video-1989-questions-leadership/28969517.html> .

⁷²¹ Abrahamian. *History of Modern Iran*. 183.

⁷²² Khamenei publicly made not many secrets on it and announced in his speech for the Persian new year on 20th March 2018, "we are widely active in Syria and Iraq, and it is not a matter of no one".

⁷²³ The Democracy Index is the result of an annual study to measure the state of democracy in 167 countries, by the Economist Intelligence Unit. In addition to a numeric score and a ranking, the index categorizes countries as one of four regime types, fully, fragile democracy, hybrid or dual and authoritarian regime. A report by The Economist Intelligence Unit. "Democracy Index 2017: Free speech under attack". http://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/Democracy_Index_2017 . p. 9.

9. An explanation to the Green Movement 2009-2011

9.1. *The crisis of participation, the reformation of revolution*

Since the onset of the war (1980-1988) and the oppressions of the oppositions in 1980s to the presidency of Khatami (1997-2005), some Iranian groups did not back the post-revolutionary state anymore. They in particular boycotted the elections of the Islamic Republic, and considered them as “rubber stamp” with legal manifestation, and in effect miniature authority. Afterwards, influenced by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the velvet revolutions, under the pressure of the growing middle-class, in the absence of the charismatic elements capable to attract the masses, the circumstances for the appearance of “the reformists” was best appreciated. Following, expectedly many people politically participated and voted for the reformatory campaigners, as they wanted to really change towards a fair accurate, or more up-to-date open space.⁷²⁴ They went to the ballot boxes expecting their opinions to be truly reflected, their hopes to be dignified and finally to transmogrify the existing reality.

The Khatami’s campaign with liberal catchphrases attracted a large number of the younger generations, born under the rule of the mullahs. The revolutionary leader, Khamenei confiscated the vote to his own benefit, despite the truth that it was a strong message for the Islamic Republic system, from the majority who simply felt loss.⁷²⁵

One year after this election, the major puzzle of the serial murders and disappearances of the Iranian oppositions and intellectuals (1988-1998) was solved.⁷²⁶ In fact, these murders were carried out by the rogue autonomous elements of the Islamic Republic ministry of Intelligence, and therefore clarified this reality that under the rule of the mullahs, the head of the rightful state (the president) has simply not fully control over the country’s affairs and in particular armed and security forces.

⁷²⁴ The Editors of Frontline. “BY POPULAR DEMAND: IRANIAN ELECTIONS, 1997-2001”. Frontline. Online edition. 2018. <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/inside/elections.html> .

⁷²⁵ In April 1993, Bazargan the head of the revolutionary interim government wrote in Kian, an Iranian monthly magazine, “The result of the mission of the prophet Muhammad after 23 years was the verse - and you see the people entering into the religion of God in multitudes- (surah An-Nasr, Triumph, 2nd verse) but after 15 years of the Islamic Revolution, you see the Iranians exiting out of the religion of God, and unfortunately, the people of Iran Lost their World and the Hereafter ...” Mehdi Bazargan. Tehran: Kian monthly Magazine. April 1993.

⁷²⁶ Sahimi. “The Chain Murders: Killing Dissidents and Intellectuals, 1988-1998”. <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/01/the-chain-murders-killing-dissidents-and-intellectuals-1988-1998.html> . Newton. Famous Assassinations in World History: An Encyclopedia, Vol. 1. 87, 91.

9.2. *The legal irony of “Thought Crime” and the student protests*

The Iranian press and publications during this time period, did not take the restrictions serious, thus relied on the reform discourse and expressed the supposed reformative views.⁷²⁷ This issue actually sparked the student protest of July 1999,⁷²⁸ which was not a new issue, but its repression was unprecedented, inasmuch as, this event before the 2009 Iranian election protest was the most widespread violent since the early years of the 1979 revolution.

The narration of the incident was as follows, on 7th July 1999, the Salam newspaper was closed. The closure was due to the publishing of the ministry of Intelligence’s provisions of the new press law.⁷²⁹

On 8th July a peacefully held rally in Tehran University’s campus and dormitories was attacked by both the plain clothes of Ansar-e Hezbollah⁷³⁰ and the police. Some of the forces demolished the students’ properties, with slogans “Ja Zahra”⁷³¹ and “Allahoakbar” threw some students out the windows, brutally beat, arrested, killed and made tens disappeared. The crackdown operation continued until the next day morning as a result of the protesters’ resistance. This attack led to several days of massive countrywide protests by the desperate students and other people. In Tehran, a number of students chanting anti-Khamenei slogans gathered enough courage to rally towards the house and office of the supreme leader.⁷³²

Despite of the unpleasant aftereffects, the crackdowns and the ratification of the provisions (truly new astringencies against the press, publications and journalists) as “thought crime law” (putting thoughts on trial) and “prohibition of any contact with foreign embassies, organizations

⁷²⁷ Arch Puddington (Ed.). *Freedom on the world 2008: The annual survey of political rights and civil liberties*. Freedom House. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. 2008. p. 339.

⁷²⁸ James Robbins. “Six days that shook Iran”. BBC News. Online edition. 11 July 2000. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/828696.stm .

⁷²⁹ Jim Muir. “Iran closes down newspaper”. BBC News. Online edition. July 7, 1999. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/388635.stm .

⁷³⁰ Or the supporters of the party of God is an advocacy special pressure militia group that was formed and organized by IRGC and ministry of Intelligence in early 1990s in order to support the Khamenei’s will, Velayat-e Faqih and revolution. The group has mostly recruited among IRGC and Basij members and has played an important vanquisher role in repressing the student movement, intellectuals, the press and public spheres by its countrywide network. Antoine Sfeir (ed.). *The Columbia World Dictionary of Islamism*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. 2007. Pp. 149-150.

⁷³¹ Zahra is a nickname for Fatimah the daughter of the prophet Muhammad.

⁷³² The Editors of The New York Times from Reuters. “Student Protests Shake Iran’s Government”. The New York Times. Online edition. July 11, 1999.

<https://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/11/world/student-protests-shake-iran-s-government.html> .

Sciolino. “Iran Students Halt Protests But Still Press For Changes”.

<https://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/18/world/iran-students-halt-protests-but-still-press-for-changes.html> .

and media which could be judged as harmful to the Islamic Republic”,⁷³³ subsequently, the 1999 student protest became a rehearsal for the 2009 Green Movement.

9.3. *Green a symbol of unity and hope for an electoral solution*

As an issue of fact, in Iranian recent history, after the constitutional movement with the goals of law and justice, but not liberty, the motto of “Where is my vote?” during the heroic and popular protests of the Green movement was a fabulous stage of emancipatory understanding of legality, election and its outfits. After the tenth Iranian presidential election (2009), although, the society was fundamentally still far from the notion of liberty and political liberation, the political Green movement with its slogan positioned against the Islamic Republic, and demanded the removal of its president (Ahmadinejad) from the office.

The green color was basically symbolized for the Mousavi’s supporters, as he was a Sayyid and this color is a sign for. After the election and massive protests, it signified unity and hope for those who opposed Ahmadinejad’s reappointment or reselection. The Mousavi’s electoral campaign organized green human chains, encouraged greenery such as green bracelets, and the promotion of this color before and after the election.⁷³⁴

Two weeks before the incident, Sobh-e Sadegh weekly, the IRGC’s official organ and Kayhan newspaper, the leader’s unofficial tribune, both similarly claimed that they have information over a project for a color revolution in Iran.⁷³⁵

Then the regime’s officials attributed the protests to the propagandistic and psychological war of the electoral campaign. After the arrest of the so-called campaign organizers, (Mousavi, Karroubi and Montazeri known as the central symbolic figures of the movement) the protests as a result of fraud and repression continued vigorously. Inasmuch as this movement as an unprecedented decentralized uprising in contemporary Iran was outside the relation of leadership, supremacy and obedience, but at the same time networked (via social media

⁷³³ Similar to the “Thought Crime” depicted in Nineteen Eighty-Four, the dystopian novel of George Orwell published in 1949. Robin Wright. *The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and Transformation in Iran*. New York: Random House. 2000. Pp. 271-272. In the implementation of Art. 123 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, these laws under the Political Crime Act, which was submitted to the Islamic Consultative Assembly as a bill, were officially reapproved by the General Assembly on May 13th, 2016, and also ratified by the Guardian Council, http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html.

⁷³⁴ Ekim Arbatli and Dina Rosenberg (Eds.). *Non-Western Social Movements and Participatory Democracy: Protest in the Age of Transnationalism*. Cham: Springer International Publishing. 2017. p. 146.

⁷³⁵ Sobh-e Sadegh weekly. Late May 2009. Kayhan newspaper. 30.05.2009.

particularly twitter),⁷³⁶ interactive and consensual.⁷³⁷ Fundamentally, this shape of praxis convinced the protesters not to stop their self-propelled movement.

In a letter to Khamenei, on 10th June 2009, two days before the election, Mousavi warned him about the intervention of the IRGC and Basij commanders in election.⁷³⁸ On 11th June, one day before the election, the SMS systems of mobile phone operators and the Net were disrupted.⁷³⁹ On the election day, the police announced that gathering of the supporters of the presidential candidates is illegal. Earlier they announced that a maneuver as “Authority” will be launched on streets of Tehran, with the aim of maintaining order and security.⁷⁴⁰

Contrary to other Islamic Republic elections, at the end of the election’s day, they immediately closed the polling stations, and did not allow the lately arrived voters to vote. Moreover, while, the normal announcements of the elections results took a few days, the so-called preliminary result of this election was announced only after a couple of hours.

9.4. *The past similar cases to compare*

The issue of electoral problems did not start with this elaborated election. In the course of the previous elections in the history of Islamic Republic, there have been always cases of fraud. One of the methods of fraud that has always been widely applied is “tombstone voting” or using the birth certificate of the dead people, besides issuing several fake identity cards for one single voter. According to official statistics gathered by the international institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance in Stockholm, at the time of Khatami’s 2001 presidential election victory, the number of registered voters almost 38,700,000 was approximately 12.9 percent higher than

⁷³⁶ John H. Parmelee and Shannon L. Bichard. *Politics and the Twitter Revolution: How Tweets Influence the Relationship between Political Leaders and the Public*. Lanham: Lexington Books. 2012. p. 15. The editors of Pew Research Center, Journalism & Media. *Iran and the “Twitter Revolution”*. PEJ New Media Index June 15-19, 2009. 25 June 2009.

<http://www.journalism.org/2009/06/25/iran-and-twitter-revolution/> .

⁷³⁷ For instance, during a spontaneous demonstration in silence in Tehran, I as an active eyewitness observed people were marching in all directions, tried to signalize each other to keep silence. All the placards that were in the hands of the people were inviting to silence. One of the written slogans was “Peace is victorious vis-à-vis bullet”.

⁷³⁸ Mir Hossein Mousavi. “Full text of Mir Hossein Mousavi’s letter to Khamenei”. BBC News. Online edition. 11 June 2009.

http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/06/090611_op_ir88_mousavi_khamenei_letter_text.shtml .

⁷³⁹ Sean S. Costigan, Jake Perry (eds.). *Cyberspaces and Global Affairs*. Surrey: Ashgate. 2012. p. 216, The Editors of Radio Zamaaneh. “Connecting the SMS system after 40 days”. Radio Zamaaneh. Online edition. July 23, 2009. http://zamaaneh.com/news/2009/07/40_6.html .

⁷⁴⁰ Ismael. *Government and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East: Continuity and Change*. 193.

the total number of the qualified citizens in the voting age, roughly 32,600,000.⁷⁴¹ The Guardian Council also in the case of the 2009 election announced that in 50 cities, the number of votes was higher than the number of the qualified voters in their constituencies, with a total of three million votes which they claimed it had no effective role on the total outcome.⁷⁴² In an open letter dated on 27th November 2011, Mohammad Maleki (1934-2020)⁷⁴³ revealed a wide fraud in the first election of the Islamic Republic in 1979. In the election to the sixth parliament in 2000, Rafsanjani initially acquired 30th, the last seat in Tehran's constituency. After, several cases of alleged fraud, the Council of Guardian contended that the election had been marred by fraud, hence unexpectedly ordered a recount and positioned Rafsanjani at 20th. As it was also as a result of an electoral manipulation, he finally resigned the seat.⁷⁴⁴ At that time, Ahmadinejad, as one of the failed candidates to the parliamentary election strongly protested (since the Guardian Council annulled 700,000 votes). On 14th October 2008 Mostafa Tajzadeh (1956-)⁷⁴⁵ in a speech at University of Tehran, Department of Social Sciences disclosed that they annulled 530 ballot boxes in the parliamentary election of 2000. He also revealed, in some cities ironically roughly 180 percent of the eligible voters participated in the presidential election of Khatami's period. The ninth presidential election took place in two rounds, the first on 17th June 2005, the runoff on 24th June, while, at the first round Ahmadinejad was ranked second, in the runoff won the office. An official of Interior ministry revealed that the Guardian Council was in charge of an election fraud in the presidential runoff. This official alleged he was arrested when he objected to the voting irregularities.⁷⁴⁶ In the last example, on 19th June 2005, Karroubi in an open letter to the Islamic Republic's leader, denounced the

⁷⁴¹ Ali Ansari (ed.). "Preliminary Analysis of the Voting Figures in Iran's 2009 Presidential Election". Chatham House and the Institute of Iranian Studies, Univ. of St. Andrews. Online edition. 21 June 2009. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Middle%20East/iranelection0609.pdf> , p. 3. Kasra Naji. Ahmadinejad: The Secret History of Iran's Radical Leader. Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press. 2008. Pp. 78-79.

⁷⁴² The Editors of BBC News. "The number of eligible voters does not have an impact on the outcome of the election". BBC News. Online edition. 22 July 2009. http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/06/090622_ka_ir88_guardiancouncil.shtml .

⁷⁴³ The first president of the University of Tehran after 1979 revolution, and one of the organizers of the first election or the so-called referendum on creating an Islamic Republic on 30th-31st March 1979, who later diagnosed as Mohareb and served years behind bars.

⁷⁴⁴ The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Hashemi Rafsanjani". Encyclopædia Britannica. Online edition. May 8, 2017. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hashemi-Rafsanjani> . Jim Muir. "Rafsanjani scrapes in". BBC News. Online edition. 26 February 2000. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/657538.stm .

⁷⁴⁵ Vice Minister of Interior (1997-2001), head of Country's Election Headquarters (1998-2000) who after the controversial fake election of 2009 spent seven years in prison.

⁷⁴⁶ Elaine Quijano. "Iran official alleges election fraud". CNN. Online edition. June 26, 2005. <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/06/25/iran.claim/> .

leader's son, Mojtaba Khamenei (1969-),⁷⁴⁷ IRGC and Basij as executives of the electoral frauds in Iran.⁷⁴⁸

In terms of the 2009 contentious case, Newsweek reported about a secret Iranian government survey, right one week before the incident, estimated Mousavi would win 16 to 18 million votes, and Ahmadinejad just 6 to 8 million.⁷⁴⁹ Legally, the ballot boxes should have been checked before the polls under the supervision of nominees' representatives, but this process has not been done in most polling stations. There were also 14,000 mobile ballot boxes that were not monitored, and virtually made any irregularity possible. Hundreds of polling stations in various parts of the country did not have enough ballots, which resulted in a few hours of voting suspension.⁷⁵⁰

Overall, the evident arguments for the electoral violation, even based on the leaked reports of the regime dependent institutions⁷⁵¹ were over the rapidity in counting votes and announcing result, the Ahmadinejad's unpopularity and notoriety during four years of his first presidency⁷⁵² and the seemingly absurd or self-contradictory statistical facts and results.⁷⁵³

⁷⁴⁷ The potential future supreme leader of the Islamic Republic.

⁷⁴⁸ Mehdi Karroubi. "Full text of Mehdi Karroubi's letter to Khamenei". BBC News. Online edition. 19 June 2005. http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/story/2005/06/050619_karoubi-objection.shtml .

⁷⁴⁹ Scott Peterson. "Was Iran's election rigged? Here's what is known so far". The Christian Science Monitor. Online edition. June 17, 2009. <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2009/0617/p06s01-wome.html> .

⁷⁵⁰ The Editors of BBC News. "Response from the Mousavi's Committee for the Protection of Votes to the Guardians Council". BBC News. Online edition. 11 August, 2009. http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/08/090811_op_ir88_guardian_council_mousavi.shtml .

⁷⁵¹ Borzou Daragahi. "IRAN: Well-informed Larijani congratulated Mousavi on election day". Los Angeles Times. Online edition. August 11, 2009. <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2009/08/iran-wellinformed-larijani-congratulated-mousavi-on-election-day-report-says.html> .

⁷⁵² The first presidency of Ahmadinejad began in 2005, prior and after his victory, he repeatedly described himself as a supporter of social freedom and clarified that when his rivals in the first half of the revolutionary period were against the freedom of young generations, he disagreed with them. Anyhow, after a short while he run a "Guidance Patrol" or morality police to enforce Islamic law Shari'a and practically to brutally arrest mostly young girls who were improperly dressed based on the Shari'a dress code. He questioned the existence of the state of Israel as well as the Holocaust issue, spoke of the regime change in Israel, using the phrase "the world will be safer without Israel" at a conference called "Palestine Support Conference" in Tehran, October 26th, 2005. Then by following the nuclear ambitious plans made Iran Internationally isolated. The Editors of BBC News. "The Views of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad". BBC News. Online edition. 26 June 2005. http://www.bbc.com/persian/business/story/2005/06/050626_ra-ahmadi-views.shtml .

⁷⁵³ In some provinces the announced total percentages for candidates was ironically more than 100%. Ansari. "Preliminary Analysis of the Voting Figures in Iran's 2009 Presidential Election". <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Middle%20East/iranelection0609.pdf> , p. 2. The Editors of BBC News. "Iran Elections, The Chatham House Institute Report". BBC News. Online edition. 22 June 2009. http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/06/090622_ir88_election_chatham_analysis.shtml .

All these violations are listed, in which in Chapter 7, Art. 66 of the Electoral Law of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the electoral manipulation and fraud including buying and selling votes, threatening or bribing to vote, voting with fake identity card, voting more than once, disturbing the process of election, changing and forging votes and its statistics, voting with identity card of dead people, unlocking or breaking the sealed ballot boxes (without legal authority), manipulation or termination of electoral documents (without legal authorization), among others are predicted and prohibited.⁷⁵⁴

After the election, Mousavi and other candidates, based on the evidence from the Committee for the Safeguarding of Votes, expressed their objection to the result. He in his first statement, named the method of holding and counting the votes as “magic of the election and media”.⁷⁵⁵ While, the objections continued, the Guardian Council, unlike to its usual procedure, quickly confirmed the validity of the election.⁷⁵⁶ Khamenei also sealed and legitimized the result of the election.

9.5. *We are not dirt and dust, where are our votes?*

Following the announcement of the reselection of Ahmadinejad with allegedly 24 million votes, which had some similar political symptoms of a semi-coup, a significant number of people, who believed this official electoral result to be fraudulent, held massive demonstrations in the streets and squares of Tehran and other cities. In Tehran the demonstration led to the harsh clashes with the police and plainclothes forces, particularly against the building of the Interior ministry, the executive center of the election. Associated Press cited these clashes as the most serious unrest in the past decade in Tehran. Some protesters by firing several buses and burning trash bins barricaded the streets and chanted “death to dictator”.⁷⁵⁷ The shocking footages of violent crackdown and beating protesters by the military and paramilitary forces were released and

⁷⁵⁴ The Electoral Law of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Islamic Parliament Research Center Of The Islamic Republic Of IRAN. <https://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/93241> .

⁷⁵⁵ Mir Hossein Mousavi. “Mir Hossein Mousavi’s statement # 1 after announcement of the election results”. Kaleme. Online edition. June 13, 2009. <http://www.kaleme.com/1388/03/23/klm-98074/> .

⁷⁵⁶ The Editors of CNN. “Iran media: Council rejects claims of voting irregularities”. CNN. Online edition. June 22, 2009. <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/21/iran.election/index.html> .

⁷⁵⁷ The Editors of BBC News. “Unrest following the election results’ announcement”. BBC News. Online edition. 13 June 2009. http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/06/090613_ba-ir88-iran-clashes.shtml .

promptly redistributed by people and the world's leading media, and triggered intense popular sentiments.⁷⁵⁸

Since the first of this unrest, the cell phones were disconnected from all country telecommunication networks⁷⁵⁹ and dozens of ex-officials and activists were arrested.⁷⁶⁰

On June 14th, the second day of the protests, Ahmadinejad launched a celebration of victory in Valiasr⁷⁶¹ Square, where he named the opponents as “dirt and dust” and provoked the clashes.⁷⁶² In addition to Iran, there were protest gatherings in many other cities in the world.⁷⁶³

The regime in response called for pro-government demonstrations, alleging the sacreds were insulted, and subsequently heightened the repression of the opposition.

On June 15th, almost some millions of protesters with Mousavi and Karroubi (another protest candidate) marched towards Freedom Square of Tehran, which became the largest anti-government march since the 1979 revolution. At the end of the march, the violence unfolded in direct shooting of some autonomous paramilitary forces, and a number of people were killed and wounded.⁷⁶⁴ Mousavi called for a general strike,⁷⁶⁵ if he were arrested, and welcomed the martyrdom. He insisted on the annulment of the election's result, and the protesters continued to claim a stolen election or “election rigging”.⁷⁶⁶

⁷⁵⁸ Christine Kearney. “Film shows life and bloody death of Iran protester”. Reuters. Online edition. October 22, 2010. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-film-iran-idUSTRE65L67X20100622> . Kamalipour. Media, Power, and Politics in the Digital Age: The 2009 Presidential Election Uprising in Iran. 30.

⁷⁵⁹ Robert F. Worth and Nazila Fathi. “Protests Flare in Tehran as Opposition Disputes Vote”. The New York Times. Online edition. 13 June 2009. <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/world/middleeast/14iran.html> .

⁷⁶⁰ The Editors of Human Rights Watch. “Iran: Violent Crackdown on Protesters Widens”. Human Rights Watch. Online edition. June 23, 2009. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/06/23/iran-violent-crackdown-protesters-widens> . The Editors of BBC News. “Extensive arrests of political activists in Tehran”. BBC News. Online edition. 14 June 2009.

http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/06/090613_op_ir88_mosharekat_mojahedin_arrests.shtml .

⁷⁶¹ A nickname for the 12th hidden Imam.

⁷⁶² Robert Tait. “The dust revolution- how Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's jibe backfired”. The Guardian. Online edition. 18 June 2009. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/18/iran-election-protests-mahmoud-ahmadinejad> .

⁷⁶³ The Editors of CNN. “Global protests staged over post-election crackdown in Iran”. CNN. Online edition. July 26, 2009. <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/07/25/iran.world.protests/index.html#cnnSTCText> .

⁷⁶⁴ The Editors of BBC News. “Eight people have been killed in Tehran”. BBC News. Online edition. 16 June 2009. http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/06/090616_he_ir88_killing_rally.shtml .

⁷⁶⁵ Yahya R. Kamalipour (ed.). Media, Power, and Politics in the Digital Age: The 2009 Presidential Election Uprising in Iran. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2010. p. 230.

⁷⁶⁶ Parisa Hafezi. “Iran's Mousavi insists on presidential vote annulment”. Reuters. Online edition. June 20, 2009. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-election-mousavi-sb/irans-mousavi-insists-on-presidential-vote-annulment-idUSTRE55J1D620090620> .

9.6. *A green light to the rogue forces for bloodshed*

In the next morning, the dormitories and campus of the University of Tehran were violently attacked by the battlers of the Basij, thus a number of students were injured and murdered. Then on 16th, 17th and 18th June, the Silent Protest Marches were held with hundreds of thousands of protesters in Tehran.⁷⁶⁷ On 20th June, a day after the speech of Khamenei on the first Friday prayers after the presidential elections,⁷⁶⁸ the protests ended in the sharp repression of police, Basij and IRGC forces, as he cried and warned there would be “bloodshed” if the street protests continued, and the organizers of the protests would be in charge of it. In fact, it was a Green Light to the regime’s rogue fire at will forces for bloody crackdown of the protesters. They used clubs, tear gas, deliberately direct shooting to oblige thousands of demonstrators back.⁷⁶⁹ The number of victims reached much higher than what was reported by the human rights groups.⁷⁷⁰ The street violence appeared to grow more and more intense when an amateur video posted on YouTube, showed a young woman bleeding to death after being shot (by a rogue Basiji).⁷⁷¹ This became one of the most seen video of the death of a human being and symbolized her face for the defenseless protesters against the regime.⁷⁷² In the next days, the spreading violent events occurred in different parts of Tehran and Iran.

As the protest movement was known as the Green Movement, the regime’s media, the IRGC and Basij commanders, as well as other government supporters attributed the popular demonstrations to merely some rioters who were trying to run a color revolution. The security agents of the Islamic Republic in the weeks after the election and the protests, arrested thousands of journalists, political activists and protesters. Several collective courts were held and convicted them as acting with a soft coup to overthrow the Islamic regime. The government

⁷⁶⁷ Casey L. Addis. *Iran’s 2009 Presidential Elections*. Congressional research service. Pennsylvania: DIANE Publishing, 2009. p. 8.

⁷⁶⁸ Christiane Amanpour. “Iran’s supreme leader warns protesters”. CNN. Online edition. June 19, 2009. <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/19/iran.election.us/index.html> .

⁷⁶⁹ The Editors of BBC News. “Amnesty International: Iran’s Supreme Leader’s remarks, green light for repression”. http://www.bbc.com/persian/lq/iran/2009/06/090619_ba-ir88-amnesty-khamenei.shtml .

⁷⁷⁰ The Editors of The Guardian. “Iran protests: They have covered up the deaths”. The Guardian. Online edition. 9 July 2009. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/09/iran-protests-doctor-disputes-toll> .

⁷⁷¹ Kamalipour. *Media, Power, and Politics in the Digital Age: The 2009 Presidential Election Uprising in Iran*. 21.

⁷⁷² Mercedes Bunz. “Anonymous video of Neda Aghan-Soltan’s death wins Polk award”. The Guardian. Online edition. 16 February 2010. <https://www.theguardian.com/media/pda/2010/feb/16/george-polk-awards> .

supporters called the incident a “Fitna” or sedition and the lost presidential candidates as the seditious leaders.⁷⁷³

On the other side, as the Green Movement was not a preconceived social performance, but an indirect consequence of a legal election, there were some sober mullahs who considered the result of the election, at least islamically illegitimate.⁷⁷⁴

The heavy protests continued up until the tenth anniversary of the attacks on the dormitories of Tehran University in July 1999,⁷⁷⁵ the ceremonies of 40th of the victims, the inauguration of the Ahmadinejad’s presidency in August, and finally 12th June 2011 the second anniversary of Iranian presidential election fraud. During this two-year period, there were many reports about torturing, raping and murdering of the detainees. On November 20th, 2009, Human Rights Committee of the UN General Assembly in a resolution condemned the violent repression of the demonstrations by the Islamic regime.⁷⁷⁶ UNESCO in a report reflected the murders of students following the assault of the Basij forces to the universities,⁷⁷⁷ as on the morning of June 15th, they attacked to the dormitories of Tehran University, Isfahan University of Technology, Shiraz University, among others. Some students were beaten bloodily, killed and arrested, dormitories were seriously damaged.⁷⁷⁸ During the harsh conflicts of the first days, physicians and nurses of hospitals were pressured to write natural death for shotgun cases.⁷⁷⁹

⁷⁷³ Parisa Hafezi. “Khatami condemns Iran's show trial of reformists”. Reuters. Online edition. August 2, 2009. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-idUSL246200320090802> .

⁷⁷⁴ Dieter Bednarz. “End of the Green Revolution? The Power of Iran’s Iron Fist”. Spiegel. Online edition. June 29, 2009. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/end-of-the-green-revolution-the-power-of-iran-s-iron-fist-a-633144.html> .

⁷⁷⁵ Yasaman Baji. “IRAN: Protests Erupt on Student Massacre Anniversary”. Inter Press Service. Online edition. July 10, 2009. <http://www.ipsnews.net/2009/07/iran-protests-erupt-on-student-massacre-anniversary/> .

⁷⁷⁶ Louis Charbonneau. “UN panel condemns Iran for post-election crackdown”. Reuters. Online edition. November 20, 2009. <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN20238181> .

⁷⁷⁷ The Editors of BBC News. “UNESCO report on attacking academia in Iran”. BBC News. Online edition. 13 February 2010.

http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2010/02/100213_l10_unesco_report_education_under_attack.shtml .

⁷⁷⁸ Mark Dubowitz. “Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: Guardians of the Revolution and Violators of Human Rights”. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Online edition. 30 May 2013. <http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/irans-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-guardians-of-the-revolution-and-vio/> .

⁷⁷⁹ Chris Featherman. Discourses of Ideology and Identity: Social Media and the Iranian Election Protests. New York: Routledge. 2015. p. 170.

On June 17th, roughly half a million peacefully and silently gathered in Haft-e-Tir Square⁷⁸⁰ and demonstrated. Mousavi and Karroubi called on mourning ceremonies for sympathy with the families of the shot dead people.⁷⁸¹

The Association of Combatant Mullahs,⁷⁸² which after the announcement of the result, called it as an electoral engineering and requested its nullification,⁷⁸³ applied for a rally permit that was rejected by the Interior ministry on 20th June.⁷⁸⁴ The day after hundreds of thousands of protesters, flowers and candles in hands, gathered in Tehran to commemorate the killed people of the past marches. During the rally, Mousavi and people named the victims, as the martyrs of the movement.⁷⁸⁵

In the meantime, the censorship of newspapers was amplified, several newspapers were not published at all, and more filtering was applied to the Net.⁷⁸⁶ In a soccer competition between Iran and South Korea, a number of Iranian players who were protesting against the current socio-political circumstances, wore green colored wristbands.⁷⁸⁷

⁷⁸⁰ A very broad central cross section in Tehran's central business district with a very important mosque.

⁷⁸¹ Robert Tait, Ian Black and Mark Tran. "Iran protests: Fifth day of unrest as regime cracks down on critics". The Guardian. Online edition. 17 June 2009. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/17/iran-protests-day-five> .

⁷⁸² An association of the mullahs formed in 1987 through a split from Society of Militant Mullah by Karroubi and Mousavi Khomeini with the consent of Khomeini. Brumberg. Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran. 162.

⁷⁸³ The Editors of BBC News. "Request of the Association of Combatant Mullahs: Nullification of the Election or Formation of the Truth Finder Committee". BBC News. Online edition. 13 June 2009. http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/06/090613_op_ir88_majma_rowhanioon.shtml .

⁷⁸⁴ The Editors of BBC News. "Ministry of Interior and Police Warn to the Protesters". BBC News. Online edition. 20 June 2009.

http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/06/090620_ka_ir88_ahmadimoghadam.shtml .

⁷⁸⁵ Parisa Hafezi. "Thousands mourn Iranians killed in protests". Reuters. Online edition. 18 June 2009. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-election/thousands-mourn-iranians-killed-in-protests-idUSTRE55F54520090618> .

⁷⁸⁶ David Blair. "Iran struggles to censor news of protests". The Telegraph. Online edition. 15 June 2009. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/5543145/Iran-struggles-to-censor-news-of-protests.html> .

⁷⁸⁷ Kamalipour. Media, Power, and Politics in the Digital Age: The 2009 Presidential Election Uprising in Iran. 21.

Two high ranked mullahs Yousef Saanei (1937-2020) and AbdulKarim Mousavi Ardebili (1926-2016) also condemned the violence against the protesters.⁷⁸⁸ In the parliament, there were also verbal conflicts because of reading a report over the attack on the university campus.⁷⁸⁹

The night protests continued on the roofs by chanting slogans,⁷⁹⁰ however, later the roofs also were not safe places to express objection, as the plainclothes of Basij fire at will attacked on the residential buildings. Also, the houses of those who sheltered and helped the protesters had been attacked. Additionally, they damaged the parked cars in the streets. Then they accused the protesters to destruct the people and public properties, injuring and killing the Basij members.⁷⁹¹

In some bloody days, e.g., in the Black Saturday (June 20th) thousands of the riot police, IRGC and Basij forces severely confronted the demonstrators. The hospitals around the incidents were full of the protesters who were severely wounded by shooting. Hospital staff reported roughly 150 people dead merely in one day.⁷⁹² The rogue forces applied the roof of the mosques and the Basij bases to shoot people, different media from the world broadcasted images of the shooting to the demonstrators. In response, according to the official television of

⁷⁸⁸ The Editors of Radio Zamaaneh. "Condemnation of violence against people by two grand mullahs". Radio Zamaaneh. Online edition. 18 June 2009. http://zamaaneh.com/news/2009/06/post_9404.html . The Editors of BBC News. "Two grand mullahs are sympathized with the victims of the unrest in Iran". BBC News. Online edition. 18 June 2009.

http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/06/090618_he_ir88_sanei_protests.shtml .

⁷⁸⁹ The Editors of BBC News. "A report on the attack on public property and students in parliament was raised". BBC News. Online edition. 17 June 2009.

http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/06/090617_he_ir88_majlis_probe.shtml .

⁷⁹⁰ The Editors of BBC News. "The night protest against the outcome of the Iranian election continued on the roofs". BBC News. Online edition. 19 June 2009.

http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/06/090619_op_ir88_nightly_protest.shtml .

⁷⁹¹ The Editors of Radio Zamaaneh. "Creating insecurity for residential buildings in Iran". Radio Zamaaneh. Online edition. June 25, 2009. http://zamaaneh.com/news/2009/06/post_9481.html .

⁷⁹² The Editors of BBC News. "Ten killed and one hundred wounded in yesterday's clashes in Tehran". BBC News. Online edition. 21 June 2009.

http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/06/090621_ka_ir88_tehran_clashes.shtml .

The Editors of CNN. "Chaos prevails as protesters, police clash in Iranian capital". CNN. Online edition. June 21, 2009. <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/20/iran.election/index.html> .

Zahra Hosseinian and Fredrik Dahl. "Iran TV says 10 killed in Saturday clashes in Tehran". Reuters. Online edition. June 21, 2009. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-election-killed-tv/iran-tv-says-10-killed-in-saturday-clashes-in-tehran-idUSTRE55K0KL20090621> .

the Islamic Republic, a mosque was burned by the protesters.⁷⁹³

Mousavi in a statement referred to the Art. 27 of the Islamic Republic constitution, freedom to form gatherings and marches,⁷⁹⁴ and advised the regime and the armed forces not to stop the protesters.⁷⁹⁵

On June 21st, despite the military and security situation in Tehran and the repression of the day before, that left a number of dead people, the protesters chanted slogans against the regime and battled the riot police and Basij forces.⁷⁹⁶ At the same time, the Islamic regime pressured the domestic and international media,⁷⁹⁷ e.g., the BBC correspondent was expelled from Iran,⁷⁹⁸ and the Newsweek reporter was arrested.⁷⁹⁹ The IRGC in a statement on 22nd June threatened the protesters to a harsh revolutionary reaction.⁸⁰⁰

⁷⁹³ The Editors of Reuters. "People killed in mosque fire during unrest-Iran TV". Reuters. Online edition. June 21, 2009. <https://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKDAH130601> . The Editors of Radio Farda. "An IRGC commander: The perpetrators were killed by their own hands". Radio Farda. Online edition. 4 October 2009. https://www.radiofarda.com/a/F8_ARAGHI_PROTESTORES_KILLED_THEMSELVES/1843178/p2.html?contenttype=1 .

⁷⁹⁴ Iranian Constitution 1979. <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir000000.html> .

⁷⁹⁵ Mir Hossein Mousavi. "Mir Hossein Mousavi's statement # 5". Kaleme. Online edition. June 20, 2009. <http://www.kaleme.com/1388/03/30/klm-8801/> .

⁷⁹⁶ The Editors of Radio Farda. "The scattered street protests once again swept Tehran". Radio Farda. Online edition. June 21, 2009. https://www.radiofarda.com/a/f4_Tehran_protests_new_phase/1759246.html .

⁷⁹⁷ Ali Asghar Ramezani. "Pressure on Iran in relation to foreign journalists". BBC News. Online edition. 19 June 2009. http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/06/090618_si_ir88_foreignpress.shtml .

⁷⁹⁸ The Editors of BBC News. "The BBC regular correspondent was expelled from Iran". BBC News. Online edition. 21 June 2009. http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/06/090621_shr_bbc_leyne.shtml .

⁷⁹⁹ The Editors of BBC News. "The Newsweek reporter is arrested in Iran". BBC News. Online edition. 21 June 2009. http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/06/090621_wkf-newsweek-iran.shtml .

⁸⁰⁰ The Editors of Radio Farda. "IRGC threatened street protesters with a revolutionary reaction". Radio Farda. Online edition. June 22, 2009. https://www.radiofarda.com/a/f4_revolutionary_guard_threatens_protests/1759941.html .

9.7. *The severe measures and an ignominy in Kahrizak*

In late June and July, we witnessed the continuation of repression and arrest of the protesters,⁸⁰¹ journalists,⁸⁰² university professors and students⁸⁰³ in different parts of country, in particular in Tehran.⁸⁰⁴

The protesters tried to change their strategy with forming smaller and more dispersed demonstrations, as the clashes were getting bloodier every day and the number of killed people reached nearly 250 within merely 10 days.⁸⁰⁵

Some EU embassies in Tehran hosted the Iranian wounded protesters,⁸⁰⁶ and there was the continuation of the global response and summoning of the regime's ambassadors by the EU member states.⁸⁰⁷

The charge of communication of protesters with Western organizations caused the arrest of British Embassy staff in Tehran.⁸⁰⁸ The EU warned the Islamic Republic to avoid intimidation of diplomats.⁸⁰⁹

⁸⁰¹ The Editors of BBC News. "Arrests at new Iranian protests". BBC News. Online edition. 21 July 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8161824.stm .

⁸⁰² The Editors of The Himalayan Times. "Iran arrests newspaper staffs". The Himalayan Times. Online edition. June 24, 2009. <https://thehimalayantimes.com/world/iran-arrests-newspaper-staffs/> .

Damien Mc Elroy. "Iran's newspapers call for Mousavi to be punished for violence". The Telegraph. Online edition. 24 June 2009. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/5622127/Irans-newspapers-call-for-Mousavi-to-be-punished-for-violence.html> .

⁸⁰³ Aisha Labi. "70 Professors Are Arrested in Iran After Meeting With Moussavi". The Chronicle of Higher Education. Online edition. June 25, 2009. <https://www.chronicle.com/article/70-Professors-Are-Arrested-in/47804> . Karin Laub. "Iran detains university professors, Mousavi says". Herald Net. Online edition. June 25, 2009. <http://www.heraldnet.com/news/iran-detains-university-professors-mousavi-says/> .

The Editors of Radio Farda. "70 University Professors Are Arrested in Iran After Meeting With Mir Hossein Moussavi". Radio Farda. Online edition. June 25, 2009. https://www.radiofarda.com/a/o2_arrests_iran_mousavi_election/1762064.html .

⁸⁰⁴ The Editors of BBC News. "Police break up new Tehran rally". BBC News. Online edition. 22 June 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8112812.stm . The Editors of BBC News. "Iran police tear gas protesters". BBC News. Online edition. 9 July 2009.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8141873.stm . The Editors of Aljazeera. "Iranian police beat protesters". Aljazeera. Online edition. 30 Jul 2009. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2009/06/2009628192214829335.html> .

⁸⁰⁵ Eli Lake. "Iran protesters alter tactics to avoid death". The Washington Times. Online edition. June 25, 2009. <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/25/opposition-alters-tactics-to-avoid-protest-deaths/> .

⁸⁰⁶ Valentina Pop. "EU embassies wary of hosting Iranian protesters". euobserver. Online edition. 22 June 2009. <https://euobserver.com/foreign/28347> .

⁸⁰⁷ Ariel Farrar-Wellman. "European Union-Iran Relations". Critical Threats. Online edition. July 26, 2010. <https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/european-union-iran-relations> .

⁸⁰⁸ Ian Black. "Iran arrests UK embassy staff". The Guardian. Online edition. 28 June 2009. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/28/uk-embassy-tehran-arrests> .

⁸⁰⁹ Ian Black. "Iran warned by EU after British embassy workers arrested". The Guardian. Online edition. 28 June 2009. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/28/iran-british-embassy-workers-arrested> .

In the third week after the disputed election 20 people were executed in various prisons. Although, the regime introduced the executed as some smugglers, the main goal was to terrorize the protesters. Some political prisoners were sadly among them.⁸¹⁰ Then again on 14th July, via the execution of 13 other people, convicted as terrorists, the regime sent a stark message to opponents about its readiness to react in order to defend its core interests and re-assert its legitimacy.⁸¹¹ In fact, some judicial authorities conducted the trials and profited the shari'a legal tool of death penalty as a political remedy.

In the intervening period of time, some shocking frightening trustworthy news were widespread over transferring of several thousand arrested protesters and activists to a detention center as Kahrizak⁸¹² in south of Tehran, where, based on a number of testimonials, the detainees were verbally abused, raped and beaten to death.⁸¹³ However, the security forces prevented the families of the victims to publicly present their cases, Karroubi revealed some rape

⁸¹⁰ Saeed Allahyari and Nasser Kheyrollahi, political prisoners were hanged alongside other prisoners in Tehran's notorious prison of Evin on July 1st, 2009. The Editors of Amnesty International. "Iran: Fear for safety/torture and ill treatment/possible prisoner of conscience/medical concern, Nasser Kheyrollahi (m)". Amnesty International. Online edition. 22 March 2007.

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE13/033/2007/en/>. The Editors of National Council of Resistance of Iran. "Political prisoner executed under pretext of ordinary criminal". National Council of Resistance of Iran. Online edition. 11 July 2009. <https://ncr-iran.org/en/iran-protests/political-prisoner-executed-under-pretext-of-ordinary-criminal>.

⁸¹¹ Ian Black. "Execution of 13 for terror attacks reveals Iran's next move: intimidation". The Guardian. Online edition. 16 July 2009. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/16/iran-terrorism-executions-analysis>.

⁸¹² Kahrizak camp lacked water, ventilation, heating and cooling equipment, flooring or moquette, bed, sufficient light, bathroom and toilet. Only less than half a meter was reached by per prisoner, hence they were sometimes forced to sleep alternatively. The prisoners, at the time of entering were forced to be naked and crawl. Several of the detainees were killed because of the severity of the injuries and inadequate conditions of their detention. The detainees did not have the right to use bathroom, thus they got serious diseases. Drinking water inside diesel gallons that caused nausea and vomiting was given only on condition that they were beaten. Two meals were served at 16:30 and 21:30 among prisoners, which included a quarter of Lavash, a very thin flatbread and a very small potato for per person. Sometimes, some people were forced to bark and eat like dogs. As a result of malnutrition, the prisoners soon became unconscious with each small beating, and most of them lost one third to half of their weight. One kind of cruel, inhuman and degrading tortures was, the prisoners were shut down over the soldiers' bed, and others should urinate on them. Three lizards were also other ill treatment applied to harass and torture them. Based on my interviews with detainees. Borzou Daragahi and Ramin Mostaghim. "Imprisoned Iranian protesters share a bond forged in hell". Los Angeles Times. Online edition. February 14, 2010. <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/14/world/la-fg-iran-prison14-2010feb14>.

⁸¹³ The Editors of CBS News. "Iranian Doctor Confirms Prison Abuse Death". CBS News. Online edition. September 1, 2009. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iranian-doctor-confirms-prison-abuse-death/>.

cases (e.g., those young boys and girls who were raped by batons and bottles)⁸¹⁴ and a government scientist who was an advocate of the Islamic fundamentalist faction officially complained, as his son was among the Kahrizak killing victims.⁸¹⁵ In fact, the famous sentence of Jacques Mallet du Pan (1749-1800)⁸¹⁶ over the French Revolution that truly said “the Revolution devours its children”,⁸¹⁷ in this case changed to, the revolution raped and devoured its children. Once the parliament decided to visit the camp, Khamenei ordered the closure of it.⁸¹⁸ Therefore, some of its detainees were released,⁸¹⁹ and some others who were suffering from a variety of digestive diseases and bone fractures were transferred to other prisons. Seven years after the crime of Kahrizak, the notorious former Tehran prosecutor and the major agent of Kahrizak⁸²⁰ issued a public apology for the prisoners’ killings.⁸²¹ His apology however was not a cure for the families of victims at all. Two physicians connected to the Kahrizak detention center, who examined the raped victims and were pressured to declare meningitis as

⁸¹⁴ Reza Derakhshi, Fredrik Dahl and Richard Balmforth. “Iran reformer says he wants to present rape evidence”. Reuters. Online edition. August 19, 2009. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-karoubi-rape/iran-reformer-says-he-wants-to-present-rape-evidence-idUSDAH93169320090819> . The Editors of Amnesty International. “Iranian rape and torture victims at renewed risk”. Amnesty International. Online edition. 10 September 2009. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2009/09/victimas-violacion-torturas-continuan-situacion-riesgo-iran-20090910/> .

⁸¹⁵ Robert Tait and Saeed Kamali Dehghan. “Son of leading scientist dies in jail as fears grow over fate of Iran’s political prisoners”. The Guardian. Online edition. 26 July 2009. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/26/iran-political-prisoners-mohsen-rouholamini> .

⁸¹⁶ Gregory Fremont-Barnes. Encyclopedia of the Age of Political Revolutions and New Ideologies, 1760-1815. Vol. 2. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group. 2007. p. 444.

⁸¹⁷ Deborah Kennedy. Helen Maria Williams and the Age of Revolution. Lewisburg: Bucknell Univ. Press. 2002. p. 113.

⁸¹⁸ Parisa Hafezi and Zahra Hosseinian. “Iran’s Khamenei orders closure of detention center”. Reuters. Online edition. July 28, 2009. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-khamenei-order/irans-khamenei-orders-closure-of-detention-center-idUSTRE56R1J620090728?sp=true> .

⁸¹⁹ The Editors of Fox News from Associated Press. “Iran Releases 140 Prisoners, Closes Prison in Nod to Allegations of Abuse”. Fox News. Online edition. July 28, 2009.

<http://www.foxnews.com/story/2009/07/28/iran-releases-140-prisoners-closes-prison-in-nod-to-allegations-abuse.html> .

⁸²⁰ Saeed Mortazavi (1967-) is known for the numerous closures of the Iranian press, the torture of protesters after the fake election and the murder of Zahra Kazemi (1948-2003) an Iranian-Canadian freelance photographer. Although, after the incident he was promoted by the regime, finally, amazingly, as a result of an intra-government struggle and settlement, in obvious of charges accomplice to murder, illegal detention and a role in abusing the after election prisoners, on 15 November 2014 was banned lifetime from all political and legal positions, in November 2017 was sentenced to two years imprisonment, on April 22, 2018 was arrested and transferred to Evin prison. Nasser Karimi. “Iran arrests ex-prosecutor convicted in 2009 death of prisoner”. The Times of Israel. Online edition. 22 April 2018. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-arrests-ex-prosecutor-convicted-in-2009-death-of-prisoner/> .

⁸²¹ The Editors of Radio Zamaneh. “Notorious former Tehran prosecutor issues public apology for prisoner killings”. Radio Zamaneh. Online edition. September 14, 2016. <https://en.radiozamaneh.com/articles/notorious-former-tehran-prosecutor-issues-public-apology-for-prisoner-killings/> .

the cause of their death, were murdered.⁸²² Anyway, subsequently, after some time, this detention secretly reopened there under another name, Soroush 111.⁸²³

9.8. *Religious rituals and the demonstrations*

The clashes continued despite the crackdowns, and as the highly ritualistic month for the Shi'ite, Muharram (particularly its first ten nights of mourning) approached, many protesters and activists became reactive at the social networks and blogs.⁸²⁴ On the arranged day (the day of Tasu'a), although, the security forces supervised all the mourning groups and did not allow them to rally, the demonstrations of the millions Green Movement's supporters on the day of Ashura, 27th December 2009, was widespread in Tehran and other Iranian cities. Given the fact that based on Shi'a beliefs, any violence on the religious days are banned, the repression and killings of the protesters on the mentioned day intensified the anti-government sentiments to a great extent. Thus, the clashes on the Ashura Day were the bloodiest encounter between the Iranian people and the security forces after the election.⁸²⁵ Some rogue protest police vehicles hit and run over the demonstrators during the protests in Tehran.⁸²⁶

The international journalists were prevented from attending ceremonies and covering the clashes between the protesters and military forces.⁸²⁷

⁸²² Robert Tait. "Death of doctor to Iranian prison arouses suspicion". The Guardian. Online edition. 16 November 2009. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/16/iran-protest-doctor-pourandarjani-death>. Saeed Kamali. "Iranian doctor murdered after examining rape victims, says his son". The Guardian. Online edition. 25 August 2011. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/25/iran-doctor-murder-kahrizak-rapes>. Scott Peterson. *Let the Swords Encircle Me: Iran--A Journey Behind the Headlines*. New York: Simon and Schuster. 2010. p. 560.

⁸²³ The Editors of Amnesty International. "Iranian man facing imminent execution for possession of crystal meth". Amnesty International. Online edition. 7 August 2012. <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/iranian-man-facing-imminent-execution-possession-crystal-meth>.

⁸²⁴ The ritualistic event of Karbala has evolved in response to the changing social and political conditions and has been instrumentally applied by the Iranian social movements as well as the Islamic authority in contemporary Iran. In this way, in addition to the utilization of the movements from the mournings and events related to the anniversary of this numinous historical episode, mournings of the victims of the movements have always been simulated to this incident, and the regime, on the other hand, has always simulated and ideologized its characters and events with the characters and sequences of this mythological historical incident.

⁸²⁵ Ulrike Putz. "Iranian Demonstrators Put the Regime on the Defensive". Spiegel. Online edition. December 28, 2009. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/violence-in-tehran-iranian-demonstrators-put-the-regime-on-the-defensive-a-669317.html>.

⁸²⁶ The Editors of CNN. "Several killed, 300 arrested in Tehran protests". CNN. Online edition. December 28, 2009. <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/12/27/iran.protests/index.html>.

⁸²⁷ Robert F. Worth and Nazila Fathi. "Police Are Said to Have Killed 10 in Iran Protests". The New York Times. Online edition. December 27, 2009. <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/28/world/middleeast/28iran.html>.

In response to the Green protesters, on December 30th, 2009, the regime's supporters organized a rally. They marched in various cities under the heavy security shields.⁸²⁸

9.9. *The Arab Spring and the house arrest put an end to this movement*

The protesters' demonstrations poorly lasted, up till the Green oppositions, despite of the regime's ban, called for a rally on 14th February 2011 so as to announce solidarity with the revolutionary movements of Tunisia (December 2010-January 2011)⁸²⁹ and Egypt (January and February 2011).⁸³⁰ In Tehran, the early hours of the street protests were held calmly and sporadically. Then the affairs came to the violence when some riot police, plainclothe and special guard forces attacked to the demonstrators.⁸³¹

After this demonstration, the regime's representatives in parliament chanted slogans "Death to Mousavi and Karroubi", the protest candidates or the central symbolic figures of the movement and called for their execution,⁸³² as the organizers and leaders of the protests, and in this way clicked the house arrest of them and their spouses,⁸³³ which is still ongoing.⁸³⁴

Considering the Arab spring domino, the regime increased the cost of the movement's street protests. Every day the events became bloodier. Some rogue security forces murdered some protesters and activists, then prepared false charges for them. Finally, the last rally was held in silence on 12th June 2011, the second anniversary of the disputed unfavorable election.⁸³⁵

⁸²⁸ Nazila Fathi. "In Tehran, Thousands Rally to Back Government". The New York Times. Online edition. December 30, 2009.

https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/31/world/middleeast/31iran.html?_r=2&ref=world& .

⁸²⁹ Nouri Gana (ed.). The Making of the Tunisian Revolution: Contexts, Architects, Prospects. Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press. 2013. p. 2.

⁸³⁰ Frans Viljoen (ed.). Beyond the Law: Multi-disciplinary Perspectives on Human Rights. Pretoria: Pretoria Univ. Law Press (PULP). 2012. p. 195.

⁸³¹ Saeed Kamali Dehghan. "Iran's opposition green movement calls for renewed street protests". The Guardian. Online edition. 8 February 2011. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/08/iran-opposition-green-movement-tehran-protest> . Thomas Erdbrink. "Anti-government protests spread to Iran". The Washington Post. Online edition. February 14, 2011. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/14/AR2011021400848.html> .

⁸³² The Editors of BBC News. "Iran unrest: MPs call for death of Mousavi and Karroubi". BBC News. Online edition. 15 February 2011. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12462491> .

⁸³³ The Editors of BBC News. "Iran: Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi arrested". BBC News. Online edition. 28 February 2011. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12599837> .

⁸³⁴ Karroubi's wife was temporarily released after three months. Saeed Kamali Dehghan. "Call for Iran to end house arrest of opposition leaders". The Guardian. Online edition. 15 February 2013. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/15/call-iran-end-house-arrest-opposition-leaders> .

⁸³⁵ The Editors of BBC News. "The arrest of a number of opposition protesters in Tehran". BBC News. Online edition. 12 June 2011. http://www.bbc.com/persian/rolling_news/2011/06/110605_I30_iatran_tehran_arrest.shtml .

9.10. *The role of both self-radicalized and organized arbitrary militias*

According to the reports of the Amnesty International, in the course of the protests, after the announcement of the presidential election result the autonomous Basij forces were in the ambush of those who were wounded. They swept the injured protesters from the hospitals and transferred to unknown locations. As evidence, they prevented from the victims' registration by the hospital staff.⁸³⁶ Some Basij militia forces attacked to the residential buildings in order to shut down the bombardment of slogans over the roofs, breaking their private belongings and battering the inhabitants. The Basij commander claimed that some people were arrested who sabotaged by wearing the Basij and Police uniforms. While, he denied the military capability of the Basij, insisted that his forces will defend their positions.⁸³⁷ The other commander in a letter to the 12th Imam, claimed that the protesters themselves had committed crimes and blamed the pro-government Basij forces, thus he called the victims as "the fake killeds".⁸³⁸

The performances of these Basij militias to repress the protests are also as a result of the social hatred and reciprocal distrust between the modernist middle-class and the deprived social groups. They are mostly ordinary men and women either from unschooled unemployed people or ordinary occupations, exercising authority by the virtue of ideology and not by delegation. With this trend, this group turned into one of the strong pillars of the Islamic Republic which supervises the urban and rural spheres, thus, has successfully assisted to control every form of objection in Iran.

During the explained protests, the Islamic Republic was also enjoyed by the foreign militiamen from Palestinian Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah as anti-riot forces to crush the massive street protests.⁸³⁹ It should be mentioned that generally, Tehran's security mission is under the

⁸³⁶ The Editors of Radio Farda. "Amnesty International: The Basij is in the ambush of the wounded demonstrators". Radio Farda. Online edition. June 28, 2009. https://www.radiofarda.com/a/f2_postelection_Amnesty_Baseej_crackdown_protesters_injured/1764347.html .

⁸³⁷ The Editors of Radio Farda. "(Hossein) Taeb (Commander of the Basij Force): (In the course of the protests, after the announcement of the presidential election result) Sabotages were not the Basij part, some protesters abused the Basij uniforms and sabotaged". Radio Farda. Online edition. June 29, 2009. https://www.radiofarda.com/a/f10_Taef_Basij_Commander/1764974.html .

⁸³⁸ The Editors of MEMRI. "Iranian Chief of Staff Firouzabadi Writes Letter to Hidden Imam". MEMRI. Online edition. August 27, 2009. <https://www.memri.org/reports/iranian-chief-staff-firouzabadi-writes-letter-hidden-imam> .

⁸³⁹ Alan Gray. "Hamas, Hezbollah Help to Crush Street Protests in Iran". News Blaze. Online edition. June 21, 2009. https://newsblaze.com/world/middle-east/hamas-hezbollah-help-to-crush-street-protests-in-iran_9664/ . Ulrike Putz. "Die Sicherheitskräfte agieren brutal, weil sie die Lage nicht mehr im Griff haben". Spiegel. Online edition. June 15, 2009. <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/aufstand-in-teheran-betet-fuer-uns-a-630463-2.html> . Saad Abedine. "Arab neighbors watch Iran's troubles". CNN. Online edition. June 19, 2009. <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/19/iran.regional.reax/index.html> .

supervision of Sarallah corps. The Sarallah base of Tehran is an independent base that is not under the control of any of the five forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, and is directly operated under the command of Khamenei. There are two brigades inside this base, which composed of foreign forces. One of them are the survivors of the 9th division of Badr corps, with Iraqi troops. Another brigade is made up of the Lebanese Hezbollah's reserve forces, who have been in Iran for training. In this connection, ones the commander of the Navy of the IRGC expressed "the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps does not have any further words, even Iran, and it is not merely allocated so as to defend a specific geopolitical territory, but is the guardian of the Islamic Revolution everywhere in the Globe",⁸⁴⁰ its forces also contemplate only its ideological boundaries, but not any sort of specific geo-national territory.

9.11. The social movement and social classes

In any case, as far as the social classes were concerned, although, this movement was highly a matter of the middle-class, (in particular the modernist technocrats, students, women, among others) it was also supported by other parts of the society. As an issue of fact, it was a secular, trans-ethnic and trans-ideological movement which could not accept a traditional or charismatic leadership and was more likely to be led by a legal one. Contrary to the experience of the 1979 Revolution and its complications, a rational legal leadership during an electoral movement had no choice but to engage with political activists from all groups of the society. This form of interaction could have the least cost for the participants, however, considering the heavy repression did not work in this case.

The activists of the movement demonstrated that, despite the colorfulness of the society, they could attract a minimum agreement to be utilized by the constitutional rights and capacities. The people's participation in the tenth presidential election, despite the supervision of the Guardian Council and the accompaniment of Mousavi and Karroubi (their background and their emphasis on the Islamic Republic) represented the collective wisdom among them for change and to be benefited by the legal opportunity, and the strategic ability to prioritize the political requirements.

⁸⁴⁰ The Editors of Ensaf News. "Fadavi: the IRGC does not have any further words, even Iran". Ensaf News. Online edition. 20 April 2018. <http://www.ensafnews.com/110204/> .

9.12. *Consideration*

Historically, with reference to past voluntary collective behaviors and actions, it can clearly be seen that every social campaign and struggle so as to either implement or deter a single modification in social order or value system and finally become literally a social movement goes through several evolutionary trials, motivation, expression, disputation, continuation and realization. Accordingly, a social movement can be formed by creation and accumulation of protest motives. By expression of motives and protests, it becomes a social current to dispute and challenge the existing hegemonic rule. As a result of continuity of motivations and insistence on expressions and disclosures, it can possibly realize irreversible objectives and lasting effects (even legislatively).

In practical terms, what was performed as the Green Movement obviously had both enough motivation and adequate disclosure. It attracted millions of protesters to challenge the electoral result and dispute the trans-electoral complications. Nonetheless, for many reasons, the lack of continuation in expressions and disputations made it an abortive unsuccessful collective case with almost no structural change.

Such disappointment was particularly as a result of an absence of a firm association or alliance among different social groups and classes, a fragile support from the external-factors and international community, accompanied with the regime's heavy violence and crackdowns in the highpoints of the protests. In this way, the green highly cultivated sapling which could have been a strong tree, stopped from growing and remained castrated to achieve its original goals.

9.13. *Revival of the networked movements, a feminist movement and its significances*

Years after, with the fall of the waves of the protests, it gradually became clear that although, this movement may have been repressed and failed to meet its major goal to be enjoyed by legal fair election, it paved the way for further Iranian headless networked protest movements. All in all, the Green Movement was the first movement after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, in which men and women rejected the norms of the separation and discrimination imposed by the religious authority. During this movement the young women not only significantly cooperated with men, but also turned into independent and self-reliant social actors. They practiced defending themselves in street resistance and battle against the violent militants of the regime. The feminist movement was re-emerged as a result of such joint effort and collective social experience.

Originally, the Iranian feminist campaigner movement is the first gender-oriented movement in Iran after the 1979 revolution, with the aim of promoting legal and social gender equality. Women under the Islamic Shari'a faced a highly unequal gender situation, in which they have a small portion of the family rights in comparison with men, e.g., the divorce right is exclusively for men, children custody is for men in the event of divorce, working and traveling of women require men's permission, the men's share of the inheritance is twice of the women, the testimony of two women in a court is equal to one man's testimony. Thus, such movement endeavors to attract the citizens' support for claiming legal equality.

Many young men also support this movement, as they are in fact, in another way suffering from the legal prohibitions. They are blocked for communicating with women in public by the policy of moral order or gender segregation.

As a result, since 27th December 2017 started the new protests of this movement as the Girls of Revolution (Enghelab) Street, with the purpose of abolition of compulsory veil and hijab related laws for women. In these symbolic protests, tens of women were arrested, as they made civil non-violent disobedience by standing on utility boxes and public benches, fastening their head covers (the country's modesty dress code based on ancient customs) to thin pieces of wood, and waving them in iconic image similar to flags.⁸⁴¹

A day after the onset of the Persian girls (on December 28th, 2017), a new series of national wide public protests was launched in Iran against regime's oppression, rising prices and inflation, government corruption,⁸⁴² high unemployment, regime's interventions in other countries' affairs (Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Palestine, Bahrain, Tajikistan...),⁸⁴³ and finally to end the religious tyranny. The call for the participation in these popular gatherings was initially presented on social networks as "no to high prices" (a protest against the Rouhani's economic policies). With more calls, its general scope went beyond the economic problems, and reached to an opposition to the political system of the mullahs, especially against the principle of

⁸⁴¹ Isabelle Gerretsen. "Iran: 29 women arrested over anti-hijab protests inspired by girl of Enghelab Street". International Business Times. Online edition. February 1, 2018. <https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/iran-29-women-arrested-over-anti-hijab-protests-inspired-by-girl-enghelab-street-1658143> . Greg Norman. "Iranian woman in iconic video feared to have been arrested after waving hijab on a stick". Fox News. Online edition. January 23, 2018. <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2018/01/23/iranian-woman-in-iconic-video-feared-to-have-been-arrested-after-waving-hijab-on-stick.html> .

⁸⁴² The Editors of The Guardian from Reuters. "Protests over alleged corruption and rising prices spread to Tehran". The Guardian. Online edition. 30 December 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/29/iranian-police-disperse-anti-government-protests> .

⁸⁴³ The Editors of BBC News. "Iranian cities hit by anti-government protests". BBC News. Online edition. 29 December 2017. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42512946> .

Velayat-e Faqih and its official, Khamenei.⁸⁴⁴ This time, it seemed, a spark was enough to ignite the protests. The deconstructive practices and slogans (e.g., death to Khamenei,⁸⁴⁵ referendum referendum ...) demonstrated a sort of hatred of the Islamic Republic among the protesters. An important feature of these protests is that unlike to any other social movement in Iran it began not from political capital Tehran but from the second largest and most populous city, namely the holy spiritual religious capital Mashhad, and quickly reached to more than hundred towns and cities.⁸⁴⁶

This time, there was no balancing force capable of playing a mediating role between the protesters and the regime. Therefore, protesters in the middle of the street spontaneously decided what to chant and what to do. Contrary to the Green movement supporters, which were especially concentrated among the Tehran's educated middle-class, these rallies followed by not only the middle-class, the students and the women but predominately by the poor, the unemployed and the working-class, as their main concerns were everyday economic problems. However, it was not possible to estimate the number of protesters, the number of arrest people was roughly 3,700 within two first weeks of the protests,⁸⁴⁷ and it shortly boomed dramatically to more than 7,000. We have knowledge about hundreds of injuries, although, there is still no detailed information on the exact number of the victims killed in these protests, at least tens of murdering cases of protesters in streets⁸⁴⁸ and several cases in custody are recognized.⁸⁴⁹ During these massive demonstrations approximately 60 offices of the representatives of the

⁸⁴⁴ Laura Smith-Spark, Dakin Andone and Jennifer Hauser. "Iran's Supreme Leader faces rare display of public anger". CNN. Online edition. December 31, 2017.

<https://edition.cnn.com/2017/12/30/middleeast/iran-protests-intl/index.html> .

⁸⁴⁵ Saeed Kamali Dehghan and Emma Graham-Harrison. "Iranians chant 'death to dictator' in biggest unrest since crushing of protests in 2009". The Guardian. Online edition. 30 December 2017.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/30/iran-protests-trump-tweets> .

The Editors of The Economist. "Iranians demand—and deserve—a less oppressive regime". The Economist. Online edition. January 6, 2018. <https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/01/06/iranians-demand-and-deserve-a-less-oppressive-regime> .

⁸⁴⁶ The Editors of BBC News. "Iranian cities hit by anti-government protests".

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42512946> .

⁸⁴⁷ Sheena McKenzie. "3,700 people were arrested during Iran protests, lawmaker says". CNN. Online edition. January 9, 2018. <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/09/middleeast/iran-protests-3700-arrested-intl/index.html> .

⁸⁴⁸ Thomas Erdbrink. "Deadly Iran Protests Prompt Warning of Harsher Response". The New York Times. Online edition. January 1, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/world/middleeast/iran-protests.html>.

⁸⁴⁹ The Editors of Amnesty International. "Iran: authorities must investigate five deaths in custody following protest crackdown". Amnesty International. Online edition. 9 January 2018.

<https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/iran-authorities-must-investigate-five-deaths-custody-following-protest-crackdown> . Saeed Kamali Dehghan. "Iran protests: deaths in custody spark human rights concerns". The Guardian. Online edition. 9 January 2018.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/09/iran-protests-deaths-custody-human-rights> .

leader and several police stations throughout the country were attacked and fired.⁸⁵⁰ In this relation, not only the applicability of the Shi'i traditions was dimmed and become less bright or distinct, but in addition we witnessed the Iranian anti-religious sentiments.

Following these nationwide opposition protests, there was not a week or a month without protest rally by women opposed to the compulsory hijab, workers, teachers and religious minorities. These protests, although, simply received the massive crackdowns from the Islamic Republic,⁸⁵¹ contrary to the Green movement with demand for change via legality and reform (utilized by Shi'i rituals to mobilize), reflected a vivid message of desperation of legitimate reform for the normative power of such religious republic.

⁸⁵⁰ Michael Georg. "Iranian protesters attack police stations, raise stakes in unrest". Reuters. Online edition. December 31, 2017. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-rallies/iran-said-protesters-should-pay-a-high-price-if-they-break-the-law-idUSKBN1EP064> .

⁸⁵¹ The Editors of Amnesty International. "Iran's 'year of shame': More than 7,000 arrested in chilling crackdown on dissent during 2018". Amnesty International. Online edition. 23 January 2019. <https://www.amnestyusa.org/press-releases/irans-year-of-shame-more-than-7000-arrested-in-chilling-crackdown-on-dissent-during-2018/> .

Chapter III. Findings

Putting Narrative Representations, Nominal and Ordinal Comparisons forward for consideration

10. Narrative Models

10.1. A Narrative Model for the Persian Constitutional Movement

10.2. A Narrative Model for the Anti-Shah Movement

10.3. A Narrative Model for the Green Movement

11. Nominal Comparison

11.1. Class-based causal factors of the Persian Constitutional Movement

11.2. Class-based causal factors of the Anti-Shah Movement

11.3. Class-based causal factors of the Green Movement

12. Ordinal Comparison

10. Narrative Models

A review of the social movements in contemporary Iranian history clearly shows that three important quests have been made to improve the situation of freedom and social justice. These efforts, although initially somewhat successful, failed to maintain their achievements. In fact, these failures stemmed from the domination of amalgamation of poli-religious tyranny and despotism, among other internal and external variables and factors.

At this part, the sequences of events over these three historical periods (the Constitutional Movement, the Movement resulted in Islamic revolution and the Green Movement) are presented.

Here, the process of causal factors progresses from the opening contributing ones to the final stage or the end of the narrative. The meaning or significance of causality in this analysis can be defined as, a specific incident enables the factors on the road to one or more new events, this process continues so as to eventuate the particular consequence or outcome. Hence, the narratives of the construction of the social movements will reveal the linkages of the explanatory factors based on the sequential events in the direction of the possible societal transformations.⁸⁵²

As regards this procedure, a cause is not fully responsible for an effect, and an effect is not entirely dependent on a cause, because they are rather chronologically organized.⁸⁵³ As a result, in such interconnection, each occurrence is conditionally reliant and hooked on the many detailed related events, most probably rooted in many years away.

In this technique, via process tracing,⁸⁵⁴ the best and most extensive effort to identify a detailed causal mechanism, we will be able to cope with the complexity of the historical set of data in order to discard the inconsistent variables.


⁸⁵² See Mahoney. "Nominal, ordinal, and narrative appraisal in macro causal analysis". 1154-1196.

⁸⁵³ See Mahoney. "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology". 507-548.

⁸⁵⁴ See Mahoney. "The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences". 566-590., and also Mahoney. "Mechanisms, Bayesianism, and Process Tracing". 493-499.

10.1. (Model 3.) A Narrative Model for the Persian Constitutional Movement:

A narrative analysis of the circumstances in the Persian Constitutional Movement and its religious, legal and political transformations, "The Birth of a Constitution"



- Causal Linkage
- ✓ The causal mechanism is based on the sequential events, thus the numbers are mainly chronologically regulated.
- ✓ The role and dynamics of different social groups and classes, besides the external-forces in each factor are recognized.

- 1) The Safavid's sword and political project of Shi'iteization in 16th and 17th centuries led the Persians to the acceptance of the Shi'i principles, values, norms and rituals⁸⁵⁵ (The role of ruling and upper-class, besides mullahs).
- 2) The transition or evolution of knowledge in the Jurisprudence (Fiqh) and leading of the Shi'ite from Akhbari to Usuli, that made the mullahs financially independent from the state, brought them a hierarchical status with civil and institutional organization, thus a growing social role as Imam⁸⁵⁶ (The role of mullahs).
- 3) A period of agony, starvation, contempt, and humiliation due to the imposed consecutive wars, defeats and unfair treaties in 19th century. For instance, Persia lost in 1813 and 1828 the eastern Georgia, Dagestan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, ...⁸⁵⁷ (The interest and influence of external-power).
- 4) The compensatory reforms in financial, social and cultural domains. The establishment of the modern schools, sending students to the Europe and the gradual acquaintance of the Persians with the global changes had driven the idea of change⁸⁵⁸ (The role of ruling and upper-class, besides intellectuals).
- 5) The intellectual writings and speeches of the graduates from the Europe and modern schools introduced and spread the thought of liberty to the masses of ordinary religious people, hence prepared the constitutional context⁸⁵⁹ (The role of intellectuals).
- 6) The general financial weak points of the Persian government after 1890, as the inflation produced a sharp decline in the value of land, the Persian silver currency lost value against the pound sterling with a rapid fall in the international silver prices, the war compensations,

⁸⁵⁵ Matthee. "Safavid dynasty". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/safavids> . The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Safavid dynasty". <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Safavid-dynasty> . Agoston and Masters. Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire. 279.

⁸⁵⁶ Kohlberg. "Akbariya". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/akbariya> .

⁸⁵⁷ Adle. History of Civilizations of Central Asia, Vol. 5, Towards the contemporary period, From the mid-nineteenth to the end of the twentieth century. 470-476. Daniel. "Golestān Treaty". <https://iranicaonline.org/articles/golestan-treaty> . Dowling. (ed.). Russia at War: From the Mongol Conquest to Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Beyond. 728-729. Fatemi. "Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919". <https://iranicaonline.org/articles/anglo-persian-agreement-1919> .

⁸⁵⁸ Busse. "Abbas Mirza Qajar". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/abbas-mirza-qajar> . The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Mīrzā Taqī Khān". <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mirza-Taqi-Khan> . Amanat. Pivot of the universe: Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy, 1831-1896. 166-168.

⁸⁵⁹ Tajbakhsh. History of Civilization and Culture of Iran during the Qajar Period. 392-394. Amanat. "Constitutional Revolution i. Intellectual background". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-i> .

and finally lack of restraint in spending money in the Qajar court⁸⁶⁰ (The role of ruling and upper-class, besides external-power).

- 7) Due to the financial difficulties, the government gave different commercial concessions to the foreigners and as they were not enough, borrowed from abroad⁸⁶¹ (The role of ruling-class, besides external-powers).
- 8) Tobacco movement (1890-1892) as a Shi'a protest in Persia against an 1890 tobacco concession granted by the Shah to the Great Britain. The protest was held by the Tehran merchants in solidarity with the mullahs. It climaxed in a widely obeyed fatwa of December 1891 against tobacco use issued by a high ranked mullah⁸⁶² (The role of merchants, mullahs and external-power).
- 9) Attempts to reform the state finances, reorganization of the customs under the Belgian Joseph Naus on March 15th, 1898⁸⁶³ (The role of ruling and upper-class, besides external-power).
- 10) Stagflation in the Iranian markets⁸⁶⁴ (The role of ruling and upper-class, besides external-power).
- 11) The leading merchants reacted to the custom reforms by organizing demonstrations in major urban centers 1900-1905⁸⁶⁵ (The role of merchants).
- 12) By a general inaccessibility due to a dropdown in trade with Russia (Persia's major trading partner) that was in war with Japan, the situation was embittered in 1904⁸⁶⁶ (The interest and influence of external-powers).
- 13) In November 1905, a companionship of the mullahs with the merchants. The mullahs were the chief spokesmen of the merchant-funded and organized opposition demonstrations⁸⁶⁷ (The role of mullahs, merchants and ... to form a basic coalition).

⁸⁶⁰ Hakimian. "Economy viii. In The Qajar Period". <https://iranicaonline.org/articles/economy-viii-in-the-qajar-period> . Martin. "Constitutional Revolution ii. Events". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-ii> .

⁸⁶¹ Hakimian. "Economy viii. In The Qajar Period". <https://iranicaonline.org/articles/economy-viii-in-the-qajar-period> .

⁸⁶² Moaddel. "Shi'i Political Discourse and Class Mobilization in the Tobacco Movement of 1890-1892". 455. Keddie. Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891-92. 3, 5.

⁸⁶³ Kasravi. History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 29, 31. Destrée. "Belgian-Iranian Relations". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/belgian-iranian-relations> .

⁸⁶⁴ Ashraf. "BAZAR iii. Socioeconomic and Political Role". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/bazar-iii> .

⁸⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁶ Martin. "Constitutional Revolution ii. Events". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-ii> .

⁸⁶⁷ Ashraf. "BAZAR iii. Socioeconomic and Political Role". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/bazar-iii> . Martin. "Constitutional Revolution ii. Events". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-ii> .

- 14) On 12th December 1905, the governor of Tehran ordered two merchants to be bastinadoed, a punishment for having raised the price of sugar, actually, it provided the opposition with a basis for open struggle and resistance⁸⁶⁸ (The repressive part of ruling-class, besides the role of merchants).
- 15) The day after, the bazaar went on strike, a mass of people from different groups and classes led by the mullahs gathered at the Shah Mosque (in bazaar) to demand the removal of the governor⁸⁶⁹ (The role of merchants, mullahs, working-class, middle-class and ...)
- 16) On 15th December, the mullahs directed people from different groups and classes to take sanctuary in the shrine of Shah-Abdol-Azim, funded initially by the bazaar-men and later by two aspirants to the throne, requesting the dismissal of the Belgian Naus and the prime minister, and establishment of a house of justice, which was proposed to redress the grievances against the state administration⁸⁷⁰ (The role of mullahs, merchants, middle-class and ...).
- 17) Having refused these requests, on January 10th, 1906, the government accepted only one demand for establishing of a house of justice to execute the laws of the Shari'a⁸⁷¹ (The role of ruling-class, besides mullahs).
- 18) Reformers operating in secret groups began a propaganda campaign in favor of the political change. Tabatabai wrote to both the Shah and the prime minister reminding them of their promise to institute reforms, however, neither letter elicited a response. In June therefore, after an agitator had been arrested, Tabatabai delivered a long sermon calling for an end to the arbitrary government and for a council of justice, in which all classes would be represented⁸⁷² (The role of mullahs, ruling and upper-class).
- 19) The prime minister ordered the arrest of a mullah, the leading preacher of Tehran, on 11th July 1906⁸⁷³ (The repressive part of ruling-class).
- 20) The resulting demonstration ended with the death of a young mullah (Talaba) or a theology student⁸⁷⁴ (The role of mullahs and ...).

⁸⁶⁸ Ashraf. "BAZAR iii. Socioeconomic and Political Role". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/bazar-iii> .

⁸⁶⁹ Ibid., <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/bazar-iii> .

⁸⁷⁰ Browne. The Persian revolution of 1905-1909. 353-354. Kasravi. History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 29, 31. Destrée. "Belgian-Iranian Relations". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/belgian-iranian-relations> .

⁸⁷¹ Mackey. The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation. 150-155. Martin. "Constitutional Revolution ii. Events". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-ii> .

⁸⁷² Ibid.

⁸⁷³ Ibid.

⁸⁷⁴ Ibid.

- 21) The mullahs' unity (from pro-constitutional to conservative and pro-Shah) in his funeral ceremony gathered a large crowd from different groups and classes⁸⁷⁵ (The role of mullahs and ... to form a wider coalition).
- 22) The Shah promised to redress the genuine grievances, however, yet again refused to dismiss the prime minister⁸⁷⁶ (The role of ruling-class).
- 23) A rally was held in bazaar, on 13th July 1906 by the people who were shrouded and were bearing the shirt of the dead young mullah⁸⁷⁷ (The role of mullahs, merchants, working-class, middle-class and ...).
- 24) A group of the mullahs and people from different groups went to Qom in protest, the conclusive event in breaking the power of the old regime, on 15th July 1906⁸⁷⁸ (The role of mullahs, merchants and ...).
- 25) The demand for a national assembly evolved during the great sanctuary at the British legation in Tehran, which was exempt from invasion of the Persian government, besides a real open-air school of political science for studying constitutionalism. By 2nd August 1906 the number of participated people from different groups and classes reached 14000, funded by the merchants⁸⁷⁹ (The role of mullahs, merchants, working-class, middle-class, external-power and ... to form the final coalition).
- 26) The British diplomat, Sir Evelyn Mountstuart Grant Duff (1863-1926), on 23rd July 1906, at this key moment conveyed the first demands of the Basties to the Shah, dismissal of the prime minister, establishment of a house of justice, and the return of the mullahs who had sought refuge in Qom⁸⁸⁰ (The role of mullahs and external-power).
- 27) The Shah implicitly agreed in principle to a parliament, and on 29th July 1906 the prime minister resigned⁸⁸¹ (The role of ruling-class, besides passivity of coercive power).

⁸⁷⁵ Abbas Amanat, Vanessa Martin, Said Amir Arjomand, Mansoureh Ettehadih, Ali-Akbar Saidi Sirjani and Sorour Soroudi. "Constitutional Revolution". Originally published: 1982. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York. 2020.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2330-4804_EIRO_COM_7812 .

⁸⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁷⁸ J. Calmard. "Bast". Originally published: 1988. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1988.

<https://iranicaonline.org/articles/bast-sanctuary-asylum> .

⁸⁷⁹ Ibid., <https://iranicaonline.org/articles/bast-sanctuary-asylum> . Abrahamian. Iran Between Two Revolutions. 84.

⁸⁸⁰ Denis Wright. "Grant Duff, Sir Evelyn Mountstuart". Originally published: 2002. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <https://iranicaonline.org/articles/grant-duff> . Bonakdarian. "Great Britain iv. British influence in Persia, 1900-21". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/great-britain-iv> .

⁸⁸¹ Martin. "Constitutional Revolution ii. Events". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-ii> .

- 28) The Basti-people remained in the legation, as the prime minister's resignation was no longer the issue, but a more fundamental reform, a parliament was required. In addition, a struggle over the exact nature of the proposed parliament ensued, and the central intellectual issue became the degree to which the reforms should be guided by the Shari'a law⁸⁸² (The role of mullahs, intellectuals, merchants, working-class, middle-class and...).
- 29) A decree of 5th August 1906 granted the right to a National Consultative Assembly⁸⁸³ (The role of ruling-class, besides passivity of coercive power).
- 30) All but a few Basties left the legation, and the mullahs returned from Qom⁸⁸⁴ (The role of mullahs, intellectuals, merchants and ...).
- 31) A draft based on the Belgian constitution was submitted and signed on 8th September 1906⁸⁸⁵ (The role of intellectuals, ruling and upper-class, besides external-power).
- 32) An election took place in the capital on 29th September 1906 and the parliament was opened on 7th October, by many merchants, mullahs, intellectuals and guildsmen as representatives⁸⁸⁶ (The role of ruling and upper-class, merchants, mullahs, intellectuals and middle-class).
- 33) The death of Mozaffar ad-Din Shah on 3rd January 1907⁸⁸⁷ (The role of ruling-class).
- 34) Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar who was basically opposed to the constitution, came to the reign on 3rd January 1907⁸⁸⁸ (The repressive part of ruling-class).
- 35) On 19th March 1907, a parliament finance committee proposed to reorganize the government finances along with the European lines, e.g., the revenues paid directly into the treasury, the officials' salaries, the abolishment of the gifts made to the Shah in return for the appointments of official positions⁸⁸⁹ (The role of ruling and upper-class).

⁸⁸² Amanat, Martin, Amir Arjomand, Ettehadih, Saidi Sirjani and Soroudi. "Constitutional Revolution". http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2330-4804_EIRO_COM_7812 .

⁸⁸³ Malikzadeh. The History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 379-380. Amanat. "Constitutional Revolution i. Intellectual background". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-i> .

⁸⁸⁴ Browne. The Persian revolution of 1905-1909. 353-354.

⁸⁸⁵ Destrée. "Belgian-Iranian Relations". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/belgian-iranian-relations> .

⁸⁸⁶ M. Hassan Kakar. "Elections". Originally published: 1998. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <https://iranicaonline.org/articles/elections> .

⁸⁸⁷ The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Mozaffar od-Dīn Shāh". <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mozaffar-od-Din-Shah> .

⁸⁸⁸ Yarshater. "Iran ii. Iranian History (2) Islamic period (page 5)". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/iran-ii2-islamic-period-page-5> .

⁸⁸⁹ Martin. "Constitutional Revolution ii. Events". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-ii> .

- 36) In April 1907, the growing discontent among the pro-old regime groups. The Shah brought back Amin al-Soltan from exile and appointed him as prime minister⁸⁹⁰ (The repressive part of ruling and upper-class).
- 37) The conservative pro-old regime mullahs, led by Sheikh Fazlollah Noori, opposed to the constitution, particularly over Art. 8 (equality before the law). He drafted an article to be included in the supplement, providing that no bill passed by the parliament could be implemented without the consent of a committee of mullahs, then openly organized a number of demonstrations against the constitutionalists⁸⁹¹ (The role of mullahs).
- 38) On 21st June 1907, Sheikh Fazlollah Noori and his group took sanctuary in the Shah-Abdol-Azim shrine, accusing the constitutionalists of having established a parliament that had no legitimate basis in the Shari'a and demanding an Islamic constitution. They additionally attacked the freedom of press as contrary to Islam. The Bast was subsidized by the court⁸⁹² (The repressive part of ruling and upper-class, mullahs ...).
- 39) The Anglo-Russian convention of 31st August 1907, in which they acknowledged the separate spheres of influence in Persia, the British in the south and the Russians in the north⁸⁹³ (The interest and influence of external-power).
- 40) In October the supplementary law was ratified in chaotic circumstances and continuing of the economic problems. The parliamentary authority was undermined by the secret societies which had different types of organization, from gangs to political ones. The parliament was also plagued by the inexperience and absenteeism of its deputies⁸⁹⁴ (The role of mullahs and ...).
- 41) The constitutional crisis on 8th December 1907 moved to a climax, as the Shah summoned the cabinet to resign⁸⁹⁵ (The repressive part of ruling and upper-class).

⁸⁹⁰ Calmard. "Atabak-e A'zam, Amin-al-Soltan". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/atabak-e-azam> . Kasravi. The History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 251,281.

⁸⁹¹ Lambton. "Mahkama: Iran". 91, 111-112. Iran's 1906 Constitution and Its Supplement. <http://fis-iran.org/en/resources/legaldoc/iranconstitution> . Martin. "Nuri, Fazl-Allah". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/nuri-fazl-allah> .

⁸⁹² Ibid. Martin. "Constitutional Revolution ii. Events". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-ii> .

⁸⁹³ Ghani. Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: From Qajar Collapse to Pahlavi Power. 9. Shuster. The Strangling of Persia. 48, 119, 179. Also, see Röder. "The Separation of Powers: Historical and Comparative Perspectives". 321-372.

⁸⁹⁴ Amir Arjomand. "Constitutional Revolution iii. The Constitution". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-iii> .

⁸⁹⁵ Martin. "Constitutional Revolution ii. Events". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-ii> .

- 42) On the following day a mob of 600-700 toughs, organized by the Shah's supporters, attacked the parliament⁸⁹⁶ (The repressive part of ruling and upper-class ...).
- 43) On 16th December the parliament that was first dispersed, regained power via some associations which surrounded it with about 3000 men, and by the following days with 6000-7000 supporters⁸⁹⁷ (The role of mullahs, intellectuals, merchants, working-class, middle-class and ...).
- 44) By December 26th, the crisis was over because the Shah swore to accept the constitution, and the deputies, in turn, swore faithfulness to him⁸⁹⁸ (The role of ruling and upper-class, merchants, mullahs, intellectuals and ...).
- 45) The segregation of the extremist deputies from Azerbaijan, and the moderates including some notables, merchants, and the mullahs such as Behbahani and Tabatabai⁸⁹⁹ (The role of intellectuals, merchants and mullahs).
- 46) The failure and inability of the authority of the parliament and a sudden drop in acceptance of the parliament threatened the mass support for the debated movement⁹⁰⁰ (The role of mullahs, intellectuals, merchants, ruling and upper-class).
- 47) On May 26th, 1908 the first Persian oil field was discovered by a British man, William Knox D'Arcy, who had obtained a concession to explore petroleum in Persia, in 1901⁹⁰¹ (The interest and influence of external-power).
- 48) The Shah's coup d'etat of 1908, on 4th June, not astonishingly, merely one week after finding petroleum in Persia, Mohammad Ali Shah left his palace for the King's Garden, a residence just outside the city, where he could be safe under the protection of the Cossack Brigade. He also ordered to cut the telegraph lines to Tehran⁹⁰² (The repressive part of ruling and upper-class, besides the interest and influence of external-powers).

⁸⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁸ Nazim al-Islam Kermani. ed. by Ali-Akbar Sa'idi Sirjani. Tarikh-e bidari-e Iranian (the History of Awakening the Iranians) Vol. 1. Tehran: Tehran Agan. 1983. p. 143.

⁸⁹⁹ Amanat. "Constitutional Revolution i. Intellectual background".

<http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-i> . Martin. "Constitutional Revolution ii. Events". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-ii> .

⁹⁰⁰ Kermani. Tarikh-e bidari-e Iranian (the History of Awakening the Iranians) Vol. 2. 155-162.

⁹⁰¹ Kazemi. "Anglo-Persian Oil Company". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/anglo-persian-oil-company> .

⁹⁰² Kasravi. History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 581.

- 49) The parliamentary supportive societies rallied in a mosque, near the parliament building. The leading merchants attempted to weaponize⁹⁰³ (The role of mullahs, intellectuals, merchants, middle-class, working-class and ...).
- 50) On 14th June, the Shah decided to exile eight prominent constitutionalists⁹⁰⁴ (The repressive part of ruling-class).
- 51) On 23rd June 1908 by the Cossacks of Shah and the Russian support, the mosque was forcibly cleared, the parliament building was bombarded, and the constitutionalists were arrested and some were executed, thus the revival of despotism⁹⁰⁵ (The repressive part of ruling and upper-class, besides the interest and influence of external-powers).
- 52) Shifting the center of opposition to Tabriz, as Tehran was controlled by the anti-constitutional Shah. In Tabriz the provincial society declared itself as the government of Azerbaijan and appealed to the Social Democrats of Baku for help⁹⁰⁶ (The repressive part of ruling and upper-class, besides the role of intellectuals, merchants, middle-class, working-class, women, external-power and ...).
- 53) The Shah sent a troop to Tabriz⁹⁰⁷ (The repressive part of ruling and upper-class).
- 54) The British and the Russians, asked the Shah to restore the parliament in order to bring order and accountability, on 8th September⁹⁰⁸ (The interest and influence of external-power).
- 55) Forty people took refuge in the Ottoman embassy, on 20th December 1908. Two days later the number rose to 250, and they petitioned the Shah for restoration of the constitution⁹⁰⁹ (The role of external-power and ...).
- 56) On 28th December the bazaar was closed, and within January and February there was a struggle of influence in the bazaar⁹¹⁰ (The role of merchants).

⁹⁰³ Martin. "Constitutional Revolution ii. Events". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-ii> .

⁹⁰⁴ Kasravi. History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 593. Malikzadeh. The History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 705.

⁹⁰⁵ Atkin. "Cossack Brigade". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/cossack-brigade> . Azimi. The Quest for Democracy in Iran: A Century of Struggle against Authoritarian Rule. 42.

⁹⁰⁶ Martin. "Constitutional Revolution ii. Events". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-ii> .

⁹⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁸ Bonakdarian. "Great Britain iv. British influence in Persia, 1900-21". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/great-britain-iv> .

⁹⁰⁹ Martin. "Constitutional Revolution ii. Events". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-ii> .

⁹¹⁰ Ibid.

- 57) On 5th May 1909, the Shah declared refurbishment of the principles of the constitution and set 19th July for the general vote⁹¹¹ (The role of ruling-class, besides passivity of coercive power).
- 58) In the north of Persia, city of Rasht, an uprising began on 7th February, organized by the liberty fighters⁹¹² (The role of intellectuals, middle-class, working-class, peasant, external-power and ...).
- 59) The Russian intervention in Tabriz impelled the revolutionaries, however as the Russians feared to be captured, retreated down the Qazvin road to Tehran⁹¹³ (The interest and influence of external-power).
- 60) The Bakhtiaris took over Isfahan in January⁹¹⁴ (The role of nomads).
- 61) As the Rasht forces advanced towards Tehran, the Bakhtiaris advanced from Isfahan and entered Tehran, on 13th July 1909⁹¹⁵ (The role of nomads, intellectuals, middle-class, working-class and ... to form a wide coalition).
- 62) Shah took refuge in the Russian legation, on 16th July⁹¹⁶ (The role of ruling-class, besides external-power).
- 63) Several of the Shah supporters, including Sheikh Fazlollah Noori were tried and executed by a special tribunal⁹¹⁷ (The role of mullahs, intellectuals, nomads, middle-class, working-class and ...).
- 64) A supreme parliament of more than 300 participants, from all social groups ousted Mohammad Ali Shah and positioned his small son Ahmad Mirza on power on 16th July 1909⁹¹⁸ (The role of mullahs, intellectuals, merchants, nomads, middle-class and ...).
- 65) A new electoral law was passed, the property qualification for voters was lowered, representation by class and property was abolished, the number of seats for the capital was

⁹¹¹ Kermani. Tarikh-e bidari-e Iranian (the History of Awakening the Iranians) Vol. 2. 300-301.

⁹¹² Pezhmann Dailami. "GILAN viiia. In the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11". Originally published: 2000. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <https://iranicaonline.org/articles/gilan-viiia> .

⁹¹³ James D. Clark. "Constitutionalists and Cossacks: The Constitutional Movement and Russian Intervention in Tabriz, 1907-11". Iranian Studies, 39: 2. Pp. 199-225. 2006.

⁹¹⁴ Richard W. Cottam. Nationalism in Iran. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press. 1979. p. 96.

⁹¹⁵ Ibid. Dailami. "GILAN viiia. In the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11".

<https://iranicaonline.org/articles/gilan-viiia> .

⁹¹⁶ Bonakdarian. "Great Britain iv. British influence in Persia, 1900-21".

<http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/great-britain-iv> .

⁹¹⁷ Martin. "Constitutional Revolution ii. Events". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-ii> . Malikhzadeh. The History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 1076, 1085, 1171, 1174, 1231.

⁹¹⁸ Sheikh-ol-Islami. "Ahmad Shah Qajar". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/ahmad-shah-qajar-1909-1925-the-seventh-and-last-ruler-of-the-qajar-dynasty> . Kermani. Tarikh-e bidari-e Iranian (the History of Awakening the Iranians) Vol. 2. 486-504.

reduced, and seats for Jews, Zoroastrians, Armenians and Assyrian Christians were allocated⁹¹⁹ (The role of ruling class, intellectual, mullahs and ...).

- 66) The second parliament was arranged on 15th November. As the treasury was empty, a proposal was presented for a loan (1,250,000 pounds sterling) from the national bank to rebuild the administration, an arrangement for Swedish officers to reorganize the gendarmerie and the American financial advisers to reform the taxation⁹²⁰ (The role of ruling and upper-class, besides external-powers ...).
- 67) By mid-1910 with negotiations for withdrawal of the Russian troops, the parliament was divided into two parties with armed supporters outside. The Democrats, comprising by the deputies mostly from the north who had links with the Social Democrats in Baku and the moderates included the landed aristocracy, traditional bazaar groups, and the mullahs led by Behbahani and Tabatabai who accused the other group as irreligious⁹²¹ (The role of mullahs, intellectuals, merchants, external-power and ...).
- 68) Behbahani was shot, on 16th July 1910⁹²² (The role of intellectuals).
- 69) The Democrats' heads fled⁹²³ (The role of mullahs).
- 70) Mohammad Ali Shah tried to regain the throne and failed, in July 1911⁹²⁴ (The repressive part of ruling-class).
- 71) The American financial adviser Morgan Shuster, who arrived in Tehran on 12th May 1911, made a determined effort to salvage the Persian financial situation⁹²⁵ (The interest and influence of external-power).
- 72) Shuster's reforms and budgeting brought him into a conflict with the old Qajar bureaucracy and the Russians⁹²⁶ (The repressive part of ruling and upper-class, besides the interest of external-power).

⁹¹⁹ Abrahamian. Iran Between Two Revolutions. 100-101.

⁹²⁰ Martin. "Constitutional Revolution ii. Events". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-ii> .

⁹²¹ Ibid. Malikzadeh. The History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 1295-1296. Ettehadieh. "Constitutional Revolution v. Political parties of the constitutional period".

<http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-v> .

⁹²² Algar. "Abdallah Behbahani". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/abdallah-behbahani> .

⁹²³ Ibid.

⁹²⁴ Malikzadeh. The History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 1385-1296. Andreeva. "Russia v. Russians at the Court of Mohammad-Ali Shah". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/russia-iv-russians-at-the-court-of-mohammad-ali-shah> .

⁹²⁵ The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "William Morgan Shuster".

<https://www.britannica.com/biography/William-Morgan-Shuster> .

⁹²⁶ Ibid.


- 73) Russia occupied the north of Iran and on 29th November issued a three-part ultimatum, requiring dismissal of Shuster, an undertaking not to invite a foreign consultant without the consent of Britain and Russia, and a compensation for the Russian forces⁹²⁷ (The interest and influence of external-powers).
- 74) The occupation of much of the country by the British and the Russian forces, as Persian government met these demands partially and lately⁹²⁸ (The role of ruling-class, besides external-powers).
- 75) The term of the second parliament ended on 24th December 1911, and it brought an end to the period of the Constitutional Revolution.⁹²⁹

⁹²⁷ Martin. "Constitutional Revolution ii. Events". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-ii> . Malikzadeh. The History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 1451, 1508, 1498, 1525.

⁹²⁸ Malikzadeh. The History of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. 1451, 1508, 1498, 1525.

⁹²⁹ Martin. "Constitutional Revolution ii. Events". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-revolution-ii> .

10.2. (Model 4.) A Narrative Model for the Anti-Shah Movement: A narrative analysis of the circumstances for the monarchy collapse and its definitive outcome, the establishment of a theocratic republican constitution, "A terrestrial Revolution to erect an extraterrestrial republic"



→ Causal Linkage

- ✓ The causal mechanism is based on the sequential events, thus the numbers are mainly chronologically regulated.
- ✓ The role and dynamics of different social groups and classes, besides the external-forces in each factor are recognized.

- 1) The occupation of Iran by the allies in September 1941, during the World War II⁹³⁰ (The interest and influence of external-powers).
- 2) The deposal of Reza Shah Pahlavi, accusing him of sympathizing with the German Reich⁹³¹ (The interest and influence of external-powers).
- 3) Mohammad Reza was elected to take the throne, instead of his father, on the proposal of the United Kingdom and with the American-Soviet agreement⁹³² (The interest and influence of external-powers).
- 4) The Iranian parliament formally approved these changes⁹³³ (The role of ruling-class).
- 5) The longest course of free political sphere in the Persian recent history between 1941 and 1953⁹³⁴ (The role of ruling and upper-class).
- 6) Tudeh, a communist party was formed in 1941 with the support from the Soviet Union⁹³⁵ (The role of intellectuals and external-power).
- 7) The Shah's assassination in the University of Tehran in February 1949⁹³⁶ (The role of intellectuals and students).
- 8) The Tudeh party was repressed and declared as illegal⁹³⁷ (The repressive part of ruling-class).
- 9) The Iranian National Front was founded by Mosaddeq in 1949⁹³⁸ (The role of intellectuals).
- 10) During the 1940s and early 1950s, the Iran's share of the oil contracts with the industrial countries was truly low⁹³⁹ (The interest and influence of external-power).
- 11) The parliamentary endeavors of the National Front to nationalize the Persian oil industry⁹⁴⁰ (The role of intellectuals).

⁹³⁰ Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow. *The logic of political survival*. 425.

⁹³¹ Blamires and Jackson (eds.). *World Fascism: A Historical Encyclopedia*, Vol. 1. 342-343.

⁹³² Majd. *Great Britain & Reza Shah: the plunder of Iran, 1921-1941*. 381-382.

⁹³³ *Ibid.*

⁹³⁴ Ramin Jahanbegloo (Ed.). *Civil Society and Democracy in Iran*. Lanham: Lexington Books. 2011. p. 12.

⁹³⁵ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 281. Christian Emery. *US Foreign Policy and the Iranian Revolution: The Cold War Dynamics of Engagement and Strategic Alliance*. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 2013. p. 61.

⁹³⁶ Gene R. Garthwaite. *The Persians*. Oxford: Blackwell. 2005. p. 239.

⁹³⁷ Parsa. *Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution*. 132.

⁹³⁸ Mary Elaine Hegland. *Days of Revolution: Political Unrest in an Iranian Village*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press. 2013. p. 53.

⁹³⁹ James A. Bill. *The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations*. New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press. 1988. p. 61.

⁹⁴⁰ Katayoun Shafiee. *Machineries of Oil: An Infrastructural History of BP in Iran*. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 2018. p. 167.

- 12) The British Oil Company, which was pretty sure of its influence on the Shah, presented a new contract that was due to be ended in 1993⁹⁴¹ (The interest and influence of external-power).
- 13) The nationalization of Persian oil industry on 20th March 1951⁹⁴² (The role of intellectuals, ruling and upper-class ...).
- 14) As the oil nationalization was able to become a driving force for other nations, a coup was accomplished against the national government of the prime minister Mosaddeq. On August 19th, 1953, the United Kingdom obtained the US approval and took action with the assistance of the proponents of the monarchy in the army, some mullahs, some preachers and their followers, some landowners and conservative politicians⁹⁴³ (The interest of external-powers, besides the repressive part of ruling and upper-class ...).
- 15) The Shah after returning was determined to prevent the repetition of the Mosaddeq's case by imposing martial law, blocking the political mobility and ignoring the essential functions of the constitution to constitutionalize and restrict his own monarchy⁹⁴⁴ (The repressive part of ruling-class).
- 16) Receiving financial assistance from the United States⁹⁴⁵ (The interest and influence of external-power).
- 17) Mosaddeq was imprisoned and exiled, and generally the political parties and intellectual groups such as National Front and Tudeh were repressed and their members were differently sentenced to imprisonment, exile and execution⁹⁴⁶ (The repressive part of ruling and upper-class).
- 18) The Shah primarily appointed the leaders of the coup into the key positions⁹⁴⁷ (The repressive part of ruling-class).
- 19) Oil consortium contracts with the industrial countries were signed based on 50-50⁹⁴⁸ (The interest of external-power and ruling-class).

⁹⁴¹ Mina. "Oil Agreements in Iran". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/oil-agreements-in-iran> .

⁹⁴² Alan W. Ford. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute of 1951-1952. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press. 1954. p. 268.

⁹⁴³ Abrahamian. A History of Modern Iran. 116-120.

⁹⁴⁴ Keddie. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. 135.

⁹⁴⁵ Abrahamian. A History of Modern Iran. 128. Abrahamian. Iran Between Two Revolutions. 419.

⁹⁴⁶ The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Mohammad Mosaddeq". Encyclopædia Britannica. Online edition. February 26, 2018. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mohammad-Mosaddeq> . Abrahamian. A History of Modern Iran. 122.

⁹⁴⁷ Ali Akbar Dareini. The Rise And Fall Of The Pahlavi Dynasty: Memoirs Of Former General Husein Fardust. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 1998. p. 89.

⁹⁴⁸ Bamberg. British Petroleum and Global Oil, 1950-1975: The Challenge of Nationalism. 43.

- 20) On December 7th, 1953, on the eve of the Richard Nixon's visit to Tehran, a demonstration took place at Tehran University against the consortium agreement, three students were killed and until the present time, every year, it is commemorated by both religious and secular students⁹⁴⁹ (The role of intellectuals, students and external-power).
- 21) In 1954, elections to the 18th parliament were held with the handpicked candidates under the monarch control⁹⁵⁰ (The repressive part of ruling-class).
- 22) In 1955, the Shah ousted the prime minister Zahedi and became the undisputed ruler of Iran. He established a centralized concentrated royal structure, which later canalized all the discontents to himself⁹⁵¹ (The repressive part of ruling-class).
- 23) The discovery of new oil fields in 1956⁹⁵² (The interest of external-power and ruling-class).
- 24) By the second economic development program (1956-1962) several modernizational projects were carried out⁹⁵³ (The role of ruling-class).
- 25) On 20th March 1957, secret police, SAVAK was formed with the technical cooperation of CIA, FBI and Mossad⁹⁵⁴ (The interest and influence of external-powers and the repressive part of ruling and upper-class).
- 26) In 1957, the Shah canceled the martial law, which was imposed after the coup and to form a Western style parliamentary system allowed some limited political activities by founding two fabricated parties⁹⁵⁵ (The role of ruling-class).
- 27) The Shah's pro-Israeli state policies⁹⁵⁶ (The role of ruling-class).
- 28) In 1961 two moderate members of the National Front, Taleqani and Bazargan formed the Liberation Movement⁹⁵⁷ (The role of moderate mullah and intellectual).
- 29) In October 1962, the Provincial Associations' bill was executed. Accordingly, the women were entitled to vote, and the condition of being Muslim and swearing on Quran was eliminated from the preconditions of the electoral law⁹⁵⁸ (The role of ruling-class).

⁹⁴⁹ Chehabi. *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran under the Shah and Khomeini*. 134.

⁹⁵⁰ Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. 135.

⁹⁵¹ *Ibid*.

⁹⁵² Robert L. Rosenberg. "Qum-1956: A Misadventure in Iranian Oil". *The Business History Review*, 49: 1. Pp. 81-104. 1975.

⁹⁵³ Savory. "Muhammad Rida Shah Pahlawi". 446-451.

⁹⁵⁴ Abrahamian. *A History of Modern Iran*. 128. Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 419.

⁹⁵⁵ Savory. "Muhammad Rida Shah Pahlawi". 446-451.

⁹⁵⁶ Ehteshami and Hinnebusch. *Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System*. 89.

⁹⁵⁷ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 460, 462.

⁹⁵⁸ Milani. *Eminent Persians: the Men and Women Who Made Modern Iran, 1941-1979*. Vol. 1. 51.

- 30) A harsh reaction from the mullahs. Among them, a low ranked was appeared as Khomeini who while, avoided the women's issue, addressed the influence of the US on the Shah and attracted the masses⁹⁵⁹ (The role of mullahs).
- 31) The government officially abolished the bill within less than two months⁹⁶⁰ (The role of ruling-class).
- 32) John F. Kennedy stipulated the continuity of the future loans to implement the land and liberal reforms, which the Americans recognized as the best protection barrier against a communist revolution⁹⁶¹ (The interest and influence of external-power and ruling-class).
- 33) The Shah launched his controversial economic and social reforms called White Revolution (land reforms, benefiting of workers in profits of factories, amendment of the electoral law for the women's suffrage... 1963-1979)⁹⁶² (The role of ruling and upper-class).
- 34) Elimination of the landlord regime ruined the management system of the agricultural activities⁹⁶³ (The role of ruling and upper-class).
- 35) Expansion in independent unemployed farmworker⁹⁶⁴ (The role of ruling and upper-class).
- 36) Expansion of urbanization, urban slums, social distance and social tensions⁹⁶⁵ (The role of ruling and upper-class).
- 37) Expansion of the middle-class, urban and industrial working-class deprived of having the political institutions, such as labor unions, independent newspapers and political parties⁹⁶⁶ (The role of ruling and upper-class).
- 38) A relative socio-economic development⁹⁶⁷ (The role of ruling and upper-class).
- 39) The peaceful relation between the Shah and the bazaar and landlord-financed Usuli mullah was deteriorated. This deterioration divided them into three, the non-political (the largest), the moderates led by Shari'atmadari opposed to the women's suffrage and land reform (as interrupted endowments of the landowners to the mullahs under the Shari'a), but demanded merely full implementation of the constitutional law, lastly, the young tough dissident mullahs led by Khomeini with a secret network⁹⁶⁸ (The role of ruling and upper-class and mullahs).

⁹⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁶¹ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 421-424.

⁹⁶² Afkhami. *The life and times of the Shah*. 229-237.

⁹⁶³ Rahnema and Behdad (ed.). *Iran after the revolution: crisis of an Islamic state*. 24-25.

⁹⁶⁴ Ibid., 24-25.

⁹⁶⁵ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 446-449. Abrahamian. *A History of Modern Iran*. 139-142.

⁹⁶⁶ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 426-427.

⁹⁶⁷ Ibid., 427-428, 433.

⁹⁶⁸ Ibid., 473-477.

- 40) In June 1963, the mullahs and people's protests against the Shah's plans occurred in Qom and major cities⁹⁶⁹ (The role of mullahs and ...).
- 41) The bloody repressions of the demonstrations⁹⁷⁰ (The repressive part of ruling-class).
- 42) Khomeini was jailed and as was not a Marja', the Shah decided to execute him. Since constitutionally the execution of the Mujtahids was forbidden, the grand mullahs announced him as Ayatollah, thus the Shah inevitably exiled him⁹⁷¹ (The repressive part of ruling-class, besides the role of mullahs).
- 43) The leaders of National Front were arrested⁹⁷² (The repressive part of ruling-class).
- 44) The Liberation Movement was banned⁹⁷³ (The repressive part of ruling-class).
- 45) The blocked political system paved the way for emerging the newly posed eclectic Islamic Marxist ideologies. A number of students who were disappointed by the peaceful methods of the Tudeh, National Front and Liberation Movement parties formed underground discussion groups to examine the global revolutionary experiences⁹⁷⁴ (The role of intellectuals and students).
- 46) In late 1963, Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas, a Marxist-Leninist underground group that was formed from former members of the Tudeh party and the Marxist faction of the National Front⁹⁷⁵ (The role of intellectuals and students).
- 47) In September 1965, the People's Mojahedin, an Islamic Marxist militant Organization was organized by the former members of the religious faction of the National Front and the Liberation Movement⁹⁷⁶ (The role of intellectuals and students).
- 48) In 1967, the prominent thinker of the Liberation Movement and the ideologue of the revolution, Shari'ati emerged. He gave his speeches in Tehran, at a modern religious institute, with SAVAK's implicit consent, as SAVAK supposed his ideas could be attractive and tranquilizer to the leftist young generation. He by his re-interpretation of the Shi'i values and history had a profound effect on the revival of Shi'a political thought and represented a revolutionary elucidation of Shi'a as an emancipating ideology. He pushed the society

⁹⁶⁹ Ashraf. "BAZAR iii. Socioeconomic and Political Role". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/bazar-iii> .

⁹⁷⁰ Moin. Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah. 111-113.

⁹⁷¹ Abrahamian. Iran Between Two Revolutions. 424-426. Keddie. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. 146-147. Amir Arjomand. The Turban for the Crown, The Islamic revolution in Iran. 86.

⁹⁷² Abrahamian. Iran Between Two Revolutions. 426.

⁹⁷³ Ibid., 460, 462.

⁹⁷⁴ Ibid., 481-482.

⁹⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁷⁶ Ibid.

(students, armed and non-armed leftist groups, religious families, and middle-class) and the regime in the revolutionary hatred cycle⁹⁷⁷ (The role of intellectual).

- 49) The issue of the Chinese-Soviet conflicts (peaked in 1969), emergence of Maoistic tendencies, and the critique of the party's previous policies, blindly following the Soviet, led to a decline in the supporters of the Tudeh party⁹⁷⁸ (The influence of external-powers and intellectuals).
- 50) The Nixon doctrine of 1969 after the Indochina wars that accordingly the United States sought to secure its interests in the bipolar system of the Cold War throughout building the regional powers⁹⁷⁹ (The interest and influence of external-powers).
- 51) A fundamental change in Usuli Shi'a based on Velayat-e Faqih theory, Khomeini formulated the framework of his political theory in his lectures in the late 1960s and published it as Islamic Governance of Jurist (1970)⁹⁸⁰ (The role of mullah).
- 52) On 8th February 1971 the first armed opposition operation was executed as Siahkal Rebellion. Though, it was heavily repressed, it symbolized and propagated the impenetrability of the imperial system and strengthened the armed struggles⁹⁸¹ (The role of intellectuals and students).
- 53) An increase in the number of political prisoners, torture, repression and censorship by SAVAK in the 1970s⁹⁸² (The repressive part of ruling-class).
- 54) The discovery of some new oil wells that allowed new contracts outside the consortium⁹⁸³ (The role of ruling-class, besides external-powers).
- 55) The increased oil price and revenues⁹⁸⁴ (The economic and external-factors).
- 56) The expectations of the people from different social groups and classes rose sharply⁹⁸⁵ (by the measures of ruling-class).
- 57) Nixon was forced to reduce the exchange rate of dollar in 1971 and 1972 to deal with the oil high price⁹⁸⁶ (The interest of external-powers).

⁹⁷⁷ Savory. "Muhammad Rida Shah Pahlawi". 448.

⁹⁷⁸ Abrahamian. Iran Between Two Revolutions. 451-457.

⁹⁷⁹ Koga. Reinventing Regional Security Institutions in Asia and Africa: Power shifts, ideas, and institutional change. 32. Lau. Southeast Asia and the Cold War. 172.

⁹⁸⁰ Mohammadi. The Longevity of Clerical Business As Usual: A Socio-political History of Iranian Twelver Shi'i Clergy. 236-237.

⁹⁸¹ Keddie. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. 220.

⁹⁸² Ibid., 222.

⁹⁸³ Mina. "Oil Agreements in Iran". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/oil-agreements-in-iran> .

⁹⁸⁴ Abrahamian. Iran Between Two Revolutions. 427-428, 433.

⁹⁸⁵ Abrahamian. A History of Modern Iran. 139-142.

⁹⁸⁶ Young, Kent. Oxford International Relations Since 1945. 302-303.

- 58) OPEC headed by the Shah reincreased the oil price in two stages. The Shah did not respond to the American requests to apply his influence to lower the price⁹⁸⁷ (The interest and influence of external-powers and ruling-class).
- 59) The vast military investment and weaponization that created one of the most exquisite armies of the world⁹⁸⁸ (The role of ruling-class).
- 60) An economic richness for the bazaar made the merchants socially active⁹⁸⁹ (The role of merchants).
- 61) The bazaar funded the religious foundations such as mosques, seminaries, and Husseiniehs for the Shi'a rituals and ceremonies, and sent the mullahs and preachers regularly towards the distant poor towns and villages. It later sponsored the massive labor strikes, students and the families of the killed demonstrators⁹⁹⁰ (The role of merchants and mullahs).
- 62) In 1974 the Shah was diagnosed by cancer⁹⁹¹ (The role of ruling-class).
- 63) The Shah was persuaded to build his own single autocratic party of Rastakhiz in March 1975⁹⁹² (The repressive part of ruling-class).
- 64) The collapse of the oil price in the mid-1975⁹⁹³ (The interest and influence of external-powers).
- 65) A declaration of war to the bazaar and their beneficiaries, the mullahs. The Rastakhiz party took some provocative anti-bazaar measures, similar to opening up branches in bazaars, direct interfere in interest rate, importing a large amount of wheat, sugar and meat so as to shorten the hands of the traditional retailers, and plans for eradication of the old bazaar and replacing by supermarkets. The establishment of Religious Corps to teach the true Islam to villagers and trying to legalize an increase in the age of marriage for girls⁹⁹⁴ (The repressive part of ruling and upper-class).
- 66) The moderate and conservative mullahs who in 1970s were partly annoyed by the Shah's anti-Islam policies (spending millions of dollars for 2500-year Imperial anniversary

⁹⁸⁷ Root. Alliance Curse: How America Lost the Third World. 243.

⁹⁸⁷ Abrahamian. Iran Between Two Revolutions. 427-428, 433.

⁹⁸⁸ Cottam. Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study. 143.

⁹⁸⁹ Abrahamian. Iran Between Two Revolutions. 427-428, 433.

⁹⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁹¹ Cooper. The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East. 279.

⁹⁹² Abrahamian. The Iranian Mojahedin. 25-27. Afkhami. The life and times of the Shah. 434-444.

⁹⁹³ See Savory. "Muhammad Rida Shah Pahlawi". 446-451.

⁹⁹⁴ Abrahamian. Iran Between Two Revolutions. 443-445, 497-498. Abrahamian. A History of Modern Iran. 151-153.

celebration and the calendrical system change from the Islamic Hejri to the Imperial) by issuing fatwas against Rastakhiz joined to the opinionated mullah, Khomeini, and provided him by large financial resources and a vast Shi'a organizational network⁹⁹⁵ (The role of mullahs).

- 67) The increasing violence of the security forces, SAVAK's torturings and murderings caused the critiques of the international sphere. In 1975, Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, as well as the United Nations affiliated International League for Human Rights condemned each the violations of human rights⁹⁹⁶ (The influence of external-powers).
- 68) Jimmy Carter emphasized the importance of the human rights issue in Iran for the United States in his 1976 presidential election campaign⁹⁹⁷ (The interest and influence of external-power).
- 69) The Shah, who did not want to lose the image of a leading reformist and his keen on bringing the benefits of the Western civilization to Iran, showed a positive reaction to the foreign pressures. In early 1977, he amnestied hundreds of prisoners, allowed the Red Cross to visit the prisons and promised the International Commission of Lawyers that further trials would be held in civil courts⁹⁹⁸ (The role of external-powers, ruling and upper-class, besides passivity of coercive power).
- 70) The decrease of the crackdowns encouraged the opposition to protest more loudly⁹⁹⁹ (The role of intellectuals, students, mullahs and ...).
- 71) In the early 1977, both guerrilla organizations of People's Fedai and Mojahedin looked back and revised their tactics as many members of them were arrested or executed¹⁰⁰⁰ (The role of intellectuals and students).
- 72) In June 1977, the main ideologue of the Islamic-leftist eclectic discourse, Shari'ati died. His death gave the mullahs a fabulous position to fully plunder and interpret his legacy under the pure Islamic thoughts¹⁰⁰¹ (The role of intellectuals and mullahs).

⁹⁹⁵ Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. 226-228.

⁹⁹⁶ Savory. "Muhammad Rida Shah Pahlavi". 448.

⁹⁹⁷ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 497-503. Abrahamian. *Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran*. 119.

⁹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰⁰ Behrooz. *Rebels with a Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran*. 68-69.

¹⁰⁰¹ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 466. Abrahamian. *The Iranian Mojahedin*. 109-110. Milani. *Eminent Persians: the Men and Women Who Made Modern Iran, 1941-1979*. Vol. 1. 365-366.

- 73) Khomeini's popularity successfully attracted a broad companionship of the social forces¹⁰⁰² (The role of mullah and ... to form an initial coalition).
- 74) On 23rd October 1977, the Khomeini's eldest son died¹⁰⁰³ (The role of mullah).
- 75) As his death was widely attributed to SAVAK, the uprising was resparked. From then onwards, a series of ceremonies for the 3rd, 7th and in particular 40th days of the bloodsheds (also each dedicated to the commemoration of the victims of the previous ceremonies) was nationwide held, which was an excellent example of the political ideological use of the Shi'a traditional rituals, and provided fabulous opportunities for protesters to gather and exchange oral information and more stimulate their sentiments against the regime¹⁰⁰⁴ (The role of mullahs, merchants, middle-class and ...).
- 76) On October 19th, 1977, after nine nights political peaceful poetry sessions organized by the Writers' Association and the Iranian-German Cultural Association, the police in order to disrupt the tenth night, dispersed some thousand student listeners who reacted by angry protests and anti-government slogans¹⁰⁰⁵ (The role of intellectuals and students).
- 77) Arrested protesters in the previous unrest were acquitted after some short trials in the civil courts, hence such trials clearly revealed to the society that SAVAK is no longer able to use the military courts to repress the opponents¹⁰⁰⁶ (The role of ruling-class and passivity of coercive power).
- 78) On 7th January 1978, the publication of an article accusing Khomeini of being a foreigner devious author of the Sufi lyrics, collaborative to the communists as well as a British spy¹⁰⁰⁷ (The role of ruling-class).
- 79) On January 9th an intensification in the protests, particularly in Qom and a strike in the bazaar, which ended in a bloody repression¹⁰⁰⁸ (The role of mullahs, merchants, middle-class and ...).
- 80) On 18th February, the 40th day of Qom's bloodshed commemoration ceremonies were widely held, in Tabriz violence erupted, protesters attacked police stations, Rastakhiz offices,

¹⁰⁰² Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. 232. Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 515-517. Abrahamian. *A History of Modern Iran*. 160-161. Bakhash. *The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution*. 15. Ganji. *Defying the Iranian Revolution: From a Minister to the Shah to a Leader of Resistance*. 14.

¹⁰⁰³ Clawson and Rubin. *Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos*. 90.

¹⁰⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰⁵ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 504-505.

¹⁰⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 505.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 505. Amuzegar. *The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis' Triumph and Tragedy*. 247-248.

¹⁰⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

banks, luxury hotels, cinemas and liquor stores, then for the first time shouted, “Down with Shah”. It was repressed by tanks and warfare helicopters¹⁰⁰⁹ (The role of mullahs, merchants, middle-class and ...).

- 81) The ceremonies of the 40th day of Tabriz victims were drawn to violence, especially in Yazd on 29th March¹⁰¹⁰ (The role of mullahs, merchants, middle-class and ...).
- 82) On May 10th, the 40th day ceremonies of Yazd killings ended in brutal violence, particularly in Qom, the security forces shot at the demonstrations, cut the city electricity, and by undermining the old tradition of sit-in at the house of grand mullahs killed two mullahs inside the Shari’atmadari’s house¹⁰¹¹ (The repressive part of ruling-class, besides the role of mullahs and ...).
- 83) To deal with the crisis, the regime initiated by creating a secret revenge committee and resistance corps, which sent threatening letters to the intellectuals and planned bombing and attacking their offices. On the other side, abandoned some anti-bazaar policies, banned the screening of Western obscene movies, apologized Shari’atmadari, dismissed the notorious head of SAVAK and deferred the development plans to curb inflation¹⁰¹² (The role of ruling and upper-class, besides passivity of coercive power).
- 84) Temporarily, the regime’s policies and the recommendations of the influential mullah amongst the religious and leftist oppositions, Shari’atmadari and other moderates worked, in a way that by the summer of 1978, for two months, there was no major upheaval and in early June the prime minister declared “the crisis is over”¹⁰¹³ (The role of ruling and upper-class, moderate mullahs and intellectuals).
- 85) In July during the first few days of ritualistic month of Ramadan unrest again erupted. In Isfahan angry protesters who some were armed, conquered the city. The government regained control by killing and declaring a martial law¹⁰¹⁴ (The role of mullahs, merchants, middle-class and ...).
- 86) On 19th August 1978 (the 25th anniversary of the coup), the Cinema Rex in Abadan in a working-class area was fired by a group affiliated with the senior mullahs. More than 400 people were burned in the fire and killed¹⁰¹⁵ (The role of mullahs).

¹⁰⁰⁹ Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. 226-228.

¹⁰¹⁰ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 507-508.

¹⁰¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹² *Ibid.*, 508-509.

¹⁰¹³ Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. 231.

¹⁰¹⁴ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 512-513.

¹⁰¹⁵ *Ibid.*

- 87) The next day, some ten thousand relatives of the victims who gathered at their funeral, accused SAVAK¹⁰¹⁶ (The role of mullahs, merchants, middle-class and ...).
- 88) The Shah sought to reduce the severity of the crisis by giving more concessions, amnestied hundreds of prisoners, expelled military forces from universities, promised free elections and appointed Sharif-Emami as the prime minister in order to attract the mullahs' satisfaction on 27th August¹⁰¹⁷ (The role of ruling-class and passivity of coercive power).
- 89) Sharif-Emami called his government "National Reconciliation", improved the press freedom, let the old parties reorganize, canceled the Imperial Calendar, released the most high ranking mullahs, closed tens of casinos and arranged with the moderate opposition leaders, such as Bazargan, a peaceful ceremony for Eid al-Fitr¹⁰¹⁸ (The role of ruling-class and passivity of coercive power).
- 90) Khomeini for Eid al-Fitr demanded as a duty for all Muslims, no reconciliation with the Shah and resisting until his expulsion. With the sharp rise of his popularity and the climax of the revolutionary passion, his speeches radicalized the idea of incompatibility with the regime and the necessity of the implementation of Islamic rule, which was welcomed by many lower-class and the inhabitants of the poor neighborhoods and slums, who were some former peasants in a new setting, provided by a sense of solidarity based on the revolutionary ideology¹⁰¹⁹ (The role of mullahs, working-class and ...).
- 91) Exceeding half a million rallied in Tehran on Eid al-Fitr September 7th, 1978, chanting for the first time "Independence, Freedom, Islamic Republic", thus explicitly overshadowed the demand of the moderate opposition on the implementation of the constitutional law¹⁰²⁰ (The role of mullahs, middle-class, working-class and ...).
- 92) As it was proved that the moderates had no necessary influence on the movement and successive protests, also considering the bloody repressions reduced the possibility of negotiating, the Shah reacted decisively to keep his sovereignty, e.g., prohibited demonstration and declared an overall martial law for the first time since 1963¹⁰²¹ (The repressive part of ruling-class).

¹⁰¹⁶ Afkhami. The life and times of the Shah. 458-459.

¹⁰¹⁷ The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Jafar Sharif-Emami".

<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jafar-Sharif-Emami> . Keddie. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. 231.

¹⁰¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰¹⁹ Afkhami. The life and times of the Shah. 462, 464-465.

¹⁰²⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰²¹ Ibid.

- 93) The next morning, on Friday, September 8th, there were intense clashes in southern Tehran. Roughly five thousand people, most students and working-class gathered in Jaleh Square, many of whom were not aware of the early morning announcement of the martial law. Some war helicopters were applied to disperse people, then commandos and tanks fired on the crowd, killed almost tens and injured hundreds¹⁰²² (The role of students, working-class and ...).
- 94) The day after the black Friday, which created a profound impact on the relation between the Shah and people, began the widespread wave of labor strikes¹⁰²³ (The role of working-class and ...).
- 95) With the suppressive measures, recession and reducing wages the economic demands became political, thus the working-class strikers joined to the demonstrations¹⁰²⁴ (The role of working-class and ...).
- 96) On October 6th, the ceremonies of the 40th day of the Black horrible Friday were ended similarly bloodily in major cities.¹⁰²⁵ (The role of mullahs, middle-class, working-class and ...).
- 97) Following another series of strikes, almost all bazaars, universities, high schools, oil constructions, banks, newspapers, hospitals and large factories were shut down, people in addition to their own union demands, urgently requested the dissolution of SAVAK, martial law, the release of prisoners and the Khomeini's return¹⁰²⁶ (The role of mullahs, students, middle-class, working-class and ...).
- 98) The Shah versus the crisis, made the most contradictory decisions, on the one hand, arresting the leaders of National Front and pressuring on Iraq to dismiss Khomeini, on the other hand, to order the army to avoid direct shooting the people, releasing prisoners including mullahs, arresting his own technocrats and Generals, dissolution of Rastakhiz, giving economic concessions, promising free elections, gaining obsession in selecting the weak army commanders to obey him, and announcing from TV that he had heard the revolutionary message¹⁰²⁷ (The role of ruling-class and passivity of coercive power).

¹⁰²² Ibid.

¹⁰²³ Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. 232. Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 515-517. Abrahamian. *A History of Modern Iran*. 160-161. Bakhash. *The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution*. 15. Ganji. *Defying the Iranian Revolution: From a Minister to the Shah to a Leader of Resistance*. 14.

¹⁰²⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰²⁵ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 517-518.

¹⁰²⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰²⁷ Ibid., 518-520. Hovsepian-Bearce. *The Political Ideology of Ayatollah Khamenei: Out of the Mouth of the Supreme Leader of Iran*. 11.

- 99) The inelastic character of Khomeini did not allow him to compromise, thus messaged from Paris, (where he was transported since October) if the Shah has heard the voice of revolution, must resign and be tried at an Islamic court¹⁰²⁸ (The role of mullah).
- 100) By the Khomeini's camp in Paris, the link between the secular and the religious forces was completely restored and the possibility of other options between "Islamic Republic" and Monarchy was eliminated. Khomeini for the first time internationally acceptable specified "Islamic Republic" to the journalists instead of his previous "Islamic rule"¹⁰²⁹ (The role of mullahs, intellectuals and students to form an elitistic coalition).
- 101) In the ritualistic month of Muharram, on December 2nd-4th, the marches and strikes were intensified with strengthening of the coalition. In Tehran hundreds of thousands went to the roofs to shout "Allahoakbar" and thousands wearing shrouds demonstrated and violated the martial law. In Qazvin, some were rolled by tanks¹⁰³⁰ (The role of mullahs, merchants, intellectuals, students, middle-class, working-class, women and ...).
- 102) The regime gave more concessions, released more prisoners, and permitted conditional mourning ceremonies¹⁰³¹ (The role of ruling-class and passivity of coercive power).
- 103) The mullahs and the nationalists organized rallies by more than half a million on the Tasu'a and two million on the Ashura days¹⁰³² (The role of mullahs, merchants, intellectuals, students, middle-class, working-class, women and ... to form a wide coalition).
- 104) The position of the Shah deteriorated in two weeks after Ashura, when some soldiers and officers avoided targeting people under the influence of the eclectic ideologies¹⁰³³ (The role of intellectuals).
- 105) The paralysis of economy and suspension on oil-exporting, due to the daily struggles and the massive strikes¹⁰³⁴ (The role of merchants, working-class and ...).
- 106) The guerrilla groups were revived by the release of their members, return of their exiled corporators, and new recruitments, thus carried out several armed operations¹⁰³⁵ (The role of intellectuals and students).

¹⁰²⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰²⁹ Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. 234.

¹⁰³⁰ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 521-522.

¹⁰³¹ Ibid.

¹⁰³² Ibid.

¹⁰³³ Parsa. *Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution*. 322-323.

¹⁰³⁴ See Elm. *Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath*. See also Mina. "Oil Agreements in Iran". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/oil-agreements-in-iran> .

¹⁰³⁵ Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. 233.

- 107) Khomeini was engaged in a propagandistic campaign, he declared after revolution will supply the West's oil necessities and will not be an ally to the East, and his supporters published his posters with high circulation¹⁰³⁶ (The role of mullah and external-powers).
- 108) The Shah offered a proposal of a new national reconciliation government to the leaders of the National Front¹⁰³⁷ (The role of ruling-class and intellectuals).
- 109) While the senior leaders rejected the proposal, Bakhtiar one of the younger leaders (who considered "the mullah turban's danger more than the army's boot") suggested that if the Shah temporarily and some stubborn army commanders permanently left the country, and the Shah promised not to rule but to reign, he would be the head of a civilian government¹⁰³⁸ (The role of intellectual).
- 110) The Shah immediately accepted and appointed him as the prime minister on December 30th, 1978¹⁰³⁹ (The role of ruling-class and passivity of coercive power).
- 111) Bakhtiar after taking office took some measures to please the opposition, promised to abolish the martial law, withdraw the Shah, dissolve the SAVAK, allow the Khomeini's return, then seized the assets of the Pahlavi Foundation, arrested a number of former ministers and released more prisoners, but warned the opposition not to barricade the establishment of a constitutional rule¹⁰⁴⁰ (The role of intellectual, ruling-class and passivity of coercive power).
- 112) Shari'atmadari and other moderate mullahs supported Bakhtiar¹⁰⁴¹ (The role of moderate mullahs).
- 113) The leaders of the National Front boycotted Bakhtiar and insisted on the removal of the Shah¹⁰⁴² (The role of intellectuals).
- 114) Carter resumed his efforts to improve the status of democracy and emphasized on the issue of human rights. It was possibly the end of the unconditional support of the Shah from Washington¹⁰⁴³ (The role of external-power).
- 115) The Carter's policy to support Khomeini¹⁰⁴⁴ (The role of external-powers).

¹⁰³⁶ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 524.

¹⁰³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 525.

¹⁰⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴³ Milani. *The Shah*. 377, 383.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Abrahamian. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. 524.

- 116) On 4th-7th January 1979, in the Guadalupe Island, the four influential leaders of West Germany, France, Britain and the United States gathered to discuss various world issues, including Soviet effects, the Middle East and the Iranian political crisis. They drew conclusion “the sooner the Shah left Iran the better”¹⁰⁴⁵ (The role of external-powers).
- 117) On 10th January 1979, Khomeini before his return mounted on the wave of demonstrators and formed the Council of Islamic Revolution so as to manipulate the revolutionary course, then reinvited to rally and strike, and declared the Bakhtiar’s support as “following Satan”¹⁰⁴⁶ (The role of mullahs).
- 118) On January 13th, the nationwide marches demanding the Khomeini’s return and the removal of Shah and Bakhtiar¹⁰⁴⁷ (The role of mullahs, middle-class, working-class, women and ... to form a wide coalition).
- 119) The collapse of psychological state of the Shah. When the revolutionary movement began, accidentally he was deprived of all the sources of his psychological support. Also, he believed from his childhood that he was somehow supported by God and the Shi’i Imams, and the traditional non-political mullahs were his trusted allies in a war against communists and secular nationalists¹⁰⁴⁸ (The role of ruling-class and passivity of coercive power).
- 120) On January 16th, when the shah left the country to Cairo apparently for a short relaxation, hundreds of thousands went to the streets to celebrate his leave¹⁰⁴⁹ (The role of middle-class, working-class, ... ruling and upper-class, besides passivity of coercive power).
- 121) On January 19th, after Khomeini called for a street referendum to determine the assignment of the monarchy and the government of Bakhtiar, roughly more than a million people came to the streets¹⁰⁵⁰ (The role of mullahs, intellectuals, middle-class, working-class and ... to form a wide coalition).
- 122) As the airports were closed to prevent from the Khomeini’s arrival, on January 27th-28th, some protesters were killed¹⁰⁵¹ (The repressive part of ruling and upper-class).
- 123) On 1st February, Khomeini was brought to Iran from Paris¹⁰⁵² (The role of mullahs and external-powers).

¹⁰⁴⁵ Carter. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. 240. Ganji. Defying the Iranian Revolution: From a Minister to the Shah to a Leader of Resistance. 35.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Milani. The Shah. 414. Abrahamian. Iran Between Two Revolutions. 525.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Ibid., 526.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Zonis. Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah. 20-21, 116-117. Milani. The Shah. 49-50. Cooper. The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East. 279.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Abrahamian. Iran Between Two Revolutions. 525-526.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Ibid., 526.

¹⁰⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵² Ibid.

- 124) Khomeini invited people to continue the demonstrations until the withdrawal of Bakhtiar¹⁰⁵³ (The role of mullahs).
- 125) On February 4th, Khomeini appointed a moderate, Bazargan, to form an interim government and set up a secret council for directing talks with the army chiefs¹⁰⁵⁴ (The role of mullahs, intellectuals, upper-class and passivity of coercive power).
- 126) The Guerrilla groups, especially the People's Fedai played the last episode. On February 9th, when the Imperial Guard tried to repress the air force technicians' uprising at a military base, the guerrilla weaponized the volunteer people and helped the besieged airmen. The next morning, guerrillas, air force men and rebels attacked the police centers and the city's largest arm factory¹⁰⁵⁵ (The role of intellectuals, working-class and ...).
- 127) The regime collapse, on 11th February 1979, the clashes peaked, the revolutionaries occupied most of the ammunition depots, barracks, military academy as well as Evin prison, the army declared neutrality in the battle between Bakhtiar and the Revolutionary Council, the radio announced, "Here is Tehran, true voice of the Iranian nation, voice of revolution"¹⁰⁵⁶ (The role of intellectuals, working-class, ... upper-class and passivity of coercive power).
- 128) On February 12th, when the 2500-year-old Monarchy with crown and boot was substituted by Mullarchy with turban and sandal, the power fell into the hands of the committees run by the local Khomeini-oriented mullahs, which tried to enforce order by distributing food, pricing, controlling traffic and restore the courts of Shari'a. They were recruited among tough youngsters from downtown areas and operated as mace in Khomeini's hand¹⁰⁵⁷ (The role of mullahs, intellectuals, working-class and ...).
- 129) On 16th February, based on the Khomeini's order began a two-month executions period of hundreds of senior officials of the former regime by the sentences of the hanging judge of the Revolutionary Court, Khalkhali¹⁰⁵⁸ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class and ...).
- 130) The Islamic prohibitions were executed based on the Khomeini's orders, and spontaneous committees' members, supported by the Shari'a courts, similar to production

¹⁰⁵³ Ibid., 526-527.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Ibid., 527-528.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Ibid., 528-529. Abrahamian. A History of Modern Iran. 161. Keddie. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. 238.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Abrahamian. Iran Between Two Revolutions. 527-528.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Mackey. The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation. 373. Moin. Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah. 208.

and consumption of alcoholic beverages, free sexual relationship and activities, gambling, some sports, broadcasting music on radio and TV among others¹⁰⁵⁹ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class and ...).

- 131) On 8th March, the Iranian women by a massive unveiled rally reacted to the Khomeini's decree on obligatory complete veil, later in 1983, the Hijab Law was enforced by the very Islamic Consultative Parliament¹⁰⁶⁰ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class besides the role of women).
- 132) On 30th-31st March, by Khomeini's shove, fearing the Shah's return and to give an international legitimacy to the revolution, a referendum on creating an Islamic Republic was hurriedly held¹⁰⁶¹ (The role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class, intellectuals and ...).
- 133) On May 5th, 1979, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps was established by a decree of Khomeini¹⁰⁶² (The aggressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 134) On June 14th, 1979, the official preliminary draft of Constitution of Islamic Republic was published, based on Khomeini's Velayat-e Faqih theory¹⁰⁶³ (The role of mullahs as a group ruling in upper-class, intellectuals and ...).
- 135) In August 1979, more than forty periodical publications were banned¹⁰⁶⁴ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 136) On November 4th, 1979, a revolutionary group as Muslim Student Followers of the Khomeini's Path, occupied the US embassy in Tehran, took hostage 52 American citizens and diplomats, held them for 444 days and recorded the longest hostage crisis in the history¹⁰⁶⁵ (The aggressive role of mullahs and intellectuals).
- 137) Two days later, the resignation of the interim Islamized national liberal government of Bazargan, thus the revolutionary moderators and mediators who were crucial for Khomeini to form a coalition of the incompatible groups in the climax of the revolutionary phase, were

¹⁰⁵⁹ Drost. *The World's news media: a comprehensive reference guide*. 237. Muys. *Substance Use Among Migrants: The Case of Iranians in Belgium*. 76-77.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Rahnama and Nu'mani. *The Secular Miracle: Religion, Politics, and Economic Policy in Iran*. 220. Derayeh. *Gender Equality in Iranian History: From Pre-Islamic Times to the Present*. 154-155. Khosravi. *Young and Defiant in Tehran*. 44.

¹⁰⁶¹ Hiro. *Holy Wars: The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism*. 169.

¹⁰⁶² Jonathan K. Zartman (Ed.). *Conflict in the Modern Middle East: An Encyclopedia of Civil War, Revolutions, and Regime Change*. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO. 2020. p. 141.

¹⁰⁶³ Rainer Brunner and Werner Ende. *The Twelver Shia in Modern Times: Religious Culture & Political History*. Leiden: Brill. 2001. p. 303.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Drost. *The World's news media: a comprehensive reference guide*. v237.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Limbert. *Negotiating with Iran: Wrestling the Ghosts of History*. 1.

set aside by the extremists who possessed the highest expectations from the revolutionary engine¹⁰⁶⁶ (The role of intellectuals).

- 138) By the Khomeini's decree on 26th November 1979, Basij a volunteer militia and later one of the five forces of the IRGC was established to watch, threaten and control people, beat and repress domestic oppositions as it located its active military bases almost everywhere across the country, mosques, neighborhoods, schools, universities, medical centers, Islamic seminaries, guilds, factories, big companies, government offices, among other public places¹⁰⁶⁷ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 139) On December 2nd-3rd 1979 the New Constitution of Iran was approved by a referendum¹⁰⁶⁸ (The role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 140) For the first presidential election in January 1980, Khomeini banned the participation of the People's Mojahedin Organization and those who boycotted the referendum of the constitution, then by his shove on January 25th, Banisadr who was born in a mullah family close to Khomeini was elected¹⁰⁶⁹ (The role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 141) The IRGC special force of Quds emerged in 1980 as a primary mechanism for developing and supporting sacred terrorism to extraterritorial operations¹⁰⁷⁰ (The aggressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 142) On April 7th, 1980 US imposed an economic embargo against Iran¹⁰⁷¹ (The role of external-power).
- 143) In April 1980, Khomeini in his speeches harshly attacked the universities and triggered the Islamization of the Academia under the name of Cultural Revolution (1980-1983). During this closure period, the Revolutionary Council aimed at purging universities from dissident scholars and students, hence violence erupted, several were killed, hundreds injured, jailed and exiled¹⁰⁷² (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).

¹⁰⁶⁶ Tucker. The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Iraq Conflicts. Vol. 2. 689.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Hesam Forozan. The Military in Post-Revolutionary Iran: The Evolution and Roles of the Revolutionary Guards. New York: Routledge. 2016. p. 53.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Iranian Constitution 1979. <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000.html> .

¹⁰⁶⁹ Chelkowski and Pranger. Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in Honor of George Lenczowski. 250. Lentz. Heads of States and Governments: A Worldwide Encyclopedia of Over 2,300 Leaders, 1945 through 1992. 396.

¹⁰⁷⁰ O'herm. Iran's Revolutionary Guard: The Threat That Grows While America Sleeps. 46.

¹⁰⁷¹ Milani. "Hostage Crisis". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/hostage-crisis> .

¹⁰⁷² Amir Arjomand. The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic revolution in Iran. 143. Malekzadeh. "Education as Public Good or Private Resource: Accommodation and Demobilization in Iran's University System". 128. Hiro. Iran Under the Ayatollahs. 160.

- 144) Iran-Iraq's tension intensified on 22nd September 1980, when Iraq invaded Iran, on account of ideological exportationist ambitions and provocations of Khomeini, e.g., he called for an insurgency by Iraqi army. Saddam also feared that the Shi'ite ideology, opposed to the principles of his secular branch of Arab Socialist Ba'ath party, would influence on the large Shi'a population in Iraq¹⁰⁷³ (The aggressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class and external-power).
- 145) Many super-powers supported Iraq during the war¹⁰⁷⁴ (The role of external-powers).
- 146) Khomeini after a while horrifically described the war as a "divine blessing for the Islamic Revolution". With the help of this war, they could avoid accountability and release the remaining revolutionary potentials¹⁰⁷⁵ (The aggressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 147) The oil price declined in 1980s¹⁰⁷⁶ (The role of external-powers).
- 148) A constant political economic crisis¹⁰⁷⁷ (The role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 149) Banisadr criticized Khomeini and the circumstances¹⁰⁷⁸ (The role of intellectuals).
- 150) Khomeini diagnosed Banisadr as a cooperative to the People's Mojahedin Organization¹⁰⁷⁹ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 151) Banisadr called for an uprising, and on June 21st-22nd, 1981 the violent demonstrations in different cities were launched by pro-Mojahedin and pro-Banisadr. In Tehran roughly half a million protested¹⁰⁸⁰ (The role of intellectuals and ...).
- 152) By the reaction of Khomeini and hard-liners the demonstration against theocracy was violently repressed, and roughly tens were killed, hundreds wounded and thousands arrested¹⁰⁸¹ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 153) The day after, Banisadr was dismissed, his arrest warrant was issued by Khomeini as a traitor to the revolution¹⁰⁸² (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).

¹⁰⁷³ Gieling. "Iraq vii. Iran-Iraq War". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/iraq-vii-iran-iraq-war> .

¹⁰⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Matusitz. Symbolism in Terrorism: Motivation, Communication, and Behavior. 171.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Inc., Ibp, Iran Investment and Business Guide Vol. 1, Strategic and Practical Information. 54.

¹⁰⁷⁷ See Amuzegar. "The Iranian Economy before and after the Revolution." 413-425.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4328463> .

¹⁰⁷⁸ Keddie. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. 253-254, Abrahamian. The Iranian Mojahedin. 218-219.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸² Ibid.

- 154) In 1982, IRGC trained and organized the group of Hezbollah, which was formed as a militia during the Lebanon war by direct support of Khomeini¹⁰⁸³ (The aggressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 155) Islamic Revolution applied Quds and its regional proxies to create an instable Middle East and fulfill its policies¹⁰⁸⁴ (The aggressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 156) A period of terror and execution¹⁰⁸⁵ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 157) The cease fire with Iraq in August 1988¹⁰⁸⁶ (The role of external-powers).
- 158) A friction between the president Khamenei and the prime minister Mousavi greatly over the constitutional executive power of the presidential and the prime ministerial positions intensified¹⁰⁸⁷ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 159) The mandatory resignation of Khomeini's designated successor, Montazeri, in March 1989, as he disagreed with Khomeini's 1988 massacre of more than 30000 political prisoners¹⁰⁸⁸ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 160) No serious Marja' had given strong support for Khomeini's policies¹⁰⁸⁹ (The role of mullahs).
- 161) Khomeini agreed a constitutional review and assigned it to a council. It was given two months to revise the existing constitutional provisions on leadership, centralization of power in the executive, and also in the judiciary, centralization of management of the media, the

¹⁰⁸³ O'hern. Iran's Revolutionary Guard: The Threat That Grows While America Sleeps. 46.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Ibid., 72-73. Hahn. Historical Dictionary of United States-Middle East Relations. 241. Abedin (an interview). "Iran: Expert Discusses Iran's Quds Force And U.S. Charges Concerning Iraq". https://web.archive.org/web/20080416114504/http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=02&y=2007&id=36B123CE-693B-448E-BF7D-A541E2A7BD12 . The information from the U.S. State Department. Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview Share, Country Reports on Terrorism 2013. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224826.htm> . O'Hern. Iran's Revolutionary Guard: The Threat That Grows While America Sleeps.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Paulo Casaca and Siegfried O. Wolf (Eds.). Terrorism Revisited: Islamism, Political Violence and State-Sponsorship. Cham: Springer. 2017. Pp. 70-71.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Gieling. "Iraq vii. Iran-Iraq War". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/iraq-vii-iran-iraq-war> .

¹⁰⁸⁷ Amir Arjomand. "Constitution of the Islamic Republic".

<http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitution-of-the-islamic-republic#article-tags-overlay> . Iran's 1979 Constitution and its Amendment. <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000.html> .

¹⁰⁸⁸ The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Hossein Ali Montazeri".

<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hossein-Ali-Montazeri> . See also Siavoshi. Montazeri: The Life and Thought of Iran's Revolutionary Ayatollah.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Brumberg. Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran. 146.

number of deputies in the parliament and subsequent constitutional amendments¹⁰⁹⁰ (The role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).

162) The death of Khomeini on 3rd June 1989¹⁰⁹¹ (The role of a mullah in upper-class).

163) On June 4th, 1989, the Assembly of Experts by Rafsanjani's conspiracy appointed Khamenei as a new omnipotent leader of the revolution¹⁰⁹² (The role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).

164) The Council consequently did the final revision to the constitution and submitted on 8th July 1989. It made several changes in Arts 5, 107, 109, 111, eliminating the requirement for the leader to be a Marja'(a source of imitation) and faqih (a high ranked mullah) or to be confirmed by the nation, and dropped the prime ministerial post, thus all its functions transferred to the presidential, new Arts. 60, 69, 87, 125-127¹⁰⁹³ (The role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).

165) On August 6th, 1989, amendments of the constitution as a hybrid of the theocratic essence and democratic facade of the Islamic Republic were approved by obviously the sealed ballot boxes, albeit without any other choices¹⁰⁹⁴ (The role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).

166) The result of the amendment was a limited political pluralism, with violations of civil liberties, unfair elections, controlled media, dependent judiciary, and omnipresent censorship¹⁰⁹⁵ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).

167) The consolidation and realization of an ongoing Islamic Shi'i Revolution (The role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).

¹⁰⁹⁰ Amir Arjomand. "Constitution of the Islamic Republic".

<http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitution-of-the-islamic-republic#article-tags-overlay> .

¹⁰⁹¹ Lea (ed.). A Political Chronology of the Middle East. 59.

¹⁰⁹² Amir Arjomand. "Constitution of the Islamic Republic".

<http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/constitution-of-the-islamic-republic#article-tags-overlay> .


¹⁰⁹³ Ibid. Iran's 1979 Constitution and its Amendment. http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html .

¹⁰⁹⁴ Ibid. Abrahamian. History of Modern Iran. 183.

¹⁰⁹⁵ A report by The Economist Intelligence Unit. "Democracy Index 2017: Free speech under attack". http://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/Democracy_Index_2017 . 9.

10.3. (Model 5.) A Narrative Model for the Green Movement:

A narrative analysis of the circumstances in the Green Social Movement and its societal consequences, "Where is my Vote Movement"



- Causal Linkage
- ✓ The causal mechanism is based on the sequential events, thus the numbers are mainly chronologically regulated.
- ✓ The role and dynamics of different social groups and classes, besides the external-forces in each factor are recognized.

- 1) A Revolution in 1979 (Supported by a coalition among various social groups and classes).
- 2) The phenomenon of Islamic Republic (The role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class and intellectuals).
- 3) The Iran-Iraq war in 1980s¹⁰⁹⁶ (The aggressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class and external-power).
- 4) The bloody repression of the oppositions in 1980s¹⁰⁹⁷ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 5) The crisis of legitimacy, the majority of the Iranians and the growing middle-class did not back the post-revolutionary era anymore and in particular some people boycotted their rubber stamp elections¹⁰⁹⁸ (The role of middle-class).
- 6) The dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the velvet-color revolutions in 1990s (The role of external-factors).
- 7) On August 12th, 1997 the presidency of Khatami launched the reform project with liberal slogans¹⁰⁹⁹ (The role of reformist mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 8) The creation of the requirement and expectation for change and freedom among the large number of the attracted younger generations¹¹⁰⁰ (The role of middle-class).
- 9) The Iranian press and publications believed in the reform discourse and expressed their reformative views¹¹⁰¹ (The role of intellectuals).
- 10) In the late 1998, the disclosure of the pattern of the chain murders and disappearances of the Iranian oppositions and intellectuals (1988-1998) by the Iranian press¹¹⁰² (The role of intellectuals).

¹⁰⁹⁶ Gieling. "Iraq vii. Iran-Iraq War". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/iraq-vii-iran-iraq-war> .

¹⁰⁹⁷ Casaca and Wolf (Eds.). Terrorism Revisited: Islamism, Political Violence and State-Sponsorship. 70-71.

¹⁰⁹⁸ See Abrahamian. The Iranian Mojahedin. Also see Benliot. Iran: Outlaw, Outcast Or Normal Country?. Further in April 1993, Bazargan the head of the revolutionary interim government wrote in Kian, an Iranian monthly magazine, "The result of the mission of the prophet Muhammad after 23 years was the verse -and you see the people entering into the religion of God in multitudes- (surah An-Nasr, Triumph, 2nd verse) but after 15 years of the Islamic Revolution, you see the Iranians exiting out of the religion of God, and unfortunately, the people of Iran Lost their World and the Hereafter ..." Mehdi Bazargan. Kian.

¹⁰⁹⁹ The Editors of Frontline. "BY POPULAR DEMAND: IRANIAN ELECTIONS, 1997-2001". <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/inside/elections.html> .

¹¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹¹⁰¹ Puddington (Ed.). Freedom on the world 2008: The annual survey of political rights and civil liberties. 339. Muir. "Iran closes down newspaper". http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/388635.stm .

¹¹⁰² Ibid. Newton. Famous Assassinations in World History: An Encyclopedia, Vol. 1. 87, 91.

- 11) The ministry of Intelligence's provisions of the new press law or "thought crime law", a plan in particular against the Iranian newspapers¹¹⁰³ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 12) On 7th July 1999, the Salam newspaper (published by the reformist mullahs) was closed due to the publication of the plan¹¹⁰⁴ (The role of reformist mullahs).
- 13) The student protest started on 8th July 1999. Tehran University's campus and dormitories were dreadfully and deadly attacked by both the plain clothes of Ansar-e Hezbollah and the police¹¹⁰⁵ (The role of intellectuals and students).
- 14) The massive countryside protests by the desperate students and people for several days, which heavily and bloodily repressed¹¹⁰⁶ (The role of middle-class, working-class, intellectuals, students and ...).
- 15) A decade of a new form of strangling accompanied with the first presidency of Ahmadinejad, 2005-2009¹¹⁰⁷ (The repressive role of mullahs and ruling-class).
- 16) On 20th May 2009 the Mousavi's electoral campaign organized a symbolic green wave¹¹⁰⁸ (The role of intellectuals).
- 17) The official and unofficial tribunes of the regime warned over a color revolution in Iran¹¹⁰⁹ (The role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 18) Mousavi on 10th June 2009, two days before the 2009 presidential election, in a letter to Khamenei, warned about evidence of the intervention of the IRGC and Basij commanders in the election¹¹¹⁰ (The role of intellectuals).

¹¹⁰³ Wright. The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and Transformation in Iran. 271-272. In the implementation of Art. 123 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, these laws under the Political Crime Act, which was submitted to the Islamic Consultative Assembly as a bill, were officially reapproved by the General Assembly on May 13th, 2016, and also ratified by the Guardian Council, <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000.html> .

¹¹⁰⁴ Muir. "Iran closes down newspaper". http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/388635.stm .

¹¹⁰⁵ The Editors of The New York Times from Reuters. "Student Protests Shake Iran's Government". <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/11/world/student-protests-shake-iran-s-government.html> . Sciolino. "Iran Students Halt Protests But Still Press For Changes".

<https://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/18/world/iran-students-halt-protests-but-still-press-for-changes.html> .

¹¹⁰⁶ Robbins. "Six days that shook Iran". http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/828696.stm .

¹¹⁰⁷ The Editors of BBC News. "The Views of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad". http://www.bbc.com/persian/business/story/2005/06/050626_ra-ahmadi-views.shtml . See also Naji.

Ahmadinejad: The Secret History of Iran's Radical Leader.

¹¹⁰⁸ Arbatli and Rosenberg (Eds.). Non-Western Social Movements and Participatory Democracy: Protest in the Age of Transnationalism. 146.

¹¹⁰⁹ e.g., Sobh-e Sadegh weekly the IRGC's official organ and Kayhan newspaper since .05.2009.

¹¹¹⁰ Mousavi. "Full text of Mir Hossein Mousavi's letter to Khamenei".

http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/06/090611_op_ir88_mousavi_khamenei_letter_text.shtml .

- 19) Since 11th June, one day before the election, telecommunication, in particular the SMS systems of mobile phone operators and the Net were interrupted or cut off¹¹¹¹ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 20) On 12th June 2009, the presidential election was held. The preliminary result was announced only after a couple of hours, Ahmadinejad was reappointed¹¹¹² (The role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 21) After election, Mousavi and other candidates, based on the evidence from the Committee for the Safeguarding of Votes, expressed their objection to the election fraud¹¹¹³ (The role of reformist mullahs, upper-class and intellectual).
- 22) The Association of Combatant Mullahs, after the announcement of the result, called it as an electoral engineering and requested for its nullification¹¹¹⁴ (The role of reformist mullahs).
- 23) On 13th June, the people, who believed this official electoral result to be fraudulent, held the first demonstrations in Tehran and other cities¹¹¹⁵ (The role of middle-class, working-class, intellectuals, students and ...).
- 24) Ahmadinejad in response called for demonstrations to celebrate the victory, named the opponents as “dirt and dust”, then by claiming the sacreds were insulted, heightened the repression of the protesters¹¹¹⁶ (The repressive role of ruling-class).
- 25) The shocking footages of the violent crackdown and beating protesters by the military and paramilitary forces were released and promptly redistributed by people and the world’s leading media, and triggered the intense popular sentiments¹¹¹⁷ (The role of middle-class, working-class, intellectuals, students, women and ...).

¹¹¹¹ Worth and Nazila Fathi. “Protests Flare in Tehran as Opposition Disputes Vote”.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/world/middleeast/14iran.html> .

¹¹¹² Ansari (ed.). “Preliminary Analysis of the Voting Figures in Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election”.

<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Middle%20East/iranelection0609.pdf> . Kamalipour. Media, Power, and Politics in the Digital Age: The 2009 Presidential Election Uprising in Iran. xvii.

¹¹¹³ Mousavi. “Mir Hossein Mousavi’s statement # 1 after announcement of the election results”.

<http://www.kaleme.com/1388/03/23/klm-98074/> .

¹¹¹⁴ The Editors of BBC News. “Request of the Association of Combatant Mullahs: Nullification of the Election or Formation of the Truth Finder Committee”.

http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/06/090613_op_ir88_majma_rowhanioon.shtml .

¹¹¹⁵ The Editors of BBC News. “Unrest following the election results’ announcement”.

http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/06/090613_ba-ir88-iran-clashes.shtml .

¹¹¹⁶ Tait. “The dust revolution- how Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s jibe backfired”.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/18/iran-election-protests-mahmoud-ahmadinejad> .

¹¹¹⁷ Kearney. “Film shows life and bloody death of Iran protester”. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-film-iran-idUSTRE65L67X20100622> . Kamalipour. Media, Power, and Politics in the Digital Age: The 2009 Presidential Election Uprising in Iran. 30.

- 26) The people crossed the mullahs' sovereignty and rule. On 15th June some millions held some massive rallies in Tehran and other cities. During the crackdown several people were killed and wounded¹¹¹⁸ (The role of middle-class, working-class, intellectuals, students, women and ...).
- 27) In the next morning, the regime forces attacked to the dormitories of Tehran University, Isfahan University of Technology, Shiraz University, among others. Some students were beaten, some killed and some arrested, dormitories were seriously damaged¹¹¹⁹ (The repressive role of ruling-class).
- 28) Then on 16th, 17th and 18th June, the pacific marches of silence were held with hundreds of thousands of protesters in Tehran which ended in unprecedented sharp repression of the police, Basij and IRGC forces¹¹²⁰ (The role of middle-class, working-class, intellectuals, students, women and ...).
- 29) The night protests on the roofs by chanting slogans¹¹²¹ (The role of middle-class, working-class, students, women and ...).
- 30) Two high ranked mullahs condemned the violence against the protesters¹¹²² (The role of reformist mullahs).
- 31) On 19th June, Khamenei gave a Green Light to the ideological forces for bloody crackdown on the first Friday prayers after the disputed election¹¹²³ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 32) The Interior ministry rejected the application of Association of Combatant Mullahs for a rally permit on 20th June¹¹²⁴ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).

¹¹¹⁸ Hafezi. "Iran's Mousavi insists on presidential vote annulment". <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-election-mousavi-sb/irans-mousavi-insists-on-presidential-vote-annulment-idUSTRE55J1D620090620> .

¹¹¹⁹ Dubowitz. "Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: Guardians of the Revolution and Violators of Human Rights". <http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/irans-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-guardians-of-the-revolution-and-vio/> .

¹¹²⁰ Addis. Iran's 2009 Presidential Elections. Congressional research service. 8.

¹¹²¹ The Editors of BBC News. "The night protest against the outcome of the Iranian election continued on the roofs". http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/06/090619_op_ir88_nightly_protest.shtml .

¹¹²² The Editors of Radio Zamaaneh. "Condemnation of violence against people by two grand mullahs". http://zamaaneh.com/news/2009/06/post_9404.html . The Editors of BBC News. "Two grand mullahs are sympathized with the victims of the unrest in Iran". http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/06/090618_he_ir88_sanei_protests.shtml .

¹¹²³ The Editors of BBC News. "Amnesty International: Iran's Supreme Leader's remarks, green light for repression". http://www.bbc.com/persian/lg/iran/2009/06/090619_ba-ir88-amnesty-khamenei.shtml .

¹¹²⁴ The Editors of BBC News. "Ministry of Interior and Police Warn to the Protesters". http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/06/090620_ka_ir88_ahmadimoghadam.shtml .

- 33) Mousavi in a statement referred to the Art. 27 of the Islamic Republic constitution, freedom to form gatherings and marches, and invited the regime and the armed forces not to prevent the people to participate¹¹²⁵ (The role of intellectual).
- 34) The Black Saturday, 20th June, a day after the Khamenei's speech, his devotees violently cracked down the demonstrations. They used clubs, tear gas, direct shooting to force thousands of demonstrators back. They applied the roof of the mosques and Basij bases to shoot people. The number of victims was much higher than what was reported by the human rights groups at least 150 cases. Footage of a young woman, dying after being shot by the Basij, was broadcasted around the Globe¹¹²⁶ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 35) The protesters tried to change their strategy by forming smaller and more dispersed demonstrations as the clashes were getting bloodier every day and the number of killed people reached nearly 250 within merely 10 days¹¹²⁷ (The role of middle-class, students and ...).
- 36) The houses of those who chanted slogans or sheltered and helped the protesters were attacked. The regime's forces furthermore damaged the parked cars in the streets and accused the protesters to destruct the public and people's properties, injuring and killing the Basij members¹¹²⁸ (The role of middle-class, students, women and ...).
- 37) On 23rd June, the Guardian Council, unlike to its usual procedure, quickly confirmed the validity of the election¹¹²⁹ (The role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 38) The EU embassies in Tehran hosted the Iranian wounded protesters. There was also the continuation of global response and summoning the Iranian ambassadors by the EU member states¹¹³⁰ (The interest and influence of external-power).

¹¹²⁵ Mousavi. "Mir Hossein Mousavi's statement # 5". <http://www.kaleme.com/1388/03/30/klm-8801/> .

¹¹²⁶ The Editors of BBC News. "Ten killed and one hundred wounded in yesterday's clashes in Tehran".

http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/06/090621_ka_ir88_tehran_clashes.shtml .

The Editors of CNN. "Chaos prevails as protesters, police clash in Iranian capital".

<http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/20/iran.election/index.html> .

Hosseinian and Dahl. "Iran TV says 10 killed in Saturday clashes in Tehran".

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-election-killed-tv/iran-tv-says-10-killed-in-saturday-clashes-in-tehran-idUSTRE55K0KL20090621> .

¹¹²⁷ Lake. "Iran protesters alter tactics to avoid death".

<https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/25/opposition-alters-tactics-to-avoid-protest-deaths/> .

¹¹²⁸ The Editors of Radio Zamaaneh. "Creating insecurity for residential buildings in Iran".

http://zamaaneh.com/news/2009/06/post_9481.html .

¹¹²⁹ The Editors of CNN. "Iran media: Council rejects claims of voting irregularities".

<http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/21/iran.election/index.html> .

¹¹³⁰ Farrar-Wellman. "European Union-Iran Relations".

<https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/european-union-iran-relations> .

- 39) The charge of communication of the protesters with the Western organizations caused the arrest of the British Embassy staff in Tehran on 28th June¹¹³¹ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class, besides the interest and influence of external-power).
- 40) The EU warned the Islamic Republic to avoid the intimidation of the diplomats¹¹³² (The interest and influence of external-power).
- 41) In the third week after the disputed election, the regime to terrorize the protesters executed 20 people in various prisons. Afterwards, in late June and July, we witnessed the continuation of repression and arrest of the protesters, journalists, university professors and students in different parts of country, in particular in Tehran¹¹³³ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 42) On 9th July, a rally in the tenth anniversary of the attacks on the dormitories of Tehran University and the student protest of 1999 was brutally dispersed¹¹³⁴ (The role of intellectuals, students and ...).
- 43) On 14th July, again via the execution of 13 other people, convicted as terrorists, the regime sent a stark message to the opponents about its readiness to react ruthlessly in order to defend its core interests and reassert its crumbling legitimacy. They conducted unfair trials and profited the Shari'a-based legal tool of death penalty as a political remedy¹¹³⁵ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 44) On 25th July the protests at the human rights violations in Iran were held in over 100 cities around the world¹¹³⁶ (The role of external-factors).
- 45) In late July Karroubi wrote to Rafsanjani that the detainees had been subjected to torture, including rape, and otherwise were ill-treated, and demanded an investigation. Also, more

¹¹³¹ Black. "Iran arrests UK embassy staff". <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/28/uk-embassy-tehran-arrests> .

¹¹³² Black. "Iran warned by EU after British embassy workers arrested". <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/28/iran-british-embassy-workers-arrested> .

¹¹³³ The Editors of Amnesty International. "Iran: Fear for safety/torture and ill treatment/possible prisoner of conscience/medical concern, Nasser Kheyrollahi (m)".

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE13/033/2007/en/> . The Editors of National Council of Resistance of Iran. "Political prisoner executed under pretext of ordinary criminal". <https://ncr-iran.org/en/iran-protests/political-prisoner-executed-under-pretext-of-ordinary-criminal> .

¹¹³⁴ Yasaman Baji. "IRAN: Protests Erupt on Student Massacre Anniversary". <http://www.ipsnews.net/2009/07/iran-protests-erupt-on-student-massacre-anniversary/> .

¹¹³⁵ Black. "Execution of 13 for terror attacks reveals Iran's next move: intimidation". <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/16/iran-terrorism-executions-analysis> .

¹¹³⁶ The Editors of CNN. "Global protests over post-election crackdown in Iran". CNN. Online edition. July 26, 2009. <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/07/25/iran.world.protests/index.html#cnnSTCText> .

than hundred complaints about rape in Kahrizak were submitted to the judiciary¹¹³⁷ (The role of reformist mullahs).

- 46) On 27th July, Khamenei pretending to be unaware of the issue ordered the closure of Kahrizak, however, this detention center facility reopened after a short time under another name, Soroush 111¹¹³⁸ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 47) On 30th July, hundreds of thousands of people hold peaceful demonstrations across Iran. Clashes erupted after hundreds of people gathered at the cemetery of Tehran to mark the 40th day of mourning for Neda, the young innocent murdered woman. Many were beaten up and arrested¹¹³⁹ (The role of middle-class, students, women and ...).
- 48) On 1st August, began a series of collective show trials with around 100 detainees who were forced to confess to a foreign-backed attempt for a velvet revolution or coup to overthrow the Islamic regime, thus were sentenced to long prison terms and death¹¹⁴⁰ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 49) On 10th November, one of two doctors connected with the Kahrizak detention center, who examined the rape victims and were pressurized to declare meningitis as the cause of their death, was murdered. The second one was murdered a short after¹¹⁴¹ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 50) On November 20th, 2009, Human Rights Committee of the UN General Assembly in a resolution condemned the violent repression of the demonstrations by the Islamic regime¹¹⁴² (The role of external-powers).

¹¹³⁷ Derakhshi, Dahl and Balmforth. "Iran reformer says he wants to present rape evidence". <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-karoubi-rape/iran-reformer-says-he-wants-to-present-rape-evidence-idUSDAH93169320090819> . The Editors of Amnesty International. "Iranian rape and torture victims at renewed risk". <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2009/09/victimas-violacion-torturas-continuan-situacion-riesgo-iran-20090910/> .

¹¹³⁸ Hafezi and Hosseinian. "Iran's Khamenei orders closure of detention center". <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-khamenei-order/irans-khamenei-orders-closure-of-detention-center-idUSTRE56R1J620090728?sp=true> . The Editors of Amnesty International. "Iranian man facing imminent execution for possession of crystal meth". <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/iranian-man-facing-imminent-execution-possession-crystal-meth> .

¹¹³⁹ Ulrike Putz. "Mourning Neda: Iranian Martyr's Mother Wants Justice". Spiegel. Online edition. 30 July 2009. <https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/mourning-neda-iranian-martyr-s-mother-wants-justice-a-639338.html> .

¹¹⁴⁰ Parisa Hafezi. "Khatami condemns Iran's show trial of reformists". <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-idUSL246200320090802> .

¹¹⁴¹ Tait. "Death of doctor to Iranian prison arouses suspicion". <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/16/iran-protest-doctor-pourandarjani-death> . Kamali. "Iranian doctor murdered after examining rape victims, says his son". <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/25/iran-doctor-murder-kahrizak-rapes> . Peterson. Let the Swords Encircle Me: Iran--A Journey Behind the Headlines. 560.

¹¹⁴² Charbonneau. "UN panel condemns Iran for post-election crackdown". <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN20238181> .

- 51) The clashes continued despite the crackdowns (The role of middle-class, students and ...).
- 52) As the ritualistic month, Muharram approached, many protesters at the social networks called on demonstrations. Millions of protesters on the sacred days of Tasu'a and Ashura, (when violence is banned) 26th and 27th December 2009 rallied in Tehran and other cities. The repression and killings of the protesters intensified the anti-government sentiments, the protest police vehicles hit and run over the demonstrators. The clashes on Ashura Day were the bloodiest encounter. The international journalists were prevented from covering the clashes¹¹⁴³ (The role of middle-class, working-class, intellectuals, students, women and ...).
- 53) On December 30th, 2009, pro-regime rally in response to the events was held under a high security¹¹⁴⁴ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 54) The demonstrations lasted poorly (The role of middle-class, students and ...).
- 55) The Arab spring domino, including the revolutionary movements of Tunis (December 2010-January 2011) and Egypt (January and February 2011)¹¹⁴⁵ (The role of external-factors).
- 56) The Green opposition called a rally for 14th February 2011 so as to announce solidarity with the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutionary movements despite of the regime's ban. In Tehran, the early hours of the demonstration were held calmly and sporadically. The protests then came to violence as a result of the riot police, plainclothes and special guard attack to the demonstrators¹¹⁴⁶ (The role of middle-class, intellectuals, students, women and ...).
- 57) The Iranian representatives in parliament chanted slogans "Death to Mousavi and Karroubi", the protest candidates or central symbolic figures of the movement and called for their execution, as the organizers and leaders of the protests, and clicked the already planned house arrest of them and their spouses, February 2011-present¹¹⁴⁷ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).

¹¹⁴³ Putz. "Iranian Demonstrators Put the Regime on the Defensive". <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/violence-in-tehran-iranian-demonstrators-put-the-regime-on-the-defensive-a-669317.html> . The Editors of CNN. "Several killed, 300 arrested in Tehran protests". <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/12/27/iran.protests/index.html> .

¹¹⁴⁴ Fathi. "In Tehran, Thousands Rally to Back Government". https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/31/world/middleeast/31iran.html?_r=2&ref=world&.

¹¹⁴⁵ Gana (ed.). The Making of the Tunisian Revolution: Contexts, Architects, Prospects. 2. Viljoen (ed.). Beyond the Law: Multi-disciplinary Perspectives on Human Rights. 195.

¹¹⁴⁶ Kamali Dehghan. "Iran's opposition green movement calls for renewed street protests". <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/08/iran-opposition-green-movement-tehran-protest> . Erdbrink. "Anti-government protests spread to Iran". <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/14/AR2011021400848.html> .

¹¹⁴⁷ The Editors of BBC News. "Iran unrest: MPs call for death of Mousavi and Karroubi". <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12462491> . The Editors of BBC News. "Iran: Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi arrested". <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12599837> .

- 58) The Islamic regime, was totally frightened, thus increased the cost of demonstration of the movement, e.g., false charges for the demonstrators¹¹⁴⁸ (The repressive role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 59) The last rally was held in silence on 12th June 2011 the second anniversary of the disputed election, which was heavily dispersed¹¹⁴⁹ (The role of middle-class, intellectuals, students, women and ...).
- 60) In August 2013, presidential election of Rouhani¹¹⁵⁰ (The role of mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class).
- 61) The revival of the feminist movement, since 27th December 2017 started new protests of this movement as the Girls of Revolution Street, with the goal of abolition of compulsory veil and hijab related laws¹¹⁵¹ (The role of women).
- 62) On 28th December 2017 a series of anti-regime protests started throughout Iran¹¹⁵² (The role of middle-class, working-class, students, women and ...).

¹¹⁴⁸ The Editors of BBC News. "The arrest of a number of opposition protesters in Tehran". http://www.bbc.com/persian/rolling_news/2011/06/110605_l30_iatran_tehran_arrest.shtml .

¹¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁵⁰ Saeed Kamali Dehghan. "Hassan Rouhani sworn in as president of Iran, urging moderation and respect". The Guardian. Online edition. 4 August 2013.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/04/hassan-rouhani-sworn-in-president-iran> .

¹¹⁵¹ Gerretsen. "Iran: 29 women arrested over anti-hijab protests inspired by girl of Enghelab Street". <https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/iran-29-women-arrested-over-anti-hijab-protests-inspired-by-girl-enghelab-street-1658143> . Norman. "Iranian woman in iconic video feared to have been arrested after waving hijab on a stick". <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2018/01/23/iranian-woman-in-iconic-video-feared-to-have-been-arrested-after-waving-hijab-on-stick.html> .

¹¹⁵² The Editors of The Guardian from Reuters. "Protests over alleged corruption and rising prices spread to Tehran". <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/29/iranian-police-disperse-anti-government-protests> . The Editors of BBC News. "Iranian cities hit by anti-government protests". <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42512946> .

11. Nominal Comparison

The Nominal Comparative evaluation has potential to eliminatively solve the problem of large numbers of explanatory variables and small-n design in the narrative appraisals, thus its causal factors and relations have more testability.

In this study, the comparative table is able to depict the causal factors in more or less similar process for three Iranian people's movements, ended in different results of historical success and failure.

Logically, the values in this technique and type of comparison are set based on the mathematical non-statistical Boolean Algebra, a special algebraic structure that denotes to variables in conjunction, Yes (True or 1) and in disjunction, No (False or 0), contrary to the conventional Algebra that converts the values into the operations-based numbers.¹¹⁵³

In this causal comparative table, merely the part of the essential social forces for the social movements are known as the selected necessary facts versus other historical causal details and non-causal variables. After that, the presence of the factors of "Interest & influence of external-power", "To form a coalition" and "Passivity of coercive power" are presented as adequate circumstances for the accomplishment of the social movements.

As it is investigated, the outcomes of these social movements similar to any other complicated social phenomena are dependent on the implicational relationships between their causal factors. In this mechanism, the historical causal factors are beforehand distinguished from non-causal features, then they are divided into two types of necessary and sufficient conditions. According to this division, the assertion of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a single phenomenon means that a former condition is true only if a latter is true, and the presence or the absence of a phenomenon is directly dependent on the either simultaneous presence or simultaneous absence of the necessary and sufficient conditions. At the time that a participant necessary factor is preset, it points and contributes towards an outcome, but it would not be calculated as an adequate situation, thus the presence of an outcome is not fully dependent on a necessary factor. On the other side, if a sufficient factor is present, it accompanied with a necessary cause unavoidably hints at a subsequent occurrence.¹¹⁵⁴

¹¹⁵³ Monk. "The Mathematics of Boolean Algebra". <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/boolalg-math/>. The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Boolean algebra". <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Boolean-algebra>. The Editors of Encyclopedia of Mathematics. "Boolean algebra". https://www.encyclopediaofmath.org/index.php/Boolean_algebra.

¹¹⁵⁴ Frederick Betz. *Managing Science: Methodology and Organization of Research*. New York: Springer. 2011. p. 247.

Table 5. Nominal Comparison: the methods of agreement and difference

Cases		Social Movements in Contemporary Iran	Constitutional 1905-1911	Revolutionary 1977-present	Reformative 2009-2011
Causal Factors	Necessary Conditions	Role of working-class	yes	yes	yes
		Role of middle-class	yes	yes	yes
		Involvement of women	yes	yes	yes
		Sharing of merchants (bazaar-men)	yes	yes	no
		Participation of intellectuals & students	yes	yes	yes
		Contribution of mullahs	yes	yes	yes
		Part of ruling & upper-class	yes	yes	yes
		Role of peasants	yes	no	no
	Role of nomads & tribes	yes	no	no	
	Sufficient Conditions	Interest & influence of external-powers	yes	yes	yes
		To form a coalition	yes	yes	no
Passivity of coercive power		yes	yes	no	
Outcomes	Religious changes	yes	yes	yes	
	Legal changes	yes	yes	no	
	Political changes	yes	yes	no	
	Different Types of Revolutions	A Constitutional Revolution	An Islamic Revolution	No Change	

As a matter of fact, in the Iranian contemporary society, these collective actions have special socio-historical significances. Whether they essentially purposed of “revolutions (as the locomotives of history)”¹¹⁵⁵ or not, in their processes, the social forces reached to a critical point in their internal and external relations. Therefore, these regionally momentous movements attempted to create some historical turning points for the already deprived social groups and classes of the society against the ruling and upper-classes. According to such a point of view and analysis, these social movements have historical intelligence with class content, which only in the light of class analysis might be deemed, perceived and understood.

11.1. Class-based causal factors of the Persian constitutional movement

In essence, these contemporary Iranian social movements and revolutions, to fulfill the demands for reforms and changes in the social structures and subsystems, were supported by social activists and forces from extremely heterogeneous social groups and classes.

¹¹⁵⁵ To the Marx’s characterization of revolution, in his set of socio-historical written account, *The Class Struggles in France 1848-1850*.

In the case of the constitutional movement, the primary aim of justice and restriction of the Shah's unrestricted power as the symbol of the ruling-class (the external layer of the upper-class, equipped by both the most affluence and influence over all social groups and classes) resulted in the birth of some essential legal political institutions, House of Justice, Parliament (drawn from all groups to legislate), besides the rule of law and Constitution.

This movement was initially launched by the dissatisfaction with the economic stagnancy, flamed by the unfair punishment of the merchants, and supported wholeheartedly by the mullahs (as they were traditionally financed by the merchants). After that, the joint effort was maturely traced by the graduates returned from abroad as the messengers of the Western constitutionalism, inevitably and occasionally escorted by the nobles and landlords, fueled by the middle-class and relatively frequent participation of the working-class, as well as the assistance of the fearless women, and consequently the last kick of some traditionally strong nomadic forces.

As a result of the coalition and class diversity, the composition of the first Persian legislatures well reflected the connection between the recently recognized power and class relations, thus the parliamentary seats went to the individuals with absolutely diverse social backgrounds.

1) The role of the working-class

According to the census data of 1928, unevenly 58 percent of the composition of the people at work in the bazaar of Tehran were from working-class.¹¹⁵⁶ The role of the completely miscellaneous groups of the working-class not only was predominately in companionship with the bazaar's strikes and rallies, but in addition in the mullahs-led get-togethers and sit-ins of the religious sites and legations. Furthermore, in parliamentary struggles over the degree of the reforms and the legislative authority, people from lower and working-class were weaponized and organized outside the Majles, by merchants.

As Tehran was controlled by the anti-constitutional Shah, the center of opposition shifted to Tabriz. The workers of Tabriz along with other groups were actively mobilized for this stage of the constitutional struggle.

2) The role of the middle-class

In terms of the role of middle-class, it should be mentioned that the Persian constitutional movement was mostly a movement by the emerging urban middle-class, as the political

¹¹⁵⁶ Ashraf. "BAZAR iii. Socioeconomic and Political Role". <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/bazar-iii> .

participation was blocked by the super-class.

In the process of the important events, this middle-class had more active involvement and was louder than the working-class in the directed and funded strikes of bazaars, rallies, gatherings and stay-ins the shrines and embassies, since basically was the origin of most groups unsatisfied with the royal policies and mainstream political platform. They accompanied other remained Basti-people, up until the realization of the fundamental reforms, e.g., the prime minister's resignation, establishment of a Justice House, a parliament and a constitution.

3) The involvement of the women

By and large, the constitutional period was a modern ground for the social involvement of the Persian women, in particular those intellectual ones who grew brave to fight the tyranny in the society. This played part, though small, was truly worth noting.

In the early stages of the movement, they were mostly influenced by the mullahs and were convinced to participate in demonstrations and other collective behaviors that were considered traditionally non-conventional for the women. Then in the course of the elaborated movement, they participated in Tehran and other cities in taking sanctuaries and struggles. For instance, in Tabriz, in a battle between the constitutionalists and the monarchists, the bodies of twenty women who went to the battlefield with men's clothes were found.

The assertion of the constitution and even depriving them of the right to vote did not reduce their passion for political participations. As Morgan Shuster clearly pictured, they "did much to keep the spirit of liberty alive", established several secret underground associations to plan out violent and non-violent activities and procedures, to express their support for the constitutionalism and their objection to the Anglo-Russian policies. In another example, for the purpose of economic independence and establishing the Persian National Bank, women sold their jewelry to secure the bank's first capital.

4) The sharing of the merchants (bazaar-men)

In the significance of the merchants and guilds group, if we geographically pay enough attention to the locations of this movement, the main cores were the main northern, northwestern and central cities (e.g., Rasht, Tabriz, Tehran ...) of Persia, which were directly in economic and commercial ties with the outside world, especially Europe. In these cities, similar to all of the contemporary Iranian cities, the bazaars or traditional markets were morphologically located in the old central quarters, in company of mosques. In this synergy, bazaar as the financial base

for the Shi'i institutions had economic, religious and even political functions.¹¹⁵⁷ The merchants of bazaar already practiced their potentials in Tobacco Movement against a tobacco concession granted by the Shah to the Great Britain.

Although the 1905 protests already occurred against the cruel monarchy, the constitutional controversy was triggered by the merchants and the increasing price of sugar in Tehran, some merchants were punished, and this provided the opposition with a basis for open struggle. This time the merchants sought more control over their economic and political purposes. They closed the bazaars in different cities, funded and participated the sanctuaries, were active and present in parliament, besides in parliamentary struggles by weaponizing the supporters outside the Majles. As a result of the major role played by the merchants in these socio-political events, it may be possible to address this movement as a kind of bourgeoisie.

5) The participation of the intellectuals and students

The intellectuals of the constitutional movement's era were as a consequence of the growing middle-class, who had gained a preconceived notion of the interests of their class, and had played an effective role in spreading the thought of constitutionalism.

The souvenir of sending students to the European countries in order to realize ways to rescue the country via economic, political, cultural, military and technological progress, was a kind of intellectual culture in Persia. Therefore, when these illuminati returned home, as the first intellectual group of the Persia, started criticizing the religious traditional privileged thinking group, the unqualified absolute monarch and the judiciary system, thus, conceived the constitutional movement as a new solution. Their writings and speeches introduced the ideals of liberty and justice and enlightened different groups and classes, including the masses of ordinary people, hence prepared the constitutional context, in particular for a conclusive triangular alliance (merchants, mullahs and intellectuals) for a protest movement. They actively prepared and participated the sanctuaries, struggles and parliament, besides drafting the constitution.

6) The contribution of the mullahs

In relation to the part of mullahs in this historical movement, they were simply the chief spokesmen of the merchant-funded and organized opposition demonstrations and sanctuaries. At the time when the bazaars were on strike, the crowds of people from different groups and

¹¹⁵⁷ Ibid., <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/bazar-iii> .

classes were led and gathered (in mosques) by the mullahs. Moreover, most of the sanctuaries occurred in the Shi'i shrines, which basically were the mullahs-organized institutions. At the beginning of the constitutional campaign, most of the mullahs were in favor of change, pushed for a strong support and announced their solidarity with the pro-constitutionalists, in particular the bazaar-men. They insisted on the constitutionalism, as they did not know the true meaning of the constitutional parliamentary and its consequences. By the clarification of the hidden messages of this process, gradually more grand mullahs were willing to recommend the political reforms and struggles, only if they gave them more influence over the society. Later, even some of them considered the constitution equal to blasphemy and joined the pro-monarchy front. With the insistence of these pro-monarchical mullahs, the constitution that emphasized on a strict separation of powers into legislative, judicial and executive functions, finally was affected by the Islamic Shari'a laws. Accordingly, the supplemented Art. 2 determined a committee of mullahs as experts in Islamic jurisprudence to evaluate and reject legislation at variance with the Islamic database. Consequently, in the last constitutional stages only the reformist mullahs remained loyal to the constitution with this religion-based supplement.

7) The part of the ruling and upper-class

In this period, the ruling-class as the external layer of the upper-class was equipped by both the most affluence and influence over all social groups and classes. Accordingly, the ruling and upper-class had simultaneously a repressive as well as facilitative part for the constitutional movement.

The cruel monarchy with its generally and financially weak government stimulated the different social groups and classes, before the occurrence of the constitutional protests. They gave different commercial concessions to the external-powers and borrowed from abroad to spend for the Qajar court.

Their compensatory reformative measures in financial, social and cultural domains (e.g., establishment of the modern schools, sending students to the EU, reorganizing the Customs and Treasury ...) simply strengthened the middle-class, promoted the new group of intellectuals and provoked the idea of change in the society.

In such context, the Tehran's governor triggered the protests in December 1905, by publicly punishing some merchants. Resulting from the perseverance, endurance and stubbornness of the pro-constitutional forces, the monarch Mozaffar ad-Din Shah finally signed the constitution in 1906 and facilitated the constitutionalism in Persia. Nonetheless, shortly after, he died and his act of giving public approval and endorsement to a constitution for Persia was challenged by his

anti-constitutional successor, Mohammad Ali Shah, who in 1907 dissolved the parliament and declared the abolishment of the constitution. Later, astonishingly, but not unexpectedly, he bombarded the parliament with the military and political support of the pro-monarchical upper-class and external-powers. This constitutional crisis led to another pro-constitutional wave. In July 1909, pro-constitution forces marched from Persia's provinces to Tehran, deposed the Shah as the symbol of the ruling-class, and reestablished the constitution.

8) The role of the peasants

The constitutional peasantry participation was merely limited in a number of stay-ins and strikes to support the unions of craftsmen and workers in the north of Iran, albeit under the penetration of the Russian radicals at the early period of the movement. The reasons were that the Persian peasantry forces were to a great extent under the influence of the landlords, and the landlords as the members of the ruling-class were mainly against a revolution. Also, as predominately this movement was an urban one, with its deliberations and considerations, did not have adequate communication and attraction for the peasants.

9) The role of the nomads and tribes

During the constitutional period, about one quarter of the Iran's population was nomadic, thus their influence on this movement was inevitable. The Bakhtiaris as a nomadic group played an essential role in constitutional crisis. They revived the constitutional movement by fighting against the anti-constitutional monarch and forces. They accompanied with other pro-constitutionalists entered Tehran, deposed the Shah and reestablished the constitution.

10) The interest and influence of the external-powers

In this analysis, the role of the external-factor is deemed among the sufficient factors for the accomplishment of the constitutional endeavors in Persia. The serious international relation and engagement of Persia with the modern Western powers triggered the era of failure and imposed shattering treaties for this country. The financial difficulties, general inaccessibility and Stagflation in the Persian markets forced the government to give different commercial concessions and borrow from abroad.

As a result, one of the main goals of the constitutional movement was to terminate the domination of foreign powers, especially the colonial privileges of the two imperialistic dominions of the time, Tsarist Russia and Great Britain, which besieged northern and southern Persia. To Britain it was inevitable to bilaterally play in the constitutional revolutionary

movement. In the first stages, the British embassy in Tehran (that was exempt from invasion of the pro-monarchists and counterrevolutionaries) hosted people from different groups and classes, contributed a great sanctuary and called for the constitutionalism, to prove the goodwill. Nonetheless, in 1908, by discovering the first Persian oil field (by a British man), the Great Britain implicitly provoked the monarch's coup d'etat and the revival of despotism, albeit with the direct support of the Russians.

Once more, in restoration of the parliament and constitution, the British and Russian influence made the monarch to bring order and accountability to the system. Nevertheless, by the second arranged parliament and the empty treasury, the invitation of the American financial advisers to reform the taxation system reactivated the conflict with the old Qajar bureaucracy and the Russians. Russia occupied Anzali and Rasht and on 29th November issued a three-part ultimatum, requiring dismissal of the American senior financial advisor, a promise that no more foreign advisers would be invited without the British and Russian consent, and payment of an indemnity for the Russian forces. Finally, as the Persian government met these demands partially and lately, the British and the Russian forces occupied much of the country, that brought an end to the period of the Constitutional Revolution.

11) To form a coalition

In this movement, the coalition of the opposition groups began with the companionship of the mullahs with the merchants in the organized anti-monarchical demonstrations. The mullahs supported the merchant's uprising, not only due to their already formed alliance over Tobacco Movement, but in addition, due to the fact that the merchants were their chief traditional sponsors.

This alliance for the protest movement reached to a three-cornered combined action by the association of a small fraction of radical intellectuals. They together innovatively sought some sanctuaries in the religious sites and legations, and consequently confined the old regime to the constitutionalism. As the reigning-class did not keep its promises, an even larger coalition from different groups and classes was created, deposed the Shah and reestablished the constitution.

12) The passivity of the coercive power

The amount of violent repression and the passive display of pressing and coercive power in climax phase of revolutionary movement could be considered as the final crucial sufficient factor.

The companionship of the conclusive triangular alliance of merchants, mullahs and intellectuals with other social groups and classes made the Shah to passively dismiss his controversial prime minister and finally grant the right to establish a National Consultative Assembly and a constitution.

Once again, in later stages of the constitutional efforts, the monarchy did not use all his power to suppress the constitutional movement and submissively declared the restoration of the principles of the constitution and set the general election.

13) The outcomes

As regards the explored factors, in the constitutional movement, the fully presence of the both necessary and sufficient conditions confirms the harvest of the first Persian constitution. This contemporary social movement took place at the end of a century and a half of the authoritarian rule of Qajar and turned the process of governing into a political legal one in Persia. This in fact, reduced the Shah's absolute power and curved it in a constitutionalized monarchy. The rule of law limited by a newly born constitution, protected the fundamental rights of individuals and groups in the society. This constitution separated the powers (at least in appearance) and made the Shah, royal court, ministers and officials accountable before the Majlis and the Justice House. This legal exertion, entitled the official supervision of the Shari'a over the Persian politics and legislation, thus promoted the Shi'ite from a socio-religious and potentially political phenomenon to a lawful legitimizer.

11.2. Class-based causal factors of the Anti-Shah Movement

The movement resulted in unfinished revolution of 1979 basically was supported by the various social groups and classes, then fundamentally overthrew the religious, constitutional and political circumstances as was preempted by the deep-seated fundamental mullahs. This common endeavor with its upward trend began with the leftist intellectuals and students, then followed by the nationalist intellectuals, and reached to a steep growth by the eclectic religious leftist intellectuals and mullahs' re-interpretation of the Shi'a history and values, which attracted the participation of the middle and working-classes, besides urban women.

In point of fact, in 1970s, with the Shah regime's provocative policies, the revolutionary aerosphere reached to a climax. In such context the majority of mullahs who were already financed by their traditional backers, merchants, reorganized the wave of the anti-Shah

movement, based on different social groups and classes. They accompanied with the nationalist and eclectic intellectuals initiated the Islamic revolution and fostered it up until today.

1) The role of the working-class

One of the consequences of the Shah's semi-modernizational measures, was the expansion of the urban and industrial working-class, deprived of free political institutions such as unobstructed labor unions, which provided upright raw materials for political mobilizations in this social movement.

With the sharp rise and climax of the revolutionary passion, the radicalization of the radical mullahs' speeches, the idea of incompatibility with the regime and the necessity of the implementation of Islamic rule was welcomed by many lower and working-class and the inhabitants of the poor neighborhoods and slums.

They nationwide rallied along with other social groups and classes, participated in the intense bloody clashes, in particular in southern Tehran, the black Friday, which created a profound impact on the relation between the Shah and people, and finally triggered the widespread wave of labor strikes and the association of the strikers to the demonstrations. These daily struggles, demonstrations and extensive strikes caused a suspension on the oil-exporting, thus paralyzed the country's economy, and made the regime downfall unescapable.

2) The role of the middle-class

The growth of the middle-class, disadvantaged of having the independent establishments such as free associations, publications and political parties, was the other consequence of the Shah's semi-modernizational dealings. In the matter of the role of this class in this social movement, it could be basically understood that this class was the origin of most groups unsatisfied and encountered the Pahlavi's policies and its socio-political stands.

In late 1960s, the prominent thinker of the Liberation Movement party and the ideologue of this social battle, Shari'ati, gave eclectic revolutionary speeches in Tehran, at a modern religious institute, and successfully attracted different social groups, especially the groups from the middle-class. Shari'ati died just before the revolution, his death was widely attributed to SAVAK, thus provoked the middle-class rallies.

The middle-class people participated extensively in the series of ceremonies for the victims of the regime's bloody repressions, the Shi'i traditional rituals, the nationwide marches and street referendums demanding the Khomeini's return and the removal of the Shah and his last prime minister Bakhtiar.

3) The involvement of the women

In early 1960s, the Provincial Associations' bill was executed as one of the Shah's controversial socio-economic reforms of the White Revolution. Accordingly, the women were entitled to vote. The bill was radically protested by the mullahs and in this way postponed the women's active socio-political presence in the society.

With the crowning of the anti-Shah movement, the women initially had a relative presence and support for the street rallies, as well as a significant active partaking in the leftist and Islamist political and military groups. Nevertheless, by the 1979 victory, they were forcefully repressed by the segregation law in public spheres such as schools, sport places, coastal areas, among others. Then, despite of their potent reaction in a massive unveiled demonstration to the Khomeini's issued decree on the obligatory complete veil, the bring to a standstill Hijab Law was enforced by the very Islamic Consultative Parliament. In the following, we mostly witnessed their theatrical attendance at arranged government religious ceremonies.

4) The sharing of the merchants (bazaar-men)

Before the realization of the Islamic Revolution, the traditional Iranian markets' men were considered as one of the influential groups in the Iranian society, and in bonding with the mullahs were able to play an important role in socio-political upheavals in particular the anti-Shah movement.

The Shah's economic reforms and reorganizations brought a relative economic richness for the bazaar, thus made the bazaar-men socially active. They funded the religious foundations such as mosques, seminaries and Husseiniehs for the Shi'a rituals and ceremonies, and sent the mullahs and preachers regularly towards the distant poor towns and villages. They later, with the peak of the movement, sponsored the massive labor strikes, students and the families of the killed demonstrators.

After the success of the movement, the bazaar's relationship with the government changed to a great extent. This transformation entered them inside the identifiable political community, thereby they lost their historical public face in the Iranian contemporary society.

5) The participation of the intellectuals and students

The dissident intellectuals, poets, students, especially university ones, lawyers and human-rights activists were the first social group that more than any other group invited the Shah openly to engage in a socio-political contest. Accordingly, in the anti-Shah movement, they

presented and posed ideologies, founded political groups, armed and non-armed, Marxist, Islamist and eclectic organizations, published political publications and critical open letters, initiated strikes, planned and participated in demonstrations, meetings and armed rebellions.¹¹⁵⁸ In 1967, emerged the prominent thinker of the Liberation Movement party, Shari'ati. He gave his speeches in Tehran, at a modern religious institute, with SAVAK's implicit consent. In that SAVAK supposed, his ideas could be attractive and tranquilizer to the leftist young generation, in which, the blocked political system of the Shah paved the way for the newly posed ideologies and underground intellectual groups. He by his new re-interpretation of the Shi'i values and history had a profound effect on the revival of Shi'a political thought and represented a revolutionary elucidation of Shi'a as an emancipating ideology. In fact, he pushed the society (students, armed and non-armed leftist groups, religious families, and middle-class) and the regime in the revolutionary hatred cycle.

Consequently, the Guerrilla groups, mostly consisted of students and intellectuals, played the last episode. On February 9th, 1979, when the Imperial Guard tried to repress the air force technicians' uprising at a military base, the guerrilla weaponized the volunteer people and helped the besieged airmen. The next morning, guerrillas, air force men and rebels attacked the police centers and the city's largest arm factory, thus made the regime collapse tangibly conceivable. Furthermore, those students and intellectuals who joined the Khomeini's camp in Paris, made a link between the secular and the religious forces, and convinced Khomeini to more internationally acceptable apply the compound of "Islamic Republic" instead of his previous "Islamic rule".

6) The contribution of the mullahs

The White Revolution, besides the recognition of the Israeli government by the Iranian regime deteriorated the relationship between the mullahs and the Shah. The deterioration divided the mullahs into three, the non-political (the largest), the moderates led by Shari'atmadari, who particularly opposed to the article of the women's suffrage and the land reforms of the Shah's White Revolution (as interrupted endowments of the landowners to the mullahs under the Shari'a), but demanded merely full implementation of the constitutional law, lastly, the young tough dissident mullahs led by Khomeini with a secret network, they began their critical lectures since 1962. As a result of the attempts of the last group of mullahs, in 1963, people protested

¹¹⁵⁸ Ahmad Ashraf and Ali Banuazizi. "CLASS SYSTEM vi. Classes in the Pahlavi Period". Originally published: 1992. Encyclopaedia Iranica. Online edition. 1982. <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/class-system-vi> .

the Shah's plans in the major cities of Iran, which ended in a bloody repression and the Khomeini's exile. This uprising was a rehearsal for the 1979 Revolution. In the late 1960s Khomeini formulated the framework of his political theory in his lectures and published it as "Islamic Governance of Jurist", which was a fundamental change in Usuli Shi'a, based on Velayat-e Faqih theory.

With the other Shah's provocative policies (spending millions of dollars for 2500-year Imperial anniversary celebration and the calendrical system change from the Islamic Hejri to the Imperial) gradually, the moderate and conservative mullahs joined to the Khomeini's camp, and provided him by large financial resources and a vast Shi'a organizational network.

In the meantime, the death of Khomeini's son was widely attributed to SAVAK, this resparked the new series of ceremonies for the 3rd, 7th and in particular 40th days of the bloodsheds (also each dedicated to the commemoration of the victims of the previous ceremonies) was nationwide held, which was an excellent example of the political ideological use of the Shi'a traditional rituals, and provided fabulous opportunities for the mullahs and protesters to gather and exchange oral information and more stimulate their sentiments against the regime.

With the sharp rise of Khomeini's popularity and the climax of the revolutionary passion, his speeches radicalized the idea of incompatibility with the regime and the necessity of the implementation of Islamic rule.

Khomeini was also internationally engaged in a propagandistic campaign, he declared after revolution will supply the West's oil necessities and will not be an ally to the East, thus attracted the Western support.

On 10th January 1979, Khomeini before his return mounted on the wave of demonstrators and formed the Council of Islamic Revolution so as to manipulate direction and speed of the revolutionary upheavals.

In the following we recognized the realization of the ongoing Islamic Shi'i Revolution by the aggressive repressive role of the radical mullahs as a ruling group in upper-class, then the consolidation of this Islamic Republic by the ruling group of mullahs in a moderate role.

7) The part of the ruling and upper-class

The ruling-class of Pahlavi was enjoyed by the most privileged circumstances in comparison to all social groups and classes. In such system, the ruling Shah's regime oppressively bedded the surroundings for an opposition movement. By the 50-50 oil contracts, the Shah and his ruling court indisputably introduced the White Revolution and took the autocratic semi-modernizational

measures, which had significant ramifications for the Iranian social structure and provided the enough raw material for a revolutionary movement.

These economic and social reforms mostly eliminated the landed upper-class, expanded unemployed farmworker, urbanization, urban slums, middle-class and working-class deprived of having the socio-political institutions, such as labor unions, independent newspapers and political parties, thus increased social distance and social tensions. In this social stiffnesses most of the upper-class groups took the side of the ruling regime, thus after the revolution, they fled the country and were replaced by the ruling mullahs and their entourage or high-ranking officials and revolutionary guards.

8) The role of the peasants

Villagers, landowners and peasants as a result of the land reforms and the country's poor transportation system were simply marginalized, thus did not play a sufficiently decisive or important part in the social movements of the contemporary Iranian history.

9) The role of the nomads and tribes

By the coming of the social changes, the lifestyle of the Iranian nomadic population, gradually transformed to a passive form, that involved permanently remaining in one place. The phenomenon of sedentism made the nomadic forces feckless for other investigated social movements in Iran. Also, the urban nature of this movement made the tribal and ethnic forces ineffective.

10) The interest and influence of the external-powers

The role of the external-factors and international relations in this social movement began with the occupation of Iran by the allies (Russia, Britain and the US) during the World War II. The interest and influence of the top three powers ended in the deposal of Reza Shah Pahlavi and the appointment of his son to the throne.

By the Shah's assassination in the University of Tehran, in 1949, the activities of the Soviet-backed Tudeh Party (the chief Iranian communist party) was oppressed.

The interest of the British and their Oil Company was threatened by the Iranian oil nationalization. Afterwards, a CIA-backed coup toppled the national government of Iran and made the US the most influential external-power in the dissatisfactions of different social groups and classes. For instance, the White Revolution and land reforms were sponsored by the

Americans against the possible influence of the Russians on the Iranian working-class and peasants, as well as the conceivable impact of the British on the Iranian landlords and mullahs. Later, the secret police of SAVAK were formed mostly by the American technical cooperation, which did many inflammatory measures in the Iranian society, and in this way provoked the anti-Shah movement.

Through these supports and as a result of the increased oil price and revenues Iran became a regional power, insofar as the Shah threatened the American interests, for instance in 1971 and 1972, Nixon was forced to reduce the exchange rate of dollar to deal with the oil high price. Finally, in the critical phase of the anti-Shah movement, Jimmy Carter in his 1976 presidential election campaign, the Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, as well as the United Nations affiliated International League for Human Rights condemned each the violations of human rights in Iran.

On the other side, Khomeini who was entitled to accommodate in France, declared that after revolution will supply the West's oil necessities and will not be an ally to the East, thus Carter supported him. It was possibly the end of the unconditional support of the Shah from Washington.

Consequently, on 4th-7th January 1979, in the Guadalupe Island, the four influential leaders of West Germany, France, Britain and the United States drew conclusion "the sooner the Shah left Iran the better".

11) To form a coalition

To form a coalition among the opposition groups of the revolutionary anti-Shah movement is recognized as one of the crucial sufficient factors.

The regime's oppressive measures, that in particular debilitated the dissident intellectual groups, besides its provocative policies, gradually, made the moderate and conservative mullahs to join to the Khomeini's camp, and provided him by large financial resources and a vast Shi'a organizational network, backed by the bazaar-men. Then, the Khomeini's popularity successfully attracted a broad companionship of the social forces. Via his camp in Paris, the link between the secular moderates and the religious forces was completely restored and the possibility of other options between "Islamic Republic" and Monarchy was eliminated.

In any case, after the realization of the revolution, as a result of the US embassy's occupation, the interim Islamized national liberal government of Bazargan resigned. In this way, this interim coalition was distorted, and the revolutionary moderators and mediators, who were truly crucial for Khomeini to form a wide coalition of the incompatible social groups in the climax of the

revolutionary phase, were set aside by the extremists, that possessed the highest expectations from the revolutionary engine.

12) The passivity of the coercive power

The lack of violent repression and the passive demonstration of strongarm in the highpoint of this movement is measured as the ending vital sufficient condition.

When, in the final phase of the anti-Shah revolutionary movement Carter and the international organizations for human rights condemned the violations of human rights in Iran, the Shah, who did not want to lose the image of a leading reformist, reflexively showed a positive answer. Accordingly, he to deal with the crisis gave numerous concessions, amnestied as many as prisoners, allowed the Red Cross to visit the prisons and promised to hold the civil court instead of the court-martial, pull out the military forces from the universities and permitted the old parties to reorganize.

Finally, by the nationwide marches demanding the Shah's removal and the Khomeini's return, besides the paralyzing strikes, the Shah's psychological state collapsed and he submissively announced from TV that he had caught the revolutionary message, and sometime later left the country to Cairo, apparently for a short relaxation.

13) The outcomes

Notwithstanding, the occasional presence of the necessary conditions in the relatively operational case of the anti-Shah Movement, the presence of the formation of an inclusive coalition among the opposition forces, the influence of the external-powers, besides the lack of the regime's brutal pressing repression in the climax phase of the revolutionary movement as the sufficient conditions, made an inevitable revolutionary outcome for the whole process.

The regime collapse replaced the 2500-year-old Monarchy by a kind of Mullarchy system, the power fell into the hands of the committees, run by the local Khomeini-oriented mullahs, foundations, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, volunteer militia of Basij, which all tried to enforce the new order and restore the law courts of Shari'a.

Accordingly, a period of terror and execution was associated with the religious prohibitions (alcoholic beverages, free sexual relationship and Hijab, gambling, many periodical publications and cultural works...) based on the Khomeini's orders, spontaneous measures of the radical forces and indeed the Shari'a courts' support.

Internationally, a sweeping revolutionary hard-mouthed group occupied the US embassy in Tehran and triggered the Iranian international isolation. The occupation also prompted the

moderators' removal by the extremists who possessed the highest expectations from the revolutionary locomotive. Then, Islamic Republic applied the IRGC special force of Quds and its regional proxies to fulfill its policies.

Despite the fact that the first Persian 1906 constitution was subjected to a 1907 Islamic supplement, it was never considered as a mere Islamic constitution, absolutely based on the Shari'a law. By the 1979 revolution, the circumstances for the representation of the phenomenon of the Islamic constitution and the supremacy of the theocratic Shari'a law was best understood. Accordingly, a constitution was proposed on Velayat-e Faqih, a radical transformation of the traditional Shi'ism theory and its exercise of authority. It also included an appendix backed by the Quranic verses and quotations. A body of religious experts as the Council of Guardian were appointed in charge of checking the Islamicity and constitutionality of the country's parliamentary legislative procedures and laws.

The democratic and autocratic characteristics of such constitutional system provided a type of synergetic interplay through both the legal elected levels and the theocratic authorities. In this synergism, the supreme leader or the Valy-e Faqih and his affiliated groups possessed a deterministic convincing gift.

11.3. Class-based causal factors of the Green Movement

The Green awakening movement initially was run by the Mousavi's electoral campaign comprised of the critic active university students and professors before the 2009 presidential election. It widened shortly after the announcement of the election's result, in which urban protesters including some dissatisfied mullahs and upper-class, middle-class, intellectuals, students, women and working-class with a relative strong presence demanded the legal nullification of the election as they believed, the official electoral result was fraudulent.

1) The role of the working-class

Apparently, the various groups of the working-class participated faintly in the 2009 social uprising and movement, as in this course they never demonstrated their union and social justice demands and mottoes. In reality, they confidently contributed to this social collective collaboration in companionship with other protesters of the election's result, as fundamentally this protest rotated around the general socio-political issues, such as active suffrage in public and political election, citizens' rights and freedoms.

In any case, these seemingly scant joined working-class groups perceived the circumstances appropriate for pursuing their joint goals.

2) The role of the middle-class

In the electoral process, the creation of expectation for change and freedom among a large number of the desperate middle-class, induced them to support the first demonstrations in response to the election's result, in Tehran and other big cities. Accordingly, the middle-class was the chief active ingredients of this spontaneous movement, in particular in big towns and cities. These middle-class active social forces best considered the occasion to realize the nation's historic demands for a democratic civil society, thus tracked the social uprisings. They were equipped by the modern social networks to call and join the gatherings and protests. Their released shocking footages of the violent crackdowns generated the more intense popular sentiments. Subsequently, some millions held some massive street rallies, besides the night chanting slogans on the roofs. Consequently, the increased cost of the demonstrations, diminished their peaceful non-violent participation in this movement.

3) The involvement of the women

The necessity for change in the Islamic Republic's gender political culture was addressed during the tenth presidential electoral campaign. The wives of the two reformist candidates of the presidency attracted the participation of the Iranian women from different social groups and classes.

After the first 8th March under the Islamic Republic supremacy, the protest against the compulsory hijab, the repeal of the Family Protection Law and the deprivation of women of judgeship in the Shari'a courts, the women were able to reraise their liberal issues and demands, as a minimum for establishment of the independent women's associations. They by considering the legal openings, saw the situation suitable for chasing their demands of changing political legal circumstances.

In the massive peaceful rallies, they participated alongside men. During the crackdowns some were killed, wounded and arrested. Neda Agha-Soltan was one of these women. She was a young student, that became an iconic hero, as her death during a protest was videoed and distributed worldwide on the Net. Clashes erupted after her death.

By the heavy repressions and killings, the women protesters backed home and contributed to the roofs' chanting slogans.

Roughly six years after the silence of the Green movement, the Iranian women revived the old Iranian feminist movement. Since 2017 they started a new protest as “the Girls of Revolution Street”, with the goal of abolition of compulsory veil and hijab related laws. Their protest initiated a new series of nation-wide men and women anti-Islamic regime protests.

4) The sharing of the merchants (bazaar-men)

The merchants, as a result of their role in realization of the Islamic Republic in companionship with mullahs, changed to a great extent. They became conservative and simply supportive to mullah ruling-class, thereby they lost their historical public role in the Iranian contemporary movements.

5) The participation of the intellectuals and students

General orientation and direction, to some extent was the role of the middle-class urban groups of intellectuals and elites. For this reason, the regime forces repeatedly attacked to the universities and dormitories. Many university professors, teachers, students, intellectuals and journalists were beaten, tortured, arrested and some were killed.

They initiated and organized the pacific marches of silence, published statements, promoted the new strategies by forming smaller and more dispersed demonstrations as a result of increasing the costs of the clashes.

They via the social networks peacefully encouraged the movement towards the democratic ideals and open political space. Although, this method was the best to fascinate the urban middle-class groups, they failed to attract different social groups and classes from the rural areas, smaller towns, cities and provinces.

Their announcements of solidarity with the Arab Spring revolutionary movements, made the regime to block the circumstances for the continuation of the networked Green movement. From then on, the Green Movement became a Fire under the ashes of the democracy movement in contemporary Iranian history.

6) The contribution of the mullahs

Under the Islamic Shi'i sovereignty predominantly the mullahs converted into a ruling group in upper-class, as a result they had a largely aggressive repressive part for this social movement. Merely, some reformist and occasionally independent mullahs, who were critic of a decade of a new form of ruling by Ahmadinejad and his held presidential election and reappointment, based on the evidence from the Committee for the Safeguarding of Votes, expressed their objection to

the election fraud. For instance, the Association of Combatant Mullahs, after the announcement of the result, called it as an electoral engineering and requested for its nullification, two high ranked moderate mullahs condemned the violence against the protesters. The reformist mullah, Karroubi (one of the two opposed candidates) revealed that the detainees had been subjected to torture, including rape, and otherwise were ill-treated, and demanded an investigation.

In response the Interior ministry rejected the application of Association of Combatant Mullahs for a rally permit. The supreme leader and the radical mullahs of the Guardian Council also unlike to the conventional procedure, quickly confirmed the validity of the election.

Consequently, the radicals who were totally frightened of the Arab Spring and its democratic dominoes, called for the execution of two opposed reformist candidates as the so-called organizers and leaders of the movement, and clicked their house arrest and the retreat of the reformist mullahs.

7) The part of the ruling and upper-class

Under the Islamic dominion, similar to the dominant atmosphere over the other contemporary Iran's social movements, the ruling and upper-class are benefited by the most advantaged circumstances in comparison to all social groups and classes. In an upper level, the Green movement was born out of a political crack between the reformist and the radical fundamentalist repressive factions of the ruling regime.

Some of the modernist religious groups and forces of the upper-class, but not necessarily presently affiliated with the ruling regime, were critic of the current order and policies. These marginalized forces had different motives and were in favor of a reduction of power in the governing system, especially the Guardian Council, the militias and Islamic Revolutionary Guards, besides the authority of the supreme leader. They by presenting a different interpretation of the Islamic Republic and the foundations of the government's legitimacy, considered the continuation of the current process as dangerous for the system and the Islamic revolutionary ideals, thus invoked a reparticipation in the central governing.

In the early stages of the movement, the companionship of these dissatisfied groups was evident, but by increasing the cost of the opposition, their participation substantially plunged.

The symbolic characters of these forces were from the families and affiliates of Khomeini (former supreme leader), Rafsanjani (former president), Khatami (former president), Mousavi (former prime minister and the main opposed presidential candidate), among others.

8) The role of the peasants

The peasants were already castrated as a result of the Pahlavi's land reforms and could not play a sufficiently acceptable part in the Iranian contemporary social movements.

9) The role of the nomads

By the coming of the social changes, the lifestyle of the Iranian nomadic population, gradually transformed to a passive form, that involved permanently remaining in one place. The phenomenon of sedentism made the nomadic forces incompetent for the modern communal movements. Also, the urban nature of this movement made the tribal and ethnic forces ineffective.

10) The interest and influence of the external-powers

In relation to the sufficient factor of the influence of the super-powers in the Iranian contemporary social movements, before the Islamic revolution, the Shah had a respectable upright political deal with the democratic and pro-Human Rights countries. Although, this type of international relation could constructively provide support for his rule, by the same token in the highpoint of the revolts bounded his possibilities, on the Human Rights' values and trapped him in the Ritterian "iron cage of liberalism",¹¹⁵⁹ that made him passive to be utilized by his prerogative coercive power. Apparently, the Islamic Republic so as not to be trapped in such attachment, from the very beginning cut its bonds with the US, reduced relationship with the EU and refused to fully behead to such an international deal as Universal Human Rights.

In any case, the international events were also to some extent influential on this social event. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the velvet-color revolutions in 1990s made the regime to promote the reform discourse, which ended in the birth of the Green Movement and a wide divergence between the reformists and the fundamentalists.

In the process of the protests, the EU embassies in Tehran hosted the Iranian wounded protesters, and summoned the Iranian ambassadors in their countries. As a result of such frictions, the British Embassy staff were arrested by the Iranian security forces. The EU in response warned the Islamic Republic to avoid the intimidation of its diplomats.

The Human Rights Committee of the UN General Assembly in a resolution condemned the violent repression of the demonstrations by the Islamic regime. Simultaneously, the protests at the human rights violations in Iran were held in over 100 cities around the world. These supports

¹¹⁵⁹ See Ritter. *Iron Cage of Liberalism: International Politics and Unarmed Revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa.*

though small allowed the regime to affiliate the civil non-violent demonstrations to the Western countries and accuse the opposition and protesters as the “pawns of the West”.¹¹⁶⁰

The Arab spring domino was the last international factor on this protest movement, that preeminently alarmed and influenced the ruling radical mullahs so as to heavily suppress the Green social movement.

11) To form a coalition

A disagreement over a rigid alternative for the Islamic regime among the reformists and pro-overthrowing forces, the house arrest of the two protesting reformist candidates (with their wives), and in general the severely repression of the protesters made the Green Movement incapable to attract an overall support and companionship to create a comprehensive allied movement, comprised of the various opposition forces.

12) The passivity of the coercive power

The intense bloody repressive measures, such as direct firing into crowds, attacking cars, breaking into houses, attacking universities and dormitories at night, torturing, raping and murdering detainees and prisoners, stealing wounded and killed people even from the hospitals, among others during the Green Movement, prevented the realization of this vital sufficient condition.

13) The outcomes

To end, in the abortive case of 2009, with the persistence of strengthening the element of legal electoral fairness via the constitutional capacities, there were the occasional presence of the necessary conditions, besides the lack of sufficient conditions, namely a fluctuating fragile support of the international community, an absence of a rigid allied alternative for the regime, accompanied with the regime’s extreme pressing coercive violent power, in particular in the climax phase of the movement.

The only outcome of such repressed collective action was in the people’s perspective to reject at least the political religious reforms via the legal methods. This consequence paved the way towards further networked radical unrests, which were clearly depicted in two new ongoing uprisings from below, firstly, in the original protests of the feminist movement as the Girls of Revolution Street (2017-) so as to express “No” to the Islamic Shari’a-based compulsory hijab,

¹¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 207.

secondly, in the series of anti-Islamic Republic protests (2017-), with deconstructive slogans, such as “they made stairway of Islam and made the people desperate”,¹¹⁶¹ and unlawful revolutionary practices, similar to attacking and firing the offices of Imams of Friday Prayer¹¹⁶² or the representatives of the Velayat-e-Faqih, which are religiously contemplated as “sacred”. These circumstances demonstrate a beginning not the end of the protesting movements, as the innovative constitutional Shari’a-based principle of Velayat-e-Faqih does not easily tolerate political legal changes, and reforms under such religious republic.

¹¹⁶¹ The Editors of Radio Farda. “52 people were arrested at a protest rally in Mashhad”. Radio Farda. Online edition. December 29, 2017. <https://www.radiofarda.com/a/arrest-mashhad-protest-against-high-price/28944528.html> .

¹¹⁶² According to the Shi’a Islam, in the absence of the infallible Imam, Imams of Friday Prayer are considered as individuals related to the 12th hidden Imam or to the person who is appointed by him.

12. Ordinal Comparison

The emphasis of the ordinal technique is also on the notion of causality, based on the necessary and sufficient causes. Such table of data is constructed on the Fuzzy analysis, principally a mathematical logic to check the asymmetrical relationships with significant variances (of causal factors), not to examine the symmetrical relationships with statistical functions.¹¹⁶³

The ordinal Fuzzy-based evaluation, on the one hand allows this study to estimate the degree to which a factor is influential over the formation of a single social movement, on the other hand agrees a grading form for the amount of the consequences or transformations of each social movement in the investigated society.

*Table 6. Ordinal Comparison: Ranking of Factors and Changes**

Cases		Social Movements in Contemporary Iran	Constitutional Movement	Anti-Shah Movement	Green Movement
Causal Factors	Necessary Conditions	Role of working-class	3	4	2
		Role of middle-class	4	4	4
		Involvement of women	2	3	3
		Sharing of merchants (bazaar-men)	4	4	1
		Participation of intellectuals & students	4	4	4
		Contribution of mullahs	3	4	2
		Part of ruling & upper-class	2	2	2
		Role of peasants	2	1	1
		Role of nomads & tribes	3	1	1
	Sufficient Conditions	Interest & influence of external-powers	4	4	2
		To form a coalition	4	4	1
		Passivity of coercive power	4	4	1
	Changes	Religious changes	2	4	2
Legal changes		4	4	1	
Political changes		3	4	1	

* The ordinal scores (1: Least, 4: Most) are regulated on the extracted data from the class role-based analysis of the investigated social movements.

¹¹⁶³ Cintula, Fermüller and Noguera. "Fuzzy Logic". <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-fuzzy/>. The Editors of Encyclopedia of Mathematics. "Non-precise data". https://www.encyclopediaofmath.org/index.php/Non-precise_data. The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Fuzzy logic". <https://www.britannica.com/science/fuzzy-logic>.

As is shown, inside this comparative ordinal table, the ranking of the role of the different social groups and classes including working-class, middle-class, women, merchant, intellectual and student, mullah, ruling and upper-class, peasant and nomad as necessary conditions are introduced. Then the amount of the passive display of pressing or coercive power, the coalition of opposition groups and the international relation and Influence as the sufficient circumstances for the success of the Iranian contemporary social movements are denoted. Finally, the expanse and spread of the legal, religious and political changes in each case of Constitutional Movement, the anti-Shah Movement and the Green Movement are signified.

Chapter IV. Conclusion

13. Conclusion

13. Conclusion

The ancient Persian civilization across the Iranian plateau has evolved considerably over its thousands of years of recorded history, from early cultures and empires towards a predominantly urbanized and Islamized society under an Islamic Republic. Its contemporary oppressed populations have been more than a century engaged with different types of social movements to realize a way of change and democracy. The three recent decisive ones are the Reformative Green Social Movement 2009, the Revolutionary Anti-Shah Social Movement resulted in 1979 Revolution, and the Constitutional Movement in 1905. Pretty captivatingly, despite the religious, legal and political implications for these collective movements, they have all either confronted or been seriously challenged by the very unique concerns of Islamic Shari'a or its bearers, the social group of mullahs.

The first was the Constitutional Movement, which primarily sought to establish a House of Justice and put forward the first constitution to Persia. In this course, the skeptical interpretation of the leaders over the place of the Shari'a in governance, besides their unfamiliarity with the notions of democracy and its socio-political and legal implications did not explicitly necessitate the supreme sovereignty of people over the country's political system. Furthermore, as in this movement and its constitution the social civil rights, in particular women and family relations laws (including marriage, divorce, inheritance and child custody) were not explicitly addressed, a contradiction remained between the goals of the tyrannical monarchists accompanied with the Islamist fundamentalists and the demands of the supporters of democracy and the rule of law. Nonetheless, the Constitutional Movement and Revolution, with its shortcomings and ambiguities, laid the foundations for subsequent social movements in Iran.

In the intervening time, arose the next Iranian challenge to change, the nationalization of oil industry in 1951. This movement can be credited as one of the first democratic movements in the Middle East, which in turn was a separate preliminary and preparatory phase for the 1970s revolutionary movement. Although, its main goal was the dispossession of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (the today's British Petroleum Company) from the Iranian oil resources and refusing the British colonial political influence, its other fundamental objective was the establishment of a political system that could respond to the contemporary people's demands and provision of legal, political, civil, and social rights and freedoms.

In the way of achieving such goals, two groups of ideological activists acted truly unconstructively. The first group was the Tudeh party (the Iranian main communist party), which its members, and especially its leaders, considered the democracy as a phenomenon of petty

bourgeois. Their major mission was to create a system that under the hegemony of the Soviet Union could help to expand the communist camp. The second were the religious forces, who in various degrees pursued the creation of an Islamic rule that could replace the monarchy.

As a matter of fact, in the decade after the World War II, the Iranian society was not so much prepared so as to establish a political democratic change, in its true sense. Only a minority of the people had the ability to read and write, and a large part of the population in rural areas was more or less influenced by the landowners, the tribal elders and the mullahs. Lastly, the dominance of the traditional, conventional and religious values over the society prevented the collapse of the patriarchal system (as the reproducer of tyranny) in Persia.

With the disappointments of the oil nationalization due to the various external and internal factors, a large part of the intellectuals who believed in the ideals of the Iranian National Front (the pioneer party in the nationalization of oil) turned back not only from the constitutional monarchism and parliamentarism, but also from the democratic ideals. They deemed the fall of the Mosaddeq's national government, merely as a result of the plots of the Western super-powers, especially the British and American states. Their frustration with the monarchy was to a degree that they completely denied the partial progressive achievements of this system in the economic spheres, and opposed it hand in hand with the non-democratic and even anti-democratic forces, including the extreme leftists and the newly born bipolar eclectic political revolutionaries (Islamist-leftist).

There were several reasons behind the emergence and growth of such eclectic tendencies of the revolutionary Left and political Islam. Unquestionably, one of the main factors can be found in the infirmities and defeats of the democratic movement of constitution and the nationalization of oil. Another factor was once again Tudeh party and its leftist discourse, which directly or indirectly influenced any active opposition group of the period. Ultimately, the emergence of the religious intellectuals such as Ali Shari'ati with their particular revolutionary perspectives and interpretations had an undeniable effect on the growth of the eclectic anti-democratic tendencies, and therefore opened the way for the growth of the religious fundamentalist forces and the radical legal rule of Shari'a law in Iran.

On the other side, the onset of the land reforms in the early 1960s or what the Shah called "the White Revolution", in turn developed the hostility of the religious fundamentalist leaders versus the monarchy. Khomeini played a crucial role in intensifying this animosity, particularly with the implementation of the women's rights and freedoms. The promotion of the Western values and symbols in Iran and the deepening of the Shah's political, economic and military relations with the United States were also the other effective factors in raising the wave of opposition from the

fundamentalist mullahs' side. In this way, the opposition to the monarchy not only did not lead to the emergence of a democratic movement, but also pushed the society to a sort of radicalism. Insofar as, nearly two decades after the reactionary uprisings of the mullahs in the first half of the 1960s, by the 1979 revolution, the Iranian society underwent a deep and massive crisis. The religious fundamentalist leaders, especially Khomeini, took advantage of the Shah's hasty development policies and opposed the regime, and therefore preempted the foundations and possibilities for a democratic revolution in favor of an Islamic Republic.

The fact was that, none of the supporters of this revolution, including the eclectic radical groups, except for a small group of national liberals, did not truly want to secure the rights and freedom of the people or a relatively acceptable democracy.

By the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Khomeini propagated a political animosity against the Western countries, especially the United States and its allies in the Middle East. This hostility, besides a sort of siege mentality isolated the Islamic Republic within the eight-year war. After the war, with the high inflation rate and decline in purchasing power, the corruption became more widespread and involved the major sectors of the economy. As a result of such circumstances, only a small fraction of society remained in the form of radical revolutionary in the organizations such as Basij to defend the mullahs' programs and ambitions. Predominately, the regime's relentless financial assistance, privileges and immunities to this portion of the society has been the major motive for the continuity of such radical support.

In the meantime, the global social changes, especially in the field of education, technology and communication opened out a discourse of critical thinking towards the republic Shari'a-based system (in particular among the young generation). Hereupon, it can be argued that some sections of the society at least no longer regarded the Islamic fundamentalism as a solution to the various social, economic, legal and political problems, and ultimately demanded the establishment of a rather democratic state.

While, during the Arab Spring, in many Muslim countries of the region, the oppositions against the corrupt and authoritarian governments searched a solution in identitarian Muslim fundamentalist movements, it seems in Iran most opponents and critics of the regime did not pursue such reactionism anymore. For instance, in a careless and haphazard way, in both important Iranian social events of the past decades, the Student Protests in 1999 (a peaceful protest against the closure of a reformist newspaper) and the Green Movement in 2009 (with the motto of "where is my vote"), the ideas of legality and democracy were demonstrated, cultivated and trailed through the normative outfits.

In this new setup, by the transformation of the traditional patriarchal family system, the charismatic, traditional and religion-based authority and leadership do not sound attractive anymore. Accordingly, the central figures in the Student Protests and the Green Movement had never played the role of the traditional political or religious leaders, and mostly were credited as they opposed their former revolutionary colleagues. They believed that some reforms could be achieved by applying legal mechanisms and constitutional potential, including periodic elections. However, the result of such elections in this quasi-polity merely wasted the position of the reformists.

Such an objectivity is fully understandable via the comprehension of the fake reality of the constitution of the Islamic Republic. This constitution has discriminately seized a legitimate sovereignty and is not capable to confine the arbitrary application of the authoritarian sources of power. Accordingly, all the formal hierarchical outfits, such as the Guardian Council and its candidacy arrangements are not apparently able to facilitate the reflection of the majority of voters' opinion.

In any case, despite of the demise of the Reformative Green Movement and its failure to provide the society by lawful, just and impartial elections, it paved the way towards further networked, side by side, men and women radical protests. The first was a reformative feminist movement with the aim of removing the compulsory hijab and promoting the legal and social gender equality, where there are divorce right exclusively for men, children custody for men only, women's permission for working and traveling is under men's control, men's share of inheritance is twice of the women, the testimony of two women in a court is equal to one man's testimony, among other Shari'a-based gender discriminations.

After the start of the Persian girls' hijab mutation (2017), a new series of national wide public revolutionary protests was clicked against the regime's oppression, inflation, corruption, unemployment, and interventions in other countries' affairs. The scope of these protests swiftly went beyond these problems and reached to an opposition to the political system of the mullahs, especially against the principle of Velayat-e Faqih and its official Khamenei, and finally to end the religious tyranny. The ground-breaking deconstructive practices and slogans demonstrated a sort of hatred of the Islamic Republic among the protesters.

Contrary to the Green movement's supporters, who were mostly among the Tehran's educated middle-class, these rallies followed by not only middle-class, the students and the women but predominately by the poor, the unemployed and the working-class, as their main concerns were everyday economic problems.

Although, it was not possible to estimate the number of protesters, the number of arrest people was significant, and at least tens of murdering cases in streets and several cases in custody were reported. In this respect, Amnesty International, in a report on the human rights situation in Iran, named 2018, as “year of shame” for the Islamic regime.¹¹⁶⁴

During these massive demonstrations a lot of political and religious buildings throughout the country were attacked, which depicted not only a type of anti-religious sentiments among the protesters, but in addition the inapplicability of the Shi'i traditions and rituals for the new Iranian protest movements. Furthermore, in the course of these protests, a slogan to hold a “Referendum” was promoted. Such a potential has a degree of constitutional and societal bases to follow. In order to find a way to reduce the cost of change, referendum is one of the most solid legal concepts. In the constitution of the Islamic Republic this right is one of the few rights not recognized in one article, but in several different Arts. 6, 59, 99, 110, 123, 132 and 177.¹¹⁶⁵ In accordance, there is no doubt that this regime to prosper and approach to a true elective republic unavoidably requires reconsideration or a referendum, a legal right and one of the ways of administering that public issues can be referred to.

Despite the fact that, resistance to change through a free referendum (especially under international supervision) seems realistic in the practical structure of the Islamic Republic's power, this can be realized in a special process and circumstances. In that apparently, the challengers and activists are waiting for opportunities in street ventures.

Accordingly, as regards such social goings-on, also still, this different look can be addressed among the presented solutions facing the contemporary Iranian society and its crises. This alternative solution can be neither a revolutionary movement to overthrow the government (fundamentalism) nor a reformative movement to consolidate it (reformism), but a constitutional quest (constitutionalism) to reform the document that is the foundation of this Islamic Republic. With some success in the negotiations over Islamic Republic's nuclear ambitions or so-called Iran nuclear deal (2015), hopes raised for the US and Iran reconciliation and its international, political and economic consequences. The hopes were gone, when the United States withdrew from the deal or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.¹¹⁶⁶ This withdrawal resulted in many economic hardships for the entire system. The Islamic Republic inevitably conveyed these

¹¹⁶⁴ The Editors of Amnesty International. “Iran's ‘year of shame’: More than 7,000 arrested in chilling crackdown on dissent during 2018”. <https://www.amnestyusa.org/press-releases/irans-year-of-shame-more-than-7000-arrested-in-chilling-crackdown-on-dissent-during-2018/> .

¹¹⁶⁵ Iran Constitution 1979. <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000.html> .

¹¹⁶⁶ Heather Kerrigan (ed.). Historic Documents of 2018. California: SAGE reference, CQ Press. 2019. p. 289.

adversities to the Iranian society and its influenced territories. For example, it drastically increased the gasoline price. This forcing up overpricing sparked many unrests (November 15th, 2019). Protesters by burning the pictures of the supreme Twelver Shi'a Marja' and leader (Khamenei), attacked and set fire on hundreds of banks, petrol stations, security and religious bases, among others. They called for a termination on the Islamic Republic and the return of Reza Cyrus Pahlavi (1960-),¹¹⁶⁷ the exiled son of the former king of Iran.

In reaction, Khamenei this time ordered the top officials to do whatever to stop the protests. Based on such ambiguous decree, as always, the radicalized devotees, who believed, the protesters aimed to topple the Islamic regime, registered the bloodiest crackdown, since the establishment of the Islamic Republic (at least 1500 murders within two weeks).¹¹⁶⁸

Along with these unrests, an unavoidable reduction in the financial supports to the regional Shi'ite militias (Islamic Republic's proxies) ended in the erupted unprecedented demonstrations against the Islamic Republic's regional destructive role, particularly in the Shi'i towns and cities of both Iraq and Lebanon. These socio-political upheavals simply indicated the failure of the regime to extend its religious and political hegemony into a prosperous socio-economic perspective.¹¹⁶⁹ All in all, these domestic and regional shattering records demonstrated a sort of malfunction in this investigated structure of power, which in turn will subsequently deepen the social rifts and stir constitutional pursuits and social movements.

The oppressive calamitous events narrated that for the most part there were no premeditated clear plans by the leaders of the Islamic Republic to launch disaster. Socio-organizationally, the ambivalent and open (to more than one interpretation) verbal or written, Shari'a- or non-Shari'a-based decrees of the spiritual leaders facilitated the radical retaliatory initiative from below within the ranks of the Islamic revolutionary regime, an informal transition of power from the central to the individual authorities. Then, these forces acted reactionarily based on the circumstances. Predominately, radical religious leaders implicitly and explicitly criticized the moderate policies and encouraged the radical supporters and forces to act autonomously in self-determined emergency circumstances, especially, during the social protests.

¹¹⁶⁷ D. L. Bradley (ed.). Dictionary of Iran: A Shorter Encyclopedia. Lulu.com. 2015. p. 567.

¹¹⁶⁸ Michael Georgy, Cassell Bryan-Low and Jason Szep (eds.). "Special Report: Iran's leader ordered crackdown on unrest - 'Do whatever it takes to end it'". Reuters. Online edition. December 23, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-protests-specialreport/special-report-irans-leader-ordered-crackdown-on-unrest-do-whatever-it-takes-to-end-it-idUSKBN1YR0QR> .

¹¹⁶⁹ Hanin Ghaddar. "Iran Is Losing the Middle East, Protests in Lebanon and Iraq Show". Foreign Policy. Online edition. October 22, 2019. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/22/iran-losing-middle-east-iraq-lebanon-protests-bad-governance/> .

The inducement of such orders encouraged polycratic ruling and hugely chaotic circumstances with an unclarity of responsibility and confusion that therefore more pragmatically than ideologically attracted the leaders and senior mullahs' contentment and peace of mind. On the other side, a type of contest is promoted among the subordinates and devotees so as to keep the superordinates away from any type of feasible distress or anxiety. Subsequently, in practical turn of events, the final decision-making elements, who do not function within a legal transparency of order, but through a highly decentralized context are virtually obliged to functionalistically take more radical possibilities, just to avoid the probable troubles and inconveniences (versus the superiors in status).

In all narrated catastrophic cases of the political prisoners' mass executions, the dissident intellectuals' chain murders, the serial acid attackings on the not properly veiled women, the prolonged Baha'is' persecutions, the unjust violence in the 1990s protests, the oppression on the Green movement protests and its aftermath the treatment of the aggregative-radicalized affiliated elements of the regime could be described as fire at will arbitrary measures.

These aggregative-radicalized officials or non-officials bottom-up either bypassed the law or undertook the Shari'a law enforcement without legal authority. Some of these elements throughout their assigned power overdid in the way of implementing the issued authoritative but not compulsory commands, thus did their best to execute the most via an efficient self-induced-radicalized process. They were self-persuaded to leastwise in the gray zones of legality fully fulfill their parts and therefore reached an extremity in abnormality (in the absence of feeling guilty, solely accountable to God). Accordingly, the entire process can be interpreted as an organizational mechanism of cumulative self-radicalization. This procedure of measures has provided the regime a plausible deniability to respond to the raised questions about its legal and international accountability.

In any case, the implemented policies in such system have organizationally caused overlapping and occasional contending among the related but at the same time segregated power centers (Ministry of Intelligence, Islamic Revolutionary Guards, Imams of Friday Prayer, foundations and bureaucratic bodies), each of which on the one hand pursuing their self-promoted agendas, on the other hand seeking to strengthen the regional strategic depth of the regime. Thus, this appraisal depicts, how the Islamic Republic as the constitutional heir to the 1907 Shari'a-based Constitutional Supplement of the 1900s Constitutional movement, the direct outcome of the 1970s revolutionary social movement, as well as the contentious and repressive force against the Green reformist social movement has an anti-totalitarian not a totalitarian executive entity made up not of one unified, but several diverse pillars held by its leaders' arrangement.

Theoretically, as the productivity of the theory of ordinary organizations is examined in this work, it is clarified that the religious superordinates, as the ideologues to implement their policies inevitably require recruiting from ordinary people who are not necessarily well-guided by the ideological deliberations. Hence, the paramilitary organization of Basij is mostly included by the young naive unemployed groups, plain parents, neighbors and average individuals from simple non-military professions, not particular individuals who are prepared to obey within the zone of indifference. This evaluation proposes the recognition and analysis of the other normal organizational systems, particularly those which apparently intentionally encourage the self-radicalization in order to achieve functional consequences.

As regards the elaborated process of decentralization of power (Leopold Neumann and Raul Hilberg), the organizational progressive self-radicalization of the forces (Hans Mommsen) and the fact that the religious leaders to implement their oppressive policies recruit from normal people (Stefan Kühl), an analytical focus on the both lower and higher levels, an intentionalist-functional amalgamation approach (Hans Mommsen and Raul Hilberg) is suggested by this research for investigating the similar cases.

As an implication, this regional contribution to knowledge, is utilized by a systematic efficient method, thus, it fundamentally, leaves broad areas for future research in this domain. Although, this explanatory comparative investigation explored for the most part the religious, legal and political changes throughout the unique timed placed historical events (the contemporary Iranian social movements), its theoretical and methodological general frameworks are generalizable so as to analyze and complete knowing about other similar complicated cases, including social reformative, revolutionary and constitutional movements, ideological and religious structures, anti-totalitarian or supposedly totalitarian organizational systems, among others.

Finally, as an ultimate point to address, this work has also clarified the construct of religious republic in connection to the fundamentalism, thus it opens way for unfolding the other comparable amalgamated states, however, a pure religious fascistic case or a caliphate (e.g., Saudi-Arabia), a state without any republican constitutional element is not suggested.

The last implication is that, this research began with the hope that it would be extended to other cases, particularly those Middle Eastern cases. Applying this comparative framework to them would be productive indeed. Its models are very much built based on the information and access to the Iranian cases. Based on my knowledge of the regional cases, an enhancement would be a perfect way to test whether the mechanism is valid in conditions that are slightly different.

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